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I find the implications of tomorrow’s information society and the advancement of the 
latest technologies capable of infringing upon the right to privacy and individual liberty 
extremely relevant. As a result, I decided to write a PhD dissertation on the subject. 
The discourse in privacy and technology is a legal and political issue, and is more 
and more a matter of international relations and human rights law. The interplay be-
tween politics, ethics, social issues and technology/technological development is a 
growing phenomenon. Recent examples of the intersection of (international) politics, 
law, technology and privacy involve the Passenger Name Record (PNR) dispute be-
tween the US and EU, the potential widespread deployment of body scanners and the 
clash between the European Parliament and EU Council of Ministers over the US-EU 
SWIFT agreement.1
Privacy is a fundamental human right, and deserves just as much attention as any 
other human right. While there are certainly more grave human rights violations across 
the globe, particularly in Asia and Africa, here in the West, predominantly in the US and 
the UK, the threat upon the right to privacy and liberty thereof at the hands of those who 
control advanced technology is and will remain the story of the early 21st Century. This 
is true, I argue, even in the midst of other highly significant and pressing matters, such 
as the global fight against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, environmen-
tal disasters and the ongoing global economic crisis. Indeed, as technology increasingly 
advances, in terms of its capabilities in intruding upon privacy, collecting and analyz-
ing personal data and conducting mass surveillance, I believe the right to privacy will 
equally become more and more significant. 
It is perhaps during crises, particularly as a result of a major terrorist attack, that 
governments (and citizens) are more likely inclined to support the further development 
and deployment of technologies capable of safeguarding security. And, in a post-9/11 
world, this has indeed occurred. However, the same technologies are often also capable 
of seriously intruding upon privacy and other civil liberties.
It is important to note that I am certainly not against technology, nor against govern-
ments using technology. This PhD dissertation does not serve to scaremonger. On the 
1  The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) manages a global network for exchanging 
financial messages necessary for facilitating the execution of payment orders/transactions between financial institutions. 
The US-EU SWIFT agreement allows for the transfer of SWIFT transaction information from the EU to the US.
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contrary, it serves to point out both the wanted benefits and unwanted privacy threats of 
the latest technologies and recommend how to prevent those threats. I am a technology 
enthusiast and a supporter of the vast number of digital services available, from Twitter 
to Google.  I also especially recognize the infinite possibilities and benefits of technol-
ogy for society and its well-being. Indeed, for example, the advancement of ICT can 
address major global societal challenges and provide benefits in terms of commerce, 
health, democratic participation, social inclusion, environment, and convenience. I am 
aware that technologies can help governments to serve citizens. Governments use ICT 
to enhance public security and personal safety and to save lives, for instance, by provid-
ing communication capabilities and vital information to first responders, such as digital 
maps, driving directions, medical information and images. Governments can also use 
identification technologies, advanced imaging technologies and technologies capable 
of mass surveillance for better ensuring public/national security. 
However, as technology rapidly advances and becomes evermore pervasive in soci-
ety, the way and degree to which privacy and liberty may be violated also advances. The 
right to privacy is becoming evermore difficult to enforce. This has led some to argue 
that privacy (at least as we know it) will end in the near future, if we do nothing about it 
(Garfinkel, 2001), or is already on its way to ending (Whitaker, 2000; Holtzman, 2006; 
O’Hara and Shadbolt, 2008), or even has already ended so get over it,2 and besides 
what’s the use of doing anything about it. At the Centre for Law in the Information So-
ciety (eLaw@Leiden), Bart Schermer more specifically argues that privacy will cease 
to exist in 20 years (2007, 2010). All the same, there is also the strong disbelief that 
privacy can be concretely ensured in the near future. For some, therefore, the end of 
privacy and the right thereof is simply inevitable. 
For these reasons, now more than ever, I believe it is time to thoroughly tackle the 
great challenges and threats posed by the latest technologies on the right to privacy and 
other civil liberties, and to thwart the prediction that privacy will end soon. I for one 
also believe that the immense benefits of technology do not have to come at the undesir-





2  For example, Scott McNealy, the former CEO of Sun Microsystems, famously once declared, over a decade ago, “You 
have zero privacy anyhow, get over it”. see Sprenger, Polly. “Sun on Privacy: ‘Get over it’” (Wired, 26 January, 1999), 
available at: http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538
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1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the beginning of the 21st Century, as a result of the growing development and 
deployment of technology, the following new privacy issues or threats have arisen in 
the US and the UK/EU:
 - A digital data trail is generated by each and every person and automatically stored. 
 - Law enforcement agencies are routinely using mobile phones as a tool to either 
track people or record their geographic location in real-time. Mobile phones are 
also capable of being used to record conversations (even when turned off).3 
 - Vehicles are being tracked via ALPR systems and/or via GPS tracking devices 
without a warrant. 
 - Banks have begun testing the use of fingerprint scanners to authenticate identity, 
while supermarkets are also testing biometric payment systems. 
 - RFID microchips are being embedded within a variety of consumer goods, and 
RFID microchips have been approved for human implantation. 
 - Plans are in place to ensure that each and every person in the US will have an elec-
tronic health record. 
 - Advanced face recognition systems are being integrated into CCTV cameras. 
 - High-powered microphones and loudspeakers are also being attached to CCTV 
cameras, as the deployment of CCTV surveillance systems rapidly increases and 
their surveillance capabilities expand. 
 - DNA databases are rapidly growing and DNA analysis can reveal limitless amounts 
of information about a person. 
 - Children are increasingly being digitally fingerprinted and tracked at school. 
3  McCullagh, Declan. and Anne Broache  “FBI taps cell phone mic as eavesdropping tool” (CNET News, 1 December 
2006), available at: http://news.cnet.com/2100-1029-6140191.html
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 - Corporations are not only retaining vast amounts of data regarding their customers, 
but are also providing governments with access to their databases. 
 - Companies are engaged in the vast data mining of online activities and informa-
tion, and online social media networking websites can track Internet surfing habits. 
 - ‘Fusion Centers’ and data centers capable of enabling “total information aware-
ness” have been established in the US, As governments are expanding their surveil-
lance and intelligence gathering authority and activities.
 - Stories of Western governments conducting surveillance of private electronic com-
munications (emails, etc.) are now commonplace. 
 - Body scanners capable of seeing beneath clothes are being deployed at airports 
around the world. 
 - Devices capable of enabling the user to see through walls are being developed and 
deployed. 
 - UAVs, with built-in advanced cameras, are being deployed for domestic surveillance, 
and law enforcement agencies are increasingly calling for their widespread use. 
 - Neurotechnologies may one day be capable of being used for reading our thoughts. 
 - Devices are being developed that are capable of recording and storing video of an 
entire human life.  
While the above list of privacy threats/issues is certainly far from exhaustive, they 
involve the unprecedented development/deployment of advanced technologies, systems 
and infrastructures that are highly capable of being used to violate an individual’s right 
to privacy and pose the newest, and arguably one of the most serious, threats to liberty in 
modern Western society. Governments, businesses and consumers/citizens increasingly 
seek to take advantage of the apparent public security/safety, health, social, environmen-
tal, commercial and other societal benefits these technologies offer. But, at the same time, 
governments and businesses (i.e. those who can control the development/deployment of 
technology) must also sufficiently aim to minimize the privacy threats and societal impli-
cations of the widespread advancement, deployment and use of these technologies.
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1.2 CENTRAL THESIS
Backed by case studies and overall analysis, the thesis of this dissertation4 is centered 
on the general underlying problem that technology is evolving faster than the laws that 
aim to regulate their use and, as a consequence; the laws are behind the advancement of 
technology.  With the rapid advancement of technology or the inertia of technological 
development, the current laws and regulation strategies/approaches are increasingly be-
coming outdated and there is potentially no end in sight. One reason is that lawmaking 
is normally a gradual process and is primarily reactive, rather than proactive. In addi-
tion, the focus is all too often on the implications of the use of technologies, as opposed 
to the implications of the development of the technologies in the first place. 
Privacy/data protection laws are essentially a perfect case in point. The current le-
gal framework, pertaining to privacy/data protection in the US and the UK/EU, focuses 
predominantly on data controllers/processors, service providers and operators, and tra-
ditional policy or legal-based solutions, for the sake of privacy, are mainly focused on 
the users of privacy-invading technologies, as opposed to the developers/manufactur-
ers. Hence, the Privacy Act 1974 and the Directive 95/46/EC do not apply to the devel-
opers/manufacturers of privacy-invading technologies (PITs) or ICTs. This approach 
may diminish or deter the unlawful or illegitimate use of these technologies, but it may 
also fail to address the privacy-intrusiveness of the technologies concerned at the design 
stage. Often, current attempts to regulate the privacy-intrusiveness of the technologies 
concerned are based on limited technical solutions “bolted on” after a public outcry or 
significant privacy breach. But, it seems that without robust and comprehensive tech-
nical solutions for implementing the principles of privacy, the relevant privacy/data 
protection laws are increasingly ineffectual.
As this dissertation aims to demonstrate, the law should move away from focusing 
primarily on data controllers and users/operators of privacy-invading technologies/ICTs 
and should instead impose technical/design obligations, known as “privacy by design” 
(PBD) requirements, on the manufacturers/developers. The concept of PBD and the PBD 
requirements should also be technologically neutral (as much as possible). Demonstrated 
through case studies, the premise is that privacy laws, directly applied to the manufactur-
4  An overall condensed version of this dissertation was published as an academic paper. see Privacy by Design & Privacy-
Invading Technologies: Safeguarding Privacy, Liberty and Security in the 21st Century (Legisprudence, Volume 5, Issue 
3, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012), pp. 297-329.
 In addition, a forthcoming academic paper, which focuses on the dissertation’s discussion on the challenges, limitations 
and criticism of Privacy by Design, is to be published in 2012.  The foreseen reference is the following: Klitou, D. A so-
lution, but not a panacea for defending privacy: The challenges, criticism and limitations of Privacy by Design, Annual 
Privacy Forum 2012 proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 2012).
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ers/developers and the design/development of PITs, can more effectively protect privacy 
against the threats posed by existing technologies and also have, at the same time, a better 
chance of staying apace with the ever-increasing technological threats to privacy posed 
by future and emerging technologies. Privacy/data protection laws only applied to data 
controllers and users/operators of privacy-invading technologies/ICTs are constantly and 
increasingly falling behind new technological developments.  
Although there are standards and legal requirements with regards to data security 
and audit mechanisms thereof, the other principles of privacy are generally left out. The 
technical emphasis, at present, found both in law and industry standards, is all too often 
focused on data security alone. While existing laws may ultimately have an indirect ef-
fect on the manufacturers (e.g. data controllers can put pressure on ICT manufacturers 
to develop privacy-friendly technologies), this has evidently proved insufficient.
This dissertation attempts to address both the general underlying problem and spe-
cific threats to privacy and civil liberties in the US and UK, posed by the latest and 
evermore evolving privacy-intrusive technologies. In doing so, the dissertation also 
offers some potential solutions, both legal/policy and technologically/architecturally-
orientated, to address the privacy threats and current legal dilemmas and to provide 
some answers to the key research questions (see: section 1.3). 
Essentially, the dissertation shows how and why laws that focus on the design/
development of PITs may better ensure the protection of privacy and better ensure that 
the legal framework remains more up-to-date than laws only applied to data controllers/
users. The premise is supported and demonstrated through case studies (see: PART II, 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Furthermore, the dissertation overall attempts to show how laws/
regulations that mandate the implementation of PBD could potentially serve as a viable 
approach for collectively safeguarding privacy, liberty and security in the 21st Century 
(see: PART III, Chapters 9 and 10, for further information). However, while the dis-
sertation clearly advocates for the implementation of PBD, it does not ignore the fact 
that the PBD approach has its own shortfalls and is not a panacea for all issues related 
to privacy intrusion (see: sections 9.11, 9.12 and 10.19).
It is important to note that the premise of the dissertation was only developed after 
the legal analysis and assessment of the case studies was completed; during which it 
was consistently determined or revealed that technical/design solutions (i.e. PBD solu-
tions) could play a more important role than traditional legal solutions for regulating 
PITs. This determination was not planned or deliberate at all, which explains why the 
concept of PBD is not clearly or specifically integrated or discussed in most of the 
chapters.
The dissertation focuses on the following four privacy-invading technologies 
(PITs) as case studies: 
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 - Body scanners;
 - Public space CCTV microphones;
 - Public space CCTV loudspeakers; and 
 - Human-implantable microchips (RFID implants/GPS implants)
Furthermore, as demonstrated through the case studies, the dissertation also argues 
that both privacy and other civil liberties, on the one hand, and (public/national) secu-
rity, on the other, can be safeguarded. 
1.3 RATIONALE BEHIND THE SELECTION OF THE CASE STUDIES 
Some technologies may be regarded as the ‘black swans’ of PITs, i.e. those technologies 
that immediately stand out due to their disruptive or controversial and highly-intrusive 
capabilities and due to their immense societal impacts.5 This dissertation will focus es-
pecially on some of the foremost threats to privacy posed by the following PITs, which 
are considered to be ´black swans’: Human-implantable microchips (RFID/GPS im-
plants); Body scanners; and public space CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers. 
Without adequate safeguards, these technologies, and the associated acts of wide-
spread human tracking, full body scanning, audio recording and disturbing people’s 
‘right to be left alone’ out in public, could arguably pose some of the most serious tech-
nological threats to privacy and liberty in the early 21st Century. Therefore, these tech-
nologies require further scrutiny and deserve attention from lawmakers/policy makers 
in the very near future. 
These specific PITs were chosen as the case studies for this dissertation, as a result 
of the controversy surrounding their increasing deployment and use, their novelty, their 
highly-intrusive capabilities, the various apparent legal challenges to regulate and/or 
curtail the associated novel privacy-intrusive capabilities, and the lack of substantial 
study regarding their escalating development, deployment and use. 
The current focus on the privacy concerns of social networking sites, and other 
online/digital services, has generally ignored the fact that body scanners have rendered 
clothes obsolete, RFID potentially enables every object or person to be identified and 
tracked, the integration of microphones with CCTV cameras enables conversations out 
5  Nassim Nicholas Taleb equally used the term “black swan” to refer to highly-improbable events that are unpredictable 
and have an immense impact on society, but their occurrence is believed to be more predictable and less random than 
they really are. see Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly-Improbable (Random House, 
2007)..
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in public to be recorded, and CCTV loudspeakers provide CCTV camera operators the 
immense ability to disturb or scold individuals from afar. The radical privacy-intrusive 
capabilities of these selected PITs and their enormous potential for abuse or their ‘func-
tion creep’ propensity are resulting in unprecedented intrusions into both our private 
and public space, threatening not just the right to privacy, but other civil rights and our 
freedom and personal dignity overall.
It may be argued that body scanners, public space CCTV microphones and CCTV 
loudspeakers and RFID implants were foreseen. For example, the concept of “x-ray 
specs” or “x-ray glasses”, allowing the wearer to see through objects or clothes, was 
envisioned decades ago.  In addition, George Orwell, in his book Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
conceptualized “telecreens” (two-way screens complete with microphones and loud-
speakers), which surrounded the masses, in order to monitor and control their behavior 
in public spaces. These PITs, therefore, could also be deemed ‘black swans’, if looked 
at from Taleb’s viewpoint,6 since their deployment now seems quite predictable, but 
in actual fact their development and deployment depended on various unpredictable 
events occurring. For example, the widespread deployment of body scanners in the US 
depended on the occurrence of 9/11 and the “Christmas Day attack”, which were essen-
tially both unpredictable, regardless of the different apparently “obvious” explanations 
developed subsequently.
In addition, the selected PITs offer potentially significant (public/national) security 
benefits, which cannot be overlooked. Indeed, body scanners and public space CCTV 
microphones and CCTV loudspeakers are primarily used by law enforcement agencies. 
Therefore, by addressing or minimizing the threats to privacy and liberty posed by these 
PITs, we are facilitating their deployment and public acceptance and, as a result, also 
potentially helping to safeguard (public/national) security.
PITs mainly concern either the public sphere or the private sphere. The choice of 
PITs also allows the dissertation to cover both spheres (see Chapter 4 for further ex-
planation). With regards to the private sphere, the changing level of privacy we enjoy 
over our bodies is explained, with the deployment and use of body scanners as the 
case study. With regards to the public sphere, the changing nature of the public space 
and level of privacy we enjoy in public is explained, with the deployment and use of 
public space CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers in the UK as the case stud-
ies. Human-implantable microchips (RFID/GPS implants) concern both the private and 
public sphere, since HIMs and the corresponding infrastructure impact the nature of the 
6 Ibid.
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public space and of the human body, and radically change the level of privacy enjoyed 
in both spheres. 
The US and the UK were chosen as the country case studies or legal jurisdictions, 
on the grounds of actual technological threats and since it is where the chosen PITs are 
largely being deployed. Both the US and UK needed to be covered, since body scan-
ners and HIMs are predominantly being deployed in the US, while public CCTV mi-
crophones and CCTV loudspeakers are predominantly being deployed in the UK.  The 
UK is leading the way in the deployment of CCTV public surveillance systems. For 
example, London’s so-called “ring of steel” has served as a model for New York City’s 
CCTV public surveillance system (Cannataci, 2010).
Moreover, the US and the UK were selected as the country case studies, since both 
countries are also leading the way in the establishment of a ‘surveillance society’. Pri-
vacy International, a watchdog on surveillance and privacy, for their 2007 International 
Privacy Ranking, gave the UK and the US a final score of 1.4 and 1.5 respectively (out 
of a score range of 1-5, with 1 indicating a surveillance society and 5 indicating a so-
ciety where privacy is ideally upheld). The final scores of the US and UK were practi-
cally equal to the final score of China with 1.3.7 The UK, in particular, had the lowest 
score in the EU and, as the UK Government moves to monitor all online activities,8 this 
score should be even lower. The UK already has millions of public space CCTV cam-
eras deployed and operating, and the UK’s former Information Commissioner, Richard 
Thomas, himself is well-known for often declaring that the UK is “sleepwalking into a 
surveillance society”. As the leader in the overall development and deployment of PITs, 
the US is certainly not far behind. 
The focus on both the US and the UK also allows for a broader audience.  Since 
the UK is an EU Member State, there is also an opportunity to briefly show some of 
the differences between the US sectoral approach and the current EU comprehensive 
approach to privacy protection and to take into account legal precedent of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where necessary. 
7  Privacy International, 2007 International Privacy Ranking, 28/12/2007, available at: http://www.privacyinternational.
org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-559597
8  see “Internet activity ‘to be monitored’ under new laws” (The Telegraph, 1 April 2012), available at: http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/technology/news/9179087/Internet-activity-to-be-monitored-under-new-laws.html 
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1.4 KEY RESEARCH/EVALUATION QUESTIONS
The following are the general underlying research/evaluation questions the dissertation 
aims to broadly address:
 - What changes to society are brought about by the increasing advancement and 
deployment of the most intrusive PITs? 
 - How will the latest PITs impact the right to privacy and other civil liberties?
 - How can the right to privacy and other civil liberties be ensured?
 - What are the main limitations of the right to privacy and/or data protection laws? 
 - Should new laws be adopted or can existing laws be applied to the new challenges 
and threats posed by the latest PITs? 
 - Are the existing fundamental principles of privacy still relevant? If so, how can we 
uphold the principles of privacy, in light of the threats and challenges posed by the 
latest PITs? 
 - How can both security and the right to privacy and other civil liberties be ensured/
safeguarded (in practice and in theory) for the 21st Century?
The following are some of the specific questions addressed:
Body scanners
 - In what way is the use of body scanners legal and illegal?
 - How should the use of body scanners be regulated to ensure the right to privacy and 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure?
 - How can both privacy and the effectiveness of body scanners in airport security 
screening be maintained?
 - Are there viable alternatives?
Public space CCTV microphones and loudspeakers
 - How does the use of public space CCTV microphones and loudspeakers involve 
the right to privacy and privacy laws?
 - How can the deployment and use of CCTV microphones and loudspeakers be 
regulated?
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Human-implantable microchips (RFID/GPS implants)
 - In what way human-implantable microchips (HIMs) alter the nature of the human body?
 - To what extent, are RFID/GPS implants a threat to privacy, liberty and human dignity?
 - Should RFID/GPS implants be banned? If not, how should RFID/GPS implants 
then be regulated? What amendments and additions in the legal framework must 
occur in order to adequately regulate RFID/GPS implants and defend the right to 
privacy/data protection and other civil liberties?
 - When is the tracking of individuals legitimate and illegitimate? When is the use of 
RFID/GPS implants to identify and track people legitimate and illegitimate? 
 - Can the government potentially force prisoners or criminals to be implanted? Does 
the government have the right to order citizens to be implanted for identification 
purposes? Do employers have the right to dismiss an employee who has refused 
to be implanted for access control purposes? Should parents be allowed to impose 
RFID/GPS implants on their minor children? 
 - When is location information (generated by HIMs) personal information? What is 
the expectation of privacy for location information? 
 - Should the criteria of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and determination of a 
privacy intrusion be revised?
 - How are the private space and public space and the physical world and virtual world 
potentially merging? What approach can accommodate for this potential merger?
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The overall research goals of the dissertation are: 
 - To evaluate/assess the legal framework for the protection of privacy in the US and 
UK (EU) in light of the latest PITs;
 - To identify and recommend suitable enhancements, amendments and additions to 
the US and UK (EU) legal frameworks for the protection of privacy, taking into 
account the development and deployment of the latest PITs;
 - To define an approach for striking a balance between privacy and other civil liber-
ties, on the one hand, and security, on the other.
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1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
The dissertation somewhat attempts to take a multi-disciplinary approach, with the aim 
of bringing together several different fields, including law, human rights, international 
relations, social science, political science and computer science. But, the dissertation 
generally avoids the social and moral criticism of the rapid development and deploy-
ment of PITs. Without arguing against the deployment of PITs, the dissertation instead 
aims to focus primarily on addressing the legal issues at hand and on proposing practi-
cal solutions for ensuring that privacy/liberty is upheld.
For each PIT this dissertation specifically addresses as case studies, their privacy-
intrusive capabilities, based on ordinary desk research, are explained and described. 
Then, the relevant statutory laws, regulations and case law on privacy protection, within 
either the US or the UK, of special relevance to each of these PITs, are identified and 
outlined. The case studies for this dissertation specifically include: human implantable 
microchips (GPS/RFID implants); body scanners; and public space CCTV camera mi-
crophones and loudspeakers. 
In order to achieve the research objectives and address the key research questions, 
the adequacy of the legal frameworks of the US and the UK is assessed, in light of the 
identified intrusive capabilities of the four latest PITs, specifically addressed as case 
studies. The assessment of the adequacy, and ensuing determination of the deficiencies 
and dilemmas of the US and UK legal frameworks, is based on the criteria outlined and 
defined in Chapter 3. The criteria are based on the fundamental principles of privacy 
and other legal principles/requirements. The policy recommendations on enhancing the 
legal frameworks, in light of the privacy-intrusive capabilities of each PIT, are subse-
quently formulated, equally based on the fundamental principles of privacy and the 
identified legal deficiencies and dilemmas. For body scanners and human-implantable 
microchips, the US legal framework is evaluated. For CCTV microphones and CCTV 
loudspeakers, the UK/EU legal framework is evaluated. 
The same criteria are used for each PIT for assessing the legal frameworks, in terms 
of privacy protection, and for determining the required solutions, amendments and ad-
ditions to enhance the legal frameworks. However, the layout for the separate chapters 
covering each PIT is not identical, given that the overall privacy implications, intrusive 
capabilities, circumstances and potential solutions/recommendations that need to be 
considered, concerning the use and deployment of each PIT, are different.
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The problems, root causes, objectives, recommendations and countermeasures ad-
dressed by this dissertation are mapped out and summarized in an A3 Report9 (see: 
Annex I). It is important to note that the A3 Report was developed only after the overall 
research findings and conclusions were established. Moreover, the overall conclusions 
and overall policy recommendations of the dissertation (see: Chapter 10) are based on 
the specific analysis and conclusions/results of the case studies.
The dissertation attempts to take a balanced approach, in order to avoid any ex-
treme or one-sided points of view. Moreover, in order to adopt a more balanced and 
scientific approach, the different points of view of a variety of stakeholders are thus 
taken into consideration. While the (potential) threats to privacy and other civil liberties 
posed by the latest PITs are emphasized, the (potential) societal and security benefits of 
these PITs are also pointed out.
The research formally began September 2007. Timing is critical for this disserta-
tion, as the world, in terms of technological, policy, legal and political developments, 
is constantly evolving. The current state of the legal framework in the US and UK, 
the current state of art of the technologies addressed, and the current situation and 
circumstances surrounding the deployment and use of these technologies is outlined 
and evaluated based on the current state of affairs up until January 2010, for the most 
part. However, while the cut-off date is January 2010, there are some exceptions, where 
necessary or helpful. Indeed, since early 2010, there have been a number of legal/policy 
developments in the US that are relevant for the dissertation and cannot be ignored. For 
example, concerning GPS tracking, the US Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari 
in the case US v. Jones and then later issued a ruling on the legality of the installation 
and use a GPS tracking device without a warrant. In addition, the EC issued an official 
draft of their proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation.10 Also, the FTC pub-
lished the acclaimed December 2010 Staff Report, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an 
9  An A3 Report, named after the paper size standard on which it is meant to fit on, is an effective method of communicating 
a chain of reasoning and mapping out thoughts for solving problems. A3 Reports have been extensively used by Toyota 
Motor Corp. to understand and communicate the root cause(s) of a problem and its solutions. A3 Reports are composed 
of a sequence of text boxes, which, normally in the following order: (1) identify and explain the problem(s) or issue(s); 
(2) breakdown the current conditions and reasons (cause and effect) for the problem or issue in order to get to its root 
cause by asking 5 or more ‘Whys’; (3) determine the countermeasures to solve the problem; (4) establish an action plan; 
(5) identify the desired outcome; (6) implement the plan and follow up.  The “5 Whys” technique was developed by 
Sakichi Toyoda and later adopted by Toyota Motor Corp.
10 see Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protec-
tion Regulation), COM(2012) 11/4 draft.
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Era of Rapid Change”, which emphasizes the role of privacy by design.11 Some of these 
more recent developments will be discussed, albeit in a limited way. Still, the disserta-
tion generally does not incorporate additional developments after January 2010, unless 
where and when deemed required. 
1.7 MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The main sources of information for this dissertation include at least: relevant books and 
published/academic papers; statutory laws, regulations, and case law; corporate privacy 
policies and self-regulations; commissioned privacy reports; policy papers; company 
websites; press releases; current events; news articles; expert views/judgment; stake-
holder perspectives; surveys; public consultations; workshop/working group discus-
sions; and conference papers.
1.8 ADDED VALUE
The research predominantly serves to determine if the legal framework for the protec-
tion of privacy/personal data in the US and UK is still effective and adequate in light 
of the deployment of the latest PITs. Diverging from traditional legal dogma pertain-
ing to privacy/data protection in the US and UK, the deficiencies and dilemmas of the 
respective legal frameworks, particularly concerning the four specific PITs addressed 
(body scanners, CCTV loudspeakers, CCTV microphones and RFID/GPS implants) 
are identified. From there, the research proposes recommendations, which include a 
mixture of new laws and policies, amendments to existing laws, legal definitions and 
interpretations, privacy safeguards and technological solutions, in order to address the 
current legal issues and minimize the threats to privacy posed by these latest PITs. 
Overall, regardless of the PIT in question, the research aims to identify what is required 
in order to balance the perceived security gains of PITs with the right to privacy and 
other civil liberties these technologies threaten.
It is further important to note, however, that the recommended legal methods, solu-
tions, definitions and safeguards are written, for the most part, in the form of policy-
orientated proposals/recommendations, which are meant to be specific, practical and 
actionable. These proposals should arguably be considered, in order to enhance the 
11 As a follow-up to the preliminary FTC Staff Report, the FTC Final Report, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of 
Rapid Change”, was published in March 2012, available at: http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
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legal framework. However, while these recommendations should be considered for 
amending existing legislation or drafting new laws, for example, they are not written in 
a legislative text format, nor are equally comprehensive or technical. Moreover, while 
this dissertation explores the relevant legal questions and attempts to address these 
questions, the answers are not all complete, as some of the critical legal questions still 
need to be left to the courts and lawmakers to decide upon.
1.9 ISSUES AND AREAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ADDRESSED
Due to the limited scope of the research, this dissertation specifically does not attempt 
to formulate comprehensive, specific and widely agreed upon definitions of privacy 
and liberty. The research neither aims to substantially compare the American and Eu-
ropean legal approaches to privacy protection for each case study or analyze the differ-
ent relationships between the legislative and judicial branches of government. Besides, 
CCTV microphones and loudspeakers are primarily being deployed and used in the 
UK, while body scanners and RFID implants are primarily available in the US. In addi-
tion, the dissertation does not intend to resolve the long-standing legal debate on tech-
nological neutrality or to substantiality add to the broad discussion on the advantages 
and disadvantages of technological neutrality. Finally, the dissertation does not include 
substantial discussion on the overall social developments/implications surrounding the 
ever-increasing deployment of PITs.  
1.10 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION AND OVERVIEW BY CHAPTER
The dissertation is divided into four Parts:
 - In PART I, Chapter 2 briefly explains what is meant by privacy, liberty and secu-
rity, and how they are interrelated. Chapter 3 delineates the assessment criteria 
this dissertation applies to assess the adequacy of a legal framework in terms of 
protecting privacy. 
 - In PART II, Chapter 4 explains what is meant by privacy-invading technologies/
privacy-intrusive technologies (PITs) and how PITs are altering the level of privacy 
we should expect in the private and public sphere, and provides an overview of 
technologies that may pose a significant threat to privacy/liberty. Beginning with 
the first case study of dissertation study, Chapter 5, addresses the implications of 
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the deployment and use of body scanners. For the second and third case studies, 
Chapter 6 addresses the implications of the deployment and use of CCTV micro-
phones and CCTV loudspeakers. For the fourth and final case study, Chapter 7 
addresses the implications of the deployment and use of human-implantable mi-
crochips (RFID/GPS implants). Altogether, PART II explains how body scanners 
should be considered as a strip search by other means,12 how public space CCTV 
microphones and CCTV loudspeakers can act as the ears and mouth of ‘Big Broth-
er’, and how HIMs could seriously threaten privacy and alter the way we perceive 
our bodies as transmitters of information in a location-aware world. Chapter 8 
sums up some of the conclusions derived from Part II.
 - In PART III, Chapter 9 provides an overview of what is meant by “privacy by de-
sign” and an overview of the issues surrounding the concept.
 - In Part IV, Chapter 10 concludes with the dissertation’s overall research findings, 
conclusions and policy recommendations, based on the results and analysis of the 
case studies, and a concise overview of some of the answers to the general re-
search/evaluation questions. 
In the Annexes, Annex I contains an A3 Report, mapping out and summarizing the 
central thesis of the dissertation. Annex II contains a summary table with a short over-
view of the intrusive capabilities of the specific PITs addressed and the corresponding 
most relevant laws and self-regulations, legal deficiencies, and proposed key recom-
mended legal and technological solutions. 
12 see Saletan, William. “Naked Came The Passenger” (Washington Post, 4 March 2007), available at: http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/02/AR2007030202035_pf.html
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2.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Privacy, liberty and security are important, inter-related concepts that have been de-
bated for centuries. 
Section 2.2 outlines the concept of privacy. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the 
international legal instruments that stipulate the right to privacy. Section 2.4 explains 
briefly the merits of privacy. Section 2.5 outlines the concept of liberty. Section 2.6 
clarifies the relationship between privacy and liberty. Section 2.7 outlines the concept 
of security. Section 2.8 concludes the chapter with an explanation of the interlinkages 
between privacy, liberty and security. 
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY  
 
Again, it is not the intention of this dissertation to attempt to formulate a comprehen-
sive, specific and widely agreed upon definition of privacy. Instead, the dissertation 
focuses on assessing the existing legal frameworks, in light of the latest PITs, and on 
presenting practical, legal and technical measures to safeguard privacy/liberty. More-
over, this dissertation does not focus on conclusively defining the concept of privacy, 
since such an endeavor is not feasible for a dissertation alone, due to the vast array of 
different theories and conceptualizations of privacy and conflicting opinions. As Wacks 
notably once argued, “the long search for a definition of ‘privacy’ has produced a con-
tinuing debate that is often sterile and, ultimately, futile” (1980, p. 10).13  Even the EC-
tHR, as Taylor points out, “has never sought to give a conclusive definition of privacy, 
considering it neither necessary nor desirable” (2002a, p.76). Other legal scholars (e.g. 
Solove, 2006) have also observed the difficulty and ineffectiveness of trying to conclu-
13 For further discussion, see Taylor, Nick. State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy (Surveillance & Society 1, 2002a), 
pp. 66-85.
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sively and comprehensively define privacy. However, it did not take long to discover 
that privacy is so difficult to define. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, more than a century 
ago, argued “[t]o define the province of privacy distinctly is impossible, but it can be 
described in general terms” (1873, p. 160).
It may be fair to presume that this enduring futility or difficulty of reaching a com-
prehensive and determined consensus on the definition of privacy (i.e. what fully con-
stitutes privacy, what constitutes a privacy violation, what merits privacy protection) 
is the result of the concept’s “inherent flexibility”14 and the significant differences of 
opinion among legal practitioners/legal scholars and between different generations. For 
instance, Generation X may overall have a different opinion about privacy and its im-
portance/value than Generation Y (or the “Millennial Generation”). Moreover, the need 
to take into consideration the current/changing social norms/values, public opinions, 
ideological trends, available technologies, political circumstances and overall state of 
affairs (e.g. an extraordinarily high violent crime rate or the aftermath of a terrorist at-
tack) make it even more difficult to broadly/comprehensively define privacy in a fixed 
and definitive way. The concept of privacy and the belief in its importance/value may 
also differ among people based on their personalities, personal experiences, interests 
and more particularly on their occupation and position/role within society. The esca-
lating advancement, deployment and use of PITs have also added to this uncertainty 
and the difficulty in defining privacy (see section 4.2 for the dissertation’s definition 
of PITs). For example, it may be especially more difficult to define privacy in a high-
tech “surveillance society” or within a “ubiquitous information society”. Therefore, it 
should come as no surprise that a consensus on the definition of privacy has yet to be 
achieved, and the notion of doing so will only become more complicated in the future 
as technologies continuously advance and social values potentially change. Neverthe-
less, the underlying concept of privacy, which serves as the basis of this dissertation, 
should be somewhat outlined.
At first, the right to privacy was largely viewed, in US courts, as a defense against 
any “unreasonable” physical intrusion upon one’s private home, private papers, per-
sonal belongings and person (i.e. body), strictly in accordance with the Fourth Amend-
ment of the US Constitution. The focal point of the concept of privacy and its legal 
interpretations, however, has gradually evolved over time, beyond those domains, as 
modern technology and society has evolved. For starters, as widely recognized, Warren 
and Brandeis (1890) brought a new focus on the autonomy and seclusion components 
of privacy, in the wake of the increase in newspapers and photographs, made possible 
14 Feldman, Noah. “Strip-Search Case Reflects Death of American Privacy” (Bloomberg, 9 April 2012), available at: http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-08/strip-search-case-reflects-death-of-american-privacy.html
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by printing technologies and the first cameras (Schermer, 2007), and famously charac-
terized privacy as the right “to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis, 1890, p. 193). With 
the rapidly growing use of telephones, the focus of privacy evolved to the privacy of 
telecommunications. The gradual increase in the use of information technologies/elec-
tronic data systems led to the focus on the privacy of personal data stored on computer 
databases – ‘information privacy’.15 Accordingly, Westin notably defined privacy as 
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how 
and to what extent information about them is communicated” (Westin, 1967, p. 7). As 
questions arose on the morality and legality of abortion and the means employed, the 
focus of privacy further evolved to personal autonomy/self-determination and the right 
of individuals to make decisions concerning their own bodies and/or domestic matters. 
As the advancement, deployment and use of public surveillance CCTV cameras has 
rapidly increased, and the development of other technologies capable of mass surveil-
lance advances, the right to be left alone has been re-emphasized. The advancement and 
use of location-tracking devices, location-based services and mobile phones capable 
of being tracked has led to the focus on ‘location privacy’ and the privacy of location 
information. It has also re-initiated a debate on the level of privacy that may (or may 
not) exist out in public.  As the use of e-mail, online social networking (Facebook, etc.), 
micro-blogging (i.e. Twitter) and e-commerce websites (Amazon, eBay, etc.) continue 
to increase, the focus of privacy has also swiftly evolved to further address the confi-
dentiality of online (and related offline) activities and initiated the debate on how the 
‘right to be left alone’ could be extended to the information society. As electronic vot-
ing machines surfaced and their deployment and use during elections increased, and 
the potential for the implementation of Internet voting also increases, privacy has also 
re-focused on the importance of the sanctity of the vote in a democratic society. As elec-
tronic health records rapidly increase, the focus of privacy further emphasized the con-
fidentiality of personal medical data. As neurotechnology advances and its applications 
increase, a new focus of privacy will likely evolve to address the privacy of the mind/
brain.16 As the immense potential of DNA analysis emerged and the use of biometric 
data increased, the focus of privacy has evolved even further to the privacy of the body 
(or bodily/corporeal privacy). However, while the concept and focus (i.e. focal point) of 
privacy is continuously evolving and varies from time to time as technology and society 
15 For the purposes of this dissertation, ‘information privacy’ is synonymous with ‘data protection’. 
16 see “Clive Thompson on Why the Next Civil Rights Battle Will Be Over the Mind” (Wired, 24 March, 2008), available 
at: http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/16-04/st_thompson
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evolves, what was previously considered applicable continues to remain relevant, since 
all of these technologies are still heavily in use.
Privacy, therefore, is not just simply an issue concerning the inviolability of one’s 
private home, private papers, etc. or what is done with one’s personal data.17 For the 
underlying and particular purposes of this dissertation, an understanding of privacy 
includes the inviolability of a person’s mind and body (unless lawfully authorized), the 
protection of the confidentiality of personal data, the ‘right to be left alone’, the ‘reason-
able’ confidentiality of communications between two or more people no matter where, 
how and in what form they occur, and the freedom from undue, unlawful or unreason-
able surveillance, whether in public or private places.18
The ‘right to be left alone’ is associated with the freedom from unreasonable, un-
lawful or disproportionate surveillance and also the right to be free from unnecessary 
or excessive disturbance, which can interfere with a person’s life. This component of 
privacy, for example, has likely supported the establishment of the National Do Not 
Call Registry (McClurg, 1995) and the adoption of the Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 in the US, which regulates spam 
e-mail, and in the EU the relevant provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC, which prohibits 
unsolicited communications in the form of automatic calls or e-mails. The right to pri-
vacy and/or the right to be left alone also supported the creation of anti-stalking laws 
(McClurg, 1995).
Based on Article 2 of EU Directive 95/46/EC, personal data (or personal informa-
tion) is “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’)”. As Article 2 (a) states:
An identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity is regarded as information that can be used to directly or indirectly 
identify an individual.19 
Personal data normally includes, for instance, a name, address, date of birth, identi-
fication number, etc. However, personal information of a far more sensitive character, for 
17 For further discussion on the scope of privacy, see, e.g., Nissenbaum, Helen. Privacy as Contextual Integrity (Washing-
ton Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2004), pp. 101-140.
18 see Ibid.
19 see Article 2 (a) of Directive 95/46/EC.
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the underlying purposes of this dissertation, includes a person’s consumer habits, daily 
movements, private affairs and activities, voting records, conversations, interactions, im-
ages, medical history, DNA, and financial data. This list is also certainly not exhaustive. 
It is also difficult to comprehensively define a violation of privacy, since there are 
so many different types of violations. Instead of trying to provide a single meaning to 
privacy violations, Solove developed a ‘taxonomy of privacy’, classifying the range of 
privacy violations within four basic groups: information collection; information pro-
cessing; information dissemination; and invasion; and 16 subgroups: surveillance; in-
terrogation; aggregation; identification; insecurity; secondary use; exclusion; breach of 
confidentiality; disclosure; exposure; increased accessibility; blackmail; appropriation; 
distortion; intrusion; and decisional interference (Solove, 2006, 2008). 
In altering the degree, scope and manner in which privacy is or can be violated, 
the advancement of technology has also made it more difficult to broadly define what 
activities constitute a violation of privacy (and what activities do not). For the under-
lying and specific purposes of this dissertation, however, a violation of the right to 
privacy constitutes any of the following: the unauthorized intrusion upon a person’s 
mind or body; the collection and/or disclosure of an individual’s personal data without 
their consent and/or knowledge and/or without warranted justification; the unlawful (or 
disproportional/disproportionate) manner in which surveillance is conducted; and the 
disproportionate interference with the ‘right to be left alone’.
2.3 PRIVACY AS AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT 
Privacy as a fundamental human right is recognized by diverse, international instru-
ments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 12), International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 17), European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Art. 8), Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (Art. 8), American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 11), 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 16), and the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families (Art. 14). 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
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Article 17 of the ICCPR is basically identical to Article 12 of the UDHR. 
Article 11 of the American Convention of Human Rights states:
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his 
private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful 
attacks on his honor or reputation. 
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks.
Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states: 
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or 
her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
or her honour and reputation. 
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks. 
Article 14 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families states:
No migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be subjected to arbi-
trary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home, correspon-
dence or other communications, or to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and 
reputation. Each migrant worker and member of his or her family shall have the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides for the 
right to privacy, and Article 8 explicitly states: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him 
or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis 
of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been col-
lected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
2.4 THE MERITS OF PRIVACY
While this dissertation will neither explain or analyze in-depth the merits of privacy, 
since it focuses instead on regulating the new and specific threats to privacy posed by 
the latest technologies, those merits should be briefly outlined, in order to highlight 
why privacy matters and deserves considerable attention, especially as significant ICT 
industry players are increasingly promoting publicly the contrary perspective.
When comparing each of the international human rights instruments listed above, 
with the exception of the ECHR, it becomes clear that the right to privacy is explicitly 
linked with the terms “reputation” and “honor”. While the ECHR does not specifically 
mention the terms in Article 8, the ECtHR has equally associated privacy with honor 
and reputation on numerous occasions. Thus, as a result, the right to privacy is clearly 
recognized as a crucial element for realizing personal dignity and self-respect and the 
respect deserved from others.
The right to privacy can help to foster personal autonomy (see, e.g., Feldman, 
1994) and can help enable individuals to take decisions concerning domestic matters 
free from excessive or undue government interference (see, e.g., Feldman, 2002). How-
ever, privacy is more than just a constraint on a prying government or the freedom from 
excessive scrutiny of private matters; it is also an essential component for developing 
our own identities, for realizing who we are as individuals, and for developing/main-
taining different types of relationships (Warner, 2005). “Without privacy people might 
feel inhibited from forming close relationships within the family, or outside in social 
groups” (Taylor, 2002a, p. 82). “It [privacy] allows the social spheres to function and 
as a result a degree of privacy helps the community to function” (Ibid.). In that sense, 
privacy is essential for individuals to develop their personality, achieve self-realization, 
and enjoy intimate relationships and social and emotional well-being. Hence, the lack 
of privacy could lead to the undesirable conformity of behavior and obstruction of indi-
viduality or individualism (Schermer, 2007, p. 73).
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2.5 THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Liberty has found its contemporary meaning from the thinkers Locke, Fitzjames Ste-
phen, Hume, Hobbes, Rousseau, Mill and Berlin (Schermer, 2007). Berlin (1958) 
prominently classified liberty into ‘positive liberty’ and ‘negative liberty’. Positive lib-
erty confers a citizen’s freedom to exercise their civil rights, while negative liberty 
confers a citizen’s freedom from undue government interference in the exercise of their 
civil rights (Schermer, 2007).  
For the underlying purposes of this dissertation, liberty is simply the collective term 
for fundamental civil, political and social rights, in addition to physical liberty. Civil and 
political rights include, for example, the freedom of speech/expression, freedom of as-
sembly, freedom of movement and the right to privacy, all of which are widely accepted 
to be necessary for the establishment and preservation of a free and democratic society.
2.6 PRIVACY AND LIBERTY
Privacy and liberty are interrelated and should be protected in an integrated and compre-
hensive manner.20 As the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transbor-
der Flows of Personal Data (1980) point out, “the protection of privacy and individual 
liberties constitutes one of many overlapping legal aspects involved in the processing of 
data” (para. 29). Privacy is not an end, but rather a means to an end. Instead, the end is 
greater liberty. In other words, “[p]rivacy is an enabling right; it creates the foundation 
for other basic entitlements” (Holtzman, 2006, p. 53). For Gavison (1980), privacy also 
serves to promote liberty and the benefits of a free and democratic society.
The Canada Supreme Court Justice (retired) Hon. Gérard V. La Forest, in R. v. 
Dyment, prominently judged that “privacy is at the heart of liberty in a modern state” 
and “[t]he restraints imposed on government to pry into the lives of the citizen go to 
the essence of a democratic state”.21 Westin earlier expressed his belief that “a balance 
that ensures strong citadels of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure 
and surveillance is a prerequisite for liberal democratic societies” (Westin, 1967, p. 24). 
The Closing Communiqué of the 28th International Conference of Data Protection and 
20 Hence the reason, for example, why Section 222(a)(5)(A) of the Homeland Security Act requires the DHS Chief Privacy 
Officer to “coordinate with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to ensure that programs, policies, and proce-
dures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive 
manner” (emphasis added). 
21 R. v. Dyment [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 427-8.
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Privacy Commissioners (London, 2006) identified that the “protection of citizens’ privacy 
and personal data is vital for any democratic society, on the same level as freedom of the 
press or the freedom of movement”.22  The Communiqué further added: “Privacy and 
data protection may, in fact, be as precious as the air we breathe: both are invisible, but 
when they are no longer available, the effects may be equally disastrous”.23 As the Madrid 
Declaration warns, “the failure to safeguard privacy jeopardizes associated freedoms, in-
cluding freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of access to information, 
non-discrimination, and ultimately the stability of constitutional democracies”.24
Privacy also encourages, to a certain degree, the participation of citizens in the 
overall democratic process, the exercise of freedom of speech/expression, public dis-
course and the freedom of movement – all of which are necessary in a democratic and 
free society. For example, privacy: requires the preservation of secret balloting during 
an election; rejects the calculated attempt to identify participants at a peaceful protest 
or to expose the identity of bloggers/writers/journalists/users of Twitter/whistleblow-
ers, etc., who wish to remain anonymous while lawfully exercising their freedom of 
speech; to unduly record private conversations without consent no matter where they 
occur; and to track people’s movements without their permission or due authoriza-
tion. The coupling of election votes with personal data, the intentional identification 
of peaceful protestors, the exposure of the identity of writers/journalists/bloggers/users 
of Twitter/whistleblowers, etc. against their will, the recording of conversations out in 
public and the constant tracking of people’s movements all risk having a ‘chilling ef-
fect’ respectively on the right to vote, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, the freedom of movement and thus democracy overall. A threat to 
privacy, therefore, is also a significant threat to liberty, since privacy and liberty indeed 
go hand in hand. 
Privacy, as Schermer points out, is essentially a negative liberty (2007, p. 121), 
since it is the freedom from undue surveillance, scrutiny and observation, and is of-
ten categorized as the ‘right to be left alone’. If knowledge is power, as Sir Francis 
Bacon famously first aphorized, then the more knowledge someone knows about an-
other person, the more control he/she can exercise over that person (Schermer, 2007, 
p. 73). Therefore, since privacy is meant to restrict what an individual or other entity 
may know or discover about another individual, then privacy can serve as a limit or 
22 Available at: http://privacy.org.nz/28th-international-conference-of-data-protection-and-privacy-commissioners
23 Ibid.
24 Global Privacy Standards for a Global World, The Civil Society Declaration, Madrid, Spain, 3 November 2009, (known 
as the Madrid Privacy Declaration), available at: http://thepublicvoice.org/madrid-declaration/
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constraint on the control governments (or other entities) can exercise over individuals 
(Ibid.).  Privacy, on the other hand, is also a positive liberty, since it may endow indi-
viduals, for instance, personal autonomy/personal sovereignty, i.e. the freedom to take 
autonomous decisions on their personal/domestic matters (see, e.g., Feldman, 1994).
2.7 THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY
Security is also legally a universal human right.25 The underlying concept of security 
is, first and foremost, the protection of persons from injury, harm or termination and, 
secondly, the protection of objects/property from unlawful/unauthorized damage or de-
struction. There are various interrelated branches of security and different methods and 
means of achieving security. In addition to data security,26 this dissertation predomi-
nantly covers public security, aviation security and the security of critical infrastructure 
(i.e. homeland/national security).  
Public security refers to the protection of citizens, which is often a duty of local, 
regional and national authorities. A variety of threats to public security, for instance, 
include: murders; armed robberies; kidnappings; deadly virus pandemics; terrorist at-
tacks; and significant natural disasters. Methods and means of helping to maintain pub-
lic security, for instance, include: the adoption of criminal laws; and the establishment 
of institutions (e.g. police forces) to enforce the laws and other institutions (e.g. courts) 
to punish those who violate the law. Other more recent methods and means include the 
use of technology, such as public surveillance technologies, advanced imaging tech-
nologies, forensic technology and ICT infrastructure/applications.
Aviation security refers to the security of airports and aircraft, including the per-
sons onboard, from harm caused by a terrorist attack or hijacking. Aviation security is 
(primarily) focused on preventing any weapon or explosive device from being brought 
on board or near an aircraft.27 Methods and means of achieving aviation security, for 
instance, include: the screening of passengers and luggage, with the use of technology 
(metal detectors, X-ray machines, body scanners, etc.) and human resources (i.e. airport 
security personnel); passenger profiling; and intelligence gathering and analysis.
25 see, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), Article 6.
26 Data security concerns the security of information technology/infrastructures and the information stored thereof.
27 Though, in the US, for example, aviation security personnel are also heavily focused on preventing any prohibitive item 
(e.g., lighters, etc.) from being brought on board. 
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The security of critical infrastructure is an important sub-branch of national security/
homeland security. For the most part, the security of critical infrastructure, for instance, 
includes the protection of nuclear power plants, the electricity transmission/distribution 
grid, water reservoirs/treatment plants, dams, bridges, airports, seaports, railways, etc. 
against a terrorist attack or act of sabotage, including from a cyber attack.28 Methods 
and means of achieving the security of critical infrastructure, for instance, include: the 
deployment of police forces, the national/civil guard and other security personnel; the use 
of physical access control technology; the methods/means used in intelligence gathering 
and analysis; and cyber security technological measures and procedures.
2.8 PRIVACY, LIBERTY AND SECURITY
The (individual) rights to privacy and personal liberty are not absolute and must be in-
terfered with for the sake of the ‘common good’ of society (Etzioni, 1999). Security is, 
indeed, a common or public good, and privacy and liberty, to a certain extent and under 
certain conditions, have been sacrificed in the name of security. There are certainly 
plenty of examples where the liberties of individuals have been limited for the sake of 
security. Law enforcement and national intelligence agencies, for example, have been 
granted certain authority to collect vast amounts of personal data and infringe upon the 
right to privacy, in order to prevent a terrorist attack. Online activities/communications 
are significantly monitored. Global financial transactions are continuously monitored to 
discover terrorism financing activities. Mobile phones must be capable of being wire-
tapped by law enforcement agencies and must be capable of revealing the location of 
where a call is made. At an airport, a patdown or strip search, conducted in accordance 
with the law and based on the required level of suspicion, is permitted for the purpose of 
ensuring the security of commercial aviation. And last, but not least, a person’s liberty 
may be taken away, if they have committed a serious crime or significantly interfered 
with the liberty of another person. As the Constitution Committee of the UK House 
of Lords sums up, “[n]ational security, public safety, the prevention and detection of 
crime, and the control of borders are among the most powerful forces behind the use of 
a wide range of surveillance techniques and the collection and analysis of large quanti-
ties of personal data”.29
28 Cyber security has become absolutely essential for national security and the security of critical infrastructure.
29  Constitution Committee - Second Report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State (Session 2008-09), para. 45, available at: 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/1802.htm
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However, given the important merits, as described in section 2.4, privacy is also 
a common good. Although the right to privacy and other civil liberties are indeed not 
absolute, and must always be enforced in relation to the common good/general interest 
of society as a whole, infringements must also be minimized, as far as possible. More-
over, the measures taken to ensure security, which may limit the exercise/enforcement 
of the right to privacy/data protection, must be both necessary and relative for achiev-
ing legitimate objectives (i.e. subject to the principle of proportionality) or needed to 
protect the freedoms/rights of others, and the limitations must be provided for by law.30 
Yet, sometimes privacy can potentially conflict with the needs of security and other 
civil liberties. For example, terrorists could potentially benefit from the vulnerabili-
ties of patdowns, which may result from the legal requirements of bodily privacy and 
the principle of proportionality. Online anonymity or the incorporation of encryption 
technologies (a type of Privacy Enhancing Technology) could potentially enhance the 
ability of terrorists to communicate undetected and to hide behind data protection. Oth-
ers have similarly pointed out that online copyright infringers, virus disseminators and 
“cyber-bullies” can hide behind strong data protection rules, which can negatively af-
fect the value of the freedom of expression.31 
On the other hand, the protection of privacy can also help to ensure security. For 
instance, the private communications of heads of state, intelligence agents, ambassa-
dors and other government officials are vital for national security, and any breach of 
this privacy could be detrimental to national or even international security. This was 
initially a concern, for example, when the mobile phones of the former Prime Minister 
of Greece, Costas Karamanlis, and several of his cabinet ministers were wiretapped. 
The secrecy (i.e. privacy) of national intelligence and the concealment of the identity 
of intelligence agents are also vital for national security. Moreover, the secrecy of the 
locations, characteristics and vulnerabilities of critical military bases, particularly of 
30 see, e.g., the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 52(1).
31 For example, during the post-i2010 Public Hearing on “Priorities for a new strategy for European Information Society” 
held 23 September 2009 in Brussels, which I attended, a representative from the Creative and Media Business Alliance 
(CMBA) made the following oral statement: “Some, such as cyber-squatters, spammers, identity thieves, virus dissemi-
nators, cyber-bullies and other illegal content providers call for more “data protection” and “safe harbours” on the Inter-
net in the name of freedom of expression and hide behind these but do not respect them themselves”. CMBA’s full state-
ment is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/docs/post_i2010/public_hearing/cmba.pdf
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Special Forces, and the suppression of the publication of this information are also vital 
for national security.32   
Not only is security considered a universal human right in itself, but security is also 
equally essential for maintaining privacy and other civil liberties/human rights. Without 
security, there can be no liberty. As Neocleous (2007) and Waldron (2003) both explain, 
it is not always a matter of balancing security with liberty and it is mistaken to assume 
that the relation between security and liberty is self-evidently a zero-sum game. In 
addition, as Neocleous (2007) points out, key classical and contemporary liberal think-
ers, including Adam Smith, Thomas Paine and Michel Foucault, equated the liberty of 
individuals with the security of individuals. Neocleous (2007) also highlights the sig-
nificance of how Adam Smith (1776) argued “upon impartial administration of justice 
depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security”.33 
Similarly, as Neocleous (2007) additionally highlights, for William Paley (1785), “the 
loss of security” leads to “the loss of liberty”.34
Indeed, security and liberty go hand in hand. For instance, public security is crucial 
for our physical, social and economic well-being and allows for the conditions of pros-
perity. Data security, which is the protection against unauthorized access to personal 
data, is absolutely crucial for realizing the right to privacy/data protection. Aviation 
security both facilitates and enhances the freedom of movement of people, not to men-
tion that it also facilitates international commerce. Public security and the security of 
critical infrastructure preserve the right to life and the right to lawfully pursue success 
and happiness.
There is no denying that without security (i.e. aviation security, national/public 
security, data security, etc.), life, as we know it, at least in the Western world, would 
essentially not exist. However, privacy can also assist in the maintenance of security, 
and privacy and other corresponding civil liberties are significant for the pursuit of hap-
piness. Therefore, any legal framework must equally ensure the preservation of privacy 
and liberty. 
32 For example, the recording and recent publication of detailed images of the perimeters of the headquarters of the SAS 
(British Special Forces) by Google on Street View, including its precise location, has been deemed a serious threat to 
security by UK military leaders and Members of Parliament. see “Fury as Google puts the SAS’s secret base on Street 
View in ‘very serious security breach’” (Daily Mail, 19 March 2010), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-1259162/Google-Street-View-shows-secret-SAS-base-major-security-breach.html
33 Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1904, 5th edition, 
first published 1776), v.1.68.
34 Paley, William. The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (R. Faulder, 1785), pp. 444-45.
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Particularly, amid the GWOT in a post-9/11 world, the realization of security and 
the prevention of a terrorist attack merit the sacrifice of privacy and liberty, albeit to a 
limited degree and under certain controlled circumstances. The key objective then is to 
identify and implement a balanced and integrated approach for safeguarding privacy, 
liberty and security in the 21st Century.
3 Criteria for assessing the adequancy of a legal  
 framework in terms of protecting privacy 
3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
It is important to explain what is meant, throughout this dissertation, by an “adequate” 
or “inadequate” legal framework in terms of protecting privacy, and on what basis, 
criteria and guidelines, using which methodology, is a legal framework assessed to 
determine if it is adequate or inadequate.
Section 3.2 introduces the question of what is meant by an adequate privacy legal 
framework. Section 3.3 introduces the principles of privacy. Section 3.4 explains the 
purpose and meaning of each privacy principle. Section 3.5 briefly outlines the differ-
ences between the European and American approach to safeguarding the right to pri-
vacy/data protection. Section 3.6 outlines additional required characteristics for a legal 
framework to be considered sound. Section 3.7 briefly lists some measures that should 
be taken before any relevant law is enacted. Section 3.8 outlines some legal criteria 
specific to the US, while Section 3.9 outlines some specific criteria specific to the UK. 
Section 3.10 clarifies how the existing privacy principles still apply. 
3.2 AN ADEQUATE PRIVACY LEGAL FRAMEWORK?
As a starting point, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (hereinafter called “Directive 95/46/EC” or 
“Data Protection Directive”) provides some guidance on determining adequacy and can 
help to establish a set of criteria for assessing a legal framework in terms of its adequacy 
in protecting privacy. The Data Protection Directive requires that EU Member States en-
act laws prohibiting the transfer of personal data to countries outside the EU that fail to 
ensure an “adequate level of [privacy] protection”,35 with certain derogations. As provided 
35  EU Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 25.
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by Article 25(2), when assessing the “adequacy” of the level of privacy protection in a 
country the following should be considered or looked at:
 - the nature of the data;
 - the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations;
 - the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force; and 
 - the professional rules and security measures complied with. 
But, the Data Protection Directive does not explicitly or necessarily specify the 
substantive criteria for determining the “adequacy” of the legal frameworks of non-EU 
counties in terms of privacy protection.
In response, the Article 29 Working Party36 provided further guidance on assessing 
adequacy in a 1997 document, titled: “First orientations on Transfers of Personal Data 
to Third Countries – Possible Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy”.37 However, the 
Article 29 Working Party predominantly dealt with assessing the adequacy of law in 
terms of information privacy or data protection, which is essentially not broad or com-
prehensive enough to assess the overall adequacy of privacy/data protection laws with 
regards to the growing unique challenges posed by many of the latest PITs. Further-
more, the European Commission more recently also expressed their recognition in the 
important need to “clarify the Commission’s adequacy procedure and better specify the 
criteria and requirements for assessing the level of data protection in a third country or 
an international organisation”.38
36 The Article 29 Working Party is a European advisory body on data protection and privacy established under Directive 
95/46/EC.
37 Discussion document WP4 (5020/97), First orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries — Possible 
Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy.
38 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union, Brus-
sels, 4.11.2010, COM(2010) 609 final (p. 16).
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3.3 INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS IN PRINCIPLE
The principles of privacy/data protection embodied in the Data Protection Directive 
are clearly based on those previously established by the OECD Guidelines on the Pro-
tection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980) (hereinafter called 
“OECD Privacy Guidelines”),39 the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1981), and the 
UN General Assembly’s Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data 
Files (1990). The OECD Privacy Guidelines, in particular, have not only significantly 
served as the basis of domestic privacy laws in Western democratic nations, but have led 
to further establishing privacy as a recognized international norm.
There is an international consensus over the fundamental privacy principles and 
basic rules, which are shared among Western democratic nations and serve as the core 
substance of privacy and/or data protection laws (Bennett, 1992, p. 95).40 These funda-
mental privacy principles recur in some shape or form throughout numerous statutory 
sources of law, whether domestic, regional or international, ‘hard’ or ‘soft’, and have 
constituted as the minimum standard of adequate privacy protection.  The fundamental 
privacy principles apply to both the commercial activities of data controllers and the 
law enforcement activities of public authorities.
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) identifies the following as the five core 






While overall the privacy/data protection principles of the FTC, Data Protection 
Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) and the OECD are similar, the FTC’s set of core prin-
39 The OECD Privacy Guidelines were based, in part, on the original Fair Information Principles (FIPs), established by the 
US Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the 1973 report, “Systems, Records, Computers, and the Rights of 
Citizens”. The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) also embodies the FIPs for regulating the collection and processing 
of personal data by federal agencies.
40 For further discussion, see Bennett, Colin J. Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the 
United States (Cornell University Press, 1992).
41 Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), available at: http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm
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ciples (or Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs))42 was chosen, since they are 
arguably more neatly presented and concisely worded. Critically missing, however, 
from the FTC’s set are (6) the “purpose specification principle”,43 and (7) the “use 
limitation principle”,44 both of which were formulated in the OECD Privacy Guide-
lines and are significantly applicable to privacy protection in general. In terminology, 
missing from both sets is the generally accepted legal (8) principle of proportionality.
Similarly, the eight data protection principles, listed in the Data Protection Act 
1998 (DPA),45 which transposes Directive 95/46/EC into UK domestic law, requires 
that all personal data must be:
1. Processed fairly and lawfully; 
2. Obtained and used only for specified and lawful purposes;
3. Adequate and relevant, and not excessive; 
4. Accurate and, where necessary, up to date;
5. Kept no longer than necessary;
6. Processed in accordance with the rights of individuals;
7. Secure; and
8. Transferred only to third-party countries that have adequate data protection  
 laws and practices
These data protection principles are parallel to the principles of privacy selected 
here. The first data protection principle and the conditions that must be met in ac-
cordance with Schedules 2 and 3 of the DPA are parallel to the principle of consent/
choice. The second data protection principle is parallel to the purpose specification 
principle and the use limitation principle. The third data protection principle is parallel 
to the principles of proportionality and data minimization. The fourth data protection 
principle is parallel to the access/participation principle and the integrity principle. The 
fifth data protection principle is parallel to the use limitation principle. The sixth data 
protection principle is parallel to the principles of notice/awareness and consent/choice. 
The seventh data protection principle is parallel to the principle of security/integrity. 
42 For instance, the so-called “Bill of Rights” for online privacy, developed with major industry players, is also significantly 
based on the FIPPs. The FIPPs are rules on the fair treatment of personal data (Schwartz, 2000) and are “the building 
blocks of modern information privacy law”. (Schwartz, 1999, p. 1614).
43 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), Art. 9.
44 Ibid., Art. 10.
45 Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 1, Part I. 
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Altogether, the principles of privacy, with the exception of the principle of consent, 
also serve as the agreed upon principles between the US and EU for a potential binding 
transatlantic agreement on the exchange of data for law enforcement purposes and the 
protection of privacy thereof.46 The principles of privacy also serve as the basis for the 
EC’s proposal for a new Directive on the processing of personal data for law enforce-
ment purposes.47
A wide-ranging and thorough set of criteria permits the clear assessment of the 
legal adequacy of privacy/data protection laws or lack thereof with regards to the latest 
PITs. To determine if a legal framework is adequate in terms of protecting privacy and 
personal data, it should be evaluated against this set of criteria, taking into consider-
ation the intrusive capabilities of PITs (see Chapter 4) on a case-by-case basis. 
Throughout this dissertation, the fundamental principles of privacy/data protection 
will serve, in one way or another, as the criteria and analytical basis for assessing the 
adequacy of the US and UK legal frameworks/legal practices, with regards to the latest 
PITs, and for establishing what, if any, amendments, corrections or enhancements to 
the US and UK legal frameworks are necessary. For the sake of this dissertation, if a 
legal framework, in its present form, does not fulfill the fundamental privacy principles, 
where applicable, then it is inadequate (to a certain degree). 
3.4 PURPOSE AND MEANING OF EACH PRINCIPLE
The purpose and meaning of each of the interrelated fundamental privacy principles 
shall correspond to the following:
(1) Choice/Consent
The OECD Privacy Guidelines do not specify exactly what constitutes as consent 
and how to determine consent. The choice/consent principle is also embodied in the 
collection limitation principle in the OECD Guidelines.
46 see the Final Report by EU-US High Level Contact Group on information sharing and privacy and personal data protec-
tion, May 2008.
47 see Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement 
of such data, COM(2012) 10 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012.
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To determine consent, several aspects should be considered, including whether the 
consent is informed (see principle (3) notice/awareness), how the consent was obtained 
by the data controller or granted by the person concerned and whether the consent 
was somehow forced or if the consent was somehow tied into the permitted exercise 
of another human right (i.e. indirectly forced). As Article 2 (h) of Directive 95/46/EC 
requires, consent, in order to be valid, must be “freely given specific and informed”. 
Moreover, consent must be “unambiguous”.48 The Article 29 Data Protection Work-
ing Party published an opinion further specifying what constitutes valid consent and 
clarifying the meaning of “freely given”, “specific”, “informed” and “unambiguous”.49 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, “freely given” implies that the consent is 
a “real choice” and is not based on deception, intimidation, coercion or the threat of 
significant negative consequences.50 “Unambiguous” consent implies that there is “no 
doubt as to the data subject’s intention to deliver consent”.51 
Directive 95/46/EC also stipulates that a data subject’s consent can be given through 
any “indication of his wishes”. As the Article 29 Working Party clarifies, “[t]here is in 
principle no limits as to the form consent can take”.52 Consent may include not only “a 
handwritten signature affixed at the bottom of a paper form, but also oral statements to 
signify agreement, or a behaviour from which consent can be reasonably concluded”.53 
Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, and in line with Directive 95/46/EC, consent 
can be validly expressed in written, verbal or electronic form. However, as the Article 
29 Working Party also points out, “oral consent may be difficult to prove and, there-
fore, in practice, data controllers are advised to resort to written consent for evidentiary 
reasons”.54 In any case, the express authorization must be recorded or documented.
For the purposes of this dissertation, in line with widely accepted notions, consent 
shall mean a data subject’s voluntary, informed and expressed authorization to process 
his/her personal information or to intrude upon his/her privacy, thereby granting the 
48 see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP187, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, Adopted on 13 
July 2011.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 12.
51 Ibid., p. 21.
52 Ibid., p. 11.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 25.
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person concerned personal autonomy and the freedom to meaningfully choose what he/
she would like to reveal about him or herself.
There are certain exceptions to the principle of consent, including when neces-
sary for the protection of public security or for reasons of legitimate public interests, 
the safety or vital interests of the person concerned (i.e. emergency health concerns), 
the administration of justice or the prevention or investigation of a criminal offense by 
competent authorities, in accordance with the law. Consent is also not required when 
the collection and processing of personal data is deemed necessary to prevent threats 
to public/national security. Thus, the principle of consent is not applicable for law en-
forcement operations or surveillance activities, when carried out in accordance with the 
law, since these activities certainly require secrecy to be effective (Schwartz, 2000).55 In 
addition, consent is not required, for obvious reasons, when the processing pertains to 
personal data that the concerned data subject clearly made public himself/herself (e.g. 
by publishing it on the Internet via Facebook, Twitter, Blogger, etc.). 
With regards to choice/consent, the following are some questions that should be 
addressed, where applicable: 
1. When is consent specifically required and not required?
2. How can consent be expressed? Is the expression of consent recorded/documented? 
3. When is consent considered informed and meaningful?
4. When is consent perceived to be given freely and/or non-freely?
5. Are data subjects permitted to change or withdraw their consent?
6. Is consent required each and every time personal data is collected and processed?
7. What are the consequences of refusing?
(2) Access/Participation 
Access and/or participation, for the purposes of this dissertation, shall refer to a data 
subject’s right of access to the personal data held by data controllers and the capacity or 
opportunity to review that data and to request that the data be erased or corrected (for 
instance, where it is evidently determined that the data is inaccurate). Moreover, access/
participation encompasses the capacity of data subjects to have removed or the ability 
55 see Schwartz, Paul M. Beyond Lessig’s code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Infor-
mation Practices (Wisconsin Law Review, Volume 2000, Issue No. 4, 2000), pp. 743-787, at 784.
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to remove themselves any unlawfully retained personal data.56 The access/participation 
principle is referred to as the individual participation principle in the OECD Guidelines. 
The expansion of the access/participation principle could also include the right for data 
subjects to set their ‘privacy preferences’,57 where appropriate, feasible and/or techni-
cally possible. However, the principle of access/participation may also be limited for law 
enforcement purposes or national security interests, albeit in accordance with the law.58 
With regards to access/participation, the following are some questions that should 
be addressed, where applicable:
1. How accessible is the relevant personal data to the person it concerns?
2. How is the right to access and participate granted or implemented?
3. When can a request for access and/or participation be refused?
(3) Notice/Awareness
Notice and/or awareness, as commonly understood, pertains essentially to the re-
quirement of data controllers and/or processors59 to clearly and/or visibly communicate, 
for instance, when personal data could be or is being collected, what sort of informa-
tion could be or is being collected, how that information could be or is being collected 
(i.e. using which technology, method or means), why (i.e. for which reason(s)) and 
by whom (i.e. the identity of the data controller/data processor and often their contact 
information).60 This awareness will also help data subjects to make an informed choice 
without which the data subject’s consent will not be informed or will be ill-informed. 
The notice/awareness principle is also based on the principle of transparency and is 
56 see OECD Privacy Guidelines, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 59; Fair Information Practice Principles, available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm
57 Privacy preferences are basically the stipulated circumstances under which a data subject has knowingly given his/her 
consent for a data controller/data processor to process his/her personal data. 
58 see Article 17 of Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, and Article 13 of Article 17 of Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA, and Article 11 of the EC’s proposal for a Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes, COM(2012) 10 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012.
59 Article 2 (d) of Directive 95/46/EC defines data controllers as “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data” 
and paragraph (e) defines a data processor as “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller”. 
60 see OECD Privacy Guidelines, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 57; Fair Information Practice Principles, available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm
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essentially the same as the openness principle found in the OECD Privacy Guidelines. 
Nonetheless, there are also certain exceptions to the notice and/or awareness principle 
when the exceptions are proportionate and necessary for law enforcement purposes, in 
accordance with the law, or necessary for competent authorities to execute their legiti-
mate responsibilities.61
With regards to notice/awareness, the following are some questions that should be 
addressed, where applicable:
1. In what form should the notice be communicated?
2. Where is the notice communicated? 
3. What is exactly communicated?
4. Who is primarily responsible for ensuring the notice is appropriately visible?
(4) Integrity/Security
The security of personal data and of the infrastructure storing that information is at 
the heart of privacy. Without data security, there can be no data protection/privacy. The 
security of personal data often corresponds to the requirement of data controllers to take 
the necessary technical and organizational measures to safeguard against any unlawful 
or unauthorized access, use, modification or disclosure of any personal data that they 
are storing.62 Data security is, therefore, also essential for data integrity and the data 
quality principle of the OECD Privacy Guidelines, which corresponds to the notion of 
data accuracy, relevance and reliability.63
With regards to data integrity/security, the following are some questions that should 
be addressed, where applicable: 
1. What measures must be taken to ensure the integrity and security of personal data?
61 see Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC; Article 17 of Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA; Article 11 of the EC’s 
proposal for a Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data for law enforce-
ment purposes, COM(2012) 10 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012.
62 see OECD Privacy Guidelines, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 56; Fair Information Practice Principles, available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm
63 The original FIPs, established by the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, included data “reliability”, and 
the recent Department of Commerce, Internet Policy Task Force Green Paper, “Commercial Data Privacy and Innova-
tion in the Internet Economy: A Dynamic Policy Framework” (2010), affirmed that organizations must ensure that stored 
personal information is “accurate, relevant, timely, and complete” (p. 26).
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2. If possible, how can data controllers and data subjects ensure that these mea- 
 sures have been implemented or realized?
3. Are these measures mandated in accordance with binding hard laws /regula- 
 tions or encouraged through soft laws/voluntary standards/codes of conduct?
 (5) Enforcement/Redress
Although the privacy principles are inter-dependent and each is equally fundamen-
tal, like integrity/security, enforcement is crucial. The principles are only genuinely 
effective to the extent and scope in which they are complied with, implemented or fol-
lowed in practice. Both the privacy principles and the laws that embody the principles 
cannot enforce or implement themselves on their own. Essentially, without the means 
of enforcement, the privacy principles could end up ineffective or even ignored. It is, 
therefore, necessary to consider not only the content of the law, but also the means of 
enforcement or the enforcement mechanisms that are in place to ensure the laws have 
a genuine effect and impact.
Enforcement, for the purposes of this dissertation, entails the impartial means to 
oversee and verify compliance and investigate and resolve complaints. Accordingly, the 
principle of enforcement requires independent and effective oversight/supervision. En-
forcement also includes the availability of both non-judicial (or administrative) means to 
provide appropriate redress and judicial means to penalize the responsible parties who 
violate the right to privacy. Arguably, victims of privacy violations should also have the 
right to receive damage awards, where deemed appropriate by a court of law. Criminal 
sanctions should be mandated for serious violations. Arguably, enforcement should al-
ways entail the right to private legal action before an impartial and independent tribunal. 
The accountability principle of the OECD Privacy Guidelines relies on the principle 
of enforcement/redress, but both principles are not the same. Accountability is more fo-
cused on assigning liability to the responsible entities/authorities for ensuring the pro-
tection of privacy and is more emphasized “on showing how responsibility is exercised 
and making this verifiable”,64 i.e. requiring data controllers to implement measures for 
upholding the data protection principles and to demonstrate that the measures taken are 
both appropriate and effective.65
64 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 173, Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of accountability, Adopted on 13 
July 2010, p. 7.
65 Ibid.
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Both enforcement and accountability require the identification of the responsible 
entities/authorities, which are primarily, at present, the relevant data controllers and/or 
processors. According to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, similar to Directive 95/46/EC, 
data controllers are the responsible entities or persons “competent to decide about the 
contents and use of personal data”. However, identifying the responsible data controllers 
is not always easy, especially as a result of the increase in cross-border data flows and the 
complexity of information systems. Moreover, while the existence, nature and content of 
enforcement mechanisms can be assessed, “[t]he assessment of adequacy will be incom-
plete to the extent that it cannot assess actual practices and the realities of compliance”.66
With regards to enforcement/redress and accountability, the following are some 
questions that should be addressed, where applicable:
1. What enforcement mechanisms are available? 
2. If available, what are the specific legal sources that establish the enforcement  
 mechanisms?
3. Are both judicial and non-judicial remedies available for data subjects?
4. Is the right to private legal action available?
5. Can data controllers be held criminally liable for serious privacy violations?  
 Are they also subject to civil action and penalties?
6. Can the injured data subjects be rewarded monetary compensation for these  
 violations? Are the criminal sanctions and monetary sanctions sufficiently rig- 
 orous to ensure compliance?
7. Is there a supervisory public authority responsible for overseeing compliance?  
 What are the enforcement powers of this supervisory public authority and how  
 independent or impartial is it?
(6) Purpose Specification
The purpose specification principle requires that the purposes for which personal 
data is lawfully collected must be transparent and specified beforehand (usually in writ-
ing), and its subsequent processing (collection, use, retention, modification, analysis, 
distribution, etc.) must be limited to the fulfillment of those specific purposes and not 
66 “Application of a methodology designed to assess the adequacy of the level of protection of individuals with regard to 
processing personal data: Test of the method on several categories of transfer”, Final Report presented by the University 
of Edinburgh on behalf of: Charles D. Raab, Colin J. Bennett, Robert M. Gellman, and Nigel Waters, September 1998, 
European Commission Tender No. XV/97/18/D, p. ii, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/stud-
ies/adequat_en.pdf
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contrary to them. The purpose specification principle also holds that personal data 
should not be retained for longer than necessary to fulfill those purposes. Once its 
retention is no longer necessary to fulfill the specified purpose for which it was col-
lected, data controllers must then delete or destroy the relevant personal data or, at 
minimum, unequivocally anonymize the personal data.67 The principle is considered 
essential since “informed consent to the collection and processing of his/her personal 
data is dependent on the information about the purpose and use of those data” (Tzanou, 
2010, p. 421). The purpose specification principle, for instance, is embodied in Article 
6.1(b) of the EU’s Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC).
With regards to purpose specification, the following are some questions that should 
be addressed, where applicable:
1. What are data subjects informed concerning the purpose of the data collection?
2. Are there any legally binding restrictions on the purposes for which personal  
 data can be collected? 
3. How is it determined that personal data is no longer needed to fulfill the speci- 
 fied purpose for which it was collected?
(7) Use Limitation
The use limitation principle requires that personal data should not be used in any 
way beyond the originally stated objectives for which it was collected, unless with 
the explicit consent of the concerned data subject or explicitly permitted by law. The 
use limitation principle helps to prevent “function creep”. Function creep occurs when 
“personal data collected for one specific purpose and in order to fulfill one function, 
are used for completely different purposes, which are totally unrelated to the ones for 
which they were initially collected”.68 
With regards to use limitation, the following are some questions that should be ad-
dressed, where applicable:
1. When are the originally stated objectives deemed to have been achieved? 
2. How can data subjects be sure that their personal data is not used beyond what  
 they have been informed of and have originally consented to?
67 see OECD Privacy Guidelines, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 54.
68 Tzanou, Maria. The EU as an Emerging Surveillance Society: The Function Creep Case Study and Challenges to Pri-
vacy and Data Protection (4 Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law, 2010), p. 421.
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(8) Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is a general legal principle often used in both do-
mestic criminal law, to represent the notion that the punishment for a criminal offense 
must be relative to its gravity, and in international law, to regulate a state’s use of armed 
force during a conflict, whereby the harm brought upon civilians and civilian infrastruc-
ture must be relative to the intended lawful and specific military objectives sought after. 
The legal principle of proportionality also effectively applies to privacy/data pro-
tection law.  As widely recognized, the legal principle represents the notion that the 
processing (collection, use, retention, modification, analysis, distribution, etc.) of per-
sonal data and/or the infringement upon privacy, whether based on consent or not, 
should be necessary, reasonable, appropriate, relevant and not excessive in relation to 
the specific, legitimate purpose(s)/aim(s) for doing so (e.g. security gains), in accor-
dance with the law in a free and democratic society.69 The principle of proportional-
ity is applicable, regardless of the purported legitimate purpose(s)/aim(s) sought after. 
In addition, as widely understood, the principle of proportionality also applies to the 
chosen means/measures (i.e. method, technology, etc.) used. If less intrusive or more 
reasonable means/measures are available to equally achieve the same legitimate aim(s), 
then those means should arguably be chosen instead. Accordingly, both the relevance of 
the purported legitimate aim(s) and the factual circumstances and consequences of the 
employed means must be considered (for further discussion, see, e.g., Taylor, 2002a).
Specifically, in terms of data protection, the principle of proportionality is also 
connected with the data minimization principle and the collection limitation principle, 
which collectively require that no more data should be collected than is required for the 
specified purpose(s)/aim(s) of its collection and that the personal data should only be 
obtained through lawful means.
69 see, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 52(1).
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3.5 THE EUROPEAN APPROACH VS. THE AMERICAN APPROACH 
Again, there is indeed consensus among Western free and democratic nations over the 
fundamental principles of privacy, but there are differences of opinion, particularly be-
tween policy makers/lawmakers in the EU and the US, over how to best implement the 
fundamental principles and what the machinery of enforcement and redress should en-
tail.70 These differences, some of which were previously highlighted by Bennett (1992) 
and Reidenberg (2000), are still valid.71
Among EU Member States, there is somewhat broad agreement that privacy prin-
ciples and data protection rules must be codified in legally-binding legislation and backed 
by an independent, dedicated, central/national and governmental supervisory agency with 
the authority to investigate complaints, ensure compliance and impose sanctions for non-
compliance. This agreement was manifested in the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC – a 
comprehensive, broad, multi-sectoral privacy legislation that regulates practically all data 
collection/processing activities, regardless of the technology concerned, of both private 
entities and public authorities (except for law enforcement agencies). The EU’s regula-
tory approach is thus technology-independent. Accordingly, each EU Member State has 
passed domestic legislation transposing Directive 95/46/EC and has established a national 
data protection supervisory authority. As Reidenberg (2000) points out, although there 
are varying legal interpretations of Directive 95/46/EC within the EU, there is clearly a 
“common view that data protection is a basic human right that must be guaranteed by the 
state”. The European legal approach has had a direct influence on the legal frameworks of 
other countries outside the EU, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Africa and 
Canada (Birnhack, 2008).72 Nevertheless, while legally binding ‘hard’ laws are customary 
for protecting privacy in Europe, self-regulations (or non-legally binding ‘soft’ laws) are 
also occasionally relied upon.73
70 The current negotiations between the US and EU over a future binding transatlantic agreement on the exchange of data 
for law enforcement purposes and the protection of privacy thereof may highlight these differences.
71 For further discussion, see Bennett, Colin. Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the 
United States (Cornell University Press, 1992).
72 Birnhack, Michael D. The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime (Tel Aviv University Law 
Faculty Papers, Paper 95, 2008).
73 see Bignami, Francesca. The Non-Americanization of European Regulatory Styles: Data Privacy Regulation in France, 
Germany, Italy, and Britain (Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #174, 2010), available at: http://www.
ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/CES_174.pdf
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The US legal approach to protecting privacy is based instead on a unique mixture 
of separate statutory laws for various subject matters/technologies/domains, case law 
and self-regulations. In particular, the US approach is sectoral rather than all-inclusive 
or comprehensive, which is partly the cause for some of the deficiencies or gaps in the 
US legal framework, as explained in the subsequent chapters of the dissertation. The 
US regulatory approach is thus technology-dependent. Moreover, the US Congress often 
passes laws only after a serious problem or incident arises and not before. As Reidenberg 
(2000) similarly points out, under the US approach, the “law only intervenes on a nar-
rowly targeted basis to solve specific issues where the marketplace is perceived to have 
failed”.  Still, the US has not successfully passed legislation similar to the EU’s Directive 
95/46/EC. The Privacy Act of 1974, for instance, is nowhere near as comprehensive and 
broad as Directive 95/46/EC and nor does it apply to private entities. While there are other 
specific privacy protection laws for different subject matters, domains or technologies, 
voluntarily adopted self-regulations/industry codes of conduct/corporate practices are in-
stead primarily relied upon, at present, to safeguard privacy in the US (Reidenberg, 2000). 
Data controllers are free to formulate these regulations and are primarily responsible for 
ensuring their compliance.
However, although in the US there is no dedicated, governmental supervisory au-
thority, equivalent to the national data protection supervisory authorities in EU Member 
States, to enforce compliance with privacy rules, the enforcement of corporate self-reg-
ulations/privacy policies are supervised by the FTC. The FTC has the authority to act 
against unfair and deceptive practices or broken promises. While the FTC is the closest 
body in the US to a national data protection supervisory authority, there is also in the US 
the Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Board.74 There are also offices of privacy protec-
tion on the state-level, but the responsibilities of these bodies are merely advisory. 
On the other hand, as Bignami empirically reveals, tort litigation for privacy vio-
lations in the EU still plays a relatively insignificant role compared to within the US. 
Instead, administrative redress plays a more significant role in the EU. However, as Big-
nami also reveals, the number of tort litigation cases for privacy violations in the EU has 
74 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was established after the National Commission on Terror-
ist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the 9/11 Commission) recommended it. The PCLOB is an independent 
agency within the executive branch and is meant to provide oversight in the fight against terrorism. But, the PCLOB is 
still inactive. 
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steadily increased since the adoption and transposition of Directive 95/46/EC,75 which 
provides for judicial remedy and the awarding of compensation for privacy violations.76
In accordance with the OECD Privacy Guidelines, however, there is essentially no 
single, correct way of enforcing or implementing the privacy principles, as long as they 
are indeed enforced or implemented in practice. In actual fact, the OECD Privacy Guide-
lines explicitly “permits Member countries to exercise their discretion with respect to the 
degree of stringency with which the [OECD Privacy] Guidelines are to be implemented, 
and with respect to the scope of the measures to be taken”,77 and does “not presuppose 
their uniform implementation by Member countries with respect to details”.78 
In spite of this, for the sake of this dissertation, the assessment of the adequacy of 
enforcement/redress mechanisms is, for the most part, based on the European approach.
3.6 REQUIRED LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 
In parallel with the application of the fundamental privacy principles, there are other le-
gal characteristics that should arguably be considered when assessing the adequacy and 
soundness of a legal framework in terms of privacy protection. Based on these required 
legal characteristics, other legal deficiencies and dilemmas in the legal framework can 
also be determined.
In terms of ensuring the protection of privacy, the legal framework should also be: 
 - Legally binding, ‘hard’, actionable and enforceable;
 - Consistent;79
 - Precise, clear80 and not ambiguous;81 
75 Prof. Francesca Bignami presented her empirical analysis at the third annual international conference Computers, Pri-
vacy and Data Protection (January 29-30 2010, Brussels), which I attended. 
 see Bignami, Francesca. The Non-Americanization of European Regulatory Styles: Data Privacy Regulation in France, 
Germany, Italy, and Britain (Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #174, 2010), available at: http://www.
ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/CES_174.pdf
76 see Articles 22 and 23 of Directive 95/46/EC.
77 OECD Privacy Guidelines, Memorandum, para. 45.
78 Ibid. 
79 see Tamanaha, Brian Z.  On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University, 2004).
80 see, e.g., Khan v. United Kingdom, Application no. 35394/97, Judgment of 12 May 2000, §26.
81 see Tamanaha, Brian Z.  On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University, 2004).
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 - Free of vague concepts and/or definitions;
 - Free of legal loopholes;
 - Foreseeable (the law should be of such quality and precision that determining when 
it has been complied with or breached is apparent and predictable, and if breaches 
are permitted, then the justification for doing so must also be precise and clear):82
 - Readily accessible;83
 - Flexible, but also specific, where and when needed;
 - Up to date with current PITs and anticipatory of their further advancement;
 - Not primarily dependent on self-regulations, whether governmental or private;  
 - Not primarily dependent on case law;
 - In compliance with relevant international norms and other legal instruments; and
 - Not completely contrary to the recommendations of international organizations, 
such as the OECD, United Nations and Council of Europe, or perhaps the domestic 
laws of other countries widely considered democratic and free.84
If any legal framework or legal practice is contrary to or lacks any of these required 
legal characteristics, where applicable, then the law may be inadequate, to a certain 
extent or degree, depending on the extent and scope of the contradiction and deficiency.
3.7 BASIC PRE-MEASURES
In addition, based on both common practices and the privacy principles, other basic 
measures should arguably be carried out before any relevant law is enacted, policy 
adopted, policy instrument implemented or PIT deployed. These basic pre-measures 
may include: 
 - An assessment of the impact upon privacy;
 - Identification and testing of possible alternative means for achieving the same end 
in a less intrusive manner; and 
 - Public engagement with relevant stakeholders, requesting public input/comments, 
and taking into account the concerns of the general public.
82 see, e.g., Kopp v. Switzerland, Application No. 23224/94, Judgment of 25 March 1998.
83 Ibid.
84 Of course, what makes a country “democratic and free” is a whole other question, which requires its own set of criteria. 
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3.8 LEGAL CRITERIA SPECIFIC TO THE US 
In the US, the law must be capable of upholding the integrity of the US Constitution, 
in particular the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment. Where applicable, the law must comply with the Privacy Act of 1974 and 
other relevant statutory laws, both federal and state.
3.9 LEGAL CRITERIA SPECIFIC TO THE UK 
In the UK, the law must be capable of upholding the right to a private life, as enshrined 
in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and incorporated 
into domestic law through the Human Rights Act (1998). The law should comply with 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). All UK laws must com-
ply with the principles enshrined in the Data Protection Directive and the Data Pro-
tection Act (1998), which incorporates the EU Directive into UK law. Moreover, UK 
lawmakers should equally take into consideration the recommendations and opinions of 
the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the Article 29 
Working Party and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.
3.10 APPLYING THE PRIVACY PRINCIPLES OF THE 20TH CENTURY TO  
 THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT OF THE 21ST CENTURY
As reaffirmed by OECD member states, during a 1998 conference in Ottawa, Canada and 
declared in a Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of Privacy on Global Networks:
the technology-neutral principles of the 1980 OECD [Privacy] Guidelines 
continue to represent international consensus and guidance concerning the 
collection and handling of personal data in any medium, and provide a foun-
dation for privacy protection on global networks.85
Indeed, however, the OECD Privacy Guidelines “were prepared in the context of 
the technology then known and envisaged,” as the Hon Justice Michael Kirby, who 
chaired the expert group that produced the OECD Privacy Guidelines from 1978-80, 
85 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of Privacy on 
Global Networks, Ottawa, 7-9 October 1998, DSTI/ICCP/REG(98)10/FINAL.
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pointed out.86 While the velocity and scope of the advancement of PITs since 1980 
has been remarkable, the fundamental privacy principles formulated by the OECD can 
potentially still meet the technological challenges of the 21st Century and still remain 
applicable “irrespective of the particular technology employed”.87 However, the endless 
advancement and deployment of PITs equally requires new and specific guidance on 
how to apply the privacy/data protection principles in practice,88 and may require fur-
ther legislative and non-legislative action to ensure their effective application.89
Moreover, perhaps contrary to the OECD’s earlier view, some of the principles, 
particularly the use limitation and purpose specification principles (in addition to the 
principle of proportionality), are not only applicable to the processing of personal in-
formation/data, but also to the protection of privacy in general. For the most part, the 
privacy principles can also potentially be adapted to address privacy violations no mat-
ter where and in which manner they occur. The continued relevance of the fundamental 
privacy principles is demonstrated by the case studies.  
PART II (Chapters 5, 6, 7) evaluates/assesses the adequacy of the legal frame-
works in the US and UK, based on the criteria outlined in this chapter, in light of the 
privacy-intrusive capabilities of the following four particular PITs: body scanners; 
CCTV microphones and loudspeakers; and human-implantable microchips (RFID 
implants; GPS implants).
86 Kirby, Hon Justice Michael. Privacy protection, a new beginning: OECD principles 20 years on (Privacy Law and 
Policy Report, Volume 6, No. 3), pp. 25-29, at 27, available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/1999/41.html 
87 OECD Privacy Guidelines, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 37.
88 see COM(2007) 87 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
follow-up of the Work Programme for better implementation of the Data Protection Directive.
89 see COM (2009) 262 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - An area 
of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen.
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Privacy-Invading Technologies (PITs) are rapidly advancing and are increasingly being 
deployed worldwide at an unprecedented pace.
Section 4.2 defines what is meant by PITs. Section 4.3 overall outlines the increasing 
threat posed by the growing deployment of PITs. Section 4.4 explains the overall threat to 
bodily privacy posed by PITs. Section 4.5 explains the increasing decline of privacy out 
in public, as a result of surveillance technologies and other PITs. Section 4.6 provides an 
overview of several other technologies that may pose a significant threat to privacy.
4.2 A DEFINITION OF PITs
A definition of PITs requires flexibility, in order to be broad enough to cover all ex-
isting, emerging and prospective technologies. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
Privacy-Invading Technologies/Privacy-Intrusive Technologies (or PITs) are generally 
defined as and encompass:
Any form or type of technology, whether hardware or software, product or 
service, which poses a particular threat to privacy and/or is capable of be-
ing used to substantially violate an individual’s right to privacy and/or data 
protection rights.
To some extent, however, nearly all information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) could be regarded as PITs, including, for example, the Internet, digital services, 
mobile phones, cameras, credit cards, electronic voting machines and even photocopi-
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ers.90 Moreover, all technologies that enhance and/or replace human senses, particularly 
sight and hearing, is a PIT. Certainly, some PITs are more privacy-intrusive than others.
Therefore, PITs include not just ICT, but especially other types of technologies, 
such as DNA analysis systems, neurotechnology, identification technologies, nanotech-
nologies, advanced imaging technologies and mass surveillance technologies. For fur-
ther discussion, see section 4.6.
4.3 THE GROWING DEPLOYMENT AND THREAT OF PITs
In a post-9/11 world, amid the GWOT (now instead referred to by the White House 
under the Obama Administration as the “Overseas Contingency Operation”), PITs, 
particularly surveillance technologies used by law enforcement agencies, are rapidly 
being developed and deployed on a global scale. The increasing technological devel-
opment and availability of PITs is likely driven by the increasing collective demand 
from governments, companies and individuals for their widespread use. Governments, 
businesses and private individuals alike are collectively spending hundreds of billions 
of dollars on (homeland/national) security and surveillance technologies.  A “culture of 
fear”, whereby society fearful of the event of terrorism and/or violent crime, has fuelled 
the ‘security-industrial complex’ (Furedi, 2006) and has likely sparked this new and 
profitable ‘economy of fear’. 
A partnership between the public and private has evolved further, as a result. This 
merger of the agency of governments and corporations into a symbiotic relationship 
based on mutual wants is being justified not just in the name of security, but also for 
convenience, efficiency, personalized service, commercial advantages and for prevent-
ing fraud. However, for instance, as Masters and Michael (2006) point out, “[w]hile 
the safety and security argument has obviously paved the way for some new technolo-
gies in response to the new environment of terrorism and identity fraud, there is now a 
concern that further advancements will begin to infringe on the freedoms that security 
paradigms were originally designed to protect” (Masters and Michael, 2006, p. 37).
As pointed out in the study, An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control, 
prepared by the Omega Research Foundation in 2000 for the European Parliament’s 
STOA panel, the advancement of surveillance technologies, in conjunction with other 
crowd control technologies, are instruments of political and social control and powerful 
90  Investigative journalism in the US has uncovered the potential for multi-purpose photocopiers to reveal sensitive per-
sonal information stored on their hard drives. see Werner, Anna. “Office copiers can present identity theft risk” (CBS, 5 
February 2010), available at: http://cbs5.com/investigates/copier.identity.theft.2.1471886.html
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means of monitoring and discouraging internal dissent. The study further argues that in 
the foreseeable future, technology will most likely play the most important role in cur-
tailing civil liberties.91 The STOA panel made that prediction more than a decade ago.
If privacy and individual liberties are as dangerously at stake as easy to infringe 
upon, then the rapid and continuous technological advancement and deployment of 
PITs has, and will increasingly continue, to seriously jeopardize civil and political lib-
erties. The latest PITs, and their radical privacy-intrusive capabilities and enormous 
potential for abuse, are leading to unprecedented intrusions into both our private and 
public space, threatening not just the right to privacy, but other civil rights and our free-
dom and personal dignity overall.
4.4 PITs AND THE HUMAN BODY
The private sphere encompasses an individual’s personal space, private property, place 
of residence, personal belongings, domestic affairs, physical body, etc. Accordingly, 
the power of government authorities/law enforcement agencies, in free and democrat-
ic countries, over the private sphere is significantly restricted, in comparison to their 
power over the public sphere. An individual’s physical body (i.e. the human body), in 
particular, concerns the most intimate or personal aspect of the private sphere and its 
protection is clearly an indispensable element of privacy altogether.
It is commonly recognized that the privacy of the human body, or “corporeal pri-
vacy”, pertains to the privacy of one’s genitalia, brain, genetic data and integrity of 
one’s physical self, including the prohibition of removing objects/materials/liquids 
from one’s body or inserting objects/materials/liquids into one’s body by force or 
without that person’s consent (albeit certain exceptions may apply for only legitimate 
purposes).92 In short, corporeal privacy prohibits the undue scrutiny of/intrusion upon 
one’s physical body without his/her consent. Corporeal privacy also involves the right 
to make certain autonomous decisions concerning one’s physical body, which would 
partly explain why sexual preferences, reproduction, abortion and vaccinations are all 
considered privacy issues. Accordingly, corporeal privacy also prohibits forced abor-
tions, forced sterilizations and normally forced vaccinations.
91 Crowd control technologies, An appraisal of technologies for political control, Final Report to the STOA (Omega Foun-
dation, 2000), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/publications/studies/19991401a_en.pdf
92 For example, police can forcibly request a breath sample (or even a blood sample) from a driver involved in an automo-
bile accident to determine the driver’s blood alcohol content (BAC) level.  Or, medical personnel may perform required 
emergency operations/procedures on an individual, without that person’s consent, if, for instance, he/she is unconscious.
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Above all, the intrusion upon an individual’s private parts or genitals, by force or 
without that person’s consent, can lead to the utmost affliction of personal indignity, 
dishonor or humiliation. “[B]asic concepts of human dignity dictate a course of the 
utmost caution before an intrusion into the most private parts of the human body is 
allowed”.93  For instance, as the 8th Circuit Court in the US declared, “a strip search, 
regardless how professionally and courteously conducted, is an embarrassing and hu-
miliating experience”.94 The 9th Circuit Court has also held that “[t]he desire to shield 
one’s unclothed figure from [the] view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the 
opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity”.95
In essence, the human body is a key target of PITs. As Haggerty and Ericson point 
out, “[a] great deal of surveillance is directed at the human body” (2000, p. 611). The 
human body has become “an assemblage comprised of myriad component parts and pro-
cesses which are broken-down for purposes of observation”, which will ultimately trans-
form “the body into pure information, such that it can be rendered more mobile and com-
parable”, for the purpose of “developing strategies of governance, commerce and control” 
(Ibid., p. 613). Similarly, as Lee A. Bygrave argues, recent technological developments 
have led to the mining of the human body for ever-greater amounts of information.96
From the advancement of visualization or imaging technology, such as body scan-
ners, to DNA analysis, HIMs, biometric identification technology, and neurotechnol-
ogy, the focus of PITs on the human body has never been greater. With the emergence 
of HIMs, the human body may also become both generators and transmitters of infor-
mation themselves, changing not just the level of privacy we enjoy over our bodies, 
but also the way we perceive our bodies. Yet, the current legal framework pertaining to 
privacy/data protection was evidently designed, for the most part, to control personal 
data, as conventionally understood, and not necessarily to regulate the extensions of 
privacy infringement into other domains, such as the human body (Wood, 2006, p. 89).
Chapter 5 specifically focuses on the latest PIT capable of infringing upon the 
privacy of the human body and practically rendering clothes as an obsolete means of 
shielding our naked bodies or genitalia – Body scanners. 
93 Security and law enforcement employees, District Council 82, American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO v. Hugh CAREY, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., 737 F.2d 187 (2nd Circuit, 1984).
94 Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Circuit, 1982).
95 York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Circuit, 1963).
96 see Bygrave, Lee A.  The body as data? Reflections on the relationship of data privacy law with the human body (The 
edited text of a speech given at an international conference organized by the Office of the Victorian Privacy Commis-
sioner on the theme “The Body as Data”, Federation Square, Melbourne, 8 September 2003).
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4.5 PITs AND THE PUBLIC SPACE
The nature of the public sphere (or public space)97 has changed, as a result of the in-
creasing development and deployment of technologies and infrastructures capable of 
mass surveillance. Indeed, during the beginning of the 21st Century, we have witnessed 
the rapid disappearance of any remaining expectation of privacy in public, particularly 
in major urban areas and especially in the US and UK. 
In the Western world, the US and UK, in particular, are gradually moving towards 
a “surveillance society”98 of a scale and capacity never seen before, where everyday life 
is monitored, physical movements are tracked, most incidents/events can potentially 
be monitored/recorded and practically every person can potentially be watched and 
listened to without their acknowledgement/consent (see, e.g., Lyon, 2001). The ad-
vancement of technologies capable of mass surveillance has enabled both governments 
and private entities to potentially keep a vigilant and omnipresent eye and ear on the 
masses out in public. As a result of the rapidly increasing advancement, deployment 
and use of CCTV cameras (combined with microphones, loudspeakers and face recog-
nition software/systems),99 UAVs, GPS technology and its applications, RFID technol-
ogy and its applications, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Google’s Street View, 
Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) systems, Intelligent Transport Systems 
(ITS),100 mobile phones as a tracking tool, and location-based services/location-aware 
97 The public sphere includes, for instance, public parks, squares, sidewalks, etc. Semi-public spaces (or pseudo-public 
spaces) include, for instance, sports stadiums and shopping malls.
98 David Lyon describes a “surveillance society” as “a situation in which disembodied surveillance has become societally 
pervasive”. Lyon, David. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Open University Press, 2001), p. 33.
99 Face recognition software is even being integrated within online applications, for example, within websites such as 
Facebook and Face.com. Google Goggles, which allows users to search online (via Google images) for objects they 
have taken photos of, could also just as easily incorporate face recognition software, allowing users to also search online 
(via Google images) for persons they have taken photos of. 
100 As explained by the EDPS, Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) refer to the deployment of ICT (geolocalization tech-
nologies, such as GPS and contact-less technologies, such as RFID) within different transport modes, which will fa-
cilitate the provision of a variety of public and/or commercial LBS, such as real-time traffic information, eFreight, 
and eCall, and in doing so collect and process vast amounts of data from public and private sources. The deploy-
ment of ITS will support the development of applications for ‘tracking and tracing’ of vehicles and goods. see Eu-
ropean Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on the Communication from the Commission on an Action Plan for 
the Deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in Europe and the accompanying Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council laying down the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Sys-




applications (which collect and retain electronic records of people’s movements within 
public space), residents of the US and UK may essentially be subject, in many ways 
often involuntarily and sometimes unknowingly, to constant surveillance.
As mass surveillance becomes a reality, people will increasingly no longer be 
able to freely perform daily and lawful activities out in public, without being watched, 
tracked or listened to by either public or private entities.101 Due to the widespread de-
ployment of sophisticated CCTV systems, especially in urban areas, it is already dif-
ficult to escape ever-vigilant and omnipresent observation or to enjoy simply wandering 
around without being paid any attention to. For Gavison (1980), anonymity is a cru-
cial element of privacy and enables the freedom/ability to carry out activities in public 
without necessarily “being the subject of attention”, whereas “the aspect of anonymity 
that relates to attention and privacy is that of being lost in a crowd” (1980, p. 434). 
However, due to the significant tracking capabilities of mobile phones/smartphones and 
the potential widespread deployment of the identification/tracking capabilities of RFID 
technology, advanced CCTV camera surveillance systems (face recognition, etc.) and 
biometric technology, anonymity will no longer be an established notion of the public 
space and “being lost in a crowd” (Gavison, 1980, p. 434) is now gradually becoming 
more and more unexpected.102 
In reality, the public sphere (i.e. streets, sidewalks, etc.) obviously never had the 
same level of privacy as the private sphere (e.g. a place of residence). However, it is 
arguably fair to assume that people, only just over a decade ago, generally viewed 
public spaces, in theory, as areas/zones where they still remained relatively anonymous 
or could be relatively left alone and not paid any attention to (for further discussion, 
see Gavison, 1980). Indeed, the ongoing rapid deployment of mass public surveillance 
technologies has led to the current debate on the level of privacy out in public. Before-
hand, it was not really a matter of serious discussion. Although we have always known 
that our actions could be seen or our words could be heard in public by other people 
relatively nearby, only up until recently, people expected not to be closely monitored 
and publicly scolded from afar, for example with public CCTV cameras and CCTV 
loudspeakers, and they did not expect their actions and movements to be recorded and 
stored indefinitely for potential further processing. In other words, as Taylor points 
out, it is fair to say that “we all carry out acts in public that we would consider to be 
of a ‘private’ nature, where subjectively, we might have exhibited an expectation of 
101 For further discussion, see Lyon, David. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Open University Press, 2001).
102 For further discussion, see Blitz, Marc Jonathan. Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the 
Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity (Texas Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 6, 2004), pp. 1349-1481.
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privacy” (2002a, p. 74). Taylor further adds, “[t]hough the expectation of privacy may 
be considerably reduced in a public setting, this does not automatically mean that all 
privacy is lost” (2002a, p. 75). Therefore, while we certainly may still expect to be seen 
and heard when out in public, to a limited extent, we should not accept to be unduly 
identified, tracked, monitored, recorded and disturbed, and systematically observed and 
scrutinized or even potentially humiliated in public.
The degree of surveillance out in public is only getting worse and could ultimately 
get out of hand. As Monmonier points out, “[o]ne need not be a science fiction fan to en-
vision a future in which cameras as dense as streetlights feed images to central comput-
ers with face-recognition algorithms and biometrics software that match pedestrians to 
their stored profiles and track their movement through streets and parks” (2004, p. 115). 
Enhanced public surveillance CCTV systems, however, are just one component of 
a public mass surveillance grid; “ubiquitous computing” (ubicomp)103 and/or “ambient 
intelligence” (AmI)104 are other components.105 Ubicomp, which may also be known as 
pervasive computing,106 is the widespread (or ubiquitous) embedding of tiny, networked 
processing/computing devices or microchips into the very fabric of urban infrastructure 
and everyday objects. In addition to tiny, networked microchips and wireless sensors, 
RFID technology is central to ubicomp/AmI. AmI “refers to electronic systems that 
are sensitive and responsive to the presence of people”107 and the integration of these 
electronics into the surrounding environment, enabling for human interaction with the 
environment.108 GPS technology could equally become ubiquitous and evolve beyond 
mobile devices to their ‘embedded’ form.109 
103 Mark Weiser first introduced the concept of “ubiquitous computing” during the 1990s. see Weiser, Mark. The Computer 
for the Twentieth-First Century (Scientific American, Vol. 265, No. 3, September 1991), pp. 94-104.
104 see Aarts, Emile., and Boris de Ruyter. New research perspectives on Ambient Intelligence (Journal of Ambient Intel-
ligence and Smart Environments I, 2009), pp. 5-14, at 5.
105 As also highlighted by the SWAMI (Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence) project, “ambient intelligence” may 
pose a serious threat to privacy. 
106 Pervasive computing is similar to ubiquitous computing, only that the former emphasizes interoperability and seamless 
interconnectivity. see Aarts, Emile., and Boris de Ruyter. New research perspectives on Ambient Intelligence (Journal 
of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments I, 2009), pp. 5-14, at 6.
107 Ibid., p. 5
108 Ibid.
109 see Cave, J., et al. Trends in connectivity technologies and their socio-economic impacts, Final report of the study: 
Policy Options for the Ubiquitous Internet Society, (RAND Europe, July 2009), p. 30.
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Surveillance, therefore, may also come from not just the obvious or usual suspects, 
but additionally from the gradual testing and deployment of tiny, networked wireless 
sensors, which can, for example, measure or respond to temperature changes, sound, 
chemicals and odors. The widespread deployment of these sensors will create what is 
now known as a “ubiquitous sensor network” (USN), whereby the various sensing ca-
pabilities will bring about ‘intelligent environments’ and a ‘single information space’. 
Cities adopting ubicomp/pervasive computing and/or AmI and extensively deploying 
wireless sensors and next generation wireless networks (e.g. Broadband Convergence 
Network (BcN) or Wireless Broadband (WiBro)), are currently known as “ubiquitous 
cities” or “U-cities”, which is essentially just another name for what is more commonly 
known as “smart cities”. In U-cities, ICT is effectively ubiquitous and more than ever 
prevalent in people’s daily lives, and extensively integrated into urban space and public 
infrastructure, linking the physical world with the virtual world, and integrating commer-
cial, public, financial and medical data systems into a ‘single information space’.
On the other hand, South Korea, rather than the UK and the US, is pioneering the 
development of U-cities and is currently engaged in numerous multi-billion dollar proj-
ects to develop the cities of tomorrow. Hwaseong-Dongtan, Busan and the New Songdo 
City are the most significant examples. The extensive deployment of ICT-related tech-
nological solutions, such as smart meters, telemedicine, e-Government and intelligent 
transport systems, together with sophisticated public surveillance systems, can poten-
tially improve energy efficiency, improve healthcare delivery, enhance the provision 
of public services, reduce traffic congestion and increase public safety respectively. 
However, the corresponding privacy issues are also a serious concern.
Nevertheless, with the deployment and use of public transportation smart cards, 
electronic identification (eID), intelligent transportation systems, GPS-enabled smart-
phones, e-Health technologies, RFID technology and enhanced, networked CCTV sur-
veillance cameras, for example, we are already witnessing the beginnings of a ubiqui-
tous information society in cities across the US and Europe, albeit not on the full scale 
and scope of the emerging U-cities in South Korea.
In addition, sensors and other surveillance technologies are not only being deployed 
in public spaces, but also increasingly in homes, as part of the ICT-enabled solutions for 
independent living for the elderly, known as Ambient Assisted Living. These sensors and 
technologies can monitor a variety of activities in one’s home. The assisted living solu-
tions range from video monitoring systems to motion sensors that detect falls and other 
sensors embedded within domestic appliances and the extensive deployment/use of RFID 
tags/microchips. Collectively, the deployment of these sensors and technologies may, 
therefore, also change the nature of private homes (i.e. the private sphere).
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As ICT and other technologies become widely deployed and embedded within urban/
public infrastructure and everyday objects, these technologies will also likely become 
‘invisible’, so to speak, since people might no longer be able to see these technologies 
and, even if they can see them, might no longer really take notice of their ubiquitous pres-
ence.110 Therefore, mass surveillance technologies, for instance, could equally become 
not just ubiquitous, but banal as well. Accordingly, the term “banal surveillance” may 
better describe this growing trend.111 For example, people already do not always notice the 
ubiquitous deployment of CCTV cameras and yet they are clearly visible.112 
Moreover, in radically changing the long-established nature of public spaces, tech-
nology capable of mass surveillance enters into a realm beyond privacy. The freedom 
of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of movement and the right to be left alone are 
now all at risk. These freedoms are the cornerstone of a democratic and free society, 
and public spaces serve as the place to carry out strikes or demonstrations, to exercise 
the freedom of movement and freedom of speech, and to engage in legitimate political 
activism and public discourse. Therefore, as technologies capable of mass surveillance 
are also used as a means of social and political control, they pose the serious risk of also 
‘chilling’ the free exercise of these fundamental freedoms, in addition to threatening 
the right to privacy.113
Some authors, for instance David Brin, welcome the changing nature of the public 
space and the overall erosion of privacy, due to the development and deployment of ad-
vanced technologies capable of widespread surveillance, and envisage the emergence of 
a “transparent society” somehow remarkably endowing society with the benefits of open-
ness and accountability by practically allowing everyone to know and observe everything 
110 In the words of Godfrey Reggio (the Director of the acclaimed film Koyaanisqatsi), “Technology has become as ubiq-
uitous as the air we breathe, so we’re no longer conscious of its presence”. Welsh, James M., Gene D. Phillips, and 
Rodney Hill. The Francis Ford Coppola Encyclopedia (Scarecrow Press, 2010), p. 157.
111 I base the term “banal surveillance” on the term “banal nationalism”, coined by Michael Billig to describe the routine or 
unnoticed performance of nationalism in everyday life. see Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism (Sage Publications, 1995).
 It is also important to note here, however, that today’s terminology used to describe tomorrow’s world and potential 
future scenarios could become outdated or inaccurate, since something quite different could easily manifest instead.
112 This may be similar to the ubiquitous and unnoticed deployment of national flags, which characterizes “banal nationalism”.
113 see Crowd control technologies, An appraisal of technologies for political control, Final Report to the STOA (Omega 
Foundation, 2000), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/publications/studies/19991401a_en.pdf
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and everyone else (Brin, 1999).  While this was somewhat a novel idea, it is incomplete 
and, as Schneier significantly points out, “it ignores the crucial dissimilarity of power”.114
On the contrary, if left unchecked, especially without adequate safeguards in place, 
and with the (technological/scientific, economic and political) elite branch or power 
structure of society controlling the advancement and deployment of the most privacy-
intrusive technologies, what could more likely emerge instead is the rise of a high-tech, 
dystopian, surveillance society or a so-called “technetronic society”. In Between Two 
Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a highly-respected 
actor in world affairs and the former US National Security Advisor (1977-1981), com-
pellingly described this “technetronic society” decades ago:
Such a society would be dominated by an elite whose claim to political power 
would rest on allegedly superior scientific know-how. Unhindered by the re-
straints of traditional liberal values, this elite would not hesitate to achieve its 
political ends by the latest modern techniques for influencing public behavior 
and keeping society under close surveillance and control (1970, pp. 252-53).
The deployment and use of technologies capable of mass surveillance might im-
prove, for example, public security/safety, but without sufficient legal safeguards in 
place, it would do so by undesirably undermining the freedoms/liberties citizens seek 
to exercise and the relative sanctuary they seek to enjoy out in public spaces. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the latest developments regarding public space CCTV cam-
eras – the integration of CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers. Chapter 7 ad-
dresses both the corporeal privacy and public surveillance implications of Human-im-
plantable microchips and the corresponding RFID and GPS infrastructure, essentially 
outlining how HIMs alter/impact both the nature of the human body (private sphere) 
and the public sphere. HIMs, therefore, serve as a case study for both PITs and the hu-
man body and PITs and the public space.
114 Schneier, Bruce. “The Myth of the ‘Transparent Society’” (Wired, 3 June 2008), available at: http://www.wired.com/
politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/03/securitymatters_0306
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4.6 EXAMPLES OF PITs THAT MAY POSE SERIOUS THREATS TO   
 PRIVACY AND LIBERTY
In addition to the four PITs specifically addressed in this dissertation (i.e. the case 
studies), there are many other PITs, either still in the R&D or innovation stages or 
have already been deployed and are in use, which present equally serious challenges, 
if not greater, to privacy and liberty. These other PITs include: open source informa-
tion115 data mining intelligent software116 (part of open source intelligence (OSINT)117 
technologies); cookies; Fusion Centers; DNA analysis; electronic voting machines; au-
tomatic license plate recognition; intelligent transportation systems; unmanned aerial 
vehicles; ultra-thin, high-resolution cameras; Google’s digital services (e.g. Google 
Voice, Google Street View, etc.); LEXID; Facebook (and other online social network-
ing services); cloud computing services; automobile black boxes; Deep Packet Inspec-
tion software or behavioral advertising technology (e.g. Phorm); laptop/PC web-cams; 
nanoelectronics; software agents/artificial intelligence; Einstein 2;118 and neurotech-
nologies. This list is certainly far from complete and does not even begin to cover the 
numerous other completed or ongoing publicly and/or privately funded projects that we 
know of (or do not know of) that are developing PITs. 
115 Open source information, as opposed to closed source or classified information, includes anything publicly available, 
whether online or offline, such as blogs, tweets, information posted on social networking sites, videos, web chats or any 
other user-generated content, online news, websites, public data, geospatial data, books, academic papers, newspapers, 
magazines and even book/movie reviews.
116 The software and system being developed by Project INDECT or the software used by Visible Technologies can mine 
through infinite amounts of open source information, categorize this information and raise ‘alarms’. 
117 Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is the use of open source information for intelligence gathering and analysis. OSINT 
is increasingly being used by intelligence and law enforcement agencies around the world.  OSINT is complementary 
to Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Communication 
Intelligence (COMINT). We are seeing over and over that murderers and other criminals, and even lone terrorists, either 
brag about their crimes afterwards or give clues or clear warnings beforehand online. This is where OSINT comes in. 
If intelligence agencies or law enforcement agencies were able to monitor, sort and analyze all communications online, 
this could be used to apprehend the suspects or perhaps prevent the planned crime or act of terror.  OSINT could also 
provide some early warnings of a looming crisis.
118 Einstein 2 is a cyber intrusion detection system, developed by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
(US-CERT), meant to detect unauthorized traffic on governmental networks. Einstein 3 will go a step further and is 
meant not just to detect unauthorized traffic, but defend against it and attack the threat. However, in doing so, Einstein 
3 is expected to collect and analyze the content of all communications, in addition to monitoring malicious software 
attack patterns, in the name of cyber-security. see Radack, Jesselyn. “NSA’s cyber overkill” (Los Angeles Times, 14 July 
2009), available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/14/opinion/oe-radack14
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The following is a brief explanation of the radical capabilities and new threats to 
privacy and liberty posed by the following five PITs: Neurotechnology; Unmanned 
aerial vehicles; LEXID®; DNA analysis; and Automatic License Plate Recognition. 
4.6.1 Neurotechnology
Neurotechnologies are essentially technologies capable of determining and even per-
haps intervening in the neural functioning of a human mind.119 A number of neurotech-
nological applications are already available for general public use. 
An example of the recent advancement in neurotechnology includes hypersonic 
sound (HSS). Developed by the American Technology Corporation, HSS provides the 
ability to direct sound to a specific area or target, similar to light, using ultrasonic sound 
energy. Thus, HSS can be potentially used to infiltrate an individual’s brain and direct 
verbal communication to a particular person exclusively.
Other applications or examples of neurotechnology include Emotiv’s commercially 
available brain-computer interface (BCI) technology that can read and interpret human 
thoughts, emotions and intentions to a certain degree. The information, for instance, 
can enable a computer game to respond to a player’s emotions or enable an avatar 
(game character) mimic the expressions of the player.
Neuroscientists have even developed a way of turning thoughts into ‘tweets’ on 
Twitter, and the ability to use thoughts to move and control robotic arms or a wheel-
chair. Moreover, neuroscientists are working to develop new technologies to identify 
particular brain patterns, determined through brain scans, pertaining to certain behav-
iors, such as violence and lying. Neuroscientists have also successfully reconstructed 
patterns of brain activity into images to determine what the test subjects had seen.120
There are certainly societal benefits of neurotechnology, especially for the dis-
abled, who either cannot move or are missing limbs or are bound to a wheelchair.  As 
a result, there are significant R&D projects, in the US, EU and Japan, that are working 
towards neurotechnological solutions for handicapped persons. Neurotechnology also 
offers benefits for the mentally ill. However, it is questionable that these innovative 
R&D activities involving neurotechnolgy are taking into consideration the potentially 
119 For further information, see “Clive Thompson on Why the Next Civil Rights Battle Will Be Over the Mind” (Wired, 24 
March, 2008), available at: http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/16-04/st_thompson
120 see Naselaris, Thomas., et al. Bayesian Reconstruction of Natural Images from Human Brain Activity (Neuron, Volume 
63, Issue 6, 902-915, 24 September 2009).
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serious ethical issues and privacy threats at this early stage.121 As the applications of 
neurotechnology steadily advance and the scope of use increases, grave privacy and 
security concerns will certainly increase accordingly, if privacy is not adequately con-
sidered from the very beginning.
Neurotechnologies clearly challenge a realm/domain of privacy never seriously 
considered before to be vulnerable to technology – the brain or mind, and essentially 
spark a new debate on mental privacy or privacy of the brain/mind122 and the meaning 
of ‘cognitive liberty’ (or freedom of thought).123
4.6.2 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (also known as “drones”) are aerial vehicles piloted 
by either artificial intelligence or by remote control, and are often used for surveillance/
reconnaissance missions or air assaults. UAVs include, for example, the “Shadow”, 
“Raven”, “Zephyr” and “Predator”. Other UAVs or drones include micro aerial ve-
hicles (MAV), vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) vehicles or larger airships, such as 
blimps, and robotic helicopters, such as the A-160T Hummingbird.
The most advanced imaging systems/cameras are often attached to large or me-
dium-sized UAVs, providing the ability to conduct continuous, wide-area visual sur-
veillance from the air. The images or video feed are then transmitted in real-time to 
computers on the ground. Advanced imaging systems, developed under the auspices of 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), include the Autonomous 
Real-time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance - Imaging System (ARGUS-IS)124 and Pan-
optes, an ultra-thin, lens-free, ultra high-resolution camera. 
The increasing development, deployment and use of UAVs and advanced imaging 
systems have resulted in the need to monitor and analyze large amounts of video data. 
121 For example, the neuroscientists that I spoke with at the ICT Event 2010, who were demonstrating BCI technology 
applications, which they had developed, never considered any of the potential privacy or ethical issues associated with 
the technology.
122 “Clive Thompson on Why the Next Civil Rights Battle Will Be Over the Mind” (Wired, 24 March, 2008), available at: 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/16-04/st_thompson
123 The non-profit law institute Cognitive Liberty and Ethics defines “cognitive liberty” as the “right of each individual to 
think independently and autonomously, to use the full spectrum of his or her mind, and to engage in multiple modes of 
thought”. For further information, see http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/faqs/faq_general.htm
124 ARGUS-IS is the integration of a 1.8 Gigapixels video sensor, an airborne processing subsystem and a ground process-
ing subsystem.
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In a broad agency announcement for contractors, DARPA described the “ever increas-
ing need to monitor live video feeds and search large volumes of archived video data for 
activities of interest due to the rapid growth in development and fielding of motion vid-
eo systems”.125 As DARPA explains, the capability of UAVs in recording huge swathes 
of video footage, which involves so many activities or objects to be watched for hints of 
“suspicious behavior” and their growing field of view (up to 25 km2 in the near future), 
is making it evermore harder to effectively monitor and scrutinize/interpret all potential 
activities. An automated system, DARPA further explains, is therefore required to have 
the capability of simultaneously analyzing and detecting specific actions, events and ac-
tivities in real-time and indexing and searching archived video, as opposed to the use of 
labor intensive human analysis of portions of real-time video and the manual review of 
archived video using normal fast forward and reverse controls.126 This automated sys-
tem is termed the Video and Image Retrieval and Analysis Tool (VIRAT) and DARPA is 
contracting software companies and universities to develop it. The resolution capability 
of the video system ranges from 10-30 cm, which DARPA has assured is not enough to 
permit human identification.127 However, there are several multi-gigapixel cameras in 
development, such as Panoptes, which are more than capable of being used to identify 
individuals on the ground. VIRAT will be capable of looking for activities, such as 
loitering, running, smoking, hand shaking, kissing, fires, crowds, convoys and vehicles 
movements.128 The focus of VIRAT is aerial video, but of course VIRAT can also be 
used for on ground-based video.129
In addition to foreign intelligence operations and military reconnaissance, UAVs 
can be used by law enforcement agencies for domestic routine aerial surveillance. The 
variety of potential public security/safety gains of the use of UAVs include their use 
in the surveillance of suspected criminals, search and rescue missions, border surveil-
lance, neighborhood patrols, chemical and biological weapon detection, monitoring 
forest fires, floods and storms, and enforcing traffic laws.   While UAVs are not yet 
commonplace, there is an increasing interest in their use. In a paper titled “Applications 
125 Broad Agency Announcement, Video and Image Retrieval and Analysis Tool (VIRAT), DARPA INFORMATION PRO-







for mini VTOL UAV for law enforcement”, Douglas Murphy from the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Center in San Diego and James Cycon from Sikorsky Aircraft Corpo-
ration, reveal the support of the US Department of Defense in using UAVs for routine 
law enforcement and domestic surveillance and control.130 In the UK, police are equally 
keen on using UAVs for domestic routine surveillance.131 UAVs could also be used for 
crowd or riot control, with the attachment of the latest non-lethal weapons. 
In the US, the FAA is (or at least was) the main barrier to the widespread deploy-
ment of UAVs for mass domestic aerial surveillance and routine law enforcement op-
erations. The FAA has opposed the widespread deployment and use of UAVs in the US, 
based on air traffic/aviation safety concerns. At present, the FAA only authorizes the 
domestic use of UAVs on a case-by-case basis and has issued hundreds of certificates to 
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.132 But, as a result of the FAA Mod-
ernization and Reform Act of 2012, which requires the FAA to develop and implement 
operational and certification requirements for the deployment of UAVs as part of the 
national airspace system by the end of 2015, the routine and widespread deployment 
and use of UAVs is set to become a reality in the very near future.133
In addition to potential aviation safety concerns, there are also justified privacy 
concerns. Since case law in the US, for instance, permits law enforcement agencies 
to view or record what is in plain sight or open to the public eye,134 it is likely that the 
general use of UAVs does not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Already, 
the use of manned police aircraft is legally permitted and considered reasonable for 
routine law enforcement activities or to gather evidence without a warrant.135 But, there 
are still potential legal questions when, for instance, the surveillance is carried out 
to observe private residential backyards or to peek into high-rise apartment windows 
without a warrant. Nevertheless, the deployment/use of UAVs poses a greater threat to 
130 see Murphy, Douglas., and James Cycon. “Applications for mini VTOL UAV for law enforcement”, available at: http://
www.spawar.navy.mil/robots/pubs/spie3577.pdf
131 see Lewis, Paul. “CCTV in the sky: police plan to use military-style spy drones” (The Guardian, 23 January 2010), 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/23/cctv-sky-police-plan-drones
132 see Waterman, Shaun. “Drones over U.S. get OK by Congress” (The Washington Times, 7 February 2012), available at: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/7/coming-to-a-sky-near-you/?page=1
133 see Ibid.
134 The US Supreme Court, for instance, held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields. see, e.g., 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
135 The US Supreme Court in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), for instance, ruled that law enforcement officers do not 
require a warrant to observe an individual’s backyard from a helicopter hundreds of feet in the air.
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privacy. For instance, manned police aircraft are not meant nor designed specifically 
for conducting mass aerial surveillance and nor do they have the most advanced imag-
ing systems built-in. Moreover, UAVs could easily far outnumber ordinary manned 
police aircraft and they can fly for prolonged periods of time. Since UAVs can be much 
smaller and quieter, they can hover in areas where much larger manned aircraft cannot 
and their presence could also potentially go unnoticed. As potential vehicles for crowd 
control technologies and non-lethal weapons, UAVs could also have serious implica-
tions for other civil liberties.
4.6.3 LEXID® 
The LEXID® (Lobster-Eye X-ray Imaging Device), being developed by Physical Optic 
Corporation and funded by the DHS, is an X-ray imaging hand-held device that provides 
the ability to view objects or persons behind walls or hidden in containers or vehicles. 
The visualization or imaging technology of the LEXID® is modeled after the eyes of 
lobsters. Lobsters see by reflection, not refraction, made possible by thousands of squares 
located in their eyes. Composed entirely of straight walls and right angles, as opposed to 
the curved cones of a human’s eye, a lobster’s eye reflects light beams that enter at consis-
tent angles. The consistency of these angles of reflection focuses all of the light beams to 
the same focal point, which enables lobsters to see in extremely dim light.136
The LEXID® consists of a low-powered X-ray generator and an optics system. In-
stead of detecting X-rays that pass through an object, the LEXID® detects X-rays that 
are scattered back to the device. The optics system, made up of thousands of polished 
metallic squares, acquires and focuses these backscattered rays by collecting all of 
the reflected rays into one focal point, instead of analyzing divergent rays at different 
points in the system. Software synchronizes the images acquired, then processes and 
displays them on a screen. The device, according to Physical Optics Corporation, can 
see through walls made of concrete or wood and even through steel up to 3 inches (75 
mm) thick. Although the images are not perfectly clear, future systems are planned to 
have improved resolution.137 
While the LEXID® offers potential security gains, people’s homes and cars, for 
instance, are now more than ever vulnerable to unreasonable and warrantless searches 
conducted by law enforcement agents using this technology. If the use of LEXID® in-
136 Physical Optics Corporation, available at: http://www.poc.com/emerging_products/lexid/default.asp
137 Ibid.
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deed becomes widespread and is left unchecked in the US and EU, the Fourth Amend-
ment of the US Constitution or Article 8 of the ECHR / Article 7 of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union respectively will be rendered practically futile.
4.6.4 DNA analysis
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), now widely understood as the “genetic information 
molecule” of all living organisms, can be found in any human cell or bodily material, 
e.g. saliva, blood and strands of hair. Anything derived from a person’s body can serve 
as a ‘DNA sample’. A ‘DNA profile’ is generated from a DNA sample and is stored 
on a DNA database. The unique DNA characteristics are visualized as a numeric code.
While DNA profiles alone pose a far less threat to privacy than DNA samples, since 
the profiles are basically “just a bunch of numbers”,138 DNA profiles can still potentially 
reveal information on specific hereditary characteristics, depending on the chromosome 
zones used.139 Moreover, in a process known as “familial DNA searching”, DNA pro-
files can also be used to identify relatives, whereby a partial genetic match between two 
or more DNA profiles signifies that the individuals concerned are genetically related to 
one another.140 
The analysis of a DNA sample, on the other hand, can reveal vast amounts of sensi-
tive personal information, including details regarding physical characteristics, health 
and even certain behavioral traits. In the words of Sir Alec Jeffreys,141 “[i]f you have 
a DNA profile it is just a bunch of numbers on the computer and it really does not 
matter, but if you have the original DNA sample then you have the potential to extract 
absolutely every scrap of genetic information of that individual”.142 The science and 
technology behind DNA analysis is advancing rapidly. Studies have now shown that 
“nearly all behaviors that have been studied show moderate to high inheritability - usu-
138 Sir Alec Jeffreys, House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, Forensic Science on Trial, Seventh Report 
of Session 2004-05, para. 70.
139 see Council Resolution of 25 June 2001 on the exchange of DNA analysis results (2001/C 187/01).
140 For further discussion/explanation on the potentially significant privacy implications of “familial DNA searching”, see 
Epstein, Jules. “Genetic Surveillance” - The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA Investigations (Journal of Law, 
Technology and Policy, Vol. 2009, No. 1), pp. 141-173, available at: www.jltp.uiuc.edu/archives/Epstein.pdf
141 The British geneticist, Sir Alec Jeffreys, developed the standard DNA profiling techniques used today.
142 House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, Forensic Science on Trial, Seventh Report of Session 2004-
05, para. 70. 
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ally to a somewhat greater degree than do many common physical diseases” (McGuffin 
et al., 2001). Evidently, genes have an influence on behavior (Hood and Rowen, 1997). 
The MAOA gene is linked to violent behavior,143 the D4-7 gene variant is known as 
the “risk-taking gene”, the “stathmin” gene is responsible for fear and anxiety, and the 
CHRM2 gene is associated with intelligence (Dick et al., 2007). As research has shown, 
the information contained within a DNA sample could also potentially be used to con-
struct a computer image of the source’s face.144
People constantly leave behind DNA samples unintentionally and unavoidably. 
Since DNA samples are so easily left behind, a physical intrusion/abstraction is not 
necessary to obtain a DNA sample, and DNA samples can easily be obtained covertly. 
There are practically infinite possibilities on how a DNA sample could be covertly 
obtained. And, similar to trash discarded on public property, the collection of discarded 
DNA samples is, for obvious reasons, not illegal.145 Even so, “[n]o surveillance tech-
nology is more threatening to privacy than that designed to unlock the information 
contained in human genes”.146 DNA is essentially everywhere and, as a result, could 
potentially or theoretically lead to what is known as “genetic surveillance”147 or “bio-
veillance” (i.e. the omnipresent identification and tracking of individuals via the use 
of DNA), and even the business of “genetic paparazzi”,148 whereby the ‘paparazzi’ go 
around in search of DNA samples of popular figures, such as movie stars, in order to 
publicly reveal potentially hidden sensitive personal information about them for mon-
etary rewards.149
The vast (sensitive) personal information contained within one’s DNA still requires, 
however, sophisticated scientific expertise and advanced technology to be discovered. 
143 see Russell, Jacob. “Genetic risk for violent behavior?” (UPI Correspondent, 27 November 2006), available at: http://
www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Health/2006/11/27/genetic_risk_for_violent_behavior/9889/
144 see Goldman, Russell. “Crime Scene DNA Could Create Image of Suspect’s Face” (ABC News, 18 February 2009), 
available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/AheadoftheCurve/story?id=6897788&page=1
145 For example, the US Supreme Court, in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), ruled that the warrantless search 
and seizure of trash discarded for collection is permissible.
146 Canadian Privacy Commissioner’s report on Genetic Testing and Privacy (1992), p. 2.
147 For further discussion/explanation on the potentially significant privacy implications of “familial DNA searching”, see 
Epstein, Jules. “Genetic Surveillance” - The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA Investigations (Journal of Law, 
Technology and Policy, Vol. 2009, No. 1), pp. 141-173, available at: www.jltp.uiuc.edu/archives/Epstein.pdf
148 see Frumkin, Dan., et al. Authentication of Forensic DNA samples (Forensic Science International: Genetics, 2009).
149 Ibid.
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Therefore, due to the high costs of DNA analysis, at present, “genetic surveillance” is 
not yet feasible. However, this could all change, as DNA analysis becomes more and 
more widespread, routine, cheaper and easier to perform.
Indeed, the cost of DNA sequencing/analysis has rapidly dropped in the last 
four years, at a much quicker rate of decline than computers, according to George 
M. Church, a pioneer in DNA sequencing technology and Professor of Genetics at Har-
vard University,150 which has potentially given rise to a ‘Moore’s Law for DNA analy-
sis’.151 Already, at the cost of several thousand dollars, DNA tests can be conducted to 
determine if a person is prone to certain diseases. Web-based services, such as 23an-
dMe, provide genetic home testing, which allows an individual to mail DNA samples 
for DNA analysis, normally to determine paternity. However, the most worrisome is 
relatively cheap and complete genetic sequencing.152 Complete Genomics announced 
that the company will begin to charge $5,000 for the genetic sequencing of a human 
chromosome. The next step is $1,000 per genome, which is expected by 2012, and even 
newer techniques could drive the price down to $100 per genome.153  
With regards to DNA analysis/sequencing, privacy is especially threatened by the 
risks of DNA samples being analyzed and used for additional unspecified purposes, 
without explicit consent or knowledge of the person concerned or beyond the original 
specified purposes the samples were collected with consent. As widely recognized, the 
risks of abuse are immense, due to the many ways in which the sensitive personal in-
formation contained within DNA samples can be wrongfully exploited. For instance, 
insurance companies may be interested in DNA analysis to predict a person’s potential 
future health status or even potential driving skills,154 when calculating premiums for 
insurance applicants. The results of the DNA analysis could provide the basis for a 
higher insurance premium. Employers could equally be interested in DNA analysis to 
also predict the potential future health status of job applicants or current employees 
and to determine the personality traits and intelligence of candidates. Accordingly, em-
150 see Pollack, Andrew. “Dawn of Low-Price Mapping Could Broaden DNA Uses” (New York Times, 6 October 2008), 
available at:  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/business/06gene.html?hp
151 see Humphries, Courtney. “Over the Horizon: A Moore’s Law for Genetics” (Technology Review, Published by MIT, 
March/April 2010), available at: http://www.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/24590
152 see supra note 148.
153 see supra note 149.
154 According to a recent study conducted by neuroscientists at the University of California in Irvine, a particular gene 
variant may be responsible for bad driving.  
 see http://uci.edu/features/feature_bdnfdriving_091028.php
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ployers could use DNA analysis results to deny someone a job or promotion and could 
easily collect samples from employees without their knowledge or consent. Showing 
up at a job interview alone, for example, could supply the prospective employer with a 
DNA sample. 
In the US, therefore, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
(GINA) was finally enacted and, as a result, employers are prohibited from taking em-
ployment-related decisions based on genetic information. GINA also prohibits health 
insurance companies from denying a person health insurance coverage or raising pre-
miums based solely on genetic information. Nevertheless, what GINA explicitly covers 
is just the tip of the iceberg, when it comes to the foreseen and unforeseen possibilities, 
as outlined above, of using the potentially limitless sensitive personal information con-
tained within DNA.
But, the covert nature of DNA sampling could mean one day that we could all be 
subject to DNA analysis without our knowledge or consent. Therefore, we could still 
gradually lose control of knowing when DNA analysis is conducted on us and how 
the results may somehow be used.155  Accordingly, GINA, and similar legislation, will 
become increasingly difficult to enforce. 
With the decreasing cost and increasing sophistication of DNA analysis and the po-
tential for a DNA profile to be stored for every individual, DNA could one day be used 
for omnipresent identification and tracking or “genetic surveillance”.156 It could begin 
with not just police, but also with private companies, such as banks, demanding DNA 
samples to verify identity by using on-the-spot DNA sequencing. It is not as paranoid 
or farfetched as one might think. Already, according to responses to a review of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), police in the UK have publicly proposed 
their desire to lower the threshold for which they can collect DNA samples to include 
non-recordable or non-imprisonable offences, such as littering and speeding, and the 
power to collect DNA samples simply to verify identity.157 The storage of tens of mil-
lions of DNA samples and profiles, by governments and/or private entities, and both the 
155 For further discussion, see Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on Genetic Data, adopted March 2004 (WP 
91), p. 12.
156 see Epstein, Jules. “Genetic Surveillance” - The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA Investigations (Journal of Law, 
Technology and Policy, Vol. 2009, No. 1), pp. 141-173, available at: www.jltp.uiuc.edu/archives/Epstein.pdf
157 see Modernising Police Powers: Review of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, Home Office, Consul-
tation Paper, March 2007, para. 3.33; Ford, Richard. “Police want DNA from speeding drivers and litterbugs on data-
base” (The Times, 2 August 2007), available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2183105.ece; 
Travis, Alan. “Police may be given power to take DNA samples in the street” (The Guardian, 2 August 2007), available 
at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/aug/02/ukcrime.humanrights
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decreasing cost and diminishing difficulty of DNA analysis, may inevitably lead to a 
society worried about unavoidably leaving behind vast amounts of (sensitive) personal 
information (i.e. DNA samples) wherever they go or whatever they do.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has described DNA analy-
sis as “by far the most significant breakthrough in crime detection since the inception 
of fingerprint identification”.158  Indeed, DNA profiles, generated from DNA samples 
obtained from crime scenes, have led to the identification of suspects responsible for 
murders and rapes, and significantly improved the chances of a crime being solved. For 
example, in the UK, at one point, with DNA profiling, the rate of detection increased 
to 43% from the average detection rate of 24%.159 However, the faith in DNA as the 
“golden standard” of identification is now being called into question, as researchers 
have revealed how DNA samples can be potentially falsified.160 In addition, offenders 
could plant false DNA evidence at a crime scene.
In any case, while the benefits of DNA profiling and national DNA databases for 
criminal investigations are clear, both for proving a suspect guilty of a crime or for 
revealing their innocence, albeit not perfectly, the threat to privacy and liberty is daunt-
ing, as DNA collection, storage and analysis becomes more and more common, ad-
vanced, revealing, cheaper and easier. 
4.6.5 Automatic License Plate Recognition 
Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR), also known as Automatic Vehicle Iden-
tification (AVI), is a mass surveillance technology/system capable of automatically 
reading or scanning license plates on vehicles and then comparing the number on the 
license plate with all those stored in databases. An ALPR system is basically made up 
of cameras, computers and databases. The computers utilize software that manipulates/
enhances the images of the license plates and optical character recognition to extract the 
numbers/letters on the license plate. 
ALPR systems are used to identify drivers on the road and locate vehicles that police 
are searching for. Thus, ALPR systems can potentially offer public security gains in rela-
158 see “Under the Microscope”, Her Majesty’s Inspector David Blakey, Home Office, July 2000.
159 House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, Forensic Science on Trial, Seventh Report of Session 2004-
05, para. 62. 
160 see Frumkin, Dan., et al. Authentication of Forensic DNA samples (Forensic Science International: Genetics, 2009).
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tion to criminal investigations, such as locating a wanted criminal suspect. ALPR systems 
are also being used in London, for example, to enforce the city’s congestion charge.
However, while ALPR systems certainly offer public security gains and other soci-
etal benefits, there are legitimate concerns over the capabilities of ALPR systems being 
used by governments for the general widespread tracking of vehicle movements and 
other purposes beyond searching for wanted criminal suspects or investigating a crime.
 
5 BODY SCANNERS:      
 A strip search by other means*
5.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Since the tragic events of 9/11, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
critically served to enhance the ability of airport security screening to detect and/or 
discover potential threats to aviation security. The deployment of new technology has 
been central to this enhancement. Body scanners have only recently been deployed at 
airports across the US as an alternative to patdowns. There are also now calls for their 
use to eventually replace walk-through metal detectors. Body scanners, however, are 
highly intrusive upon the privacy of one’s body and may violate the Fourth Amendment 
of the US Constitution, if not proportionally and appropriately used. 
Section 5.2 explains the privacy intrusiveness of (backscatter) body scanners, a 
type of body scanner, comparing them to a strip search. Section 5.3 explains how back-
scatter body scanners work. Section 5.4 points out their security benefits and draw-
backs. Section 5.5 discusses the plausibility of the threat posed by plastic guns, ceramic 
knives, and liquid/chemical and plastic explosives, which backscatter body scanners 
are promoted for aiding in their detection or discovery. Section 5.6 describes the pos-
sible alternatives to backscatter body scanners in airport security screening.161 Section 
5.7 describes the scope of deployment of body scanners in the US. Section 5.8 outlines 
the statutory law and case law of special relevance in the US. Section 5.9 evaluates 
and highlights the deficiencies and dilemmas of the US legal framework in terms of 
protecting privacy, fulfilling the principles of privacy and upholding the integrity of 
the Fourth Amendment with regards to the use of body scanners. Section 5.10 outlines 
some proposals on how to enhance the US legal framework. Section 5.11 briefly ex-
plains whether the focus should be on regulating the use or regulating the manufacture 
161 This chapter will only discuss the security screening of passengers themselves and not their luggage or carry-on bags.
*  Chapter 5, despite subsequent additions and modifications, served as the basis for the article I published previously, 
titled: Backscatter body scanner - A strip search by other means (Computer Law & Security Report, Volume 24, Issue 
4, Elsevier, July 2008), pp. 316-325.
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of body scanners. Section 5.12 outlines the international deployment of body scanners. 
Section 5.13 ends the chapter with some ending remarks.
5.2 A STRIP SEARCH BY OTHER MEANS?
Backscatter body scanners, manufactured by American Science and Engineering, Inc. 
(AS&E)162 and Rapiscan (a unit of OSI Systems, Inc.),163 enable the operator of the de-
vice to see just beneath the clothing of an individual, clearly revealing that individual’s 
naked body, including the shape and size of genitals, buttocks and female breasts. As 
Bill Scannell, a privacy advocate/technology consultant, asserts, “It shows nipples. It 
shows the clear outline of genitals”.164 Backscatter body scanners can also potentially 
reveal sensitive medical details about a person, such as mastectomies and colostomy 
appliances. The graphic anatomical detail of the images produced by backscatter body 
scanners has led Barry Steinhardt of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to 
persistently call their use a “virtual strip search”.  
As virtual money is used to make payments by other means - electronic means, 
a virtual strip search is used to inspect one’s body by electronic means. But, could a 
virtual strip search be considered the same as a conventional strip search? Well, society 
and law enforcement bodies consider virtual money to be just another form of money. 
Interpol defines virtual money as “an encrypted code representing money, in the same 
way that paper money is only paper bearing certain characteristics such as graphics and 
serial numbers”.165 The only main difference is that virtual money is seen on a com-
puter screen. Perhaps, just like virtual/electronic money is increasingly being used in 
place of conventional paper money and could one day become the dominant medium 
of exchange, unit of account or store of value in the digital age, virtual strip searches 
can also substitute conventional strip searches. As William Saletan asserts, “they [back-
scatter body scanners] don’t extend the practice of strip-searching. They abolish it”.166 
162 AS&E, available at: http://www.as-e.com/products_solutions/tsa_z_backscatter_pilot.asp
163 Rapiscan, available at: http://www.rapiscan.com/sec1000.html
164 Sharkey, Joe. “Airport Screeners Could Get X-Rated X-Ray Views” (New York Times, 24 May 2005), available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/business/24road.html
165 Interpol, available at: http://www.interpol.int/Public/TechnologyCrime/CrimePrev/VirtualMoney.asp 
166 Saletan, William. “Naked Came The Passenger” (Washington Post, 4 March 2007), available at: http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/02/AR2007030202035_pf.html
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Essentially, the only significant difference between the use of backscatter body scan-
ners, without the employment of a privacy algorithm, and the conduct of a conventional 
strip search is that an individual’s naked body is seen not in person, but via a computer 
screen and without the need to remove a single item of clothing. “Stripping is just a 
means. Virtual inspections [backscatter body scanners] achieve the same end by other 
means”167 (emphasis added).  
Nonetheless, backscatter body scanners are at present being used as an alternative 
to patdowns, without the guarantee of the employment of a privacy algorithm. Advo-
cates of backscatter body scanners assert that their use, as an alternative to patdowns, 
actually enhances the privacy of passengers, since patdowns require physical contact. 
But, the use of a backscatter body scanner, without the employment of a privacy al-
gorithm, is comparable to conducting a strip search, and thus is considerably more 
intrusive than an appropriately conducted patdown. Although, according to the TSA, 
during the trial phase at Sky Harbor International Airport, 70% of passengers opted to 
be subjected to a backscatter body scanner instead of a patdown,168 it is unclear whether 
or not they were fully aware of the intrusive capability of backscatter body scanners or, 
for instance, if they were shown a true sample of the images generated. Moreover, it 
was not revealed what percentage of the passengers who opted to be scanned was male 
or female and it is also unknown how the passengers were surveyed.169 
In recognition of the intrusive capability of backscatter body scanners and to dem-
onstrate their disapproval of the proposal to deploy them at US airports, Privacy Inter-
national awarded the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the ‘Orwell Award’ for 
167 Ibid. 
168 Frank, Thomas. “Revealing X-ray scanner makes its debut” (USA TODAY, 26 February 2007), available at: http://
www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2007-02-26-backscatter-usat_x.htm
169 On the other hand, this result was recently confirmed by a more appropriately conducted poll by Gallup. In the midst 
of the so-called Christmas day attack, 78% of US air travelers surveyed approved of the use of body scanners at US 
airports. see “In U.S., Air Travelers Take Body Scans in Stride”, 11 January 2010, available at: http://www.gallup.com/
poll/125018/air-travelers-body-scans-stride.aspx
 And even more recently, a survey study conducted by the IT firm Unisys in April 2010, as part of the Unisys Security 
Index, found that nearly 65% of Americans are willing to undergo full body scans for greater aviation security. see 
Unisys Press Release available at: http://www.unisys.com/unisys/news/detail.jsp?id=1120000970001910179
 But, these results still leave an average of 30% of Americans unwilling to undergo full body scans, which should not be 
discounted.  Moreover, the willingness of US travelers will likely continue to drop as time elapses further away from 
the so-called Christmas day attack.
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the “Most Invasive Proposal”.170 The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has 
equally recognized that body scanners pose a serious threat to privacy and has called 
for the suspension of the use of body scanners at airports until appropriate laws and 
regulations are put into place.171  
5.3 HOW BACKSCATTER BODY SCANNERS WORK
Objects with a high atomic number (high Z materials), such as metallic weapons, ab-
sorb X-rays, while explosives, containing, for example, nitrogen and carbon, which 
have a low atomic number (low Z materials), scatter X-rays. The intensity of X-ray 
backscatter decreases as the atomic number (Z) increases. Human tissue is predomi-
nately composed of oxygen, which has a relatively low atomic number. The technology 
of backscatter body scanners works by projecting low-radiation X-rays onto an indi-
vidual while standing in a portal.172 The X-rays that reflect off the individual or back-
scatter are detected by the scanner, identified where they came from and converted into 
a photographic-quality image displayed on a monitor, revealing any concealed objects 
of low Z material. Backscatter body scanners also recognize the lack of scattering and 
therefore can reveal any concealed object of high Z material. Concealed objects, both 
metallic and non-metallic, are distinguishable in backscatter images due to their signifi-
cant differences in atomic number from human tissue. The image edges of concealed 
objects of low Z material are ideally enhanced to facilitate their detection.173
170 Privacy International, US Big Brother Awards, available at: http://www.privacyinternational.org/bigbrother/us2000 (5 
April 2000).
171 Further information is available at: http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/
172 AS&E, available at: http://www.as-e.com/products_solutions/smart_check.asp
173 see World Intellectual Property Organization, International Application No.: PCT/US1991/005558, Publication No.: 
WO/1992/002937, Publication Date: 20 February 1992, Applicant: IRT CORPORATION, available at: http://www.
wipo.int/pctdb/en/wo.jsp?IA=WO1992002937&DISPLAY=DESC; 
 U.S. Patent No. 7,110,493, entitled “X-ray detector system having low Z material panel”, Issued to Rapiscan Security 
Products, Inc. on September 19, 2006.
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5.4 SECURITY BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF BACKSCATTER BODY  
 SCANNERS 
Evidently, there are systemic vulnerabilities in the security screening process at air-
ports. This is true not just in the US, but internationally. The covert security audits, 
conducted by the TSA and the GAO, have especially revealed the vulnerabilities at 
US airports. GAO investigators managed to get though airport security checkpoints 
undetected with either improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or improvised incendiary 
devices (IIDs) hidden both in their carry-on luggage and on their persons.174 In 2007, 
it was publicly disclosed that TSA screeners on numerous occasions failed to detect 
simulated explosives and bomb parts hidden under the clothes of TSA covert security 
auditors.175 A few months later, it was reported that a loaded firearm slipped through 
airport security176 and a TSA screener, during a covert security audit, failed to detect a 
fake bomb even after conducting a patdown.177 
While the vulnerabilities are partly due to “human factors”,178 the main problem, in 
the first place, is the incapability of walk-through metal detectors (WTMDs) to detect 
plastic guns, ceramic knives, and liquid/chemical and plastic explosives. The other sig-
nificant problem is with patdowns. The quality of patdowns may vary significantly, due 
to human factors, and patdowns cannot reveal relatively small amounts of chemical or 
plastic explosives hidden very close to a person’s genitals, such as within their underwear, 
174 see Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA’s Passenger Screening Process, State-
ment of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, and John W. Cooney, Assis-
tant Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations of the United States Government Accountability Office, during 
the testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, 15 November 
2007, available at: http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071114175647.pdf
175 Frank, Thomas. “Most fake bombs missed by screeners” (USA TODAY, 17 October 2007), available at: http://www.
usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-17-airport-security_N.htm
176 see “Loaded gun slips through airport security” (CNN, 23 January 2008), available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/
US/01/23/airport.gun/index.html
177 see “TSA tester slips mock bomb past airport security” (CNN, 28 January 2008), available at: http://edition.cnn.
com/2008/US/01/28/tsa.bombtest/index.html
178 “Human factors” refers to the demands a job places on the capabilities of, and the constraints it imposes on, the people 
doing it. For screeners, the human factors issues cited in past studies include the repetitive tasks screeners perform, the 
close and constant monitoring required to spot the rare appearances of dangerous objects, and the stress involved in 
dealing with the public, who may dislike being screened or demand faster action to avoid missing their flights”. U.S. 
General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance, GAO/
RCED-00-75 (Washington, D.C.: 28 June 2000), p. 26. 
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since patdowns conducted at airports in the US and in Europe do not normally involve the 
touching of these sensitive areas. While the deficiencies of WTMDs and patdowns were 
always clear to security experts, these deficiencies have been especially highlighted by 
the so-called “underwear bomb” containing PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate) that made 
it through Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport undetected on December 25, 2009.
Indeed, backscatter body scanners can (potentially) significantly enhance the se-
curity screening process at airports and reduce the adverse effects of human factors by 
facilitating security screeners to detect or discover any object hidden on a person that 
metal detectors and sometimes a patdown cannot or do not.179  
Nevertheless, like any single security apparatus, device or system, (backscatter) body 
scanners are certainly not foolproof. Since the low-radiation X-rays emitted from back-
scatter body scanners only penetrate about 0.1 inches (0.254 centimeters) of the skin, 
they are unable, for instance, to reveal threats hidden deeper in body cavities. Terrorists 
determined to get pass security screening with a bomb, for example, can hide explosives 
and a detonator in their rectum, which was indeed the new strategy reportedly used by al 
Qaeda to target Saudi Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef inside a palace in August 2009.180 
There is also a risk from high-explosives surgically implanted within skin tissue, where 
they may potentially not be revealed by body scanners, for example under breast tissue.181 
In addition, body scanners apparently may also have potential difficulties in detecting 
179 During the second meeting of the Task Force on Security Scanners in 2010, first set up by the European Commission, 
representatives present from Schiphol Airport, Manchester Airport and the UK Department of Transport, for instance, 
explained that after their trial phases of body scanners, they are convinced that the evidence proves that body scanners 
offer immense security benefits and enhancements (i.e. improved detection of both metallic and non-metallic threats on 
a person). The European Commission has equally recognized and acknowledged the security benefits of body scanners, 
which must be seriously taken into consideration. see the Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at EU airports (COM(2010) 311 final), 15.6.2010. 
180 MacVica, Sheila. “Al Qaeda Bombers Learn from Drug Smugglers: New Technique of Storing Bomb Materials Inside 
Body Cavity Nearly Kills a Saudi Prince” (CBS News, 28 September 2009), available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2009/09/28/eveningnews/main5347847.shtml
181 Reportedly, terrorists are known to have implanted PETN in the breasts of women. see “Terrorists Could Use Explo-
sives in Breast Implants to Crash Planes, Experts Warn” (The Sun, 24 March 2010), available at: http://www.foxnews.
com/world/2010/03/24/terrorists-use-explosives-breast-implants-crash-planes-experts-warn/?test=latestnews
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explosives hidden in shoes or items stitched into clothing.182 The security vulnerabilities 
of body scanners were additionally highlighted by the GAO in a 2009 report183 and again 
most recently in a report released in 2010.184 Hence, the reason why a “holistic approach” 
is required for ensuring aviation security, as the European Commission argues, which 
embodies a combination of a variety of devices and methods.185
On a different note, the non-security related drawbacks of backscatter body scan-
ners include the requirement of up to 45 seconds to completely scan a passenger, and 
therefore backscatter body scanners may hinder the flow of passengers.186 
5.5 THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE THREAT POSED BY PLASTIC GUNS,  
 CERAMIC KNIVES, AND LIQUID/CHEMICAL AND PLASTIC  
 EXPLOSIVES
Since the privacy intrusion should match the threat for which it aims to prevent or 
address, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, those threats themselves 
should be evaluated and explained.
First of all, there is no evidence that guns completely made of plastic, including 
ammunition, exist. Even if they do exist, it is highly doubtful terrorists could get their 
hands on one.  A Glock is probably the closest known weapon to a plastic gun, made of 
182 Jonathan Corbett, an engineer and blogger, has published a video showing how he managed to go through a backscatter 
body scanner without the system detecting a small metal case that was stitched into a special side pocket of the shirt 
he was wearing. YouTube is understandably restricting access to the videos. As the UK Daily Mail reports, he suggests 
that this is because the body scanners “blend metallic areas into the dark background – so if an object is not directly 
placed on the body, it will not show up on the scan”. see Moran, Lee. “How to get ANYTHING through TSA nude body 
scanners: Blogger exposes loophole in $1billion fleet” (7 March 2012), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2111417/TSA-nude-body-scanners-Jonathan-Corbett-video-exposes-loophole.html#ixzz1oRILtdLo
183 see Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint 
Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges, GAO-10-128, 7 October 2009, available at: http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d10128.pdf
184 see Homeland Security: Better Use of Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of Passenger 
Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen Security, GAO-10-401T, 27 January 2010, available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10401t.pdf
185 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at 
EU airports (COM (2010) 311 final), 15 June 2010.
186 Wilber, Del Quentin. “Airport Security Technology Stuck In the Pipeline” (Washington Post, 8 February 2008), avail-
able at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/02/07/ST2008020704150.html
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83% steel by weight, but it is clearly detectable by metal detectors. Besides, the manu-
facture of plastic guns or any other undetectable firearm, which has less than 3.7 ounces 
of metal, has been banned in the US since 1988.187 However, the law explicitly does not 
ban the manufacture of such weapons exclusively for US military or intelligence agen-
cies, and nor does it prevent their possible manufacture in other countries.188
The threat posed by ceramic knives, which have blades made from zirconia and 
handles made from nylon, has been exaggerated, to some extent, and is certainly not 
serious enough to merit the widespread use of backscatter body scanners, regardless 
if ceramic knives are even harder and can remain sharper than steel knives. Although 
terrorists managed to hijack airplanes using only box cutters and then tragically crash 
the airplanes into buildings on 9/11, today reinforced cockpit doors are securely locked 
throughout flights, as required by law.189 In addition, the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) sanctioned the expansion of the federal air marshal ser-
vice190 and authorized pilots to carry firearms.191 However, a recent CNN nationwide 
investigation revealed that only an estimated 1% of commercial airline flights on a daily 
basis are in fact protected by armed federal air marshals and field offices are increas-
ingly shorthanded.192 
There are threats posed by liquid/chemical explosives carried on a person onboard 
an airplane. But, these threats vary in degree, depending on the type of liquid/chemical 
explosive. On August 10, 2006, an apparent terrorist plot to blow up airplanes, reported-
ly using triacetone triperoxide (TATP) made onboard, was thwarted in the UK.193 This 
led to restrictions on bringing any type of liquid onboard airplanes. TATP is a liquid ex-
plosive composed of hydrogen peroxide, sulfuric acid and acetone, each essentially in-
nocuous to aviation security on their own, but explosive when mixed together. Although 
187 An Act to reauthorize the ban on undetectable firearms (Public Law 108-174), which reauthorized for a further ten years 
the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-649).
188 Ibid.  
189 Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-71), SEC. 104.
190 Ibid., SEC. 105.
191 Ibid., SEC. 128.
192 Griffin, Drew., Kathleen Johnston and Todd Schwarzschild. “Sources: Air marshals missing from almost all flights” 
(CNN, 25 March 2008), available at: http://www.cnn.com/2008/TRAVEL/03/25/siu.air.marshals/index.html
193 see Laville, Sandra., Richard Norton-Taylor and Vikram Dodd. “A plot to commit murder on an unimaginable scale” 
(The Guardian, 11 August 2006), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/aug/11/politics.usa1
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TATP is indeed explosive, with power close to that of TNT,194 the implausibility lies in 
the immense difficulty of mixing the chemical ingredients onboard an airplane, without 
the proper apparatus and the necessary low temperature conditions, while managing not 
to alert other passengers in the process.195 In addition, before TATP can be detonated it 
must first crystallize out of solution, which can take hours, and a considerable amount 
is required to bring down an airplane.196 Instead of making TATP onboard an airplane, 
the explosive could be carried onboard, undetected by conventional methods of screen-
ing, given that it contains no nitro groups or metallic elements.197 However, TATP is one 
of the most unstable explosives known198 and thus it is likely to detonate prematurely 
when carried on a person, i.e. before boarding an airplane. 
There are numerous other explosives in liquid form, such as nitroglycerin, nitro-
methane and Astrolite G, a mixture of ammonium nitrate and hydrazine. But, these 
compounds also present difficulties for terrorists. Nitromethane gives off a very pun-
gent smell, which would likely alert airport screeners, nitroglycerin is highly unstable 
and a noticeable amount would be required to bring down an airplane, and hydrazine is 
extremely toxic and corrosive. But, these challenges and hazards might not be enough 
to deter terrorists, and additional methods, beyond those discussed here, for developing 
liquid or chemical explosives are certainly possible.  
Other explosives that pose a considerable more serious threat to commercial avia-
tion security include plastic explosives, such as C-4, PE4, Semtex, PETN and polymer-
bonded explosives (PBX). These explosives are ready for detonation, undetectable to 
metal-detectors, generally odorless and only a relatively small amount is required to 
bring down an airplane. PETN was the explosive used by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
which he hid in his underwear and managed to get through security at Amsterdam’s 
Schiphol Airport undetected, in order to attempt to destroy a Northwest Airlines aircraft 
on December 25, 2009 (known as the “Christmas Day attack”). It was also reportedly 
194 see Dubnikova, Faina., et al.  Decomposition of Triacetone Triperoxide Is an Entropic Explosion (Journal of the Ameri-
can Chemical Society, January, 2005), p. 1, available at: http://www.technion.ac.il/~keinanj/pub/122.pdf
195 see Greene, Thomas C. “Mass murder in the skies: was the plot feasible?” (The Register, 17 August 2006), available 
at: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/08/17/flying_toilet_terror_labs/print.html; Perks, Bea. and Katharine Sander-
son. “Terror plot sparks frenzied speculation about liquid explosives” (The Royal Society of Chemistry, 11 August 
2006), available at: http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/2006/August/11080602.asp
196 see Ibid.
197 see Dubnikova, Faina., et al, 2007.
198 Ibid. 
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the same type of explosive molded into the soles of the shoes of Richard Reid in an at-
tempt to destroy an American Airlines aircraft around eight years earlier.
5.6 ALTERNATIVES TO BACKSCATTER BODY SCANNERS
The security checkpoint at airports is essentially the last layer of security or defense 
in commercial aviation, besides the strategic placement of Federal Air Marshals on-
board airplanes, the mighty capabilities of the US Air Force and NORAD, and techni-
cal countermeasures against shoulder-fired missiles. Before passengers reach security 
checkpoints, there are a number of additional security measures taken. Passengers are 
required to submit accurate and thorough personal data when reserving an airline ticket 
and are profiled or pre-screened against a terrorist watch list maintained by the TSA. 
Passengers are also required to present a passport or ID card before boarding and these 
identity documents are checked for authenticity. Passports and ID cards from around 
the world are increasingly becoming more sophisticated and difficult to forge, albeit 
certainly not impossible. Bomb-sniffing dogs are also important and are used at airports 
across the US. Other methods of passenger screening include Screening of Passengers 
By Observation Techniques (SPOT), whereby TSA officers, known as Behavior Detec-
tion Officers (BDOs), are specially trained to look for subtle suspicious indicators, such 
as particular facial gestures, in what is known as micro-expression training. Finally, 
domestic and foreign (human) intelligence is certainly also a critical factor, if not the 
most critical, in discovering a terrorist plot and preventing its execution.
Although technology is just one element of ensuring aviation security and for 
screening passengers at airport security checkpoints, it is considered key to the de-
velopment of the so-called “checkpoint of the future”. The development, testing and 
deployment of technological equipment, which detects explosives in all forms, chemi-
cal/biological weapons and non-metallic weapons, is mandated as a “high priority” for 
the DHS.199 Technology has consistently been considered critical for ensuring aviation 
security. For instance, from 2003-2004, the TSA and the DHS funded over 200 R&D 
projects with the aim of developing technologies for enhancing the security of trans-
portation, particularly in aviation.200 In 2004, the TSA spent 79.5% of its $159 million 
199 see Title 49 U.S.C, Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Chapter 449, Subchapter I, Section 44925(a).
200 see US Government Accountability Office, Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS are Researching and Develop-
ing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management, GAO No. 04-890, 2004, available at: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04890.pdf
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transportation security R&D budget on researching and developing aviation security 
technologies and the DHS spent 71.9% of its $88 million R&D budget for the same 
purposes.201 And, this is just a fraction of the total amount of money the US Government 
has spent on procuring aviation security technologies. 
The technological alternatives to backscatter body scanners, discussed below, are 
other devices that can also facilitate the detection of threats hidden on a person during 
the passenger screening process. With the exception of active millimeter wave portals, 
several of these alternatives are considerably more privacy-friendly, yet still capable of 
helping to ensure aviation security. However, arguably none of these alternative devices 
or technologies are foolproof either.
Active millimeter wave portals, prominently manufactured by L-3 Communica-
tions, are another type of body scanner. They are also being piloted or deployed at 
numerous airports and other locations across the US. Rather than low dose X-rays, 
extremely high radio frequency (RF) energy/waves is projected onto the body’s surface, 
rendering clothes lucent, and an image is created from the radio waves reflected. There-
fore, similar to backscatter body scanners, active millimeter wave portals can practi-
cally see through clothes and can potentially reveal concealed metallic or non-metallic 
threats. Millimeter wave portals, however, may require less time to scan each passenger. 
But, the ability of millimeter wave portals to detect low-density objects or materials, 
such as chemical or liquid explosives, is not certain and has been called into question. 
Another drawback is that airport screeners may likely require additional specific train-
ing in order to correctly analyze the active millimeter wave images.
While the images produced by active millimeter wave portals are different from the 
images produced by backscatter body scanners and appear to be not as graphically de-
tailed, active millimeter wave portals are still highly privacy-intrusive, essentially equal 
to that of backscatter body scanners, and certainly considerably more intrusive than 
ordinary patdowns. Active millimeter wave portals gained popularity over backscatter 
body scanners not because they are more privacy-friendly, but rather because they do 
not project X-rays, which is a publicized concern of passengers.
Millivision’s Automatic Threat Detection (ATD) System uses passive millimeter 
wave imaging technology, as opposed to active millimeter wave imaging technology. 
The system detects and distinguishes the millimeter wave energy that is naturally emit-
ted from a person’s body from the wave energy emitted from objects hidden under a 
201 Ibid., p. 4 and p. 22. However, this funding is not only for checkpoint security or passenger/luggage screening, and 
includes the CAPPS II program and technical countermeasures for defending against shoulder-fired missiles.
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person’s clothes and then generates an image, which can potentially help to discover 
any concealed object.202 
Combining digital video recorders with passive millimeter wave imaging technol-
ogy, Brijot’s BIS-WDS® GEN 2 is also capable of screening passengers for both con-
cealed metallic and non-metallic weapons and explosives, but fully avoids the privacy 
concern of seeing through clothes by neither generating an anatomically detailed image 
nor absolutely requiring security officers to monitor the images. An on-board computer 
comprised of an “intelligent detection engine” can (potentially) pinpoint in real-time 
the location of potential threats on any person, whether still or moving, who enters the 
system’s “field of view” and automatically alert security officers.203 Brijot’s system can 
examine a person in as little as 0.5 seconds and therefore does not slow down at all the 
flow of passengers.204 Brijot’s BIS-WDS® GEN 2 is much like Rapiscan’s WaveScan 
200, which also uses passive millimeter wave technology. The intelligent detection en-
gine, however, likely requires further development and validation in order to be assured 
of its effectiveness. Brijot’s SafeScreen is another privacy-friendly alternative, whereby 
metals, plastics, ceramics, composites, liquids, gels, explosives, etc. can be discovered 
on a person by detecting and showing objects that are colder or hotter than the surface 
temperature of the subject, also without generating an anatomically detailed image. 
Brijot is marketing these devices as means for primary security screening at airports 
and other locations. 
ThruVision has also developed similar imaging technology. The T5000 passive 
terahertz imaging system is equally capable of revealing both metallic and non-metallic 
objects hidden under clothing on multiple still or moving persons some distance away. 
Terahertz rays or T-rays are a form of low-level radiation, between infrared light and 
microwaves on the electromagnetic spectrum, and are naturally emitted from all ma-
terials. The T5000 works by collecting the T-rays emitted off a person and processing 
them to form images that reveal any concealed objects, also without displaying physical 
details of the body.205 Picometrix also develops similar terahertz imaging technology. 
202 Millivision, available at: http://www.millivision.com/technology.html
203 The technology, however, still requires further advancement in order to be a trustworthy replacement of well-trained 
screeners, as pointed out by Eckard Seebohm, Head of the Aviation Security Unit of the European Commission dur-
ing the first Body Scanners Task Force public consultation meeting held on 12 December 2008 at the Centre Albert 
Borschette in Brussels.
204 Brijot, available at: http://www.brijot.com/products/BIS-WDS_Gen2
205 ThruVision, Press Release (7 March 2008), available at: http://www.thruvision.com/images/PDFs/News/thruvision%20
introduces%20t5000.pdf
Part II 85
The SPO camera units, developed by QinetiQ also use passive millimeter wave 
technology to detect the waves naturally emitted by the human body and to determine 
if there are any “cold” objects, such as metals, plastics and ceramics concealed under 
a person’s clothing. Suspicious objects are meant to trigger a red light on the display 
monitor, prompting the operator to search the individual. SPOs do not rely on image 
screening and can rapidly scan people simultaneously as they are moving, thereby nei-
ther producing still nor revealing images. The TSA deployed SPO camera units at the 
Denver International Airport during the 2008 Democratic National Convention.206 
While passive millimeter wave technology and the BIS-WDS® GEN 2, T5000 and 
SPO are viable and privacy-friendly alternatives to backscatter body scanners, they are 
also not yet as sophisticated and especially do not generate images that are clear or de-
tailed enough to offer the same degree of security benefits of active millimeter wave 
portals or backscatter body scanners.207 Moreover, these alternatives still require further 
testing and operational trials. For now, the TSA is testing passive millimeter technology at 
Boston’s Logan International Airport, and the technology is also being tested in the UK.
Alternatives to advanced imaging technologies include the explosive trace detection 
(ETD) technology of General Electric’s EntryScan, which is a trace portal machine (also 
known as a “puffer machine”). EntryScan works on the premise that when a terrorist pre-
pares an explosive device tiny amounts of the explosive materials get on their skin, clothes 
or hair. When a person steps into the gateway of an EntryScan, air is blasted onto that 
person and the tiny particles that are liberated are collected and instantly analyzed for ex-
plosive chemicals. This screening methodology probably does not raise any privacy con-
cerns. However, an obvious drawback with puffer machines is that they are not reliable if 
a terrorist has worn a full protective suit when preparing the explosive device concerned 
and has tightly sealed it in plastic. Puffer machines have been deployed in airports across 
the US, but they are currently being phased out due to maintenance issues and problems 
caused by dust and dirt continuously breaking down the machines.208  
Other non-invasive ETD technologies or methods include the use of portable or 
stationary ‘swabbing devices’ that are able to detect explosive chemicals on a per-
206 QinetiQ, “US Transportation Security Administration Deploys QinetiQ New Airport Security Technology”, 4 Sep-
tember 2008, available at: http://www.qinetiq.com/home/newsroom/news_releases_homepage/2008/3rd_quarter/
spo_at_us_conventions.html
207 This representatives from Schiphol Airport pointed this out during the first Body Scanners Task Force public consul-
tation meeting held on 12 December 2008 at the Centre Albert Borschette in Brussels.  The meeting was chaired by 
Eckard Seebohm, Head of the Aviation Security Unit of the European Commission.
208 see Tessler, Joelle and Arthur Max. “Better airport scanners delayed by privacy fears” (Associated Press, 28 December 
2009).
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son’s hands or on his or her hand bags. Thousands of these devices have already been 
deployed at US airports and the TSA has begun to randomly select people for hand 
swabbing. The devices can be used not just at security checkpoints, but also throughout 
an airport including at boarding gates. There are, however, also drawbacks with these 
devices. Legal and non-threatening substances could potentially result in ‘false posi-
tives’209 and ‘false negatives’ could result when a terrorist has successfully managed to 
completely avoid touching the hidden explosive.
Ahura Scientific’s FirstDefender is a hand-held device that uses a method of analy-
sis called raman spectroscopy to detect explosives or other chemicals in sealed plastic 
or glass containers. The FirstDefender works by projecting a laser beam onto the un-
known solid or liquid substance and analyzing the light that scatters back to the device. 
Every substance scatters light in a unique way and the FirstDefender can determine the 
scattering patterns of a vast array of explosives, toxic industrial chemicals, toxic indus-
trial materials and chemical warfare agents.210 The most serious drawback is that the 
FirstDefender cannot analyze substances in non-translucent containers or those hidden 
underneath clothes and a considerable amount of the substance is required. Prospective 
advancements in raman spectroscopy, known as Surface Enhanced Raman Spectrosco-
py (SERS), can incredibly enhance the sensitivity of this explosive detection technique, 
but the technology is still in its early stages.211 
On the other hand, the Fido® PaxPoint™, a handheld device developed by ICx 
Technologies, is capable of detecting liquids used in making explosive devices in both 
clear and opaque containers by analyzing vapors emitted from the bottle’s opening.212 
The TSA is piloting the device.
The GK1, developed by Nemesysco, uses Layered Voice Analysis (LVA) technol-
ogy to determine in advance the real intentions of people and to conduct a threat assess-
ment by using input from 3-5 questions. The GK1 is like a lie detector. LVA uses signal-
processing algorithms that can differentiate between a “normal” voice and a “stressed” 
voice. If the GK1 detects stress, security personnel can take the concerned person aside 
209 Meserve, Jeanne., and Mike M. Ahlers. “TSA to swab airline passengers’ hands in search for explosives” (CNN.com, 17 
February 2010), available at: http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/02/17/tsa.hands.swabbing/index.html
210 Ahura Scientific, available at: http://www.ahurascientific.com/chemical-explosives-id/products/firstdefender/index.
php#
211 see Hambling, David. “Army Seeks Super-Sniffer to Detect Explosives, Bio-Agents” (Wired Magazine, 10 September 
2009), available at: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/army-seeks-super-sniffer-to-detect-explosives-bio-
agents/
212 ICX Technologies, available at: http://www.icxt.com/products/icx-detection/explosives/fido-paxpoint/
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for further questioning and a patdown. The system is based on the premise that all 
voices have a certain frequency and any deviation from that frequency can indicate 
an increase in stress, excitement or anticipation. The GK1 has been tested at Moscow 
Domodedovo International Airport.213 The GK1 is part of the growing movement to-
wards using biometric sensors at airports to measure the body temperature, respiration 
and heart rate of passengers, which can be potentially used to determine their intentions 
or state of mind. However, voice analysis or other biometric sensors might not work on 
hardened terrorists that are neither physically nor emotionally affected by their mission. 
Moreover, the GK1 could unnecessarily subject people who are just naturally stressed 
and nervous to thorough questioning or a patdown by security personnel. The technol-
ogy, however, is also not yet sophisticated enough.
A potential technological alternative to deploying new explosive detection devices 
or advanced imaging technologies is perhaps the comprehensive improvement of the 
PNR system and the requirement of additional personal data from passengers, includ-
ing the more effective use of that data.  In this case, more data protection rights may be 
sacrificed for greater corporeal privacy. 
5.7 SCOPE OF DEPLOYMENT IN THE US 
Backscatter technology has been around for decades, however, only recently has the 
US Government officially authorized the expansion of backscatter technology onto pas-
senger screening and appropriated extensive funding to do so.214 Even before that, the 
US Government provided the necessary R&D funding for advanced X-ray screening 
systems for individuals.215 
Backscatter body scanners have reportedly been either piloted or fully deployed 
at dozens of major international airports across the US, including: O’Hare in Chica-
go; JFK in New York; LAX in Los Angeles; Miami International Airport; Hartsfield-
Jackson in Atlanta; George Bush International Airport in Houston; Dulles International 
213 Nemesysco, available at: http://security.nemesysco.com/gk1.html
214 see Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458), SEC. 4013.
215 see HR 1271, “FAA Research, Engineering, and Development Authorization Act of 1997” (Public Law No: 105-155)
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Airport; and Sky Harbor International Airport in Phoenix, Arizona.216 Backscatter body 
scanners are also being used in several prisons in the US217 and reportedly other domes-
tic locations. 
In the US, as of November 2009, according to the TSA and what has been reported, 
46 backscatter body scanners were piloted at 23 airports, and 40 millimeter wave por-
tals have been deployed at 19 airports. Six airports are using the advanced imaging 
technology for primary screening, rather than as an alternative to a patdown for second-
ary screening.218 
The TSA earlier on announced plans to deploy an additional 150 backscatter body 
scanners beginning 2010, already purchased from Rapiscan in 2009, at airport security 
checkpoints across the US and use them to replace WTMDs.219 And, as a consequence 
of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempt to destroy a Northwest Airlines aircraft on 
December 25, 2009, using PETN hidden in his underwear and undiscovered by a pat-
down, the deployment of body scanners will only increase.220 Already the US Secretary 
for Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, has announced that an additional 300 body 
216 US Customs TODAY, March 2000, available at: http://www.cbp.gov/custoday/mar2000/bodyscan.htm; Frank, Thomas. 
“TSA looks into using more airport body scans” (USA TODAY, 7 October 2007), available at: http://www.usatoday.
com/news/washington/2007-10-07-backscatter_N.htm; Frank, Thomas. “Air travelers stripped bare with X-ray ma-
chine” (USA Today, 15 May 2005), available at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-15-airport-xray-
bottomstrip_x.htm 
 Other airports in the US where body scanners have been deployed include: Albuquerque International Sunport Airport; 
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport; Bob Hope Airport; Cleveland Hopkins International 
Airport; Denver International Airport; Detroit Metro Airport; Indianapolis International Airport; Jacksonville Interna-
tional Airport; McCarran International Airport; Raleigh-Durham International Airport; Richmond International Airport; 
Rochester International Airport; Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; San Francisco International Airport; 
Salt Lake City International Airport; Tampa International Airport; Tulsa International Airport. see http://www.tsa.gov/
approach/tech/imaging_technology.shtm, last visited 12/11/09.
217 Presidential Report on Radiation Protection Advice: Screening of Humans for Security Purposes Using Ionizing Ra-
diation Scanning Systems (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, 2003), p. 16, Section 3.1.1, 
available at: http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/3987b1 pres-report.pdf
218 see http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/imaging_technology.shtm
219 Frank, Thomas. “TSA to expand use of body scanners” (USA Today, 1 October 2009), available at: http://www.usato-
day.com/tech/news/surveillance/2009-09-30-backscatter-body-scanners_N.htm
220 In acknowledging that the deployment of body scanners will likely increase, the stock market shares for the manufactur-
ers of body scanners surged during the aftermath of the Christmas Day attack (particularly more so for backscatter body 
scanners). By January 11 2010, the shares of OSI Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ:OSIS) (parent company of Rapiscan), for 
example, jumped nearly 50%, from around $22 to around $32 a share.  
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scanners will be deployed in 2010.221 That makes a total of 450 additional body scanners 
planned for deployment in 2010.222 Furthermore, the Obama Administration revealed 
their proposed budget for 2011 (fiscal year October 2010-September 2011), subject to 
congressional approval, which allocates a whopping $734 million for Advanced Imag-
ing Technology (AIT) and the procurement of 1,000 additional body scanners. How-
ever, at around $150,000 each, this funding would be sufficient to procure over 4,000 
body scanners, which is more than enough to deploy body scanners at practically every 
airport security checkpoint in the US, with extra for airports outside the US.
On the other hand, none of the 150 backscatter body scanners purchased by the US 
Government in 2009 and delivered by Rapiscan have yet to be deployed and are cur-
rently (as of February 2010) reportedly still sitting in storage,223 but reportedly will be 
swiftly deployed.
5.8 LAWS, CODES AND OTHER LEGAL/POLICY INSTRUMENTS OF   
 SPECIAL RELEVANCE IN THE US
In the US, as a common law country, case law and judicial interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment of the US Constitution play a particularly important role. The Fourth 
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.
221 Weisman, Jonathan and Siobhan Gorman. “Obama orders security fix” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 January 2010), avail-
able at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126287015166119561.html?mod=article-outset-box
222 see the written statement of Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano for a hearing entitled “The State of Avia-
tion Security - Is Our Current System Capable of Meeting the Threat?” before the US Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 20 January 2010.
223 see Jack Cafferty, Gov’t  hasn’t installed one airport scanner with stimulus $$$, Cafferty File, CNN.com, 23 February 
2010, available at: http://caffertyfile.blogs.cnn.com/2010/02/23/govt-hasnt-installed-one-airport-scanner-with-stimu-
lus/
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The Fourth Amendment gives individuals freedom from any unreasonable search 
and seizure conducted by the US Government and has significantly served as the basis of 
the right to privacy in the US, but is not explicitly a constitutional right to privacy per se. 
As the US Supreme Court affirms “[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the 
State”.224 At first, this was limited to physical intrusions upon a person’s property.225 
However, adapting to technological advancements, the US Supreme Court in Katz v. 
United States later extended the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to include not 
just properties or physical places, but also people,226 as long as the person concerned 
exhibits first “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”.227 This condition 
formulated by Justice Harlan is commonly known as the Katz test or the Harlan stan-
dard. The Fourth Amendment furthermore requires that the US Government “accept as 
axiomatic the principle that people harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
‘private parts”.228 
In Kyllo v. United States, the US Supreme Court held that the use of a thermal im-
aging device to search for evidence in the interior of a home through its walls, which 
would otherwise not be possible without physically entering the home, constituted a 
search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and was unreasonable and thus un-
constitutional without a warrant.229 In addition, the US Supreme Court based its judg-
ment on the potential of thermal imaging to reveal intimate details.230 If the same le-
gal reasoning is applied, the use of fully-intrusive backscatter body scanners to peer 
through an individual’s clothes, revealing intimate details, which would otherwise not 
be possible without physically removing that individual’s clothes, may also constitute a 
search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment (Minert, 2006). 
The US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio held that a warrantless search for weapons by 
a law enforcement officer is constitutional if it is “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
224 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
225 see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
226 see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
227 Ibid., at 361. Concurring opinion of Justice Harlan.
228 Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 191 (11th Circuit, 1992). 
229 see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
230 Ibid. 
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which justify its initiation” and “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of 
weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically 
be characterized as something less than a “full” search, even though it remains a serious 
intrusion”.231 The 4th Circuit, just several years later, extended the reasoning of the US 
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio to justify airport searches using magnetometers to search 
for weapons in order to prevent the hijacking of airplanes and the subsequent physical 
“frisk”, depending on the information provided by the magnetometer.232 
Although the Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches”, it nonethe-
less does not necessarily signify a warrant is required for all searches. Indeed, what the 
Fourth Amendment explicitly requires is that searches are “reasonable”. If the search is 
reasonable, then it is constitutional and, therefore, lawful.233
While all passengers must be searched before boarding an airplane, it is widely rec-
ognized that the conduct of any border search must therefore still be reasonable and in 
accordance with the Fourth Amendment.234 Privacy does not just vanish at borders and 
US Customs agents or airport screeners are not given a blanket license to intrude upon 
the privacy of individuals. For instance, the limited right to privacy at airports does not 
entail that passengers can be strip searched without grounds of reasonable suspicion, 
regardless of the legitimate public interests. As the 9th Circuit Court affirmed, “exercise 
of the constitutional right to travel may not be conditioned upon the relinquishment of 
another constitutional right [i.e. the Fourth Amendment] […]”.235   
The US Supreme Court has provided the preliminary grounds to determine if a 
search is reasonable. To determine its “reasonableness,” “the scope of the particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the 
place in which it is conducted” must be considered.236 As the 5th Circuit Court in United 
States v. Skipwith affirmed, to determine the reasonableness of a border search the fol-
231 Terry v. Ohio, 392, U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
232 United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Circuit, 1972).
233 For further discussion, see Vina, Stephen R. Virtual Strip Searches at Airport: Are Border Searches Seeing Through the 
Fourth Amendment? (8 Texas Wesleyan Law Review, 2001-2002), pp. 417-439; Mock, Tobias W. The TSA’s New X-
Ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment Implications of “Body Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints 
(49 Santa Clara Law Review, 2009), pp. 213-252.
234 see, e.g.,  Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Circuit, 1965); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 
531 (1985); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Circuit, 1973) at 1276.
235 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Circuit, 1973).
236 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
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lowing three factors must be considered: “public necessity, efficacy of the search, and 
degree of intrusion […]”.237 The US Supreme Court, in another case several decades 
later, held that the reasonableness of a search can be determined “by assessing, on 
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the 
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of a legitimate governmental 
interests”.238 Aviation security is undoubtedly considered a legitimate public (or gov-
ernmental interests) and searches at airport security checkpoints undoubtedly play a 
critical role in ensuring aviation security.
US Customs agents or other authorized government officials are legally permitted 
to conduct searches of individuals at borders without a warrant.239 This is commonly 
known as the “border search exception”. Warrantless border searches are also deemed 
reasonable and acceptable under the Fourth Amendment since they occur at a border240 
and have long been considered necessary in order for a state to protect itself and en-
sure legitimate governmental interests.241 US courts have firmly established that “the 
Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the interna-
tional border than in the interior”.242 Airports located anywhere within the US act as the 
“functional equivalent of the border”.243 Moreover, it would obviously be impractical 
or unrealistic for the TSA to require a warrant to carry out airport security screening.244
Border searches are divided into routine and non-routine. Routine border searches 
do not require reasonable suspicion to be carried out since they are minimally intrusive. 
237 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Circuit, 1973); see Minert, Steven R. Square Pegs, Round Hole: The 
Fourth Amendment and Preflight Searches of Airline Passengers in a Post-9/11 World (Brigham Young University Law 
Review, 2006), pp. 1631-1667, at 1657.
238 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
239 see Title 19 U.S.C. Chapter 4, Subtitle III, Part V, Section 1582 of the Tariff Act of 1930; Title 19 U.S.C. Chapter 3, 
Subtitle IV, Part 5, Section 482.
240 see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); Vina, Stephen R. Virtual Strip Searches at Airport: Are Border 
Searches Seeing Through the Fourth Amendment? (8 Texas Wesleyan Law Review, 2001-2002), pp. 417-439, at 423.
241 see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
242 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
243 United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520 (5th Circuit, 1982). 
244 For further discussion, see Vina, Stephen R. Virtual Strip Searches at Airport: Are Border Searches Seeing Through the 
Fourth Amendment? (8 Texas Wesleyan Law Review, 2001-2002), pp. 417-439; Mock, Tobias W. The TSA’s New X-Ray 
Vision: The Fourth Amendment Implications of “Body Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints (49 
Santa Clara Law Review, 2009), pp. 213-252.
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Based on the “border search exception”, “[r]outine searches of the persons and effects 
of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, 
or warrant”.245  Non-routine border searches, on the other hand, require reasonable sus-
picion to be carried out, since they are considerably more intrusive. 
A strip search is by law a non-routine (border) search and, thus, requires reasonable 
suspicion. As the 11th Circuit Court affirms, “[r]easonable suspicion to justify a strip 
search [at a border] can only be met by a showing of articulable facts which are par-
ticularized as to the person and as to the place to be searched”.246 “A strip search under 
federal law includes the exposure of a person’s naked body for the purpose of a visual 
or physical examination”.247 Alternatively, there are uniform statutory definitions from 
state legislatures of what constitutes a strip search. As the US Court of Appeals for the 
4th Circuit affirmed:
Virginia’s statutory law, which is similar to that of most states, provides that, 
“[s]trip search shall mean having an arrested person remove or arrange some 
or all of his clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the genitals, but-
tocks, anus, female breasts, or undergarments of such person”.248 (emphasis 
added).
An X-ray search of an individual’s body is also by law a non-routine border search. 
As the US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirms:
In United States v. Pino, 729 F.2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir.1984), we recognized 
that the “the amount of [reasonable] suspicion needed for an x-ray [is] ... 
the same amount needed for a strip search.” (citing Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 
1345).249
245 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22 (1st Circuit, 
1999).
246 United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Circuit, 1984).
247 Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356 (4th Circuit, 2001).
248 Ibid., citing Va. Code Ann. S 19.2-59.1(F).
249 Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294 (11th Circuit, 2001).
94 Body scanners: A strip search by other means
A patdown is by law a routine border search and thus does not require reasonable 
suspicion.250 A patdown, also known as a frisk, is defined as: 
to run the hand rapidly over the outer clothing of (a suspect) for the purpose 
of finding concealed weapons.251 
The TSA is a component of the DHS and was established with the enactment of 
the ATSA, which federalized airport screening. Absorbing the security responsibilities 
of the FAA, the TSA is now primarily responsible for the security of all forms of pub-
lic transportation, which includes civil/commercial aviation, and for the development 
and implementation of security procedures thereof. Under this authority, the TSA is 
self-regulating the use of body scanners, whereby self-regulations and internal self-
reporting, rather than legally binding ‘hard’ rules and independent, external inspection, 
are relied upon. 
The self-regulations declare that the TSA does not store, print, transmit or export 
the images produced by the body scanners and the TSA has consistently proclaimed 
that the machines do not have these capabilities. The TSA also proclaims that it is 
their policy to use software cloaking or a privacy algorithm, also known as a “modesty 
filter”, which converts backscatter images into what the TSA describes as a “drawing”. 
In addition, a security officer views the images in a remote operator console. However, 
the rules governing the operating procedures of TSOs using the body scanners have not 
been revealed, which are supposed to be documented in standard operating procedures 
(SOPs). The TSA has refused to reveal the rules “due to the sensitivity of the techni-
cal and operational details”.252 For the same reason of not wanting to reveal sensitive 
information of a national security nature, the DHS initially refused to comply with a 
request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) filed by EPIC for documents, 
contracts and procedures pertaining to the capabilities and technical specifications of 
body scanners in use. In response, EPIC filed a FOIA lawsuit against the DHS and, as 
a consequence, the DHS complied with some of EPIC’s demands by disclosing docu-
ments that reveal the technical specifications and the procurement contracts for body 
scanners with Rapiscan and L3. 
Contrary to the previous declarations of the TSA that the body scanners are not 
capable of storing or transmitting the images generated, the documents obtained by 
250 see United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22 (1st Circuit, 1999).
251 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (1996).
252 Privacy Impact Assessment for TSA Whole Body Imaging, DHS, 17 October 2008, p. 4. 
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EPIC on TSA operational requirements and procurement specifications instead reveal 
that the TSA has indeed required that the machines have storage and export capabilities 
(albeit when in test mode, as opposed to screening mode), and an Ethernet interface 
connection that supports Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).253 
The official documents also confirm that the privacy algorithms can be disabled.
With regards to the admissibility of digital evidence,254 US courts may apply the 
Federal Rules of Legal Evidence. Rule 1001 (3) states:
An “original” of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If 
data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output 
readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an “original.”
Therefore, an image produced by a body scanner, used to justify the subsequent re-
moval of a passenger’s clothes to attain the suspected concealed weapon or contraband, 
is admissible as evidence in a court of law.
Nevertheless, wrongfully obtained evidence, in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, may be excluded from criminal proceedings in a court of law.255 This is com-
monly known as the “exclusionary rule.” As Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Legal 
Evidence states: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissible.
In accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, a Privacy Impact Assessment 
(PIA) may need to be conducted for body scanners, if indeed the images generated are 
253 see Transportation Security Administration, System Engineering Branch, Operational Requirements Document, Whole 
Body Imager Aviation Applications, July 2006, Version 1.9, Final Report, pp. 10-11; Transportation Security Admin-
istration, Office of Security Technology System Planning and Evaluation, Procurement Specification for Whole Body 
Imager Devices for Checkpoint Operations, 23 September 2008, FINAL, Version 1.02, pp. 4-7.
254 Digital evidence may include, but is not limited to: the content of computer hard drives, computer printouts, GPS data, 
e-mails and digital video. 
255 see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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considered personally identifiable information.256 A PIA evaluates how personal infor-
mation in identifiable form is collected, maintained and disseminated by government 
agencies. PIAs must be conducted before or during the development, procurement or 
modification of information technology systems, and not after, in order to “ensure suf-
ficient protections for the privacy of personal information”.257 As a result, some argue 
that PIAs are grounded on the “precautionary principle”258 and serve as an example of 
the needed extension of this legal principle to the protection of privacy (Friedewald, M., 
et al. (eds.): SWAMI Deliverable D3, 2006).259
5.9 DEFICIENCIES AND DILEMMAS OF THE US LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
After assessing the effectiveness of the US legal framework in protecting privacy, based 
on the principles of privacy and the criteria of adequacy, significant legal deficiencies 
and dilemmas in the US come to light, with regards to the use of body scanners.
Even if backscatter body scanners are determined to be the most effective devices 
for detecting liquid/chemical and plastic explosives, and other threats, which arguably 
has yet to be decisively proven, numerous privacy concerns and legal questions need to 
be addressed before this technology is further used on passengers. Fear of an “endless 
debate” must not overshadow these concerns.260 
256 US Federal courts have held, for example, that a videotape is a “record” for the purposes of the Privacy Act 1974, if the 
videotape contains the means of identifying the individual concerned (see: Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980)). Thus, if the images generated by body scanners are stored in a “system of records”, in which the concerned 
individual’s image is identifiable, it is also possible that these images may constitute a “record” for the purposes of the 
Privacy Act 1974 and are, therefore, in this sense, subject to the Act.  However, as argued in the next section, body 
scanner images may not necessarily constitute information in personally identifiable form.
257 E-Government Act of 2002, Section 208.
258 The precautionary principle was originally developed in the context of environmental protection and refers to the need 
to anticipate the plausible or potential environmental harm of an act, policy or technology, and to take preventive mea-
sures against the potential harm, even if there is uncertain scientific evidence proving the harm is real. The principle is 
found in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Principle 15) and is also a core element of the 
EU’s environmental policy. 
259 SWAMI (Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence) was an EU project aimed to provide an overview of the key 
social, legal and ethical implications of ambient intelligence and highlight the privacy threats. 
260 Former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff argued against a potential “endless debate”. see Testimony by 
Secretary Michael Chertoff Before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_0035.shtm
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First of all, the legal framework, as it stands, does not fulfill the use limitation and 
purpose specification principles, nor does it ensure clarity or foreseeability. In terms 
of regulating the use of backscatter body scanners, the law does not clarify whether the 
use of backscatter body scanners is a routine or non-routine search or stipulate what 
level of suspicion is required before their use is permitted and under what legal protec-
tions. There is essentially no case law that explicitly defines or clarifies when the use 
of backscatter body scanners is reasonable and unreasonable or in accordance with the 
Fourth Amendment.261 
Since the TSA is already equating the use of (fully-intrusive) body scanners to a 
routine border search, their use can easily develop into the standard technique or pri-
mary means of passenger screening at airports, replacing not only patdowns, but also 
WTMDs. This was already suggested by (former) TSA Chief Kip Hawley with regards 
to millimeter wave portals.262 As Vina points out, “[b]y substituting the Body Scan for 
a patdown, Customs has ingeniously laid a foundation for a more liberal application of 
the Body Scan for now and in the future” (2002, p. 436). Hence, the most recent change 
in TSA’s policy regarding the circumstances surrounding the use of active millimeter 
wave portals. 
As a result, eventually no level of suspicion or consent will be required. Once that 
legal justification is made and their use is considered the norm, there is also nothing to 
prevent the expansion of the use of body scanners to other locations (and for reasons 
other than aviation security), particularly if the advancement of body scanner technology 
increases the speed in which persons can be scanned, decreases the size of the devices, 
increases their portability, further increases the distance in which people can be scanned 
from263 and allows for the incorporation of the backscatter technology within CCTV sur-
261 For further discussion, see Vina, Stephen R. Virtual Strip Searches at Airport: Are Border Searches Seeing Through the 
Fourth Amendment? (8 Texas Wesleyan Law Review, 2001-2002), pp. 417-439; Mock, Tobias W. The TSA’s New X-Ray 
Vision: The Fourth Amendment Implications of “Body Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints (49 
Santa Clara Law Review, 2009), pp. 213-252.
262 Leib, Jeffrey. “Airport to try tailored security” (The Denver Post, 19 February 2008), available at: http://www.denver-
post.com/arcade/ci_8301858
263 In the Netherlands, the NRC Handelsblad reported that it has learned that the Rotterdam police department seeks to 
develop within three years a portable device that can see through people’s clothing to check for concealed weapons. 
According to NRC Handelsblad, Rotterdam’s police have received from the government a 500,000-euro grant to de-
velop the device and are now approaching companies, universities and research institutes to develop it.  While there 
are already devices, such as ThruVision’s T5000, that can see through people’s clothes meters away in the outdoors, 
portability for the police is also important. see Heck, Wilmer. “Dutch police try to develop x-ray vision” (NRC Handels-
blad, 8 January 2010), available at: http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2454112.ece/Dutch_police_try_to_
develop_x-ray_vision
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veillance cameras.264 The law’s ambiguity could be stretched to initiate the use of body 
scanners at both public and commercial locations, such as sports arenas, mass transporta-
tion areas, government buildings, manufacturing sites, schools or shopping malls.265 
Nevertheless, a body scan is already currently not genuinely voluntary. Forcing a 
person to choose between the rights enshrined in the Fourth Amendment and the right 
to travel “constitutes coercion”.266  As the EU’s Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party argues, “[m]any passengers will consent to being scanned because by doing so 
they will avoid potential problems or delays, while their first priority is to get on board 
of their flight on time. Such consent is not sufficiently free”.267 The Article 29 Working 
Party further adds that “[i]f the consequences of consenting undermine individuals’ 
freedom of choice, consent would not be free”.268
In 2008, the US House of Representatives approved H.R. 2200 (Transportation Se-
curity Administration Authorization Act), which aims to limit the use of body scanners 
in airport screening. Contrary to the recent change in TSA’s policy on the use of body 
scanners, Sec. 215 of H.R. 2200 prohibits the use of the devices as the sole or primary 
method of screening passengers and delineates their use as an optional alternative to 
patdowns in secondary screening. The bill was referred to the US Senate and, as of 
January 2012, no further steps have been taken.269
While approving specific legislation regulating body scanners is called for, this 
particular piece of legislation is erroneous. The bill makes no mention of the mandatory 
use of privacy algorithms and in fact defines a body scanner (termed ‘whole body imag-
ing technology’) as a device “that creates a visual image of the individual’s full body, 
showing the surface of the skin”. The words “showing the surface of the skin” certainly 
implies that the form of body scanners the bill is referring to include those with their 
264 ThruVision’s terahertz ray technology already integrates CCTV technology allowing for enhanced public or urban 
surveillance. 
265 For example, the New York Police Department is already testing terahertz imaging scanners (to be placed on police 
vehicles) for detecting concealed weapons. see Wagstaff, Keith. “Police Developing Tech to Virtually Frisk People from 
82 Feet Away” (Time Magazine, 20 January 2012), available at: http://techland.time.com/2012/01/20/police-develop-
ing-tech-to-virtually-frisk-people-from-82-feet-away/
266 United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Circuit, 1973). 
267 see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP187, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, Adopted on 13 
July 2011, p. 15.
268 Ibid., p. 12.
269  On the other hand, Senators Klobuchar (D-MN) and Bennett (R-UT) introduced a bill that mandates the deployment of 
body scanners at US airports and mandates their use for primary screening.
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full intrusive capabilities intact, i.e. those that generate the graphic images we should 
be concerned about, rather than those that employ modesty filters or privacy algorithms. 
Moreover, the bill proposes a framework that equates the use of body scanners, in their 
full intrusive manner, with appropriately conducted patdowns and permits their use as 
an alternative to patdowns. Therefore, the proposed bill correctly prohibits the use of 
fully-intrusive body scanners for primary screening purposes, but incorrectly promotes 
their use for secondary screening.
To compensate for the fact that a patdown conducted appropriately, or in accor-
dance with the TSA’s SOPs, or as described in the TSA’s official training manual, is cer-
tainly less intrusive than the images generated by body scanners, whether backscatter 
or millimeter wave, and therefore their use as an alternative to patdowns is not justifi-
able, the TSA has made patdowns more intrusive. Last year, the TSA announced a new 
patdown procedure known as the ‘enhanced patdown’, which included patting down 
sensitive areas of the body – the breast and groin areas of females and the groin area of 
males.270 The enhanced patdown considerably increased complaints from passengers, 
particularly from female passengers. Since then, the TSA has instructed airport screen-
ers not to touch female passengers between the breasts.271 Nevertheless, there have been 
numerous reports that passengers, who refused to go through a body scan and instead 
opted for a patdown, are being subjected to very thorough patdowns.272 Moreover, in 
accordance with the Screening Management SOP, patdowns may still now include the 
patting of “sensitive areas” of the body if deemed necessary.273 
On top of that, the law is inconsistent. Since a X-ray search of an individual’s body 
is considered by law to be a non-routine border search274 and backscatter body scanners 
emit X-rays, the minimal or no level of suspicion required at present to use backscatter 
270 The full body patdown could be similar to the enhanced patdown.
271 see Goo, Sara Kehaulani. “Airport Pat-Down Protocol Changed: Women Complained that Security Checks Were 
Humiliating” (Washington Post, 23 December 2004), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A20026-2004Dec22.html
272 Elliott, Christopher. “The Navigator: Some worry that refusing TSA’s full-body scan may come at a price” (Wash-
ington Post, 2 May 2010), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/28/
AR2010042802743.html
273 The Screening Management SOP (Implementation Date: June 30, 2008), which was leaked on the web and is Sensitive 
Security Information for only the “Need to Know”, distinguishes between the different types of patdowns: full body pat-
downs; bulk-item patdowns; limited patdowns of the stomach area, the back and both legs; and finally patdowns that may 
include the patting of sensitive areas. The Screening Management SOP is different from the Screening Checkpoint SOP.
274 see Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294 (11th Circuit, 2001).
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body scanners is contrary to case law. Furthermore, given that the end result of backscat-
ter body scanners, without software cloaking, is similar to that of strip searches and far 
more intrusive than patdowns, the same legal reasoning behind conducting a patdown is 
inconsistently and wrongfully being applied to the use of backscatter body scanners. 
As a result of the legal framework failing to bring clarity and legal foreseeability 
to the use of body scanners, the principle of enforcement/redress is also not fulfilled. 
In terms of clarifying when their use by an airport security screener has violated the 
Fourth Amendment and when evidence has been wrongfully obtained from their use, 
there are no laws specific enough to be enforceable in a court of law. As the US Su-
preme Court affirms, “the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropri-
ate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established”.275 
Similarly, governmental agents are generally “shielded from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known”.276 Consequently, TSA airport 
screeners or Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are, at present, arguably shielded 
from legal action for any inappropriate use of body scanners.
The law, as it stands now, is not up to date with the capability of the latest vi-
sualization technology, since it is not in line with the technological reality that strip 
searches can occur by electronic means and without the need for a person’s clothes to 
be removed. Furthermore, the law does not permit the flexibility to adapt to new tech-
nologies. Due to the constrained definition of a strip search, generally accepted in the 
US, the use of body scanners cannot be legally construed to constitute a strip search. 
Therefore, even if the use of backscatter body scanners poses a similar degree of pri-
vacy intrusion as a full body strip search, the law is essentially unable to obligate the 
same level of suspicion. 
The legal framework is dependent on self-regulations. Although the PIA con-
ducted by the DHS on the deployment and use of body scanners essentially approves 
of the current circumstances surrounding their use, including the self-regulations and 
operating protocols of the TSA,277 over relying on the TSA to self-regulate the scope 
and manner of use of body scanners is naïve at best. Self-regulations, without the cor-
responding binding ‘hard’ laws as a basis and without the external enforcement mecha-
nisms in place, are far from reliable. Such an approach to regulation elevates valid 
275 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); reiterating the US Supreme Court’s judgment in Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
276 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
277 Privacy Impact Assessment for TSA Whole Body Imaging, DHS, 17 October 2008.
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concerns of accountability and supervision. But, the TSA already has a history of not 
always respecting privacy. For instance, the Inspector General of the DHS found that 
the “TSA did not consistently apply privacy protections in the course of its involvement 
in airline passenger data transfers”,278 nor reliably disclose to the public the scope of 
its use and dissemination of passenger data.279 Besides, the SOPs governing the use of 
body scanners by TSOs are not readily accessible. Moreover, the PIA conducted on 
body scanners is fundamentally based, for the most part, on the voluntary use of body 
scanners for secondary screening and not on the changed policy of the TSA to use body 
scanners in place of WTMDs for primary screening.
The legal framework pertaining to body scanners is, for the most part, ambiguous, 
altering and not legally binding. Since the self-regulations are not binding or fixed, they 
could simply change at the discretion of the TSA, regarding, for instance, the employ-
ment of a modesty filter or privacy algorithm and the retention of backscatter images. 
As former TSA Chief Kip Hawley admitted, in an interview with Bruce Schneier, “We 
[TSA] do not now store [backscatter] images for the test phase (function disabled), and 
although we haven’t officially resolved the issue, I fully understand the privacy argu-
ment and don’t assume that we will store them if and when they’re widely deployed”280 
(emphasis added). The DHS has reportedly asked the manufacturers of backscatter body 
scanners to de-activate the storage and data export capabilities of body scanners, but the 
DHS/TSA could just as easily re-activate these capabilities, and no law prohibits the TSA 
or security screeners from doing so, nor mandates that the body scanner manufacturers 
must de-activate or completely remove these capabilities in the first place. Essentially, 
since there is no binding law regulating the manufacture and design of body scanners, 
there is neither a guarantee that the images will not be stored or transmitted nor a guaran-
tee that a privacy algorithm will always be employed. There is simply no binding law that 
mandates that the TSA must employ a privacy algorithm. In addition, the self-regulations 
do not sufficiently restrict the use of backscatter body scanners on children and pregnant 
women, nor evidently guarantee that an Image Operator or TSO of the same gender of the 
individual being scanned sees the backscatter images.  
The TSA has already drastically altered their policy regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the use of backscatter body scanners and active millimeter wave portals. 
278 Review of the Transportation Security Administration’s Role in the Use and Dissemination of Airline Passenger Data 
(Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, March 15, 2005), p. 40.
279 Ibid., pp. 42-48. 
280 Bruce Schneier interview with (former) TSA Head Kip Hawley (30 July 2007), available at: http://www.schneier.com/
interview-hawley.html
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The TSA previously announced that it will begin to pilot active millimeter wave tech-
nology in primary screening or in place of WTMDs at six airports (Tulsa International 
Airport, followed by the International airports in San Francisco, Las Vegas, Miami, 
Albuquerque, and Salt Lake City). Passengers who refuse to receive millimeter wave 
screening will undergo both walk-through metal detector screening and a patdown.281 
As of November 2009, ten airports are now using the imaging technology for primary 
screening,282 and once again the TSA announced plans to use an additional 150 back-
scatter body scanners in place of WTMDs beginning in 2010. There is thus no guar-
antee that the use of body scanners, whether the backscatter or millimeter type, will 
remain as a voluntary alternative to patdowns or WTMDs.
The PIA on body scanners only confirmed that the DHS/TSA indeed intends to 
entirely replace patdowns for secondary screening with the use of body scanners, and 
even down the road to replace WTMDs with body scanners for primary screening.  As 
the PIA declares, “[a] subsequent phase will evaluate WBI [Whole Body Imaging] 
technology for individuals undergoing primary screening”.283 The DHS/TSA is follow-
ing through with this declaration and is now planning for all passengers to “go through 
the whole-body imager instead of the walk-through metal detector”, as announced by 
Robin Kane, TSA’s Assistant Administrator for Security Technology.284
Besides, PIAs, as they stand now, are focused primarily on personal data, and may 
not be fitting for body scanners. While body scanners generate images of the naked 
body, the images may not necessarily constitute information in personally identifiable 
form per se or in the legal sense, and nor are personal identifiers or the identification of 
the individual appended to the images. As a result, since body scanner images may not 
necessarily constitute a means of identifying the individual concerned, it is unlikely that 
the Privacy Act 1974 is applicable to the images generated by body scanners.  In any 
case, the Privacy Act 1974 is certainly not applicable when the body scanner images are 
not actually stored, even though the images produced by (fully-intrusive) body scanners 
are seriously privacy-invasive.
281 Frank, Thomas. “Body scanners replace metal detectors in tryout at Tulsa airport” (USA Today, 18 February 2009), 
available at: www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2009-02-17-detectors_N.htm; “TSA Continues Millimeter Wave Passen-
ger Imaging Technology Pilot”, TSA, 18 February 2009, available at:  http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/mwave_
continues.shtm
282 see http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/imaging_technology.shtm, last visited on 12/11/09.
283 see Privacy Impact Assessment for TSA Whole Body Imaging, DHS, 17 October 2008, p. 2. 
284 Sharkey, Joe.  “Whole-Body Scans Pass First Airport Tests” (New York Times, 6 April 2009, available at: http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/04/07/business/07road.html?_r=1
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The legal framework pertaining to privacy was equally designed to control data as 
traditionally understood and not to regulate privacy intrusion in other domains, such as 
the human body (Wood, 2006, p 89). The Privacy Act 1974, for instance, regulates how 
government agencies may collection, use, disseminate and retain personally identifi-
able information, and therefore it is immediately questionable if the nearly 40-year-old 
piece of legislation can effectively regulate body scanners. Moreover, the set of Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), developed by the DHS, and used by the TSA 
as a template in the PIA on body scanners, oddly omit the essential principles of en-
forcement/redress and proportionality.
In addition, the legal framework, as it stands, does not fulfill the principle of pro-
portionality. The law does not do enough to prevent the prospective required use of 
body scanners in their full intrusive capability on all air travelers, which would force 
hundreds of millions of people to be subjected to a strip search by electronic means. 
This would undoubtedly cause the potential use of body scanners to be disproportion-
ate and unreasonable, since certainly that many people do not pose a threat to aviation 
security nor exhibit a reasonable level of suspicion to justify being electronically or 
digitally strip-searched.
Already the current approach of using body scanners is not proportional to their 
purported aim of ensuring the security of commercial aviation. If a traveler, whether 
domestic or international, sets off a walk-through metal detector at an airport’s security 
checkpoint or ‘arouses’ a minimal level of suspicion or is randomly selected for addi-
tional or secondary screening, known as “sweep screening,” or is selected by the Com-
puter Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS), he or she is normally subject to a 
patdown or other special screening requirements. Even passengers wearing loose-fitting 
clothes, for instance, could be selected for secondary screening for unduly suspicion 
that they could be hiding something. Since TSA airport screeners, as a matter of policy, 
are currently using body scanners, where deployed, as an alternative to patdowns, their 
use automatically in practice does not require the same level of suspicion, if any, as a 
strip search. According to the TSA, an estimated two million passengers per week or 
15% of air travelers are selected for patdowns.285 As a result, millions of passengers, 
who do not pose a threat to the security of commercial aviation, may potentially be 
subjected to a strip search by electronic means in order to exercise their right to travel. 
The “reasonable expectation” of privacy, which is the foundation from which pri-
vacy is defined in the US, is also problematic. As a number of legal scholars have 
argued, the Katz test is flawed in that unless an individual takes extraordinary steps or 
285 see Kehaulani Goo, Sara. “TSA Keeping Pat-Down Procedures in Place,” (4 December 2004), available at: http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33790-2004Dec3.html
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affirmative measures to protect his or her privacy, he or she does not have a subjective 
or reasonable expectation of privacy (Kearns, 1998, p. 1005; Paton-Simpson, 2000, p. 
306). In addition, as Minert points out, society’s expectation of privacy could easily 
become a mere echo of the government’s expectation of privacy (2006, pp. 1653-54). 
Similarly, as the Report on the Surveillance Society argues, the reasonable expectation 
of privacy will surely be depressed if people “get used to” increasingly more surveil-
lance (Wood, 2006, p. 80). This argument is consistent with the US Supreme Court’s 
judgment in Kyllo v. United States that the more widespread the deployment and adop-
tion of a particular technology the less “reasonable expectation” of privacy the public 
enjoys with respect to its use.286 This is also somewhat true for body scanners, as their 
deployment becomes increasingly widespread and well-known publicly. Moreover, the 
never-ending advancement and escalating deployment/use of PITs gradually diminish-
es our “reasonable expectation” of privacy, as people view the outcome to be increas-
ingly necessary for their security/safety.
Although there is some case law applicable to backscatter body scanners, as out-
lined above, there is nevertheless a vacuum of law, which courts are left to fill in. Es-
sentially, US statutory laws are inadequate for regulating the use and manufacture of 
backscatter body scanners. As a result, the legal framework is primarily dependent on 
case law for direction. 
In sum, the US legal framework is inadequate to safeguard privacy with regards to 
the deployment and use of body scanners. Under the current conditions, whereby the 
employment of a privacy algorithm or the deletion of the images is not mechanically or 
automatically guaranteed and other safeguards are not legally binding, the use of body 
scanners as a primary means or secondary means of passenger screening is dispropor-
tionate and constitutes an unjustified violation of privacy in a democratic society. With 
the growing use of body scanners at airports across the US, the law, as it stands now, is 
unable to adequately uphold the integrity of the Fourth Amendment or defend the right 
to bodily privacy.
286 see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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5.10 RECOMMENDATIONS ON ENHANCING THE US LEGAL   
 FRAMEWORK 
If we adopt the “originalist” or “textualist” approach to understanding the US 
Constitution,287 then entirely new laws should be adopted, when deemed necessary, 
by elected legislators/representatives, instead of over relying on the interpretations of 
judges, which can sometimes vary or be inconsistent.
Even if the use body scanners are deemed proportional to the legitimate aim of di-
minishing the threat posed by plastic guns, ceramic knives, and liquid, chemical, plastic 
explosives, new and specific laws are necessary nonetheless.  Any new and specific 
legislative act on body scanners must be based, in part, on the principles of privacy, 
since body scanners and their growing deployment and use at airports are a threat to the 
right to privacy and the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment. Specific 
laws for body scanners, enacted by the US Congress, would eliminate the excessive 
dependence on US courts to fill in the existing legal vacuum. After all, only the legisla-
tive branch is meant to create law in the US, as opposed to the judicial branch, which is 
principally meant to apply it. 
Legislation can either primarily regulate the design and manufacture of backscatter 
body scanners (rules on technical specifications) or instead primarily regulate their use 
(rules on operating standards). In other words, the full intrusive capabilities of body 
scanners can be maintained, while their use is strictly regulated, or the intrusive ca-
pabilities can be permanently limited during design and manufacture, thereby not re-
quiring such strict regulation on their use. Either way, legislation should apply, where 
applicable, the core principles of privacy.
Focus on manufacturer-level regulations/laws
Regulation at the manufacturer-level should permanently minimize the intrusion 
upon privacy from the get-go. The burden is placed considerably more on the manufac-
turers rather than on the airport screeners. Legislation should mandate the automatic, 
built-in employment of a privacy software algorithm, in order to greatly reduce the 
intrusiveness of (backscatter) body scanners, thereby minimizing the infliction of in-
dignity and humiliation upon individuals. It is important to note that the meaning of 
“built-in” here refers to the permanent employment of the software solutions, rather 
than a software add-on approach. The software can blur out the face and genitals and/
287 This approach is, for example, prominently advocated by US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. see, e.g., Scalia, 
Antonin. A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton University Press, 1997).
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or obscure the details associated with the entire body, in what is known as a “virtual 
fig leaf” or “modesty filter”. These capabilities are already available and are increas-
ingly being further developed. Rapiscan, for instance, developed software that converts 
body scanner images into “generic figures”, which resemble an avatar, as opposed to 
an image of an individual’s genitals.288 However, it is essential to ensure that the effec-
tiveness of these privacy algorithms or software solutions are validated and cannot be 
circumvented.289 Moreover, in no circumstances, should the privacy algorithms or filters 
or software solutions be capable of being disabled at airports. 
Nevertheless, the creation of a “drawing” or “chalk outline” of one’s body, as it is 
often described as or referred to, may still remain somewhat or slightly intrusive and 
therefore, based on the use limitation and purpose specification principles, built-in 
restrictions on the ability to print, retain or otherwise distribute/export the backscatter 
images must be ensured. However, in exceptional circumstances, when a weapon or 
contraband is revealed, the limited retention, export or printing may be necessary as 
evidence in a court of law to justify the subsequent (targeted) patdown or, if legitimately 
justified, an ordinary strip search if challenged by the defendant. This may also be 
helpful to satisfy the access/participation principle. On the other hand, the retention of 
body scanner images may not be required at all. Nevertheless, in these very exceptional 
circumstances, if indeed required, an additional secure password, entered only by the 
Supervisory Transportation Security Officer (STSO), could override the built-in restric-
tion and enable the image to be retained. This event must be automatically recorded. 
In order to ensure the image data transmitted between the backscatter body scanners 
at the security checkpoint and the remote operator consoles is not intercepted, based on 
the security principle, the images must be encrypted and on top of that transmitted via 
a secure cable connection. The manufacturer must equally be required to ensure that the 
software fixes and built-in restrictions cannot be easily undone or bypassed. 
Perhaps, in order to undeniably diminish the intrusive capability of body scanners, 
the images generated can also be monitored, like in Brijot’s imaging system, by an 
intelligent detection engine. However, intelligent detection software (also known as au-
tomatic threat recognition or ATR) may still require further advancement and testing in 
288 The software upgrade may be tested by the TSA. See Hughes, John. “Airport ‘Naked Image’ Scanners May Get Privacy 
Upgrades” (Bloomberg, 8 September 2010), available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-08/airport-naked-
image-scanners-in-u-s-may-get-avatars-to-increase-privacy.html
289 Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of EPIC, made this point during a brief discussion at the third annual international 
conference Computers, Privacy and Data Protection (29-30 January 2010, Brussels).
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order to be a trustworthy replacement of well-trained screeners.290 Indeed, the develop-
ment and testing is occurring. Software, developed by L-3, capable of analyzing body 
scanner images for threats, locating those threats and raising an alarm, could replace the 
need for human operators to view the images altogether. The software is currently being 
tested at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport and the initial results are reportedly positive.291 
In addition to removing the need for a remote operator or viewer, the ATR capabilities 
can also potentially reduce the security implications of human errors. With ATR capa-
bilities, security checkpoint personnel will only need to resolve the alarms by conduct-
ing, for instance, a targeted patdown of the area on a person where the (potential) threat 
(metallic or non-metallic object) was detected. The TSA is also evaluating the viability 
and effectiveness of the ATR capabilities, with ongoing trials, and a successful certifica-
tion process is expected.292 
Essentially, once the intrusive capabilities of backscatter body scanners are without 
a doubt considerably and permanently narrowed, as guaranteed by the various tech-
nological limitations, including validated and trustworthy privacy algorithm/software 
solutions, their use will not qualify as a strip search by other means and will be less 
intrusive than a patdown. Therefore, strictly under these conditions, body scanners may 
qualify as a routine search and may constitutionally replace (full body) patdowns as 
a mandatory means of secondary screening at airports and even perhaps legitimately 
replace the use of WTMDs altogether for primary screening, which does not require 
reasonable suspicion. This is contrary to Mock’s (2009) view that backscatter body 
scanners may not replace WTMDs, since a “drawing” or “chalk outline” of one’s body 
is more intrusive than a magnetometer search (Mock, 2009, p. 238).
Evidently, body scanners, even with the employment of a privacy algorithm, are 
considerably more effective than WTMDs, patdowns and other alternative devices in 
290 As pointed out by Eckard Seebohm, Head of the Aviation Security Unit of the European Commission during the first 
Body Scanners Task Force public consultation meeting held on 12 December 2008 at the Centre Albert Borschette in 
Brussels.
291 During the second meeting (which I also attended) of the Task Force on Security Scanners, established by the European 
Commission, representatives from the Netherlands (the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism –NCTb) explained 
the success of the ATR software. The representatives also noted that the Data Protection Authority in the Netherlands 
has referred to the body scanners currently in use at Schiphol Airport as a “perfect example” of privacy by design. 
292 see Tessler, Joelle and Arthur Max. “Better airport scanners delayed by privacy fears” (Associated Press, 28 December 
2009); Hughes, John. “Airport ‘Naked Image’ Scanners May Get Privacy Upgrades” (Bloomberg, 8 September 2010), 
available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-08/airport-naked-image-scanners-in-u-s-may-get-avatars-to-
increase-privacy.html
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helping to detect a variety of potential threats to aviation security. The mandatory use of 
modestly intrusive body scanners for secondary screening should satisfy those who ar-
gue that consent or offering a choice will cancel the security benefits of body scanners. 
This is a valid point, since terrorists will more than likely choose an ordinary patdown 
over being body scanned, as there is a far greater chance of finding a hidden threat with 
body scanners, especially if that threat is a relatively small amount of chemical or plas-
tic explosive hidden very near to his or her genitals. The mandatory use of minimally 
intrusive body scanners for primary screening on all passengers should satisfy those 
who warn of the terrifying insufficiency of WTMDs and should eliminate the concerns 
over the discriminatory manner in which body scanners may be used. While minimally 
intrusive body scanners are more intrusive than WTMDs, here the significant security 
gains are arguably proportional to the somewhat greater privacy intrusion. 
Nonetheless, proponents of body scanners argue that privacy algorithms could 
compromise the security benefits of the devices. A virtual fig leaf, for instance, could 
prevent a backscatter body scanner from revealing a plastic explosive attached to or 
near an individual’s genitals. The immense intrusive capability of backscatter body 
scanners and the full-body graphic images they generate is indeed what makes them 
very effective security devices. If, however, the images generated by body scanners 
remain fully intrusive, then the law must strictly regulate their use to ensure it is propor-
tional to the security gains and that the right to privacy and freedom from unreasonable 
search and seizure is preserved. 
Focus on user-level regulations/laws
Regulating the use, legislation should essentially harden the policies and self-reg-
ulations of the TSA, guaranteeing that they remain unchanged and are legally binding. 
In addition to built-in restrictions on storing, printing and transmitting the images 
produced by body scanners, in line with the use limitation and purpose specification 
principles, the TSOs who view the images (Image Operators) should in no way be 
able to see simultaneously in person the passengers while being scanned. This can be 
accomplished through the continued use of remote operator/viewer consoles. The pas-
senger being scanned should also remain unidentified, except in circumstances when a 
weapon or contraband is revealed. The law should also explicitly mandate that an Im-
age Operator of the same gender must inspect the images, unless under extraordinary 
circumstances, which may occur where a TSO of the same gender is not available due 
to staff shortages or emergencies, in accordance with the Screening Management SOP 
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with regards to patdowns.293 Moreover, to better ensure the images do not exist any-
more than is needed for the purpose for which they were created and are not publicly 
disclosed in any way, cameras and mobile phones must also be absolutely forbidden 
within a remote operator console. This will prevent airport security personnel from tak-
ing photographs of the computer screens that display the images. Accordingly, based on 
the use limitation principle, the law must prohibit any (unlawful) storage, photograph 
or public disclosure of the images. 
Furthermore, in accordance with child pornography laws, the use of body scanners, 
at their full intrusive capability, on children and pregnant women must be restricted. 
The law must therefore specifically mandate that the images of children must always, 
without exception, employ software cloaking. The creation of body scanner images of 
children without software cloaking should be explicitly criminalized.
A “trusted passenger program”294 could be implemented, whereby qualified fre-
quent flyers, which have volunteered sensitive data and have gone through an extensive 
security assessment/background check, are exempted from body scanners, unless they 
also arouse a reasonable level of suspicion. The TSA has already rolled out a similar 
program, known as “Precheck”, whereby approved travelers go through WTMDs in-
stead of body scanners. 
Based on the enforcement principle, a dedicated screening supervisor at each air-
port or the corresponding STSO, under the management of the Transportation Security 
Manager (TSM), should conduct the direct supervision of the compliance of these bind-
ing rules (rather than simply general uniformed personnel of the TSA or TSOs). Thus, 
the responsible individual should have the power to initiate the dismissal of any airport 
screener who repeatedly fails to comply. In addition, a dedicated oversight committee, 
together with the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Liberties, DHS Privacy Office, and 
the Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Board,295 could direct the nationwide compli-
ance of the rules. 
In addition to the capacity of air travelers to bring a claim against the US Gov-
ernment (or private security screeners that act on behalf of the government, for the 
unreasonable or unlawful use of body scanners), the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry 
293 see the Screening Management SOP (Implementation Date: June 30, 2008).
294 see Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-71), SEC. 109. 
295 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was established after recommended by the National Com-
mission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the 9/11 Commission). The PCLOB is as an independent 
agency within the executive branch.
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Program (DHS TRIP)296 or a dedicated redress program, in accordance with the redress 
principle, must facilitate an immediate investigation of such claims. While the Privacy 
Act 1974 limits judicial remedy, under the legislative act, to US citizens or US lawful 
permanent residents (LPRs), significant to the use of body scanners at airports, TRIP 
is open to all individuals regardless of whether they are US citizens, LPRs or simply 
visitors to the US. Therefore, as a matter of DHS policy, foreign passengers or non-US 
persons could also have the right to seek (administrative) redress for the wrongful use 
of body scanners. However, preferably the law should open the door for foreign pas-
sengers or non-US persons to seek judicial remedy for the unlawful, disproportional or 
inappropriate use of body scanners.297  
Based on the principle of proportionality, the use of backscatter body scanners, 
at their full intrusive capability, must require the same level of reasonable suspicion 
as a strip search and must not be equated with an appropriately conducted patdown. 
In order to do so, the definition of a strip search must be modified to equate the use of 
backscatter body scanners and other similarly intrusive technology to a virtual strip 
search, thereby causing their use to be considered a non-routine search. For clarity, the 
content of the definition would need to accommodate for the fact that a strip search is 
possible by electronic means and without the need for a person’s clothes to be removed. 
A definition of a strip search, in line with backscatter technology, and anticipatory of 
the further advancement of similarly intrusive technology, such as active millimeter 
wave portals, should read as follows:
A strip search shall mean the visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, 
female breasts, or undergarments of an individual either in person or through 
any electronic means.
Above and beyond the laws that regulate the manufacture and/or use of body scan-
ners, the airports that have opted out of federal screening and switched to qualified, au-
thorized private airport security screening companies, in accordance with the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act of 2001,298 should perhaps have the freedom to decide 
296 DHS TRIP serves as a means for individuals who believe they have been improperly denied entry or identified for ad-
ditional screening by a DHS component at a transportation hub to file a request for redress.
297 The legal fact that the Privacy Act of 1974 limits judicial remedy to US citizens or US legal permanent residents has 
been criticized by the EU in the negotiations with the US over a transatlantic binding agreement on the exchange of data 
for law enforcement purposes and the protection of privacy thereof. see the Final Report by EU-US High Level Contact 
Group on information sharing and privacy and personal data protection, May 2008.
298 Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-71), SEC. 108.
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whether or not they want to deploy body scanners in the first place. However, the deci-
sion to permit this option is certainly debatable.
The deployment of minimally intrusive body scanners at other locations (e.g. train 
stations or major sports stadiums) may also be permissible on a case-by-case basis. Nev-
ertheless, even if privacy algorithms and other technical measures are permanently em-
ployed to safeguard privacy, the law must also prohibit the deployment and use of body 
scanners by private actors (other than authorized, private airport screening companies). 
Lastly, in order to improve security overall, similar to the California Penal Code,299 
Federal law should prohibit the commercial manufacture of knives undetectable to WT-
MDs by mandating that all knives contain a minimum quantity of metal.  
5.11 MANUFACTURER-LEVEL OR USER-LEVEL REGULATION?
Whether manufacturer-level or user-level laws/regulations for regulating body scanners 
should be predominantly chosen depends on which is a better approach or policy option 
for balancing privacy with security.  
The automatic, permanent incorporation of privacy filters or algorithms, within the 
images generated by body scanners, can implement the privacy principles and, in do-
ing so, can lawfully and justifiably increase both the deployment and employment of 
body scanners at airports. Therefore, the manufacturer-level approach can, at the same 
time, both increase security gains and protect the privacy of a person’s body by reduc-
ing the level of graphic detail contained in the images. In addition, privacy algorithms 
do not necessarily cancel the security gains of body scanners, but rather can potentially 
help airport screeners, albeit with some further training and technical advancement, to 
objectively detect threatening objects. The potential for developing effective intelligent 
detection software can further aid in this detection. Any questionable identification of 
objects to the airport screener could perhaps be compared with the images of known 
objects before a decision is made to proceed with a patdown. 
Since the user-level regulatory approach will maintain the full graphic details of 
the images generated by body scanners, their use will only constitutionally replace 
strip searches, and therefore will neither address the flaws of the primary nor secondary 
means of security screening. 
In the long run, therefore, the manufacturer-level regulatory approach may favor 
both privacy and security, but nonetheless manufacturer-level regulations/laws will 
299 see Section 12001.1 of the California Penal Code. 
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need to be combined with some user-level regulations/laws, in order to ensure the ful-
fillment of all the principles of privacy.
5.12 INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENT, DEVELOPMENTS AND RESPONSES 
The deployment of backscatter body scanners and active millimeter wave portals is 
gradually spreading around the world. In Europe, the Netherlands and the UK are lead-
ing the way in testing and deploying body scanners. In Italy, the Italian Civil Avia-
tion Authority has also deployed and tested body scanners in Rome and Milan and, in 
Rome’s second largest airport, Brijot’s passive millimeter wave imaging technology 
was also tested. Body scanners were also tested in France and Germany. 
The UK began testing active millimeter wave portals in 2006 at London’s Heath-
row Airport and Paddington Railway Station, and began testing backscatter body scan-
ners at Manchester’s international airport. Body scanners are being deployed in more 
airports across the UK. Previously, there were even proposals to install millimeter wave 
portals throughout London’s tube stations,300 but this was later rejected due to imprac-
ticalities.301  Instead of offered as an alternative to patdowns, passengers in the UK are 
randomly chosen. There are also calls and initiatives for the compulsory use of body 
scanners in all UK airports.  Concerns previously emerged that the body scans deployed 
in the UK allow the images to be printed, after it was reported that body scanner im-
ages of the ‘Bollywood’ movie star Shah Rukh Khan were distributed among London’s 
Heathrow Airport security personnel.302 
On the other hand, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), a UK govern-
mental department responsible for administering screening measures at points of entry 
and exit, had also previously took a step in the right direction for privacy and awarded 
a contract to Brijot Imaging Systems Inc. for its privacy-friendly BIS-WDS® GEN 2 
millimeter wave systems, which will be deployed at airports.303  
300 Webster, Ben. “Body scan machines to be used on Tube passengers” (Times Online, 8 July 2005), available at: http://
technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/personal_tech/article541746.ece
301 “Tube to reject passenger scanners” (Kable, 16 March 2006), available at: http://www.kablenet.com/kd.nsf/Frontpage/
85C58F53F411521180257132005EF49F?OpenDocument
302 Shah Rukh signs off sexy body-scan printouts at Heathrow (Yahoo India News, 6 February 2010), available at: http://
in.news.yahoo.com/43/20100206/908/ten-shah-rukh-signs-off-sexy-body-scan-p.html
303 Brijot, Press Release (14 December 2007), available at: http://www.brijot.com/assets/pdf/pressreleases/HMRC%20
PR%20Web.pdf
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In the Netherlands, active millimeter wave portals were deployed in 2007 at Schi-
phol International Airport. However, rather than initially being used on a trial basis, 
they have already been formally introduced into the screening process at several se-
curity checkpoints. As a joint initiative of the National Coordinator for Counterter-
rorism (NCTb), Customs authorities and Schiphol Airport, the use of millimeter wave 
portals, like in the US, is self-regulated. However, these self-regulations are backed 
by comprehensive privacy/data protection legislation in the Netherlands. According to 
the self-regulations, the image analyst sits in a closed space and cannot see in person 
the passenger who is being scanned and the images are not saved. Rather than using a 
modesty filter, only the face of the passenger is made “unrecognizable” in the images.304 
Although the millimeter wave portals are voluntary, meaning that passengers have a 
choice between millimeter wave portals or going through regular security procedures, 
this is only for the time being305 and, like the self-regulations of the TSA, is subject to 
change. Already, Schiphol Airport is planning to deploy more body scanners and all 
passengers flying to the US must go through body scanners since the so-called “Christ-
mas Day attack”.
The EU was en route to adopting body scanners as a common method of passen-
ger screening, but that was previously put on hold. Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 
300/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security requires the European 
Commission (EC) to adopt general measures on aviation security, which must include the 
‘methods of screening allowed’. The EC then proposed in a draft regulation the use of 
body scanners as a means of screening passengers at airports. In response, the European 
Parliament voted overwhelmingly to demand a full study on the impact of body scanners 
relating to fundamental rights, privacy and health before taking a decision on the intro-
duction of body scanners at airports, noting that the use of body scanners is “equivalent to 
a virtual strip search” and has “a serious impact on the fundamental rights of citizens”.306
 As a result, the EC, and more specifically the Body Scanners Task Force, prepared 
a communication,307 in consultation with the Article 29 Working Party, EDPS and other 
interested parties and stakeholders, and based on the answers received to a questionnaire 
304 Schiphol International Airport, available at: http://www.schiphol.nl/media/portal/_news/pdf/pdf_files/flyersecuri-
tyscan_v1_m56577569830813442.pdf
305 Schiphol International Airport, available at: http://www.schiphol.nl/
306 European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2008 on the impact of aviation security measures and body scanners on 
human rights, privacy, personal dignity and data protection.
307 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at 
EU airports (COM (2010) 311 final), 15 June 2010.
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made available to the public.308 The communication addresses the European Parliament’s 
concerns and questions and briefly provides an assessment on the effectiveness of body 
scanners on enhancing aviation security. Meanwhile, as a consequence of the so-called 
“Christmas Day attack”, the US upped the pressure on Europe to deploy body scanners.309 
But, the EU remained steadfast on its previous commitment to wait until the EC com-
pletes their assessment of the privacy concerns and validated security benefits of body 
scanners before deciding on whether or not to bring forward legislation on a common 
EU approach to deploying and using body scanners as a method of screening at EU air-
ports and under what conditions. During the second meeting of the Task Force on Se-
curity Scanners, the EC announced that an impact assessment on body scanners will be 
launched and completed next year (2011).310 The EC urged that a common EU approach 
308 The first meeting/public consultation of the Task Force on Security Scanners was held on 12 December 2008 at the Centre 
Albert Borschette in Brussels, of which I was an active participant.  The meeting was chaired by Eckard Seebohm, Head 
of the Aviation Security Unit of the European Commission. Present at the meeting were numerous relevant stakeholders, 
including representatives of the manufactures of the different body scanners on the market (L3, Brijot, Rapiscan, Millivi-
sion and others), the International Air Transportation Association (IATA), ACI Europe, Schiphol Airport, the Dutch Min-
istry of Justice, the CEBRN programme of the UK Home Office, the Article 29 Working Party, European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS), Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the European Cockpit Association (ECA), and the assistant to 
MEP Philip Bradbourn, an outspoken critic of body scanners.  There was essentially a consensus among the stakeholders 
that body scanners are significant for enhancing aviation security, but certain privacy safeguards are required. Indeed, the 
EDPS and FRA are not completely against body scanners, but are instead hesitant. I pointed out the need to incorporate 
‘privacy by design’ solutions, which representatives from the Article 29 Working Party, FRA and EDPS equally advocated. 
Representatives of L3 and Rapiscan confirmed that design solutions are feasible and already available and may include 
anything from blurring the face to converting the body scanner images into animations or even holograms. The representa-
tive from L3 further expressed the concern that manufacturers of body scanners have not been given any clear standards to 
follow during the design and development of the body scanners.  I raised the notion that passive millimeter wave imaging is 
a privacy-friendly alternative to backscatter body scanners or active millimeter wave portals, which of course delighted the 
representative of Brijot. However, the representatives from Schiphol Airport objected to this point and noted that Brijot’s 
systems do not provide images that are clear or detailed enough to offer the same degree of security benefits of active mil-
limeter wave portals or backscatter body scanners.  
 In a follow-up email to a Policy Officer at the Aviation Security Unit, nearly a year after the task force meeting and closing 
of the public consultation, I learned on 26/11/09 that no summary for that consultation was published, no further meeting 
was scheduled and a legal initiative was yet to be foreseen.  In other words, the EC was taking their time to develop the 
report/communication requested by the European Parliament. However, as a consequence of the “Christmas day attack”, 
the EC accelerated the adoption of this communication on body scanners, which was published in June 2010. 
309 see Hsu, Spencer S. “U.S. to push foreign governments to use body scanners at airports” (Washington Post, 8 Janu-
ary 2010), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/07/AR2010010704282.html
310 Upon invitation, I also attended the second meeting of the Task Force on Security Scanners, held 14 September 2010 
in Brussels. The meeting served to further debate some of the key privacy and health issues/impacts surrounding body 
scanners, and to discuss the detection performance of body scanners. In addition to representatives from various stake-
holders, representatives from EU Member States were also present at the meeting. 
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be taken, in order to better ensure both the protection of privacy and other fundamental 
rights and the maintenance of aviation security. The EC also urged that a combination of 
technical specifications and operational rules is the way forward.311 
In 2011, the European Parliament approved the deployment of body scanners at EU 
airports, but banned the use of the backscatter type and insisted that passengers con-
tinue to have the right to refuse to be scanned. Although the EU has in the end approved 
of the use of body scanners, at least there is an apparent agreement within the EC and 
among most EU Member States that specific, fixed and binding legislation should regu-
late the development, deployment and use of body scanners throughout the EU, unlike 
in the US where there is still an excessive reliance on altering self-regulations. Since 
air passengers travel from the US to the EU and vice-versa, they arguably deserve the 
same level of privacy protection. For that reason, US and EU regulations on body scan-
ners should be similar. On the other hand, if the EU does not adopt a common position 
on the deployment and use of body scanners, then it will be up to EU Member States to 
adopt their own regulations. 
Body scanners were also tested at Melbourne International Airport in Australia, 
which at the time decided not to blur out the genitals in the images,312 and the Australian 
Government announced its decision to deploy body scanners at airports throughout the 
continent.
According to a survey study conducted by the IT firm Unisys in April 2010, as part 
of the Unisys Security Index, the vast majority of air travelers in the UK, Germany, 
Netherlands and Australia, with the exception of Spain, are apparently willing to sup-
port, to a certain degree, the deployment and use of body scanners, in return for greater 
aviation security.313 
The US has also been pressuring additional countries to deploy body scanners and 
urged the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to adopt an agreement on 
improving security standards with the help of body scanners. Whether or not the de-
ployment of body scanners will be globally accepted is yet to be seen. 
311 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at 
EU airports (COM (2010) 311 final), 15 June 2010.
312 see Shears, Richard. “Airport admits ‘strip search’ body scanners WILL show people naked,” (Daily Mail, 15 Octo-
ber 2008), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1077800/Airport-admits-strip-search-body-scanners-
WILL-people-naked.html
313 The survey results are available at: http://www.unisyssecurityindex.com/
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5.13 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the legal framework in the US does not require a complete overhaul, in order 
to ensure that the deployment and use of body scanners is both constitutional and propor-
tional and does not erode the right to (bodily) privacy, specific statutory laws are required.
The use of body scanners potentially offers immense security benefits and should 
certainly not be outright prohibited. However, until the necessary binding laws are ad-
opted and put into effect concerning their manufacture, use and deployment, the vio-
lation of privacy is disproportionate. In the meantime, there are alternative means of 
ensuring the security of commercial aviation, albeit probably not as effectively, which 
can also ensure privacy and uphold the integrity of the Fourth Amendment.
6 PUBLIC SPACE CCTV MICROPHONES  
 and LOUDSPEAKERS: The ears & mouth  
 of ‘Big Brother’
6.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
With the exception to where there is an overlap with visual surveillance in public spac-
es, this chapter specifically addresses the concerns of the public space audio surveil-
lance capabilities of integrated CCTV microphones and the added threat to privacy and 
liberty posed by the integration of public CCTV loudspeakers. 
Section 6.2 introduces the privacy-intrusive evolution of CCTV surveillance tech-
nology. Section 6.3 outlines the social and privacy implications of the CCTV micro-
phones and loudspeakers, and how CCTV microphones and loudspeakers are changing 
the nature and long-established notion of the public space. Section 6.4 reveals the scope 
of deployment of CCTV microphones and loudspeakers in the UK, whether privately or 
publicly owned and operated. Section 6.5 outlines the problems, weaknesses and defi-
ciencies of earlier CCTV systems and explains the potential security gains of attaching 
microphones and loudspeakers to CCTV cameras. Section 6.6 describes the potential 
alternatives to CCTV microphones and loudspeakers. Section 6.7 gives an overview of 
the statutory laws and case law of special relevance in the UK. Section 6.8 evaluates 
and highlights the relevant deficiencies and dilemmas of the UK legal framework in 
terms of safeguarding privacy and individual liberty with regards to the deployment 
and use of CCTV microphones and loudspeakers. Section 6.9 proposes relevant policy 
and legislative recommendations to enhance the UK legal framework. Section 6.10 
concludes with a brief summary and some ending remarks. 
6.2 THE (PRIVACY-INTRUSIVE) EVOLUTION OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE  
 TECHNOLOGY 
CCTV (‘Closed-Circuit Television’) cameras have been in existence for decades, but 
during the turn of the 20th Century, particularly in the UK, the number of CCTV cam-
eras deployed has increased dramatically. There are millions of CCTV cameras in the 
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UK alone.314 As a result, CCTV cameras continue to play a visually prominent role in 
the “surveillance society” the UK is rapidly entering. 
The ongoing evolution of CCTV technology has evolved from expensive, fixed 
cameras connected to videocassette recorders (or VCRs) via cables, which recorded 
and stored restricted amounts of low-resolution video data, to affordable IP (Internet 
Protocol) addressable, wireless pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) CCTV cameras, which can be 
both remotely accessed and controlled, and can record practically unlimited amounts 
of digital, high-resolution video data, transmitted to computer hard drives for storage 
and analysis. If a dedicated communications network is not available, the digital video 
data recorded from these next generation public surveillance cameras can also now be 
transmitted and easily made available over the Internet or even via mobile phone tech-
nologies (Cannataci, 2010).
Other ongoing and/or potential enhancements to public surveillance cameras in-
clude the integration of: automatic license plate recognition systems that can track driv-
ers; biometric technology (e.g. advanced face-recognition technology) that can be used 
to rapidly identify individuals; intelligent software that can recognize in real-time un-
lawful behavior, activities or events and certain objects;315 microphones (or audio sen-
sors) that can record audio data; loudspeakers that can enable CCTV control room op-
erators to communicate with people; RFID readers that can track people in possession 
of RFID tags; software agents that can automatically and purposefully mine the vast 
314 “FactCheck: how many CCTV cameras?”, Channel 4 News,18 June 2008, available at: http://www.channel4.com/news/
articles/society/factcheck+how+many+cctv+cameras/2291167
315 The Intelligent Video Surveillance (IVS) market is growing rapidly. Honeywell’s Active Alert® and Keeneo’s tailor-
made software are just two examples of systems on the market that can automatically determine and classify different 
human behaviours and alert CCTV operators. Portsmouth has recently become the first city in the UK to set up a 
network of ‘intelligent’ cameras that can alert CCTV operators of ‘suspicious’ behaviour. see Slack, James. “Minority 
Report comes to Britain: The CCTV that spots crimes BEFORE they happen” (Daily Mail, 28 November 2008), avail-
able at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1089966/Minority-Report-comes-Britain-The-CCTV-spots-
crimes-BEFORE-happen.html; ‘’’Sci-Fi Film’ CCTV Predicts Crime” (Sky News, 27 November 2008), available at: 
http://uk.news.yahoo.com/5/20081127/tuk-sci-fi-film-cctv-predicts-crime-45dbed5.html; An ‘intelligent’ CCTV cam-
era, nicknamed “the Bug”, designed to predict when a person may be about to commit a crime, is also being tested in 
high streets and shopping centers in the UK. The camera consists of a ring of eight cameras scanning in all directions. 
Software linked to the camera can determine when anybody is behaving unusually or suspiciously.  A ninth camera then 
zooms in to follow that person. see Iredale, Will and Chris Gourlay. “CCTV camera ‘tails’ suspects” (Sunday Times, 15 
April 2007), available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1655200.ece; There are also a number 
of ongoing projects funded by the EU to improve the functionality and reliability of IVS.  For example, Project SAMU-
RAI and Project ADABTS aim to develop intelligent public surveillance software integrated with CCTV cameras for 
real-time behaviour profiling.  Project Smart-Eyes (SEARISE) is even more advanced. The project’s consortium aims 
to develop an “artificial cognitive visual system” for detecting, tracking and categorizing salient events and behaviours. 
The plan is to test the system in large crowded public spaces, once completed in 2011.
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amounts of visual and audio data generated/stored; millimeter imaging technology that 
see through clothes (Surette, 2005); networked sensors that can monitor people’s eye 
movements, body heat, etc.; and finally multiple chemical, biological, and radiological 
sensors (Canantaci, 2010). These enhancements and the integration of other technolo-
gies are part of the evolution from first-generation CCTV systems to second-generation 
systems, in order to address the problems, weaknesses and deficiencies of the earlier 
systems (Surette, 2005).
The integration of a variety of sensors (audio sensors and chemical, biological, and 
radiological sensors) with CCTV technology has been categorized in Europe as “Mas-
sively Integrated Multiple Sensor Installations” (MIMSI) (Cannataci, 2010). In the US, 
the term for MIMSI is “Domain Awareness System” (DAS) (Ibid.). The New York Po-
lice Department (NYPD) defines DAS as “technology deployed in public spaces as part 
of the counterterrorism program of the NYPD’s Counterterrorism Bureau”.316 As Can-
nataci (2010) shrewdly points out, the NYPD’s broad definition of DAS clearly allows 
for practically any type of technology (device, sensor, etc.) to be integrated.  
As part of the increasing enhancement of public surveillance capabilities, highly 
sensitive omni-directional microphones and (horn) loudspeakers have been integrated 
into public space CCTV surveillance systems in the UK. This enhancement phase 
of public space CCTV surveillance systems, which this dissertation principally ad-
dresses, is the present move beyond the collection of images to the capability of 
both recording and communicating audio data with the addition of microphones and 
loudspeakers respectively. 
The increasing integration of additional surveillance technologies with existing 
CCTV surveillance technology can significantly expand the threat to privacy (Cannata-
ci, 2010). Accordingly, the increase in a surveillance system’s capabilities increases the 
need for additional relevant policies (Surette, 2005, p. 164). The integration of micro-
phones and loudspeakers with CCTV cameras equally requires corresponding policies 
and regulations to ensure the adequate protection of privacy and liberty.
316 NYPD’s Public Security Privacy Guidelines, 2 April 2009, p. 2, available at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/down-
loads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_security_privacy_guidelines.pdf 
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6.3 THE EARS AND MOUTH OF ‘BIG BROTHER’ 
Indeed, an era is emerging where practically any individual, and not only governments 
or large corporations, can engage in activities that intrude upon the privacy of many, as 
a result of the widespread accessibility and use of advanced technology.317 In addition, 
rogue individuals with special computer skills can hack into people’s personal com-
puters and mobile phones. Nevertheless, any notion that the infamous ‘Big Brother’ 
metaphor is already outdated, as a result of the existence of so-called “small brothers”, 
is still somewhat premature. 
In the UK especially, the actions and policies of the British Government have done 
well to keep ‘Big Brother’ alive and kicking.318 In George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
“telecreens” – two-way screens complete with microphones and loudspeakers – sur-
rounded the masses in fictional “Oceania”, in order to monitor and control their behaviour 
both in their homes and in public spaces. With the equivalent of eyes, and now also the 
equivalent of ears (microphones) and a mouth (loudspeakers), in a matter of speaking, 
there are valid concerns that CCTV cameras have become much closer to resembling the 
telescreens of Oceania and have further become an incarnation of ‘Big Brother’.
Both CCTV loudspeakers and CCTV microphones could, therefore, reinforce the 
ability of CCTV cameras to monitor and control public behavior “through the promo-
tion of habituated anticipatory conformity” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999, p. 5). Like 
in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where people assumed that every sound was overheard and 
movement observed (Orwell, 1949, p. 9), the known presence of CCTV loudspeakers 
and microphones could lead to not only direct social control, but their perceived presence 
could wreak indirect control. As Hubert H. Humphrey once observed, “[i]f we can never 
be sure whether or not we are being watched and listened  to, all our actions will be 
altered and our very character will change”.319 In the words of Foucault, “an inspect-
ing gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end up interiorizing to the 
317 For example, with a smartphone an ordinary individual can broadcast live videos onto USTREAM and with an iPhone 
can even control a small flying drone (developed by Parrot) that has a video-streaming camera. Moreover, hundreds of 
millions of people are walking around with a smartphone video camera and they can easily and immediately upload 
their videos onto YouTube.
318 The UK Government’s plan to install 24-hour CCTV systems in the homes of 20,000 selected families to tackle anti-
social behavior is yet another reason why the ‘Big Brother’ metaphor is still valid. In addition, hundreds of CCTV cam-
eras have already been deployed within housing trusts across the UK. see Little, Alison. “Sin bins for worst families” 
(Daily Express, 23 July 2009), available at: http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/115736  
319 see Long, Edward V. The Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry (Praeger, 1967), viii.
Part II 121
point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, 
and against himself” (Foucault, 1980, p. 155).
Public space CCTV cameras can already bring about the similar panoptic feelings 
caused by Jeremy Bentham’s ‘panopticon’ design (Bannister et al., 1998). When people 
have panoptic feelings, they often increasingly adjust their behaviour to comply with what 
society considers ‘normal’ or socially acceptable (Schermer, 2007, pp. 217-18). Panoptic 
feelings may affect greater those who are more aware of the possibility (Schermer, 2007), 
whether real or potential, that they are being observed, especially if they are reminded of 
this possibility via CCTV loudspeakers. Attaching both loudspeakers and microphones 
to CCTV cameras will thus likely only increase the power of CCTV cameras to cause 
panoptic feelings in the long-term. 
6.3.1 The ears (microphones)
Whether over the phone or face-to-face, conversations were beforehand considered pri-
vate. Today, phone calls can be potentially monitored, and mobile phones (even when 
turned-off) and computers can be used as an eavesdropping device, while conversations 
have moved to online instant messaging, which can also be monitored and digitally 
stored. With the further advancement of listening devices320 and the continuous evolu-
tion of privacy invasion, face-to-face conversations out in public are now potentially 
the latest target.
The ongoing attachment of microphones to CCTV cameras in the UK, at present, 
permits the recording of audio data in combination with video data to give a near com-
plete account of activities in the public space(s) concerned. As Steve Harrison, Westmin-
ster’s Assistant Director of Community Protection asserts, concerning the attachment of 
microphones to CCTV cameras in Westminster, “[t]his is about trying to instantly capture 
an image and audio that goes with it to let us know what’s going on”.321 The CCTV mi-
crophones are reportedly so sensitive that they can provide CCTV control room operators 
the capability to potentially monitor and record conversations out in public many meters 
320 Revolutionary technology in electronic eavesdropping includes the use of devices that transmit laser beams or very 
high frequency radio waves, which can enable users to listen in to a conversation hundreds of feet away and practically 
render windows and/or walls invisible.
321 Derbyshire, David. “Council plans to listen in on street life” (The Telegraph, 4 May 2005), available at: http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1489282/Council-plans-to-listen-in-on-street-life.html
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from their location source. This would also raise concerns over the potential for CCTV 
microphones to possibly record conversations within private homes.322
Understandably, individuals often discuss personal thoughts or feelings during 
their verbal interactions out in public, including political opinions, religious beliefs 
or other beliefs of a similar nature, which Section 2 of the Data Protection Act 1998 
legally recognizes as “sensitive personal data”. Although these verbal discussions may 
occur out in public, they still arguably merit a reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit 
if kept at a certain volume level,323 and should not be recorded by public or private 
bodies. While video surveillance of the general public obviously cannot listen in and 
record these opinions, feelings or beliefs when expressed verbally, the attachment of 
microphones to public space CCTV cameras, on the other hand, can provide the audio 
recording capability necessary to do so.
CCTV microphones could equally jeopardize certain individual liberties and fun-
damental freedoms, and repress legitimate political dissent, all in the name of security, 
similar to other technologies capable of mass surveillance (Cockfield, 2003). For in-
stance, CCTV microphones could have the so-called “chilling effect”324 on the freedom 
of expression, as people become more cautious of what they express with their friends 
and family out in public. Governments could even use CCTV microphones to moni-
tor what is being said during a protest or what people generally talk about as means of 
becoming better aware of public opinion and maintaining political and social control. 
On top of that, the audio data collected by CCTV microphones, in conjunction 
with the video data collected by the cameras, could be used not only to further moni-
tor and control behavior in public spaces, but even also to enforce anti-social behav-
ior rules concerning excessive noise at housing areas under the Anti-social Behaviour 
Act 2003 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Local governments have already used 
322 There have already been concerns over the deployment of CCTV cameras positioned in a way that can view inside the 
windows of private homes. 
323 However, perhaps this expectation of privacy could one day be forgotten, as today’s Internet generation (or Genera-
tion I or Generation Z) have a growing expectation, or even desire, to communicate to an audience what most would 
traditionally view personal. see Nussbaum, Emily. “Say Everything”, Kids the Internet, and the End of Privacy: The 
Greatest Generation Gap Since Rock and Roll (New York Magazine, 12 February, 2007), available at: http://nymag.
com/news/features/27341/
324 A legal term predominantly adopted in US courts, which is used in reference to laws, circumstances or actions that 
do not explicitly prohibit the exercise of fundamental freedoms, but rather bring about unnecessary repression or an 
intolerable burden on exercising these freedoms. The term has also been increasingly recognized and referred to by the 
ECtHR on numerous occasions. see, for example, Case of Kyprianou v. Cyprus, Application no. 73797/01, Judgment of 
15 December 2005, para. 175: Steel and Morris v. UK, Application no. 68416/01, Judgment of 15 February 2005, para. 
95; Case of Wille v. Liechtenstein, Application no. 28396/95, Judgment of 28 October 1999, para. 50. 
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CCTV cameras deployed in housing areas to monitor individuals subject to Anti-Social 
Behaviour Orders (ASBO) or Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs) and to gather 
information and evidence in certain locations for an ASBO application.325 The policy 
and strategy is thus already potentially in place for using CCTV microphones for the 
similar purposes.
6.3.2 The mouth (loudspeakers)
Public CCTV loudspeakers primarily concern the component of privacy that endows 
citizens the right to be left alone. The loudspeakers attached to public CCTV cameras 
provide their operators the capability not only to observe people in public, but also to 
scold individuals and shout commands at them. While there are other methods in which 
CCTV operators can disturb individuals,326 with the widespread deployment of CCTV 
loudspeakers, the scope of the ability to do so is unprecedented. 
The deployment of CCTV loudspeakers is (or at least was) part of the UK Govern-
ment’s ‘Respect Action Plan’, a scheme for tackling anti-social behavior or low-level 
crime.327 In the words of the Home Office, the use of the “talking cameras”, as the Home 
Office and media refers to them, is to “tackle bad behaviour and promote good”.328 Any 
individual who engages in an activity considered by the CCTV operator to be “bad 
behavior” or “anti-social” can potentially be scolded and publicly humiliated or ridi-
culed into behaving “correctly”. CCTV loudspeakers are thus being used as a means 
of threatening public humiliation, in order to deter anti-social behavior, which may be 
a form of social control through the conveyance of informal punishments, as opposed 
to social control through the threat of formal sanctions, such as fines or imprisonment. 
While most people may likely not have a problem with CCTV loudspeakers, if 
their use prevents the vandalizing of property or leads to safer and cleaner streets and 
325 see “Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour in Mixed Tenure Areas”, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, March 2003, p. 104, 
available at: http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/housing/pdf/138706.pdf
326 For example, a CCTV control room operator could bother people he or she sees using public telephone booths. see 
“Phone Pest picked targets on security video” (The Telegraph, 7 June 1996), available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/html-
Content.jhtml?html=/archive/1996/11/27/ntel27.html
327 see the Respect Action Plan, produced by the Central Office of Information on behalf of the Respect Task Force (based 
in the Home Office), January 2006.
328 see a promotional image from the Home Office, available at: http://www.respect.gov.uk/uploadedImages/Public_site/
Homepage/Main_features/TalkingCCTVbanner428x161.jpg
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parks, however, once the public accepts CCTV loudspeakers, their deployment could 
become further routine. Today, CCTV loudspeakers are largely being used to discour-
age vandals or fly tippers. But, eventually the widespread, unregulated deployment and 
use of CCTV loudspeakers could lead to a new echelon of social control.
Rather than using restricted pre-recorded messages, operators have the ability to 
speak directly to individuals from afar. The CCTV loudspeakers in their present form 
effectively grant their operators the power to intrude upon the daily lives of ordinary 
people and disturb the right to be left alone. Without technological or legal limitations 
as to what can be said, when, where and for which purposes, the potential for CCTV op-
erators to abuse the intrusive capability of loudspeakers is immense. There is essentially 
nothing to prevent operators from yelling out demeaning statements. Accordingly, the 
attachment of loudspeakers to CCTV cameras could further threaten personal freedom 
and personal dignity. 
The use of CCTV loudspeakers to tackle anti-social behaviour and/or crime might 
be just the beginning. As John Willman suggests, an editor of the Financial Times, 
CCTV loudspeakers could be used to greet customers and tell them about new products 
and special offers, and, with the addition of improved face recognition technology or 
the development and integration of highly-advanced iris scanners,329 CCTV loudspeak-
ers could direct these messages to identified customers, much like the personalized talk-
ing advertisements in Steven Spielberg’s film Minority Report.330 In addition, CCTV 
loudspeakers could also be used by employers to convey work-related commands to 
employees and by schools to scold students who break the rules. 
Moreover, the ‘asymmetrical’ design of CCTV loudspeakers, as a result of the 
inability of the general public to verbally respond to the speaker (i.e. the CCTV loud-
speaker operator), in addition to not being able to see him or her, could exacerbate the 
unequal relationship between the observers (CCTV control room operators) and the ob-
served (general public) (for further discussion, see, e.g., Hubbard et al., 2004, p. 244). 
329 Iris scanners could rapidly advance, as a result of an innovation, known as Smart-Iris, developed from the ultra high-
resolution, ultra-thin, lens-free, Panoptes cameras merged with projection devices. The advancement could remove the 
problems associated with traditional iris scanners, such as glare, dim lighting and the need for cooperative individuals 
to stop and stare at the scanners. see Drummond, Katie. “Darpa’s Beady-Eyed Camera Spots the ‘Non-Cooperative’” 
(Wired, 27 May 2010), available at: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/darpas-beady-eyed-camera-spots-the-
non-cooperative/
330 see John Willman, “Talking cameras are just the start” (Financial Times, 7 April 2007), Ed1, p. 9.
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6.4 SCOPE OF DEPLOYMENT IN THE UK
CCTV microphones and loudspeakers, for the most part, are being deployed in the 
UK alone.
6.4.1 CCTV microphones
Westminster City Council began testing CCTV microphones in 2005 to deal with noise 
at night,331 but later reportedly decided not to proceed further.332  Regardless, apparently 
more than 300 public CCTV cameras have been fitted with microphones in benefit 
offices and city centers.333 For example, the public should be aware that a CCTV mi-
crophone is apparently located on Riverside Road near the Wimbledon Stadium, since 
the media reported that this particular CCTV microphone recorded a suspect’s “manic” 
laughter nearby a crime scene.334 Nevertheless, the extent to which CCTV microphones 
have been deployed is not clear. The BBC reported on a controversial proposal to use 
CCTV microphones on crowds during the 2012 Olympic Games in London,335 in addi-
tion to the estimated 500,000 CCTV cameras the police plan to use.336
The increasing deployment of wireless network infrastructure in urban public spac-
es helps to reduce the costs of setting up and operating CCTV microphones. Moreover, 
audio data does not require an excessive amount of additional storage space. Therefore, 
due to the relatively simple installation of CCTV microphones and inexpensiveness and 
availability of the technology, their widespread deployment is not inconceivable. 
331 Iain Thomson, “Council listens in to Soho crowds” (Vnunet, 4 May 2005), available at: http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/
news/2127273/council-listens-soho-crowds
332 Iain Thomson, ‘Westminster Pulls CCTV Microphones’ (Vnunet, 31 January 2008), available at: http://www.vnunet.
com/vnunet/news/2208582/westminster-pulls-cctv
333 see statement made by Baroness Walmsley, Daily Hansard for 12 June 2008, Volume No. 702, Part No. 106, Column 
736, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldhansrd/text/80612-0010.htm
334 The man is no longer a suspect in the murder. see Harding, Eleanor. “Mystery chuckler not the killer of Andrew Cun-
ningham from Earlsfield” (Local Guardian, 4 June 2009), available at: http://www.yourlocalguardian.co.uk/news/local/
wimbledonnews/4419573.Mystery_laughter_leads_to_dead_end/
335 John Pienaar, ‘Olympics audio surveillance row’ (BBC News, 26 November, 2006), available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6186348.stm
336 “CCTV plan to boost 2012 security” (BBC News, 4 March 2008), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
england/london/7278365.stm
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The SIgard system, developed by Sound Intelligence,337 was set up in London, 
Manchester and Coventry338 and tested in Glasgow.339 The CCTV microphones are 
linked to computers with sound analysis software and are apparently able to determine 
when sound contains the indicators of aggression (similar to the way the human brain 
interprets sound) and then alert the CCTV operators.340 The CCTV microphones that 
were installed in Westminster were activated if noise levels reached above a certain 
threshold and made use of the existing Wi-Fi network that links the cameras to West-
minster’s central CCTV control room.
6.4.2 CCTV loudspeakers
A freedom of information request could reveal precisely how many loudspeakers have 
been connected to CCTV cameras throughout the UK and, if their use is indeed being 
tracked, how many times they have been used and precisely for which reasons.341  
CCTV loudspeakers were first pioneered in Wiltshire in 2003.342 As part of a 
special initiative called “Fancy an early night?”, CCTV loudspeakers were deployed 
337 A Netherlands based company, specializing in the development of advanced technology for the detection and analysis 
of sound.  Sound Intelligence, available at: http://www.soundintel.com
338 W. van Reijendam. “English Bobbies can escape the normal life by listening to aggression detection” (Financieel Dagblad, 
13 May 2008), available at: http://www.soundintel.com/en/nieuws/algemeen/groningse-camera-hoort-agressie.html
339 see Macdonald, Kenneth. “CCTV cameras ‘listen for trouble’” (BBC News, 13 February 2009), available at: http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/7886656.stm
340 Sound Intelligence, available at: http://www.soundintel.com
341 I sent an identical freedom of information request by email on 14 November 2008 to the Home Office.  An official reply 
from the Home Office was received on 26 November 2008 stating that the matters raised in the request are the responsibil-
ity of the Communities & Local Government and that the request has been transferred accordingly. After several weeks and 
not receiving further information, I inquired with the Communities & Local Government and resent my request on 3 March 
2009. I was informed within 20 days that my previous request could not be traced, but that I would receive a response to 
my original request by 2 April 2009. On 27 March 2009, I received the FINAL response (Ref: F0002996) informing me 
that despite enquiries made of a number of the Business Units, the information I requested could not be provided since 
the Communities and Local Government does not hold this information. It was suggested that I contact the relevant local 
authorities or the particular police forces. What I have learned from this process is that either the UK Government does not 
want to provide this information or worse that indeed the use and deployment of CCTV loudspeakers is not being tracked 
centrally, if it is even being tracked at all. I can only hope it is being tracked locally.
342 “Talking CCTV pioneered in Wiltshire” (BBC News, 23 May 2003), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
england/wiltshire/2933626.stm
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three years later in Middlesbrough Borough. More than a dozen CCTV loudspeak-
ers have been fitted to public space cameras in Middlesbrough. Subsequently, on 4 
April 2007, it was announced that loudspeakers would be fitted to numerous CCTV 
cameras in the following additional 20 areas, boroughs, cities or towns across the UK: 
Blackpool, Barking and Dagenham, Coventry, Darlington, Derby, Gloucester, Harlow, 
Ipswich, Mansfield, Northampton, Norwich, Nottingham, Plymouth, Reading, Salford, 
Sandwell, Southwark, South Tyneside and Wirral.343 The announcement has been fol-
lowed through.
CCTV loudspeakers are not only being deployed in city or town centers, but within 
parks and at hospitals. In Norwich, loudspeakers were fitted to multiple cameras in Wa-
terloo Park and Eaton Park in order to curb littering.344 In Wolverhampton, New Cross 
Hospital installed CCTV loudspeakers to scold people for failing to use designated 
smoking areas.345
The deployment is being funded through the Respect Task Force,346 while the 
CCTV loudspeakers are being installed by local authorities, in partnership with the 
local police department and in coordination with the Home Office and local anti-social 
behaviour coordinators.
According to a statement made by Vernon Coaker, the Minister of State responsible 
for policing, crime and security at the Home Office, “the [Respect] task force has no 
current plans to fund further roll-out to other areas”.347 However, this does not mean 
that CCTV loudspeakers will not be deployed in more and more towns and cities with 
further funding from other sources.  Since then, several additional towns have already 
followed suit. For example, Bristol  subsequently initiated a three-month pilot348 and 
343 see “Children remind adults to act responsibly on our streets”, Home Office, 4 April 2007, available at: http://www.asb.
homeoffice.gov.uk/news/article.aspx?id=10310
344 “Offenders warned by talking CCTV” (BBC News, 13 April 2007), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
england/norfolk/6551501.stm
345 “Talking CCTV’ to tackle smokers” (BBC News, 31 July 2008), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_
midlands/7535927.stm
346 The Respect Task Force is an inter-ministerial steering group, established in 2005, with the direct responsibility over 
the UK Government’s ‘Respect’ agenda.
347 Daily Hansard for 10 May 2008, Column 427W, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/
cmhansrd/cm070510/text/70510w0019.htm
348 “City pilots ‘talking’ CCTV”, 10 December 2007, available at: www.bristol.gov.uk/redirect/?oid=PressRelease-
id-21982088
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Hartlepool also announced their plans to tryout CCTV loudspeakers.349  Merseyside, 
a metropolitan county, which includes the City of Liverpool, plans to dismantle thou-
sands of old lampposts and replace them with new high-tech CCTV equipped ones. The 
new lampposts will reportedly include loudspeakers.350 
CCTV loudspeakers are also being funded, deployed and operated by private enti-
ties. The Leeds-based property developer, Business Homes, have installed what they 
dub as “a state-of-the-art audio CCTV system” at the business park Halbeath Inter-
change in Dunfermline and are installing the system on all 25 of the business parks the 
company is currently developing throughout the UK.351 McDonald’s also deployed at 
20 restaurants across the UK a system of CCTV cameras fitted with both microphones 
and loudspeakers, which are monitored and controlled via a central control room.352 
The installation of the CCTV loudspeaker systems currently in place in Middles-
brough, West Bromwich and Nottingham, and supplied by Complus Teltronic, utilize 
the existing fiber optics or communications infrastructure.353 With the Apex system, 
however, all information is sent and received via radio waves. Each unit integrated into 
the CCTV network is composed of a horn loudspeaker, small antenna, radio receiver, 
transmitter and power supply unit, and has a unique identification number. The CCTV 
control room can operate the units several kilometres from where the actual CCTV 
cameras and loudspeakers are located. By entering the unit’s identification number and 
pressing the activation button, the operator can activate the corresponding loudspeak-
er.354 Similarly, MEL Secure Systems launched CCTV loudspeaker systems that are 
ready to install and use digital wireless transmission. The loudspeakers of Bosch Secu-
349 “Talking cameras coming soon...” (Hartlepool Mail, 3 October 2008), available at: http://www.hartlepoolmail.co.uk/
news/Talking-cameras-coming soon.4556556.jp 
350 Coligan, Nick. “CCTV on every corner” (Liverpool Echo, 29 November 2007),
351 “Business Park’s Talking CCTV A ‘First’ for Fife’”, Business Homes, 1 September 2007, available at: http://www.
businesshomes.com/newsDetails.asp?id=60
352 SourceSecurity.com, available at: http://www.sourcesecurity.com/markets/retail-and-eas/application/co-73-ga.350.
html
353 “Talking CCTV Cameras – Middlesbrough”, Complus Teltronic, 13 April 2007, available at: http://www.complustel-
tronic.co.uk/eng/newsdetail.asp?ID=396
354 Apex Radio Systems Ltd., available at: http://www.apexradio.co.uk/talkingcctv.php
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rity Systems, on the other hand, apparently have superior sound quality, and have been 
deployed, for example, in Plymouth city for that reason.355  
At this rate and level of enthusiasm, there is little reason to believe that CCTV 
loudspeakers will not eventually be deployed in every major town or city in the UK, 
and beyond. As a demonstration of what potentially is to come, CCTV loudspeaker 
technology was displayed at the 2007 Milipol exhibition, the world’s largest for internal 
state security technology.356 Given the relatively quick and easy installation of CCTV 
loudspeakers and integration with existing CCTV surveillance systems, the greater 
widespread deployment of CCTV loudspeakers is also not inconceivable. 
6.5 SECURITY GAINS 
The public security gains of integrating microphones and loudspeakers to CCTV cam-
eras are centered mostly on their potential to enhance the ability of CCTV control room 
operators to do their job, which is to assist in the fight against crime and terrorism. 
6.5.1 CCTV microphones 
CCTV cameras are meant to help ensure public safety, i.e. to prevent crime and help 
counter-terrorism activities. Indeed, the UK Home Office has spent an overwhelming 
amount of its crime prevention budget on installing CCTV cameras. However, there is 
insufficient empirical evidence that CCTV cameras are helpful in preventing or reduc-
ing crime, which raises questions on their legitimacy and whether or not the deploy-
ment and use of CCTV cameras is proportional and justified.  A Home Office report 
concluded that of the 14 CCTV systems it assessed, “most systems revealed little over-
all effect on crime levels […].”357 Even more, CCTV cameras have shown to be more 
effective for reducing property crimes than violent crimes (Welsh and Farrington, 2003-
2004, pp. 513-14) or preventing vehicle crimes in car parks. There is also little reason 
355 “Bosch delivers CCTV with loudspeakers to Plymouth City”, Security World Hotel, 5 May 2007, available at: http://
www.securityworldhotel.com/int/news.asp?string1=&string2=&string3=&string4=&YearSearch=2007&category=0&
company_id=&NAV=2&id=38223
356 see “Paris - Milipol to Focus on Homeland Security”, Intelligence Online, 4 October 2007.
357 Martin Gill, Angela Spriggs et al., ”The impact of CCTV: fourteen case studies”, Home Office Online Report 15/05, p. 
34, available at (last time visited: 23/01/12): http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr1505.pdf
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to believe that CCTV cameras significantly aid in criminal investigations. As Detective 
Chief Inspector Mick Neville asserted in May 2008 at a Conference of the Metropolitan 
Police’s Visual Images Identifications and Detections Office (Viido), although “billions 
of pounds has been spent on kit” […], “only 3% of crimes were solved by CCTV”358. 
Moreover, an internal Scotland Yard report stated that less than one crime is solved per 
year for every 1,000 CCTV cameras in London, and there over a million CCTV cam-
eras in London alone (Cannataci, 2010).359 Therefore, CCTV cameras are not an effec-
tive alternative to traditional policing methods and activities and training and deploying 
more police officers.
Public space CCTV systems especially require human operators to be vigilant and 
sharp-eyed, in order to effectively observe multiple screens in real-time (or multiple video 
streams displayed on a single screen simultaneously). Often these images include areas 
with many persons, objects and activities present. The effectiveness of CCTV cameras 
is, thus, significantly dependent on the performance of operators, which can also degrade 
over time due to boredom or fatigue (Smith, 2004; Surette, 2005) or loss of concentration 
(Cannataci, 2010) and other ‘human factors’. There are also a limited number of CCTV 
control room operators and, at times, the real-time video streams may go unmonitored 
(Norris and Armstrong, 1999). In addition, CCTV cameras naturally can only observe 
events, persons or objects within their field of view, which may occasionally be obstruct-
ed, for instance, by trucks or trees, or may even be impossible to view.
Although there is equally no empirical evidence proving so, combining microphones 
with public space CCTV cameras could improve the performance of the CCTV opera-
tors and perhaps even reduce the number of CCTV operators needed and/or improve 
the efficiency of their employment/deployment, which during the current ongoing eco-
nomic crisis is becoming crucial.360 CCTV microphones could also significantly en-
hance the capability of the CCTV cameras to detect crime. As Kim et al. demonstrate, 
auditory sensors can shorten the time required to locate a specific object, whereby the 
ability of humans to locate the direction of a sound’s source can be mimicked by ma-
chines (2007, p. 383).
358 “CCTV boom failing to cut crime” (BBC News, 6 May 2008), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7384843.
stm
359 Hickley, Matthew. “CCTV helps solve just ONE crime per 1,000 as officers fail to use film as evidence” (The Daily 
Mail, 25 August, 2009), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1208700/CCTV-helps-solve-just-ONE-
crime-1-000-officers-fail-use-film-evidence.html
360 see Camber, Rebecca. “Big brother is NOT watching you: Cash-strapped towns leave CCTV cameras unmonitored” 
(Daily Mail, 16 December 2008), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1095609/Big-brother-NOT-
watching-Cash-strapped-towns-leave-CCTV-cameras-unmonitored.html
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Sound is omni-directional as opposed to vision, which is directional, and, unlike 
vision, sound is not negatively affected by poor lighting or entirely obstructed by ob-
stacles. Microphones can provide CCTV systems and operators the ability to detect 
crime beyond a camera’s field of view and can help them to work better in areas with 
insufficient light. If several microphones are installed at a certain distance from each 
other, the location of the sound source can automatically be determined, based on the 
time difference of the arrival from the sound source to the sensors (Kim et al., 2007, 
p. 384). A pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) CCTV camera can be pointed in that direction and the 
operator can simultaneously be both audibly and visibly alerted to contact the police 
immediately via a wireless network. CCTV microphones can therefore enhance the 
vigilance and effectiveness of CCTV operators and help them to observe more monitors 
or video streams, without having to hopelessly attempt to watch each simultaneously at 
all times. The SIgard system is based on the premise that violent incidents supposedly 
often start with verbal aggression or shouting, without actually conveying this so-called 
evidence.361 While shouting may not justify triggering the CCTV microphones, gunfire, 
broken glass and explosions certainly do. 
CCTV microphones can also potentially provide evidence in a court of law. For in-
stance, the groans of Mark Witherall, while he was being brutally beaten and left to die 
by thieves, were recorded by a neighbor’s security camera, which had audio recording 
capability, and was used as evidence against the offenders during the criminal trial.362 
In this case, however, microphones attached to public space CCTV cameras were not 
the source of the evidence, but rather the audio capabilities of security cameras in a 
private home. 
6.5.2 CCTV loudspeakers 
CCTV cameras, for the most part, do not prevent or deter crime, but rather simply 
record the criminal event, since there is a limited number of CCTV control room opera-
tors and the operators are not able to do much more beyond contacting the police or 
sounding an alarm. These deficiencies of CCTV cameras could perhaps be countered 
by the use of loudspeakers. The argument is that CCTV loudspeakers could potentially 
be used to combat crime and anti-social behaviour at an early stage by confronting 
361 Sound Intelligence, available at: http://www.soundintel.com
362 “Teenagers could be heard on CCTV as they murdered father of three” (Daily Mail, 17 January 2008), available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-508880/Teenagers-heard-CCTV-murdered-father-three.html
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those who engage in such acts, issuing warnings and reminding people that they are 
being monitored. In the words of Graeme Gerrard, the Chair of the CCTV Working 
Group of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and Deputy Chief Constable 
of Cheshire Police:
Talking CCTV [CCTV loudspeakers] increases the effectiveness of town 
centre cameras because it allows the camera operators to intervene and let 
the offender know their anti-social behaviour has been spotted and is being 
recorded. In many cases this is enough to stop the offending behaviour which 
in turn results in safer and tidier streets.363
CCTV operators could use the loudspeakers to swiftly intervene and discourage or 
dissuade unlawful or violent behaviour in real time, or perhaps even before it happens, 
and to warn someone if danger approaches them. For example, the technology was used 
as a deterrent at Business Homes’ Nottingham site earlier this year against would-be 
thieves.364 In addition, CCTV loudspeakers could also be used to reassure someone who 
requires immediate medical attention that emergency services have been contacted and 
are on their way. 
According to Middlesbrough Council’s security manager, Jack Bonnar, the town 
had recorded a 65-70% reduction of public order offences, such as disorderly conduct, 
since the introduction of CCTV loudspeakers.365 Moreover, Middlesbrough Council-
man Barry Coppinger asserts that CCTV loudspeakers have “raised awareness that the 
town centre is a safe place to visit and also that we are keeping an eye open to make sure 
it is safe”.366  Other places, such as Ipswich, have also reported a success.367 
Once again, however, anti-social behaviour, such as littering, dog fouling, public 
urinating, or loitering, can hardly be considered threats to public safety, which calls 
363 see “Children remind adults to act responsibly on our streets”, Home Office, 4 April 2007, available at: http://www.asb.
homeoffice.gov.uk/news/article.aspx?id=10310
364 see “Business Park’s Talking CCTV A ‘First’ for Fife’”, Business Homes, 1 September 2007, available at: http://www.
businesshomes.com/newsDetails.asp?id=60
365 see “Children remind adults to act responsibly on our streets”, Home Office, 4 April 2007, available at: http://www.asb.
homeoffice.gov.uk/news/article.aspx?id=10310
366 “Talking’ CCTV scolds offenders” (BBC News, 4 April 2007), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/eng-
land/6524495.stm
367 “TALKING CCTV cameras are set to stay in Ipswich after a trial proved a success,...”, (Evening Star, Ipswich, 20 June 
2008).
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into question whether or not CCTV loudspeakers should be used to prevent or inhibit 
these acts and, if so, to what extent.  After all, these acts have more than likely occurred 
millions of times in the UK alone.  On the other hand, more serious forms of anti-social 
behaviour or disorderly conduct, such as vandalism, undoubtedly do pose a more seri-
ous threat to public safety and well-being. Nevertheless, the use of CCTV loudspeakers 
to prevent or deter lower level anti-social behaviour could, in theory, free police to fight 
real crime by reducing avoidable bureaucracy and paperwork. 
Still, the effectiveness of CCTV loudspeakers in improving public safety or reduc-
ing anti-social behaviour has yet to be thoroughly evaluated or credibly proven. More-
over, if the commands broadcasted from CCTV loudspeakers are not respected and not 
enforced then their effectiveness will depreciate overtime until they most likely end up 
useless. In Salford Council, for instance, over half of the people reprimanded in 2007 
for their behaviour via the CCTV loudspeakers ignored the reprimand.368 On the other 
hand, in Nottingham, of the 109 people spoken to by CCTV operators using the loud-
speakers, 78 did what they were told, and in 16 cases operators called a police officer to 
the scene and 12 fines were issued as a result.369 
Nonetheless, the widespread deployment of CCTV loudspeakers could eventually 
incite rebellious acts in response, if it has not already, which could then result in more 
anti-social behavior than there was before.
6.6 ALTERNATIVES TO THE CCTV MICROPHONES AND LOUDSPEAKERS 
 DEPLOYED IN THE UK
There are indeed a number of more privacy-friendly alternative devices and/or means, 
already in existence, with the purpose of helping to prevent and reduce crime and anti-
social behaviour.
6.6.1 CCTV microphones
Gunfire and explosive detection systems have been around for more than ten years 
(Mazerolle et al., 1999). The ShotSpotter™ system, which the local police department 
368 Haris, Jan. “Most people ignore talking CCTV”, CCTV Core, available at: http://www.cctvcore.co.uk/27-09-2007-most-
people-ignore-talking-cctv.html
369 “Talking CCTV a success in the city” (Nottingham Evening Post, 5 August 2008).
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began operating in Redwood City, California as early as 1995, uses strategically placed 
sensors or microphones to triangulate the location of gunfire across wide areas within 
seconds of a weapon being fired (Monmonier, 2004, pp. 116-119). The ShotSpotter™ 
system has demonstrated accuracy within 25 meters. In addition, ShotSpotter™ can 
support subsequent forensic analysis, including the type of gun used, the direction of 
the gunfire, and even information related to the direction and speed of shooters on the 
move.370 During the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, pole-mounted microphones were 
used to detect explosions and gunfire and quickly pinpoint the location of an incident.371 
6.6.2 CCTV loudspeakers
Derwent has developed a system, which detects trespassers and then automatically is-
sues a warning over loudspeakers to leave the area. At night, the system’s powerful 
AEGIS White Light LED illuminators, activated by a passive infra-red (PIR) sensor, 
can flood the area with light.372 It is not hard to imagine that a sudden burst of bright 
light will deter trespassers and vandals.  
A similar device called FlashCAM-880 developed by Q-Star Technology automati-
cally takes a digital photo and delivers a recorded message, when activated by motion 
sensors, to deter intruders, vandals, graffiti taggers or illegal dumpers. The digital cam-
era can operate in total darkness and has an operating range of up to 100 feet. Flash-
CAMs have been deployed in cities throughout the US and have resulted in a number 
of success stories.373
An additional alternative device to CCTV loudspeakers is the Mosquito™, an anti-
vandal system developed by Compound Security Systems Ltd., which emits a high 
frequency sound that is piercing only for teenagers. The Mosquito™ has proven to 
successfully drive away gangs of youths and in doing so can prevent teenagers from 
370 ShotSpotter, Inc., available at: http://www.shotspotter.com/products/technology.html
371 ‘Olympian challenge’, Info4 Security, 5 February 2007, available at: http://www.info4security.com/story.asp?storyC
ode=3093811&sectioncode=16
372 “Derwent’s White Light Illuminators Tackle Network Rail Thieves”, Derwent, available at: http://www.derwentcctv.
com/home/index.php?id=7&nid=75
373 Q-Star Technology, available at: http://www.qstartech.com
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engaging in acts of vandalism or loitering in front of businesses. The Mosquito™ has 
been deployed throughout the UK.374
The so-called “Manilow Method”, whereby opera, classical  or other music un-
popular with teenagers is played to drive away youth, has also been used in the UK by 
shop owners and local councils, reportedly with some success. 
Improved street lighting is another alternative to the increased deployment of 
CCTV cameras. Research has also shown that improved street lighting in a public space 
setting leads to a greater reduction in overall crime than CCTV cameras (Welsh and 
Farrington, 2003-2004, p. 513).
The further recruitment and deployment of Police Support Community Officers 
(PSCOs) or other authorized officers of a local authority or security operatives licensed 
by the Security Industry Authority, is an additional alternative to the use of CCTV loud-
speakers in tackling anti-social behaviour. Whether deploying more human resources 
on the ground is more effective than using CCTV loudspeakers is debatable, but cer-
tainly this method reduces the concerns of ‘asymmetric’ observation (see Hubbard et 
al., 2004) and any unnecessary/inappropriate public humiliation. 
Other alternatives to CCTV loudspeakers and their approach to ‘correcting’ anti-
social behavior through near public humiliation, are education and after-school social 
programs, and even video games, such as the interactive gaming technology platform 
developed by Project rePLAY through EU funding.  
6.7 LAWS, CODES AND OTHER LEGAL/POLICY INSTRUMENTS OF   
 SPECIAL RELEVANCE IN THE UK
As widely recognized, CCTV surveillance systems may legitimately be deployed for 
the sake of preventing and detecting crime, protecting property and individuals, and 
defending public interests.375 The police are especially permitted to use CCTV systems 
for carrying out their duties and functions. Other public entities and private entities may 
also be permitted to use CCTV cameras, since their use may be considered reasonable 
to prevent criminal offenses or assist in the lawful arrest of offenders.  Consent is not 
required, since the collection and processing of the data from CCTV surveillance sys-
374 Compound Security Systems, available at: http://www.compoundsecurity.co.uk
375 see Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2004 on the Processing of Personal Data by means of Video Surveillance (WP 
89).
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tems is deemed necessary to protect the vital interests of society and to prevent threats 
to public safety/security, when carried out in accordance with the law.
In the opinion of the Article 29 Working Party, Directive 95/46/EC applies to the 
processing of image and sound data by means of CCTV surveillance systems.376 The 
Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) implements or transposes in its own way Directive 
95/46/EC into UK domestic law. 
In short form, the eight data protection principles, listed in the DPA,377 requires that 
all personal data must be:
 - Processed fairly and lawfully; 
 - Obtained and used only for specified and lawful purposes;
 - Adequate and relevant, and not excessive; 
 - Accurate and, where necessary, up to date;
 - Kept no longer than necessary;
 - Processed in accordance with the rights of individuals;
 - Secure; and
 - Transferred only to third-party countries that have adequate data protection laws 
and practices
Once again, these data protection principles are parallel to the principles of pri-
vacy outlined in Chapter 3. The first data protection principle, and the conditions that 
must be met in accordance with Schedules 2 and 3 of the DPA, are basically parallel 
to the principle of consent/choice. The second data protection principle is parallel to 
the purpose specification principle and the use limitation principle. The third data pro-
tection principle is parallel to the principles of proportionality and data minimization. 
The fourth data protection principle is parallel to the access/participation principle and 
the integrity principle. The fifth data protection principle is parallel to the use limita-
tion principle. The sixth data protection principle is parallel to the principles of notice/
awareness and consent/choice. The seventh data protection principle is parallel to the 
principle of security/integrity. 
Part V of the DPA implements the principle of enforcement/redress through the 
establishment of a Data Protection (Information) Commissioner with the authority to 
intervene in suspected breaches of the DPA by data controllers and issue enforcement 
notices requiring rectification. The Data Protection Commissioner may also be granted 
376 Ibid.
377 Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 1, Part I. 
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a warrant from a circuit judge to enter and inspect the premises of a data controller. The 
DPA also provides for prosecutions of persons suspected of violating the provisions of 
the DPA and, if found guilty, those persons are subject to penalties. 
Personal data is defined in Article 2 (a) of Directive 95/46/EC as:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indi-
rectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity. 
The definition of personal data in the DPA is different in wording and format from 
Directive 95/46/EC. Part 1, Section 1(1) of the DPA defines personal data as: 
data which relate to a living individual who can be identified – 
(a) from those data, or 
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is 
likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes any ex-
pression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions 
of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual. 
Moreover, in order to determine if data is ‘personal’, any feasibly possible means 
to link the data with data relating to an identifiable individual should be taken into ac-
count. As Recital 26 of EU Directive 95/46/EC states:
to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all 
the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other 
person to identify the said person.
However, as the Article 29 Working Party argues, Recital 26 
means that a mere hypothetical possibility to single out the individual is not 
enough to consider the person as “identifiable”. If, taking into account “all 
the means likely reasonably to be used by the controller or any other per-
son”, that possibility does not exist or is negligible, the person should not be 
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considered as “identifiable”, and the information would not be considered as 
“personal data”.378
But, as the Article 29 Working Party further adds, this should particularly “take 
into account all the factors at stake”, including the cost of conducting the identification, 
the intended purpose and the advantage expected by the controller, and should consider 
“the state of the art in technology at the time of the processing and the possibilities for 
development during the period for which the data will be processed”.379
The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) is responsible for ensuring 
that all organizations comply with the obligations of the DPA and has, to a certain 
extent, the enforcement powers to do so. CCTV operators (i.e. data controllers) must 
use CCTV systems in accordance with the DPA’s data protection principles (where 
relevant) and the DPA also requires CCTV operators to register with the ICO (Taylor, 
2002a). In accordance with Section 51 (3)(b) of the DPA (and Article 27 of Directive 
95/46/EC), the ICO also issued the ‘CCTV code of practice’ to help operators of CCTV 
surveillance systems to comply with the DPA (where relevant). The CCTV code of 
practice was updated in July 2000 and again in January 2008. 
The UK is a party to the ECHR. The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) incorporated 
the ECHR into UK domestic law, requiring domestic courts to take into consideration the 
decisions of the ECtHR and requiring all domestic legislation to be interpreted in a way 
consistent with the ECHR. But, the HRA does not mandate that UK domestic courts 
must observe ECtHR jurisprudence.380 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR states:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.
It is generally accepted that the right to privacy is not absolute and may be infringed 
under certain circumstances. Accordingly, Article 8(2) states:
378 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data (WP 136), p. 15.
379 Ibid.
380 For further discussion, see Taylor, Nick. State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy (Surveillance & Society 1, 2002a), 
pp. 66-85.
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There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009,381 the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union is equally applicable within UK law and is 
enforceable within UK domestic courts. Article 7 of the Charter provides for the right 
to privacy, and Article 8 explicitly stipulates: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis  
 of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid  
 down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been col- 
 lected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent  
 authority.
The Treaty of Lisbon also elevates the right to the protection of personal data in 
EU law through the adoption of a specific article on the right.382 Article 16 B (para. 1) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)383 affirms, “Everyone 
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them”. Article 16 B (para. 2) 
grants the EU (i.e. the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council) 
the power or legal basis to legislate and adopt data protection rules applicable to all 
sectors, including in the area of freedom, justice and security, and therefore alters the 
limitations of Article 3 of Directive 95/46/EC.384
381 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed 
at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 (OJ C 306, 17.12.2007).
382 For further discussion, see Cannataci, Joseph A. Lex Personalitatis: Personality, Law and Technology in the 21st Cen-
tury (Acta Universitatis Lucian Blaga 219, 2008).
383 see Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(OJ C 83, 30.3.2010)
384 see Com (2007) 87 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
follow-up of the Work Programme for better implementation of the Data Protection Directive. 
140 Public space CCTV microphones and loudspeakers: The ears & mouth of ‘Big Brother’
Accordingly, the EC has adopted a draft proposal for a Directive on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal offences.385  The proposal builds on Directive 95/46/EC and the Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (hereinafter: CFD 2008/977/JHA),386 which ad-
dresses the protection of personal data processed by law enforcement authorities in 
criminal matters and complements Directive 95/46/EC. The United Kingdom also takes 
part in CFD 2008/977/JHA, in accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol integrating the 
Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.387
Purportedly, CCTV surveillance systems are being deployed in the UK to prevent 
crime (Taylor, 2002a, p. 79). However, while an interference with the right to privacy 
is permitted, any interference must demonstrate both that it is necessary to fulfill a 
legitimate aim and is proportionate to fulfilling that aim.388 Some authors question, for 
example, whether or not the widespread use of CCTV surveillance systems in public 
spaces is a proportionate response for preventing crime (see, e.g. Taylor, 2002a, p. 80). 
In addition, any interference with the right to privacy by public authorities must be “in 
accordance with the law”, and the consequences of the law must be foreseeable.389 
Certain interpretations of Article 8 of the ECHR finely suggest the notion that even 
activities or incidents involving identifiable individuals that occur in public and are per-
manently or systematically recorded may be considered private and may thus engage the 
right to privacy, albeit balanced with the interests of national or public security. The EC-
tHR has recognized the possibility of the blurring of the public and private spheres. For 
instance, in P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that there “a zone of 
interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the 
scope of “private life”’.390  The ECtHR also held that:
385 see Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of Individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detec-
tion or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data, 
COM(2012) 10 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012 (Article 1).
386 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (30.12.2008).
387 Ibid., recital 43
388 see Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 52(1).
389 see, e.g., Kopp v. Switzerland, Application No. 23224/94, Judgment of 25 March 1998. 
390 P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 44787/98, Judgment of 25 September 2001, para. 56.
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A person who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any mem-
ber of the public who is also present. Monitoring by technological means of 
the same public scene (for example, a security guard viewing through closed-
circuit television) is of a similar character. Private-life considerations may 
arise, however, once any systematic or permanent record comes into exis-
tence of such material from the public domain. It is for this reason that files 
gathered by security services on a particular individual fall within the scope 
of Article 8, even where the information has not been gathered by any intru-
sive or covert method.391
In Peck v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR judged that the publication or general dis-
closure for broadcasting purposes of images of identifiable individuals obtained by public 
space CCTV cameras constitutes an intrusion of the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 
of the ECHR. The ECtHR stated:
Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The court 
has already held that elements such as gender identification, name, sexual 
orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere 
protected by Art.8. The Article also protects a right to identity and personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings and the outside world and it may include activities of a profes-
sional or business nature. There is, therefore, a zone of interaction of a person 
with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
‘private life’ (emphasis added).392
Furthermore, in Niemietz v. Germany, the ECtHR judged:
it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an “inner circle” in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude there-
from entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect 
for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish 
and develop relationships with other human beings.393
391 Ibid., para. 57. 
392 Peck v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 44647/98, Judgment of 28 January 2003, para. 57.
393 Niemietz v. Germany, Application No. 13710/88, Judgment of 16 December 1992, para. 29.
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As Harris et al. argue, “the expanding understanding of private life set out in the 
Niemietz case indicates that a formal public/private distinction about the nature of the 
location will not always be decisive” (1995, p. 309).394 
An infringement of privacy can be associated with the infringement of other rights. 
The ECtHR in Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden recognized that an unjustified 
violation of the right to privacy could also be associated with a violation of the rights 
to freedom of expression and freedom of (peaceful) assembly, enshrined in Articles 10 
and 11 of the ECHR respectively. The ECtHR affirmed that 
the storage of personal data related to political opinion, affiliations and ac-
tivities that is deemed unjustified for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 ipso facto 
constitutes an unjustified interference with the rights protected by Articles 10 
and 11.395
Therefore, in order to determine the extent to which public surveillance activities 
may breach Article 8 of the ECHR, one must carefully consider the purposes and basis 
for the surveillance and the subsequent use and/or disclosure of the audio and video/
image data collected.
Finally, it is also important to note here, however, that the DPA and Directive 
95/46/EC apply to all data controllers, while the HRA and ECHR only apply to public 
authorities. Nonetheless, in accordance with Section 3 of the HRA, the DPA must still 
be legally interpreted in a way consistent with the ECHR. 
394 For further discussion, see Taylor, Nick. State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy (Surveillance & Society 1, 2002a), 
pp. 66-85.
395 Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden, Application No. 62332/00, Judgment of 6 June 2006, para. 107.
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6.7.1 CCTV microphones 
Based on the privacy/data protection principles, the purpose(s) of any CCTV surveil-
lance system should be specified beforehand and the processing of the images (of iden-
tifiable persons), or any other (personal) information obtained via CCTV surveillance 
systems, must be compatible with the lawful and specified purposes. The use of CCTV 
surveillance systems must only correspond to achieving these specified purposes. The 
data collected should also not be retained for longer than is necessary to achieve the 
specified purposes. In addition, based on the privacy/data protection principles, signs 
must be displayed to clearly inform the public that they are entering an area monitored 
by CCTV cameras.
Both audio and image data may qualify as personal data.396  Appropriately, the 
former Information Commissioner Richard Thomas declared that sound recorded by 
CCTV cameras would be treated under UK law in the same way as CCTV footage.397
Up until January 2008, the CCTV code of practice, however, did cover sound re-
cording capabilities of CCTV cameras. The updated CCTV code of practice issued in 
January 2008 addresses the concern of CCTV microphones, but does not forbid their 
use, as somewhat misleadingly reported by The Telegraph.398 Instead, the CCTV code 
of practice (2008) advises against recording conversations unless in exceptional cir-
cumstances and with the presence of signs. The CCTV code of practice (2008) states:
CCTV must not be used to record conversations between members of the pub-
lic as this is highly intrusive and unlikely to be justified. You should choose a 
system without this facility if possible. If your system comes equipped with 
a sound recording facility then you should turn this off or disable it in some 
other way. There are limited circumstances in which audio recording may be 
justified, subject to sufficient safeguards. These could include: Audio based 
alert systems (such as those triggered by changes in noise patterns such as 
sudden shouting). Conversations must not be recorded, and operators should 
not listen in.399 
396 see Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 14. 
397 “Word on the street ... they’re listening” (Sunday Times, 26 November 2006), available at: http://www.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/news/uk/article650166.ece
398 Hennessy, Patrick. “CCTV camera microphones to be axed” (Telegraph, 28 January 2008), available at: http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1576686/CCTV-camera-microphones-to-be-axed.html#continue
399 CCTV code of practice 2008, p. 10. 
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Any automated decision, using intelligent software, pertaining to the audio data re-
corded from the CCTV microphones, would fall under Article 7 of the CFD 2008/977/
JHA and would thus be subject to its safeguards. 
6.7.2 CCTV loudspeakers
While the CCTV code of practice addresses the use of CCTV loudspeakers, it is diffi-
cult to determine the relevant binding statutory laws and case law that pertain to CCTV 
loudspeakers. The CCTV code of practice exclusively addresses CCTV loudspeakers 
with the following statement:
The use of audio to broadcast messages to those under surveillance should 
be restricted to messages directly related to the purpose for which the system 
was established.400
CCTV loudspeakers are being used to curtail anti-social behaviour, which is rather 
broadly defined by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 as acting 
in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to 
one or more persons not of the same household as himself.401
Anti-social behaviour may include the following acts, just to name a few: vandal-
ism, graffiti, indecent exposure, inappropriate sexual conduct in public, soliciting, il-
legal parking, fly tipping,402 public drunken behaviour, and urinating or defecating in 
public.
400 Ibid., p. 11. 
401 Section 1, para. 1 (a).
402 Fly tipping is a form of littering that involves dumping large objects or large quantities of material.
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6.8 DEFICIENCIES AND DILEMMAS OF THE UK LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Based on the principles of privacy and the criteria of adequacy, as outlined in Chapter 
3, an assessment of the UK legal framework reveals significant legal dilemmas and de-
ficiencies, with regards to the deployment and use of public space CCTV microphones 
and loudspeakers.
6.8.1 CCTV microphones
The DPA certainly incorporates the data protection principles and fully transposes Di-
rective 95/46/EC into UK law. Although the data protection legislation was not origi-
nally foreseen to cover CCTV surveillance, Directive 95/46/EC indeed covers both 
audio and video surveillance, as recognized by the Article 29 Working Party,403 and in 
accordance with Recital 14 of Directive 95/46/EC. Still, the DPA or Directive 95/46/EC 
does not provide a comprehensive legal framework for regulating CCTV surveillance 
systems, in particular concerning the latest enhancements to public CCTV surveillance 
capabilities. Besides, as the EC has acknowledged, “[t]he combination of sound and 
image data with automatic recognition imposes particular care when applying the prin-
ciples of the Directive”.404 Moreover, the DPA, for the most part, regulates the process-
ing, retention and dissemination of personal data, which may or may not include the 
audio/video data collected through public space CCTV surveillance systems, but does 
not actually regulate the deployment of public space CCTV systems nor does it regu-
late their general use when no audio/video data is stored. This could mean that, even if 
the DPA regulates the subsequent use of the audio data collected and stored via CCTV 
microphones, the DPA may not necessarily regulate the use of CCTV microphones to 
simply listen in to conversations occurring out in public. 
All the same, Directive 95/46/EC does not apply to the processing of personal data 
concerning public security, defence, state security or the activities of the State in areas 
of criminal law. In particular, Article 3 of Directive 95/46/EC excludes “activities of the 
State in areas of criminal law” and “operations concerning public security”. Moreover, 
the audio data collected through CCTV microphones is exempt from the first data pro-
tection principle of the DPA, since the UK Government is arguably deploying and using 
403 see Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2004 on the Processing of Personal Data by means of Video Surveillance (WP 89).
404 Com (2007) 87 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the follow-
up of the Work Programme for better implementation of the Data Protection Directive, p. 7. 
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public CCTV microphones to prevent or detect crime.405 This exemption is equally in 
line with Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC.
Again, Article 16 B (para. 2) of the TFEU creates a legal basis for the EU to leg-
islate and adopt instruments applicable to all sectors, including in the area of freedom, 
justice and security, and therefore also alters the limitations of Article 3 of Directive 
95/46/EC.406 But, in accordance with Article 6a of Protocol No 21 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the UK is not bound by the rules laid down on the basis of Article 16 when 
carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter 4 or Chapter 5 of Title V 
of Part Three of the Lisbon Treaty, which deal with criminal matters. In addition, while 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including Articles 7 and 8, 
also applies to the UK (as an EU Member State), in accordance with Article 51, the 
Charter is not applicable to activities, which are considered a domestic matter outside 
the scope of EU law.
While CFD 2008/977/JHA aims to protect individuals with regards to process-
ing of their personal data for law enforcement purposes, the scope of the Framework 
Decision has a limited scope of application, since it only applies to the cross-border 
data processing of law enforcement agencies and not national/domestic activities.407 
Furthermore, as Cannataci (2010) notably points out, CFD 2008/977/JHA does not 
provide any concrete details on how to uphold the rights of data subjects affected by 
‘smart surveillance’ or MIMSI surveillance systems.  
The fact that Article 3 of Directive 95/46/EC excludes “activities of the State in 
areas of criminal law” and “operations concerning public security” and the fact that 
the scope of CFD 2008/977/JHA is limited to cross-border data processing compelled 
405 Data Protection Act 1998, s. 29 (1) (a).
406 For further information, see Com (2007) 87 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the follow-up of the Work Programme for better implementation of the Data Protection Directive. 
(Hence, the reason for the emergence of the Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent au-
thorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data, COM(2012) 10 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012.
407 see Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed 
in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (30.12.2008), recital 3. For further discussion, 
see Cannataci (2010).
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the EC to propose a new Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes.408
With regards to the general use of CCTV microphones, the legal framework ad-
ditionally does not fulfill the principles of use limitation and purpose specification. 
To begin with, the judgment adopted by the Court of Appeal in Durant v. Financial 
Services Authority409 narrowed the meaning of ‘personal data’ in the UK. For data to be 
“personal” the concerned individual needs to be the “focus” and the data needs to be 
intended to provide specific intelligence of a “biographical” nature about a particular 
person.410 As Rempell (2006) notably argues, this narrowed definition of personal data, 
which was accomplished by narrowing the meaning of the words “relate to” within the 
definition, is flawed (2006, p. 823) and is against the proper intentions of the drafters of 
Directive 95/46/EC for a broader definition (2006, pp. 825-26). As Rempell concludes 
in his analysis of the judgment, the problem is not necessarily with the content of the 
DPA, but rather the Court of Appeal’s decision, which seriously deviates from Direc-
tive 95/46/EC (2006, p. 840). In direct response to the judgment, the ICO was forced 
to issue corresponding guidance on the definition of what amounts to personal data.411 
The consequences of Durant v. Financial Services Authority went beyond data held 
by the Federal Services Authority (FSA) and, as widely recognized, directly affected 
the data captured via public space CCTV cameras (Rempell, 2006). With regards to the 
images generated by public space CCTV cameras, the narrowing of the definition of 
personal data essentially meant that if only a general scene is recorded with no focus 
on any particular individual’s activities, these images are not covered by the DPA, as 
they are no longer regarded as personal data (Rempell, 2006). Therefore, in actuality 
the DPA does not apply to a large part of the data captured by public CCTV cameras. 
408 see Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, in-
vestigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement 
of such data, COM(2012) 10 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012.
409 Michael John Durant v. Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1746. Durant made a request under Part II, 
Section 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998 to obtain ‘personal data’ about him which was held by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). The FSA refused to provide all the data requested by Durant, arguing that not all of it constituted 
personal data, and emphasized that the definition of the words “relate to” in the DPA’s definition of personal data meant 
“have reference to, concern” instead of “have some connection with, connected to” (para. 25). The Court of Appeal 
agreed with the FSA. 
410 Ibid., para. 28.
411 “The Durant case and its impact on the interpretation of the Data Protection Act 1998’”, Information Commissioner’s 
Office, 2 February 2004.
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Equally, likely for the same reason, the ICO determined that Google Street View does 
not breach the DPA.412 
Following pressure from the EC413 and the threat that the EC could begin infringe-
ment procedures against the UK for the unacceptable or objectionable implementation 
of Directive 95/46/EC, and the adoption by the Article 29 Working Party of a much 
broader interpretation of personal data,414 the ICO issued once again revised guidance, 
titled “Data Protection Technical Guidance – determining what is personal”, which 
stretched, to a certain extent, the narrow definition of personal data in the UK. But, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Durant v. Financial Services Authority is legally 
superior to the guidance of the ICO. Nevertheless, as a result of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
both the European Commission and UK citizens could potentially further challenge the 
UK’s implementation of the DPA (i.e. Directive 95/46/EC).
Overall, the situation represents an example of the non-uniform implementation 
and interpretation of the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC by EU Member States (Rem-
pell, 2006), and the UK’s common practice of moving beyond the limits of the “margin 
of maneuver” as permitted by Recital 9 of Directive 95/46/EC.415 
Applying the same rationale of Durant v. Financial Services Authority to audio 
recorded by CCTV microphones, general sound recorded in public is not considered 
personal data and therefore is not covered by the DPA, since it is not focused on any 
particular individual. With additional technology, however, the background noise can 
be filtered out using inverse phasing, which cancels out unwanted noise, to discern 
private conversations concerning particular individuals. Therefore, general sound re-
corded in public at the point of collection might not be considered personal data, but 
may later be converted, with little effort, into personally identifiable information and, in 
accordance with Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC, constitute personal data. 
412 Information Commissioner’s Office, Press Release, “Common sense on Street View must prevail, says the ICO”, avail-
able at: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pressreleases/2009/google_streetview_220409_v2.pdf
413 see “European Commission suggests UK’s Data Protection Act is deficient” (OUT-LAW News, 15 July 2004), available 
at: www.out-law.com/page-4717
414 see Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data (WP 136).
415 Hence, the reason why the EC has proposed to replace Directive 95/46/EC with a Regulation, in order to eliminate the 
existing fragmentation and to ensure the uniform and effective implementation of the data protection rules within every 
EU Member State. For further discussion, see COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EURO-
PEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World, A European Data Protection Frame-
work for the 21st Century, COM(2012) 9 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012.
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However, even if general sound recorded in public and stored on databases could be 
considered personal data, or construed as such, and thus protected by the DPA, the act 
of recording sound out in public is not prohibited. In essence, only what is done with 
that stored audio data afterwards is regulated. 
Nevertheless, audio data collected from public CCTV microphones is wrongfully 
being equated with video data collected from public CCTV cameras. Audio data, even re-
corded in public, can be considerably more ‘sensitive’, since it may record private conver-
sations and thus the political opinions and religious beliefs of individuals – information 
which video data normally cannot discover, unless the messages/words are both written 
down, for example on a sign or t-shirt, and are discernible via the CCTV cameras.
With further sophistication, CCTV microphones can also potentially lead to the 
greater identification and tracking of individuals in public. Software can identify an 
individual by comparing their voice with voice-prints416 stored in a database. According 
to the Police IT Organization (PITO), voice is an additional mode of identification that 
is already being considered for inclusion into IDENT1,417 the UK central national da-
tabase for storing biometric information.418  The legal framework does not necessarily 
prevent the use of CCTV microphones for this purpose.
Furthermore, the CCTV code of practice (2008) addresses CCTV microphones, 
but it is not binding law in itself and does not offer any actionable rights for citizens. 
Nevertheless, the CCTV code of practice (2008) only briefly deals with the issues sur-
rounding CCTV microphones, lacks specificity and leaves open several legal loopholes. 
Although the CCTV code of practice (2008) states, “CCTV must not be used to record 
conversations between members of the public as this is highly intrusive and unlikely to 
be justified”,419 it is unclear what is the actual legal basis of this declaration. Nor is it 
clear whether this includes conversations occurring in public places, particularly if peo-
ple are aware that microphones are being overtly fitted to public space CCTV cameras. 
Supporters in favor of public CCTV microphones could argue that if a person does 
not want to be heard or recorded, he/she can choose not to speak when out in public or 
at least not about ‘sensitive’ topics, such as religion or politics. Moreover, it can be fur-
ther argued that the presence of any CCTV surveillance system is merely comparable to 
416 A voice-print is data representing patterns in a digital recording of an individual’s voice.
417 PART 1: Identification Roadmap 2005 – 2020, Biometrics Technology Roadmap for Person Identification within the 
Police Service, Police IT Organization, p. 4.
418 However, the Identity Documents Act 2010 recently repealed the Identity Cards Act 2006, which permitted the record-
ing of any type of biometric information for the National Identity Register (NIR).
419 CCTV code of practice 2008, p. 10.
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the presence of an individual observer, such as a security guard. As the ECtHR in P.G. 
and J.H. v. the United Kingdom judged:
A person who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any mem-
ber of the public who is also present. Monitoring by technological means of 
the same public scene (for example, a security guard viewing through closed-
circuit television) is of a similar character.420
Therefore, since CCTV cameras installed in public places are already legitimately 
considered as the eyes of security guards or law enforcement officers/agents, micro-
phones could legitimately be considered as their ears.  
While covertly recording private conversations is regulated and is often considered 
eavesdropping, like video surveillance, it is only prohibited, without due authorization, 
in areas where privacy can reasonably be expected. Although Moreham (2006) is in-
deed correct in arguing that a person would have a reasonable expectation that another 
person, for instance, is not recording their conversations with a shotgun microphone, 
however, any expectation of privacy of conversations out in public straightaway van-
ishes with the positioning of signs or notices warning that public space CCTV cameras 
fitted with microphones are present. Accordingly, the notices would cause the audio 
recording to be conducted overtly, as opposed to covertly. Continuing to speak out 
in public, while knowing or having been given notice that microphones are present, 
could be legally considered as implicit consent to be recorded. Audio recording is not 
considered eavesdropping when consent is given and/or the persons concerned have 
been informed.
Moreover, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) does not cover 
the overt, general use of public CCTV microphones, in accordance with paragraph 1.4 
of the Covert Surveillance Code of Practice, unless specifically used for targeted/di-
rected surveillance for specific investigations. The covert use of CCTV microphones in 
public spaces for targeted/directed surveillance by police or local authorities is also still 
lawful, albeit subject to certain safeguards of RIPA. Furthermore, as Donohue (2006) 
asserts, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy of illegitimate activities in public 
places, pointing out that the ECtHR previously judged that there is no legal authority 
in the UK for the judicial regulation of police placing a microphone on the outside of a 
building (Donohue, 2006).421
420 P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 44787/98, Judgment of 25 September 2001, para. 57.
421 see Khan v. United Kingdom, Application no. 35394/97, Judgment of 12 May 2000.
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Although under the latest CCTV code of practice (2008), CCTV surveillance sys-
tems are supposed to not be used for recording private conversations, the law arguably 
permits the random or general recording of the public at large, as long as it is done so in 
a public place and especially if the public is informed that CCTV microphones are pres-
ent. The general observation or surveillance of public places is lawful, while conversa-
tions knowingly exposed in public are not protected. As Taylor points out, although the 
influence of Article 8 of the ECHR “has not yet been fully realised in the area of [overt] 
public space surveillance” (2002a, p. 73), “to find that CCTV surveillance in public 
spaces is a breach of privacy per se would be to broaden Article 8 in a way that, it ap-
pears, the European Court [ECtHR] is not prepared to do” (2002a, p. 76). Furthermore, 
as Victoria Williams argues, while Article 8 of the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence 
may recognize a legal basis for privacy in public spaces, the conventional notions of 
privacy do not translate well in public settings.422
The legal framework is equally ambiguous and vague. For instance, the language 
of the CCTV code of practice (2008) is particularly problematic. It permits “limited cir-
cumstances in which audio recording may be justified, subject to sufficient safeguards”, 
such as “audio based alert systems triggered by changes in noise patterns such as sud-
den shouting”.423 However, it does not explain what are these “limited circumstances” 
and “sufficient safeguards”.  
CCTV microphones can be triggered on the basis of decibel level or sound intensity 
and the speed at which words are spoken. With artificial intelligence (AI) technology,424 
the microphones can also be triggered by certain key words, such as expletive words 
considered aggressive. 
Nevertheless, “sudden shouting” should not be enough to warrant the activation of 
the recording of CCTV microphones. This would permit the recording of a brief argu-
ment or heated debate between two or more people, which cannot justifiably be consid-
ered necessary for preventing or detecting crime. Moreover, the CCTV code of practice 
uses the words “such as sudden shouting” (emphasis added), which indicates that other 
criteria or circumstances are permitted to trigger CCTV microphones to begin recording. 
422 see, for further discussion, the Memorandum by Victoria Williams for the House of Lords Constitution Committee 
inquiry into the impact of surveillance and data collection upon the privacy of citizens, available at: http://www.publica-
tions.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/8051402.htm
 Victoria Williams is the author of the Surveillance and Intelligence Law Handbook (Oxford University Press, 2006).
423 CCTV code of practice 2008, p. 10.
424 Artificial-intelligence is defined as “the art of creating machines that perform functions that require intelligence when 
performed by people”. Kurzweil, Ray. The age of intelligent machines (MIT Press, 1990), p. 14.
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The triggering of CCTV microphones to begin recording once a certain sound in-
tensity425 is reached is both unwarranted and impractical. A normal spoken conversa-
tion, for example at 60 decibels (dB) or more, can have about the same sound intensity 
level as ordinary street noise. Traffic, therefore, could trigger recording and in doing so 
also record normal spoken conversations occurring nearby (see Table 1).426 Neverthe-
less, who is to determine with certainty at what intensity in decibels is an exchange 
between two or more people really an argument or a normal conversation.427 Such de-
termination could easily vary from culture to culture. Using sound intensity as the ba-
sis of triggering CCTV microphones to begin recording will also permit the blanket 
recording of conversations at noisy locations, such as nightlife areas. While triggering 
the microphones based on sound intensity is impractical, justifying the recording of 
conversations out in public because someone uses expletive words or speaks quickly is 
simply absurd and is against common sense and reason. 
Type of Sound Sound intensity level (dB)
Normal spoken conversation 60
Ordinary street noise 70
Shouting 80
A pneumatic drill in use nearby 110
Table 1: Sound intensity of different types of sounds428
425 Sound intensity is the amount of sound energy per unit area. The basic units are either watts/m2 or watts/cm2. Sound 
intensity level is measured in decibels (dB). Decibels measure the ratio of a given sound intensity I to the threshold of 
hearing. The threshold of hearing is assigned a sound level of 0 decibels, which corresponds to an intensity of 10-12 
watts/m2. A sound that is 10 times more intense (10-11 watts/m2) is assigned a sound level of 10 dB, and so on. see 
“sound intensity”, Encyclopedia Britannica 2009, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 11 Nov. 2009, available at: http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/555343/sound-intensity; “sound”, Encyclopedia Britannica 2009, Encyclopedia 
Britannica Online, 11 Nov. 2009, available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/555255/sound
426 Note that the distance between the source and the microphones plays a role. 
427 Using a Velleman DVM 805 sound level meter, I measured the ‘normal’ conversation of two colleagues in a quiet office 
setting for two minutes. The meter was placed at around two meters from the source.  While no one was arguing or 
shouting, the sound levels still reached up to 70 dBA on several occasions.  Note: dBA is the meter’s use of an “A” filter, 
which is used to match more precisely what the human ear actually hears by “A-weighting” the decibel measurements.
428  Sources: The Royal National Institute of Deaf People / Encyclopaedia Britannica Online 2009.
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Moreover, the law does not place specific limits on the key words the AI software 
is permitted to be triggered by, which could freely enable the UK Government to use 
CCTV microphones to monitor conversations out in public, similar to the way conver-
sations over the phone may be monitored.
In sum, there is a lack of harmonized implementation of the Data Protection Direc-
tive (Directive 95/46/EC) and consensus on what legally constitutes personal data. The 
UK legal framework is ambiguous and inconsistent with regards to both the images 
and sound captured or recorded via public space CCTV surveillance systems. There is 
essentially no clear understanding as to the extent to which privacy exists out in public, 
if it even does exist at all. Moreover, the UK legal framework is not clear on what are 
the limited circumstances the use of CCTV microphones by law enforcement agencies 
are justified and the CCTV code of practice (2008) only leaves open more significant 
legal questions. 
6.8.2 CCTV loudspeakers
While the illegitimate and disproportional use of CCTV loudspeakers should be con-
sidered an interference with the right to be left alone, it is nonetheless difficult to de-
termine what laws are actually violated. The principles of data protection, for the most 
part, are not meant in actuality to apply to CCTV loudspeakers, since the loudspeakers 
themselves do not collect, store or process data. Furthermore, it also difficult to apply 
Article 8 of the ECHR to CCTV loudspeakers owned and operated by public authorities. 
However, the second data protection principle, which is parallel to the purpose 
specification principle, the fifth data protection principle, which is parallel to the use 
limitation principle, and the principle of proportionality are still applicable.
The CCTV code of practice (2008) does not at all sufficiently address CCTV loud-
speakers, nor fulfill the use limitation or purpose specification principles and satisfy 
the required legal characteristics of foreseeability and clarity. Although the CCTV code 
of practice (2008) restricts the use of CCTV loudspeakers “to messages directly related 
to the purpose for which the system was established”,429 it does not define under what 
circumstances are those purposes legitimate or proportionate, nor the scope of a CCTV 
control room operator’s discretion to use the CCTV loudspeakers, what should and 
should not be communicated or how and why those messages should be communicated. 
429 CCTV code of practice 2008, p. 7.
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There is (or at least was) mounting concern that CCTV surveillance technology is 
being used for trivial reasons, such as to prevent littering under the “Keep Britain Tidy” 
campaign, and for other trivial offences, such as public drunkenness, etc. The focus on 
trivial offences results in more individuals being arrested for such low-level categories 
of offenses rather than serious crimes (Surette, 2005, p. 155). There is equally growing 
concern that local governments are excessively taking advantage of the broad powers 
of the RIPA to carry out surveillance for reasons other than to prevent or detect crime or 
ensure national/public security. RIPA is rather being used to carry out surveillance for 
reasons far less important, such as catching people putting out their rubbish too early, 
failing to clean up their dog’s waste or dropping litter, and to investigate noise pollution. 
According to a freedom of information request made by the Daily Mail, more than half 
of town halls in the last three years have used the powers of RIPA to spy on families sus-
pected of putting their rubbish out on the wrong day. In addition to covertly following 
the suspected targets, the surveillance tactics have also included putting secret cameras 
in tin cans and on lampposts.430 RIPA permits the conduct of surveillance by a vari-
ety of public authorities, including town halls and not just the police and intelligence 
agencies, for reasons of preventing or detecting crime or ensuring national security 
and to ‘protect public health’ and the ‘economic well-being’.431 The latter two reasons 
serve as the potential basis for conducting surveillance for environmental concerns. 
The problem is, however, that the ambiguous wording of RIPA can justify surveillance 
operations for a variety of reasons.432 Surely, there is little concern that the legislation 
can be used to prevent and punish, for instance, commercial fly tipping. But, abusing 
the powers of RIPA for trivial reasons is a serious concern. The wider use of CCTV 
loudspeakers could potentially be further bolstered by the common practice of using 
CCTV cameras and applying RIPA for trivial reasons.
430 Borland, Sophie and James Slack. “March of the dustbin Stasi: Half of councils use anti-terror laws to watch people put-
ting rubbish out on the wrong day” (Daily Mail, 1 November 2008), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ar-
ticle-1082225/March-dustbin-Stasi-Half-councils-use-anti-terror-laws-watch-people-putting-rubbish-wrong-day.html
431 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part II, Section 28 (3).
432 As a result, proposals to amend RIPA, in order to restrict the ability of local authorities to use CCTV surveillance 
systems for trivial purposes and to provide for judicial approval in relation to certain authorisations and notices under 
RIPA, were introduced to Parliament on 11 February 2011 in a bill, titled the “Protection of Freedoms Bill 2010-11”.
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6.9 RECOMMENDATIONS ON ENHANCING THE UK LEGAL   
 FRAMEWORK
Although, as Taylor (2002, 2002a) argues, UK domestic courts might be in a position 
to develop the concept of privacy in public spaces, can we really wait for the courts to 
slowly do so? Public surveillance CCTV systems and enhancements to the technology 
integrated to these systems demand specific laws from the UK Parliament immediately.
The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of 
the Council of Europe published an opinion on video surveillance in public places by 
public authorities, concluding that 
specific regulations should be enacted at both international and national level 
in order to cover the specific issue of video surveillance by public authorities 
of public areas as a limitation of the right to privacy.433
Similarly, the Constitution Committee of the UK House of Lords recommended 
that the UK Government should adopt a statutory regime for the use of CCTV by both 
the public and private sectors, including codes of practice that are legally binding and 
overseen by the Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC) together with the ICO.434 
Nevertheless, the UK legal framework does not necessarily require a complete 
overhaul and the DPA presents a basis for public space CCTV operators to work from 
(see Taylor, 2002a, p. 82-83). While that may be the case, specific rules/regulations 
are still required to bring clarity to the purpose and scope of CCTV microphones and 
CCTV loudspeakers. Indeed, as Taylor points out, “[t]here are situations when the state 
has to intervene in the lives of its citizens, such as to prevent crime, but such interven-
tion must be based on, and restricted by, principled legislation” (Ibid., p. 83). A frame-
work or basis by which to distinguish the legitimate and proportional or illegitimate 
and disproportional use of CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers is required. 
For the moment, however, regulations on the use and deployment of CCTV micro-
phones and CCTV loudspeakers may not require EU action or intervention, since the 
deployment of these CCTV enhancements are occurring exclusively in the UK, with the 
exception of CCTV microphones being tested and deployed in the Netherlands. But, 
433 Draft Opinion on Video Surveillance and the Protection of Human Rights, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 
70th Plenary Session, Venice, Italy, 16-17 March 2007, para. 81, available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/
CDL-AD(2007)014-e.asp
434 Constitution Committee - Second Report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State (Session 2008-09), Chapter 4, para. 219, 
available at: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/1802.htm
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the European Commission and Article 29 Working Party should remain vigilant on any 
expanded deployment of CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers within Europe.
It is important to point out, on the other hand, that the means to protecting privacy 
are not just legal-orientated or policy-orientated. Regulating the design and develop-
ment of CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers can inherently minimize their 
intrusive capability from the start. Moreover, since there seems to be no clear under-
standing of the extent to which privacy exists in public, if it even does, or clear way 
of determining so, there is even more reason to focus on the design, development and 
deployment of CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers, as opposed to solely on 
their use. Accordingly, many of the obligations should fall upon the manufacturers of 
CCTV microphones and loudspeakers, rather than merely on their operators. 
In addition, since the effects of both CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers 
go beyond privacy, their use could pose a serious threat, if left unchecked, to personal 
freedom and autonomy, freedom of speech and our sense of dignity. The law and tech-
nological solutions should therefore also possess the demonstrable ability to preserve 
both privacy and liberty overall.
6.9.1 CCTV microphones
Indeed, the integration of microphones to CCTV cameras can offer security gains and 
thus should not be completely outlawed. However, before they are widely deployed, 
specific regulations must be put into place.
Since it is unclear how and under what circumstances it is lawful or legitimate for 
law enforcement agencies to use CCTV microphones or whether or not Article 8 of the 
ECHR (and the DPA) are applicable to the audio data collected, regulations on public 
space CCTV microphones should explicitly focus on their design, development and 
deployment for public use, rather than solely on their use, by placing significant limits 
on the technology itself. 
Unlike the SIgard system, or other public CCTV audio surveillance systems, public 
CCTV microphones, based on the principle of proportionality, must not be capable of 
recording conversations nor programmed to be triggered by shouting or verbal aggres-
sion (or how something is said), since this is not sufficiently justified for the purposes 
of ensuring public security. Moreover, the temptation for abuse or the propensity to-
wards ‘function creep’ or ‘surveillance creep’ is just too great, as we have already seen 
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with the use of CCTV visual surveillance capabilities for voyeurism (Surette, 2005) or 
‘cheap thrills’ in the UK.435  
The framework or basis by which to distinguish between the legitimate and pro-
portional or illegitimate and disproportional use of CCTV microphones for security 
purposes should be based on the common understandings of which sounds or noises 
actually constitute a public danger or security threat and justify their detection and the 
audio recording of the incident. Therefore, the activation of the recording capabilities of 
CCTV microphones should be limited to those particular sounds only, thereby guaran-
teeing the legitimate and proportional use of CCTV microphones. In order to remove all 
areas of ambiguity, the law should explicitly restrict the activation of the public CCTV 
microphones to the following set of sounds: gunfire; explosions; breaking glass; car 
alarms; car crashes; burglar alarms; and screams that contain the specific words “help” 
or “fire”. If and where necessary, the microphones could also detect or recognize these 
words shouted in other languages. Based on the framework, other sounds and shouted 
out words might also merit the activation of CCTV microphones. While this list of 
sounds may not be exhaustive, the delineation of which sounds may activate the CCTV 
microphones to begin recording must be precise. However, the adding of any additional 
sounds is up for debate, and security experts, law enforcement agencies and the public 
at large should be consulted beforehand. 
The detection of these diverse, yet very distinct sounds and the two specific words 
“help” and “fire”, shouted at no less than 65 decibels or more, can be achieved with 
the use of AI software or the incorporation of software agents with reactive abilities.436 
Researchers from the University of Portsmouth are already working to develop AI 
software that can recognize sounds and words.437 The incorporation of AI or software 
agents, however, may also require separate legislation (Schermer, 2007). Moreover, the 
435 see “Peeping tom CCTV workers jailed” (BBC News, 13 January 2006), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/eng-
land/merseyside/4609746.stm
436 A software agent is any software that exhibits any character commonly associated with agency, such as reactive, proac-
tive, goal orientated, deliberative, communicative and adaptive. Software agents with reactive abilities or characteristics 
“employ any type and number of sensors to sense its environment. The software can react to sensory input using its 
actuators” (Schermer, 2007, p. 22).
437 Thurston, Richard. “CCTV cameras that listen as well as watch” (SC Magazine, 25 June 2008), available at: http://
www.scmagazineuk.com/CCTV-cameras-that-listen-as-well-as watch/article/111675/
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decisions of a software agent may classify as an “automated individual decision” and, 
therefore, should set off the safeguards of CFD 2008/977/JHA.438
When gunfire, etc. is detected, the microphones can immediately begin to record, 
calculate the location of the sound source, direct the cameras in that direction and alert 
the CCTV control room operators, who in turn can alert a police dispatcher to send the 
closest police officer(s) or unit. Based on the purpose specification principle, however, 
the audio recording must cease within a definite short period of time after each new 
event or incident is detected. In addition, based on the use limitation principle, the 
audio data must only be accessed and used for evidential purposes and, where possible 
or necessary, any unrelated background sound should be edited out, which could also 
be helpful for the related criminal investigation and prosecution. Shouting “help” or 
“fire”, in order to intentionally trigger the CCTV cameras without justification, should 
accordingly be prohibited. 
Thus, in line with the principle of notice/awareness, the placement of additional or 
different notice signs from the ones already available may not necessarily be required, 
since the CCTV microphones will not record any personal data.
A CCTV system that can only detect the above specific sounds and shouted words, 
as mandated by law, is the way forward to both enhance public security and guarantee 
that privacy safeguards are in place and unwavering. Moreover, such a system may 
require fewer cameras to cover larger areas and thus less recorded visual data of the 
public space (Kim et al., 2007, p. 389).
6.9.2 CCTV loudspeakers
Even if CCTV loudspeakers do prove to be effective for public safety reasons, they still 
require the proper checks and balances.
Once again, it is difficult to clearly determine the relevant laws that pertain to 
CCTV loudspeakers and what laws CCTV loudspeakers violate. Regulations on CCTV 
loudspeakers should therefore equally focus on their development, manufacture and 
deployment rather than solely address their use. 
438 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (30.12.2008), Article 7.
 Article 9 of the EC’s proposal for a Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data for law enforcement purposes (COM(2012) 10 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012) prohibits measures based solely on the 
automated processing of personal data, if not authorised by law and subject to appropriate safeguards (in line with 
Article 7 of CFD 2008/977/JHA).
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Based on the understanding of privacy as the right to be left alone, CCTV loud-
speakers should not be capable of being used for disturbing or scolding individuals. 
The possibility of operators to abuse CCTV loudspeakers by harassing people from 
afar must be minimized. 
Indeed, as Taylor points out, the CCTV operator “phone pest” occurrence,439 
whereby an operator used public pay phones to pester people he could see via CCTV 
cameras, could not have been prevented by laws that only regulate the collection, use 
and storage of CCTV images (2002, p. 107). However, regulations concerning the de-
sign and development of public space CCTV loudspeakers, in combination with spe-
cific rules on their use and specified penalties for misuse, could significantly minimize 
the chances of this occurring with CCTV loudspeakers.
The use of specific pre-recorded messages and the removal of the ability of CCTV 
operators to speak directly to the public can automatically limit what operators can 
communicate via CCTV loudspeakers. The different pre-recorded messages could be 
activated by entering a designated three-digit number that corresponds with each mes-
sage onto computer keypads. For example, 146 for “CCTV cameras are monitoring 
you, please discontinue the graffiti” or 112 for “stay where you are, the police are on 
their way”. CCTV loudspeakers should only be capable of delivering these pre-record-
ed messages at a certain volume and should not use the voice of children to leverage 
their so-called “pester power” nor the voice of celebrities to leverage their influence, but 
rather a generic male or female voice.
Some might argue that the use of pre-recorded messages will make it difficult to 
deliver more specific or detailed messages, since they are fixed. However, surely one 
of the hundred or so different pre-recorded messages that can be stored will be ca-
pable of getting the appropriate point across to the concerned individual(s). Others 
might also argue that discovering the correct three-digit number to enter in order to 
deliver the appropriate pre-recorded message will take longer or prove more difficult 
than speaking directly. But, an electronic list of the available pre-recorded messages 
can be easily displayed on a monitor.  Moreover, trained and experienced operators 
will begin to memorize a number of different three-digit numbers and their correspond-
ing pre-recorded messages, which might in fact enable operators to communicate with 
targeted individuals quicker, easier and more effective than having to do so by spoken 
words. Pre-recorded messages, rather than speaking directly to perpetrators, might also 
enhance compliance and reduce the provoking of rebellious acts in response.
439 see “Phone Pest picked targets on security video” (The Telegraph, 7 June 1996), available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/
htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1996/11/27/ntel27.html
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Even pre-recorded messages can be illegitimately, inappropriately and/or dispro-
portionately used, resulting in the unnecessary cause of harm to a person’s dignity or in-
dividual liberties and the unnecessary disturbance of the public peace. The framework 
by which to distinguish if the use of CCTV loudspeakers is legitimate and proportional 
should be based on whether or not their use serves the purpose of preventing, deterring 
or discontinuing an anti-social act that threatens public security and/or well-being. 
The pre-recorded messages used to prevent, deter or discontinue an anti-social act 
must be used in accordance with the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 and not for trivial 
reasons that do not threaten public security and/or well-being. For instance, littering, 
such as dropping a chewing gum wrapper or putting out a cigarette on the sidewalk, 
does not justify the use of CCTV loudspeakers. Only more serious forms of littering and 
hazards to the environment, such as fly tipping, justify the use of CCTV loudspeakers. 
More to the point, the law should also further clarify that the powers of RIPA should not 
be used for trivial reasons.440 Besides, the use of CCTV loudspeakers for trivial reasons 
would likely lead to rebellious acts and depreciating levels of compliance.
Still, the automatic limitation on what can be communicated using CCTV loud-
speakers via pre-recorded messages already provides the means to better preserve the 
legitimate use of CCTV loudspeakers and prevent harm to a person’s dignity and per-
sonal autonomy. 
In the end, it is the public CCTV operators who have to make the decision whether 
or not to use the loudspeakers. Keeping track of the number of times the CCTV loud-
speakers are used will help to ensure they are being used legitimately and proportion-
ally, and not for ‘cheap thrills’ or on grounds of discrimination. Since the pre-recorded 
messages are activated by entering numbers into computer keypads, tracking the use of 
CCTV loudspeakers can be done automatically. This will also permit an accurate and 
easier evaluation on their impact in each specific area. 
Taylor argues that “[i]f Article 8 [of the ECHR] were to apply to public visual 
surveillance systems it would at least ensure a debate about whether or not CCTV 
surveillance could be justified in an individual situation, or whether other methods of 
crime prevention might be equally, or more, successful with less intrusion” (2002a, p. 
81). Taylor goes on to write that “[i]f Article 8 were engaged the issue of proportional-
ity would require that the least obtrusive means necessary should be undertaken, thus 
440 Proposals to amend RIPA, in order to restrict the ability of local authorities to use CCTV surveillance systems for trivial 
purposes and to provide for judicial approval in relation to certain authorisations and notices under RIPA, were intro-
duced to Parliament on 11 February 2011 in a bill, titled the “Protection of Freedoms Bill 2010-11”. The bill also calls 
for the appointment of a Surveillance Camera Commissioner and introduces a code of practice for surveillance camera 
systems. As of October 2011, the bill has only just entered into the report stage in the House of Commons.
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not barring surveillance, but ensuring it is appropriate and justifiable” (Ibid., p. 81-82). 
Accordingly, this would call for the deployment of CCTV loudspeakers to be restricted 
to certain areas of public space, which have credibly been identified as ‘hotspots’ or 
high-risk areas of anti-social behaviour and where an evaluation has determined that 
the CCTV loudspeakers would be the appropriate and effective solution to the problem. 
This will better ensure that CCTV loudspeakers are proportionally deployed and that 
their deployment and use is based on legitimate aims, in accordance with the law and 
the principle of purpose specification and principle of proportionality. In addition, 
before a decision is taken by local authorities to deploy CCTV loudspeakers anywhere, 
there should be an open dialogue with the surrounding neighborhood or the public 
directly affected.
The well thought-out deployment of CCTV loudspeakers will also help ensure the 
noise generated by the loudspeakers does not unnecessarily disturb those nearby. CCTV 
loudspeakers should equally be banned from being deployed nearby medical facilities so 
as to not disturb patients. Perhaps, the use of CCTV loudspeakers should also be prohib-
ited during certain times of the day, unless in exceptional circumstances that merit their 
use, such as to prevent serious crimes, rather than low-level anti-social behaviour. 
With “single wire digital transmission” technology, for example, thousands of 
CCTV loudspeakers could potentially be operated individually or in groups from a 
single location hundreds of kilometers from where they are located. However, in order 
to check the concentration of power, the law should prohibit the centralization of the 
ability to operate that many CCTV loudspeakers from a single control room. 
With more advanced technology, such as HyperSonic Sound (HSS),441 it may also 
be possible to deliver the pre-recorded messages in a way only audible to the targeted 
individual. The basis of excluding CCTV loudspeakers from certain public areas in or-
der to ensure the sound does not unnecessarily disturb others may, as a result, no longer 
be compelling. Still, the use of HSS in CCTV loudspeakers should be banned in order 
to ensure ‘mental privacy’, which also requires separate legislation in itself. 
CCTV loudspeakers can be used as a form of verbal warning or reprimand for juve-
niles or means to convey informal punishments. Therefore, if CCTV loudspeakers are 
to be the “voice of authority”,442 then only publicly authorized public authorities should 
441 HyperSonic Sound technology, developed by American Technology Corporation, provides the ability to direct sound to 
a specific area or target, similar to light, using ultrasonic sound energy. American Technology Corporation, available at: 
http://www.atcsd.com/site/content/view/34/47/
442 “Talking CCTV brings voice of authority to streets”, Home Office, 4 April 2007, available at: http://www.homeoffice.
gov.uk/about-us/news/talking-cctv
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be allowed to use them. Furthermore, the integration of loudspeakers must be restricted 
to publicly owned and managed surveillance CCTV systems.
The law needs to specify the consequences of ignoring verbal warnings communi-
cated via CCTV loudspeakers for anti-social behaviour. After the first verbal warning, 
if the perpetrator does not comply, then a second verbal warning should follow. If the 
perpetrator still does not comply, then a police officer should be dispatched, when nec-
essary, to resolve the issue or penalize that person, in accordance with the law.443 Under 
certain circumstances, fines and/or ASBOs could be issued after failing to comply with 
the second warning. If the person runs from the scene, the perpetrator could potentially 
be identified, with the enhancement of CCTV image quality, addition of face recogni-
tion technology444 and linkage to the NIR. The verbal warning or reprimand can then be 
registered in the record of the person concerned. 
Failure to comply with verbal warnings from CCTV loudspeakers to refrain from 
anti-social behaviour does not immediately merit the use of non-lethal force deterrence 
technology, also known as less-than-lethal force or compliance weapons. However, the 
integration of non-lethal deterrence technology to public space CCTV cameras, such as 
the scheme developed by ICx Imaging Systems, which consists of a high-powered strobe 
light to temporarily disorientate perpetrators,445 or LRADs could be legitimate if used to 
bring to an end violent or dangerous acts alone and subject to specific rules.446 The use of 
less-than-lethal force simply for crowd control should be considered illegitimate.
Still, CCTV control room operators should receive additional special training, in 
coordination with the Home Office, in order to be allowed to operate the loudspeakers. 
Training should ensure that the operators are better equipped to base their decision on 
using CCTV loudspeakers in a standardized and objective manner and in accordance 
with the relevant privacy principles and framework of proportionality and necessity, as 
far as humanly possible, and with a sound knowledge and understanding of the special 
circumstances in their area.
443 Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003.
444 “Better CCTV needed for ID” (BBC News, 11 May 2006), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/poli-
tics/4761519.stm
445 ICx Technologies, Inc., http://www.icxt.com/products/icx-surveillance/thermal-imaging/illuminator/
446 LRADs are already being deployed in the US by police for crowd control purposes and this recent development has 
rightfully caused an outrage. see “Sheriff’s Department Responds To Sonic Device Outrage” (10news.com, 15 Septem-
ber 2009), available at: http://www.10news.com/news/20931535/detail.html
 LRADs were most recently deployed and used by police for protests during G20 Pittsburgh Summit. 
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CCTV loudspeakers can also be used alongside ‘intelligent’ CCTV cameras. With 
the use of software agents, the pre-recorded messages could instead be activated exclu-
sive of human involvement. Software agents with the ability to deliberate extensively 
before reacting (Schermer, 2007, p. 22) could determine when an anti-social act is being 
committed and then broadcast the relevant pre-recorded message or even automatically 
alert the police. Software agents could also solve the difficultly of monitoring all the 
CCTV cameras and provide a better assurance that the loudspeakers are used objec-
tively and flawlessly. 
However, once again, software agents potentially require separate legislation 
(Schermer, 2007) and the technology is likely not yet sophisticated enough. Moreover, 
the decisions of a software agent may classify as an “automated individual decision” and, 
therefore, should set off the safeguards of Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.447
In a “symmetrical surveillance” scheme for CCTV systems (Goold, 2006), the 
data on the use and deployment of CCTV loudspeakers, including the messages used, 
where, when and by whom, would be easily and readily available to the public on the 
Internet. This could further deter the abuse of the intrusive power of CCTV loudspeak-
ers by operators, address the concern over “who watches the watchers” (Cockfield, 
2003), and reduce the problem of the “unobservable observer” (Goold, 2006) or, more 
precisely, in the case of CCTV loudspeakers, the ‘unobservable speaker’.
The control room supervisor should also be responsible for monitoring the use 
of CCTV loudspeakers by the operators. If any operator uses the loudspeakers in an 
unwarranted manner, such as for ‘cheap thrills’ or in a racial discriminatory manner,448 
he or she may be subject to disciplinary action, including, but not limited to, dismissal. 
Based on the principle of enforcement, an oversight/supervisory committee should be 
established to oversee the proportional and warranted deployment and use of the CCTV 
loudspeakers on a nationwide scale, ensuring individual liberty, public peace and the 
right to be left alone out in public is better preserved. 
447 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (30.12.2008), article 7.
448 As Norris and Armstrong point out, evidence increasingly shows that CCTV operators are already using the surveillance 
capabilities of CCTV cameras in a racial discriminatory manner (1999, pp. 110-111). 
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6.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The deployment and use of CCTV microphones and loudspeakers, in conjunction with 
other technologies, could potentially enhance the ability of CCTV cameras to prevent 
and fight crime and serious anti-social behaviour. Therefore, CCTV microphones and 
loudspeakers ought not to be completely banned.
However, without an unambiguous understanding of the scope of privacy in public 
and/or the necessary regulations on the development, deployment and use of CCTV mi-
crophones and loudspeakers, there is no assurance that our legitimate rights and freedoms 
will not be unreasonably and disproportionally intruded upon. Until these regulations are 
in place and put into effect, there are alternative privacy-friendly devices and means of 
preventing and fighting crime and anti-social behaviour already in existence.  
Indeed, being out in public entails a much lesser degree of privacy, and those who 
engage in unlawful, wicked or serious anti-social behaviour, whether thieves, murderers, 
vandals or terrorists, substantially lose their right to be left alone. However, the legitimate 
governmental interest in curtailing crime and anti-social behaviour should not mean 
that our conversations out in public may simply be recorded or citizens may be publicly 
humiliated into behaving ‘correctly’. 
7 HUMAN-IMPLANTABLE MICROCHIPS:  
 Location-awareness & the dawn of the   
 Internet of Persons
7.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
In an age of sophisticated location-based services (LBS)449 and GIS, and at the dawn-
ing of the ‘ubiquitous information society’ as a result of RFID, the development and 
deployment of HIMs, and their prospective added linkage to GPS satellites, for human 
identification and tracking purposes, may have certain security, health, convenience and 
commercial benefits. However, HIMs also raise serious concerns whether or not the ex-
isting legal framework in the US is adequately capable of protecting the core principles 
of privacy protection and democratic freedoms.
Section 7.2 explains the technology behind human-implantable microchips. Sec-
tion 7.3 describes the social and privacy implications of the identification and track-
ing capabilities of human-implantable microchips and other location-based services. 
Moreover, the section focuses on how human-implantable microchips can change the 
nature of the public space and the way we view our bodies. However, for the most part, 
the ethical or moral issues surrounding the deployment of HIMs are not discussed. 
Section 7.4 outlines the security gains of human-implantable microchips. Section 7.5 
outlines the security drawbacks and risks of human-implantable microchips. Section 
7.6 reveals the scope of the actual deployment of human-implantable microchips in the 
US and abroad, and illustrates the potential further deployment. Section 7.7 describes 
the possible alternatives to human-implantable microchips. Section 7.8 gives an over-
view of the statutory law, case law, administrative decisions and soft regulations in the 
US of special relevance to human-implantable microchips. However, the medical, con-
sumer and financial privacy issues associated with human-implantable microchips are 
449 Location-based services and applications allow users to benefit from services that make use of their accurate physi-
cal location accessible via, for example, cell phones, smartphones or mobile computing devices (MCDs), and include 
services to locate in real-time another person or to locate a place or object, such as the whereabouts of the nearest 
automated teller machine (ATM). Other types of LBS include emergency services, real-time traffic information, route 
information, and tourist information.
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not thoroughly dealt with here450. Instead, the focus is on the privacy issues associated 
with the identification and tracking capabilities451 of human-implantable microchips 
(RFID/GPS implants) and the legality of processing location information. Section 7.9 
assesses and highlights the relevant deficiencies and dilemmas of the US legal frame-
work in terms of safeguarding privacy and civil liberties, with regards to the potential 
deployment and use of human-implantable microchips. Section 7.10 proposes relevant 
policy and legislative recommendations to enhance the US legal framework. Section 
7.11 concludes with some ending remarks. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, HIMs are implantable RFID tags (herein-
after known as “RFID implants”) and/or implantable GPS receivers/transponders 
(hereinafter known as “GPS implants”) marketed or sold for human-implantation.452 
HIMs, for the specific purposes of this dissertation, however, will not include biosen-
sors, sensory amplifiers, cortical implants, cochlear implants, or any other medical 
device, including Proteus Biomedical’s implantable ChipSkin™ or “chip in the pill” 
technology or the “SmartPill”, which adds intelligence to implanted medical devices 
or medication, nor does it include micro-electrode arrays, wireless implantable sensors 
or implantable nanomachines.
7.2 RFID/GPS IMPLANTS AND THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND THEM
7.2.1 RFID implants
More than four decades ago, Westin had already predicted that “[e]xisting microminia-
turized transmitters the size of a pinhead might be coded with an identification number, 
450 The legislation and regulations that apply to credit and debit cards, such as the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation E, 
will likely apply, while consumer privacy will be protected to the extent that it is protected under existing laws, such 
as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. see Willingham, Kristina M. Scanning Legislative 
Efforts: Current RFID Legislation Suffers from Misguided Fears, North Carolina Banking Institute, Volume 11 (2007), 
pp. 313-341.
451 While to some extent medical privacy issues are touched upon, it is not the central issue that is addressed.
452 HIMs could also be referred to as “ICT implants”. see Weber, Karsten. The Next Step: Privacy Invasions by Biometrics 
and ICT Implants (Ubiquity, Vol. 7, Issue 45, 2005), available at: www.acm.org/ubiquity/views/pf/v7i45_weber.pdf; 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN GROUP ON ETHICS IN SCIENCE AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO THE EURO-
PEAN COMMISSION, Opinion No. 20, Adopted on 16/03/2005.
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enclosed in a permanent capsule, and implanted under the skin by a simple and painless 
surgical operation” for locating individuals (1967, p. 86).  At that time, this might have 
seemed somewhat science fiction, but today this is indeed taking place. 
Animals and physical objects have been identified and tracked in supply chain 
processes using radio frequency identification (RFID) technology for some time now. 
However, we have moved beyond the use of RFID to expedite logistics and facilitate 
supply chain management. Now, RFID is becoming a technology of choice for identify-
ing humans. For instance, in the EU, as Eurostat revealed, in 2009 ‘person identifica-
tion’ (albeit, not implanted) accounted for 56% of all RFID use by enterprises.453 
RFID is a type of “automatic identification technology” (AIT) or “automatic 
identification and data capture” (AIDC) technology,454 which provides the “means of 
[electronically] identifying things or individuals, collecting data about them, and au-
tomatically causing that data to be entered into a computer system, with no human 
interaction”.455 A RFID tag or microchip is the combination of an antenna coil and 
a silicon microchip with basic modulation circuitry and memory, and RFID tags can 
range from a fraction of a millimeter to several millimeters or centimeters. 
In a way similar to CDs, RFID tags can be developed as read-only, read-write or 
write once, read many (WORM). Read-only tags contain data, which is added or ‘writ-
ten’ during their manufacture, which cannot be changed, removed or augmented, simi-
lar to an original CD album commercially sold. Additional data can later be ‘written’ 
on read-write tags by command pulses from a read-write RFID interrogator/reader. The 
data on WORM tags is not set during their manufacture, but rather set the first time it is 
used, similar to a blank non-rewritable CD.  
RFID tags can either be passive or active. The latter are powered by a battery and 
constantly transmit their data, while the former are activated by the radio frequency 
(RF) signal emanated from RFID readers/interrogators and only transmit their data 
when activated. In order to allow multiple RFID tags to be read simultaneously by a 
single reader without their signals interfering with each other, the reader employs an 
anti-collision algorithm, which controls access to the shared radio channel or frequency 
(Floerkemeier et al., 2005, p. 3).
453 For further information, see Eurostat news release at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/4-
19012010-BP/EN/4-19012010-BP-EN.PDF
454 Other types of AIDC technology or AIT include: bar codes, QR Codes, optical character recognition, and biometric 
technology. 
455 The Use of RFID for Human Identify Verification, Report No. 2006-02, Data Privacy & Integrity Advisory Committee, 
Adopted 6 December 2006, p. 2, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_advcom_12-2006_
rpt_RFID.pdf
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When a passive RFID tag is in the presence of an appropriate RF signal, emanated 
continuously by an RFID reader’s antennae, it sends in response its stored data (ID 
number, etc.) to the reader using the reader’s own carrier signal. The reader can range 
from inches to several feet away and the direct line of sight or physical contact between 
the tag and reader is not required. Passive RFID tags also do not need a battery since 
they are powered by the reader’s signal.
Each time a RFID tag or RFID implant is read, a tag read event (TRE) is gener-
ated, which can automatically be registered and stored in a computer database. TREs 
can contain, in addition to the unique ID number, the antenna’s ID number that read 
the RFID tag or RFID implant (i.e. the location of the RFID reader) and a timestamp.
A RFID implant is a silicon-glass encapsulated, passive and read-only RFID tag, 
which is normally injected into the right hand or upper right arm by a doctor or medical 
practitioner using a syringe. Neither surgery nor sutures are required. However, RFID 
tags can also be implanted into human molars.456 To enable bonding to human tissue 
and thereby prevent migration, RFID implants are coated with a polymer. A signal, 
currently at a low frequency of 125 or 134 kilohertz (KHz), emitted by the antennae of 
either a fixed location or a wireless handheld RFID reader, remotely activates the RFID 
implant causing it to transmit its unique ID number (in the case of VeriChip’s RFID 
implant a 16-digit number) back to the RFID reader, which in turn is either wirelessly 
relayed automatically to a computer or entered manually. The number then can be used 
to identify the individual and access his or her additional personal information via a 
computer database or on the Internet, such as medical or financial information or even 
biometric data, such as a digitized photograph or fingerprint. Typically, around 20 cm 
is the read range for the low frequency ban of 125-134 KHz, but it can go up to one 
meter.457 Currently, the size of implantable RFID tags can range from 8 to 12 mm in 
length and 1 to 3 mm in diameter. RFID implants can hold anything from 56 to 512-
plus bits of data. However, with the advancement of RFID technology, cloud computing 
and miniature microprocessors, RFID implants (HIMs) will only get smaller and gain 
augmented data, processing and communication capacities and will be increasingly 
linked to the ‘cloud’. 
456 see Thevissen, Patrick., et al. Implantation of an RFID-tag into human molars to reduce hard forensic identification 
labor (Forensic Science International, Volume 159, 2006), pp. 33-39.
457 OECD Policy Guidance on Radio Frequency Identification (2008), pp. 33-34.
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VeriChip,458 the only official distributor of human-implantable RFID microchips,459 
first marketed their product as a means of assisting doctors and nurses in emergency 
situations by providing patient information.460 When an unconscious patient is admin-
istered into a hospital, the medical staff can employ an RFID reader. If the patient 
has a RFID implant embedded, the reader will indicate its unique 16-digit ID number, 
which can subsequently be entered manually or wirelessly transmitted to VeriChip’s 
web-enabled database to access the patient’s medical and personal information. If the 
hospital has indeed adopted the VeriMed Patient Identification System protocol in their 
emergency rooms, medical staff can immediately access the patient’s identification and 
health record – information that can prove vital in an emergency situation.461  VeriCh-
ip implantees can access, via the Internet, the Global VeriChip Subscriber service or 
VeriMed Registry or VeriMed Health Link System to add personal healthcare informa-
tion to VeriChip’s web-enabled database.462 The VeriChip RFID implant is 11.1mm x 
2.1mm and can hold up to 128 bits of information. 
Moreover, VeriChip Corp. (currently known as PositiveID Corp.) has even taken 
the “capabilities of RFID implantable microchips beyond simple identification” to 
create the “GlucoChip”, which “combines an embedded bio-sensor system on an im-
planted RFID microchip” (i.e. RFID implant) that enables glucose levels in the body 
to be measured in real-time.463 Therefore, while PositiveID Corp. (formerly known as 
458 In 2009, VeriChip Corporation changed its name to PositiveID Corporation after completing its acquisition of Steel 
Vault Corporation. Throughout this dissertation, however, the company that created the first FDA approved RFID 
implant will still be known as VeriChip, in order to avoid confusion. 
459 But, VeriChip certainly did not invent the concept of HIMs. see, e.g., U.S. Patent. No. 4,706,689, Issued to Daniel Man 
on 17 November 1987, which describes a device designed to be implantable behind the ear of a human. The device 
transmits a signal intended to enable tracking of the implantee. The device operates continuously and is designed to be 
recharged through external contacts. 
460 As outlined later on, VeriChip has also marketed the use of its RFID implants for purposes beyond merely providing 
medical information when needed.
461 In June of 2007, the American Medical Association concluded that implantable “[r]adio frequency identification (RFID) 
devices may help to identify patients, thereby improving the safety and efficiency of patient care, and may be used to 
enable secure access to patient clinical information”.  American Medical Association, CEJA Report 5-A-07, p. 4, avail-
able at: http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/467/ceja5a07.doc      
462 VeriChip and Microsoft have also entered into an agreement, whereby users of the VeriMed Health Link System will 
now be able to export their information to Microsoft’s HealthVault.  see Bacheldor, Beth. “Microsoft Partners With 
Implantable RFID Chip Maker VeriChip”, RFID Journal, 2 December 2008, available at: http://www.rfidjournal.com/
article/articleview/4477/1/1/
463 see http://www.positiveidcorp.com/products_glucochip.html
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VeriChip Corp.) has apparently stopped marketing the VeriChip implant, the company 
has changed the name to “GlucoChip” and integrated additional capabilities. 
7.2.2 GPS implants
GPS tracking devices have also become an accepted tool of law enforcement agents to 
covertly track suspects or overtly track sex offenders and of business owners to track 
employees, while other location-aware devices, such as GPS-enabled mobile phones 
and their corresponding applications have also become extremely popular. 
The GPS is a US space-based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) that 
provides reliable positioning services to civilian users on a continuous worldwide basis. 
The GPS is made up of three parts: 24 satellites orbiting the Earth; monitoring stations 
on Earth; and the GPS receivers owned by end-users. GPS satellites transmit signals 
from space that are picked up and identified by GPS receivers. The GPS receiver in turn 
calculates or triangulates its own position every second or few seconds, consisting of 
current longitude, latitude, altitude and time, based on the readings from the satellites 
with an accuracy of a few feet or better anywhere on Earth.464 GPS receivers alone do 
not disclose location information. However, when combined with data transmission 
technology or cellular phone technology, GPS receivers can disclose the geographic 
coordinates to another party.  
GPS implants are the combination of the technology of GPS and cell phones, cre-
ating an enduring sub-dermal personal locating device (PLD). The GPS implant uses 
GPS to accurately locate itself and the cellular phone network to transmit its location. 
The cellular phone network enables the GPS implant to continue to function in areas 
such as underground subway tunnels. GPS especially has some problems in urban ar-
eas, indoors and other GPS-impaired environments that lack direct line-of-sight to GPS 
satellite signals.  But, A-GPS (Assisted GPS) and, as proposed by Darren Murph, a 
so-called “GPS repeater” can enhance the ability of GPS devices to receive signals 
indoors, underground and in dense urban areas.465 
The way in which GPS implants are meant to work is the following. GPS satellites 
send a signal to the implant which then in turn relays a radio signal via the cellular 
phone network, using a built-in transponder or General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) 
464 see the US Government website on GPS, available at: http://www.gps.gov
465 see Murph, Darren. “Underground / indoor GPS repeater maintains your position” (Engadget, 21 February, 2007), avail-
able at: http://www.engadget.com/2007/02/21/underground-indoor-gps-repeater-maintains-your-position/
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module, to “push” a stream of accurate real-time geographic coordinates to a monitor-
ing station where it can be digitally stored on Internet servers or computer databases to 
form what Morris et al. (2004) have termed “digital trail libraries”. 
GIS software can then plot the GPS implantee’s movements and convert or inter-
pret geographic coordinates into understandable street addresses. Integrating hardware, 
software and data, GIS allows users to view geographic coordinates or data in differ-
ent ways and reveal relationships, patterns and trends in the form of maps, reports and 
charts. There are three views: the database view; the map view; and the model view.466
Despite earlier reports that GPS satellites are deteriorating,467 the system is instead 
currently undergoing a multi-billion dollar upgrade, which will gradually replace satel-
lites, meant to significantly improve accuracy and deliver new capabilities in the fu-
ture.468 Besides, an alternative or complementary to GPS is ‘Galileo’, the European 
GNSS currently being established by the EU and European Space Agency (ESA), with 
scheduled completion by 2013. Similar to GPS, Galileo will be an open service to 
everyone. GPS and Galileo will be capable of operating together, allowing future in-
teroperable multi-signal receivers to receive signals from both systems, which is also 
expected to improve accuracy and reliability. 
For now, the GPS element, in particular, requires the implant to be considerably 
larger than ordinary RFID implants and requires considerable more energy. GPS im-
plants could be powered by  a thermo-couple circuit that produces voltage from the 
fluctuations in body temperature or electromechanically through the movement of mus-
cles in the body.469 Even more revolutionary, a small external power source, attached 
anywhere on the human body with electrodes and using the human body’s electrical 
conductive properties, could also possibly power the GPS implant.470 Alternatively, 
however, as part of a Personal Area Network (PAN), RFID implants could perhaps 
466 see the Guide to Geographic Information Systems, available at: http://www.gis.com
467 see Johnson, Bobbie. “GPS system ‘close to breakdown’” (The Guardian, 19 May 2009), available at: http://www.
guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/may/19/gps-close-to-breakdown
468 see Hennigan, W.J. GPS is getting an $8-billion upgrade (Los Angeles Times, 23 May 2010), available at: http://ar-
ticles.latimes.com/2010/may/23/business/la-fi-gps-20100523
469 see U.S. Patent No. 5,629,678, Issued 13 May 1997, describes an apparatus for tracking and recovering humans utiliz-
ing an implantable transceiver powered electromechanically through the movement of body muscle.
470 see U.S. Patent No. 6,754,472, entitled “Method and apparatus for transmitting power and data using the human body”, 
Issued to Microsoft Corporation on 22 June 2004.  (Similarly, Xega, a security firm in Mexico, has also started offer-
ing HIMs that apparently send radio signals to a special GPS device carried by the implantee, which can then be used 
to determine the location of that person if he or she were to be kidnapped).
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communicate with the GPS microchips and GPS applications already widely available 
within smartphones and, as a result, lower the energy requirements of HIMs.  
7.3 LOCATION-AWARENESS AND THE DAWN OF AN INTERNET OF   
 PERSONS
7.3.1 The capabilities of HIMs
The capabilities and privacy risks associated with HIMs are significant. Although 
VeriChip, for example, primarily markets their product (a RFID implant) for medical 
applications,471 RFID implants can be used to identify and track/monitor the move-
ments of living organisms, both human and animal. 
However, as the staff of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rightfully point out, 
“RFID by itself is not a location-tracking technology”.472 There are significant infra-
structure requirements. In order to enable RFID to track the movements of people, the 
widespread, strategic and registered placement of RFID readers, linked to computer 
databases, in synergy with RFID implants (or other RFID tags associated with persons 
one way or another), is required. Interoperable RFID readers, wirelessly linked to the 
Internet and positioned by public authorities and/or private entities at the entrance of 
airports, train stations, government buildings, stores/shopping centers, etc., throughout 
highways and cities, and attached to CCTV cameras, can enable the tracking of the 
daily movements of RFID implantees (or anyone for that matter in possession of a 
RFID tag coupled with personal information). 
The potential widespread deployment of RFID-enabled mobile phones will only 
enhance that capability by increasing the number of RFID readers in the global infor-
471  However, VeriChip has promoted their RFID implant for other purposes.
472 RFID: Radio Frequency IDentification: Applications and Implications for Consumers: A Workshop Report From the 
Staff of the Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter called “FTC staff report on RFID”], FTC, March 2005, p. 3, avail-
able at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050308rfidrpt.pdf
 Moreover, RFID technology and its applications do not always present threats to privacy and personal data protection. 
Examples of non-threatening RFID applications may include document management, supply chain management and 
other Business-to-Business services.
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mation system.473 In addition, the RFID readers can be integrated with GPS technology, 
similar to the scheme developed by EarthSearch Communications. For the most part, 
the tracking capabilities of RFID implants are proportional to the number of readers 
deployed in public. On the other hand, Wi-Fi based RFID systems, like the technology 
pioneered by AeroScout,474 and the use of a higher RF signal, can considerably reduce 
the number of RFID readers needed to track the movements of millions and millions of 
people (implantees).
Like GPS satellites, RFID technology and the corresponding infrastructure will also 
play a significant role in changing the nature of the public space. As Rob van Kranenburg 
explains, “the satellite infrastructure [GPS] creates connectivity from above. The RFID 
infrastructure creates connectivity from below”.475 While the GPS network, combined 
with the cellular network, can constantly relay an individual’s exact location anywhere, 
RFID is more effective and convenient for tracking individual’s movements within build-
ings. The Ubisense system, for example, using RF technology, can reveal the exact lo-
cation in real-time of any number of individuals in huge complex sites within 15 cm of 
accuracy and render this information in 3D visualizations on screens.476
The capability of RFID technology to track movements indoors and reveal habits 
and relationships of individuals was already demonstrated ironically on the British TV 
show Celebrity Big Brother. RFID readers were installed by Wavetrend in numerous 
locations within the ‘Big Brother house’, while the housemates were made to wear 
RFID tags. Wavetrend’s AssetTrace allow the show’s producers to view on a screen the 
floor plan of the house and each participant’s location in real-time. According to the 
show’s producers, the scheme will enable the TV show’s psychologists to interpret the 
473 There is a real possibility that RFID readers will be integrated into most new cell phones within a couple years. see 
Lomas, Natasha. “RFID could be in all cell phones by 2010” (ZDNet News, 25 June 2009), available at: http://news.
zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-315292.html; Nokia and Samsung have already unveiled RFID mobile phone readers, and 
there were rumors that the next-generation iPhone (v.4) will have a built-in RFID reader.  These rumors are substanti-
ated by the fact that Apple has applied for a patent for a touch screen RFID tag reader. However, as of June 2010, this 
has yet to manifest and the just released iPhone v.4 does not have a RFID reader.  The reasons for the delay could be the 
uncertainties of manufacturers due to the privacy concerns, lack of adequate standards and legal deficiencies. 
474 see AeroScout, available at: http://www.aeroscout.com/content.asp?page=SystemOverview
475 van Kranenburg, Rob. The Internet of Things: A critique of ambient technology and the all-seeing network of RFID, 
Network Notebooks 02, Institute of Network Cultures (2008), p. 18, available at: http://www.networkcultures.org/_up-
loads/notebook2_theinternetofthings.pdf
476 see Ubisense, available at: http://www.ubisense.net/content/8.html
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celebrities’ behavior and question the housemates who have been voted off about their 
movements within the house.477 
Essentially, RFID implants can broadcast the implantee’s unique ID number, which 
may serve as a means of identification, to anyone or anything with a RFID reader within 
inches to several feet/meters away. The greater the radio frequency in which RFID im-
plants operate, the greater the distance from which they can be read by RFID readers. 
The greater the ‘read range’ of RFID implants, the greater their capability to keep track 
of movements, and thus essentially the privacy-intrusive capability of RFID implants 
is, in part, directly proportional to the radio frequency.478 However, a frequency higher 
than 125 or 134 KHz may be required to significantly improve the tracking capabilities 
of RFID implants, but not too high, as this would hamper the RF signal’s capability of 
penetrating an implantee’s flesh, since “low frequency signals penetrate liquids more 
easily”479 and humans are mostly made up of water. Nevertheless, RFID readers with 
more powerful antenna could potentially read the RFID implants beyond their standard 
or nominal read range, known as the “rogue scanning range”,480 and the use of a second 
reader could “eavesdrop” on the RFID implant at a greater distance than the rogue 
scanning range.481
In addition to the distance at which RFID tags can be read, as the OECD Policy 
Guidance on Radio Frequency Identification also points out, the potential privacy inva-
sion through the use of RFID is also likely to be proportional to the possibility of re-
vealing “sensitive information about individuals through inferences and profiling”, the 
degree of interoperability and the tracking capabilities.482 With the increasing advance-
ment of RFID technology, including augmented data, processing and communication 
capacities, the privacy-intrusive capabilities of RFID implants will equally increase.
477 see Swedberg, Claire. “RFID Works for Big Brother” (RFID Journal, 7 January 2009), available at: http://www.rfidjourn-
al.com/article/articleview/4534/1/1; Savvas, Antony. “Celebrity Big Brother uses RFID technology to track housemates” 
(Computer Weekly, 6 January 2009), available at: http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2009/01/06/234068/celeb-
rity-big-brother-uses-rfid-technology-to-track.htm
478 see OECD Policy Guidance on Radio Frequency Identification (2008).
479 Ibid., p. 31.
480 see “A Holistic Privacy Framework for RFID Applications”, Future of Identity in the Information Society, Simone 
Fischer-Hübner and Hans Hedbom (eds.)., Deliverable D12.3,  p. 69, available at: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/
deliverables/fidis-wp12-del12.3.A_Holistic_Privacy_Framework_for_RFID_Applications_v2.pdf
481 Ibid.
482 OECD Policy Guidance on Radio Frequency Identification (2008), p. 53.
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HIMs can also be integrated with other technologies. For instance, RFID implants 
and RFID readers can enhance the capabilities of CCTV surveillance systems. RFID 
readers attached to or located nearby CCTV cameras could potentially combine visual 
surveillance with database-linked surveillance capabilities, thereby enabling CCTV 
camera operators to identify and follow the individual they wish to observe. However, 
while this may be more practical than using face recognition software, extensive co-
ordination between the relevant data controllers is required. RFID implants could also 
be potentially interfaced with Wi-Fi technology. VeriChip already began the process of 
interfacing their RFID implants with Wi-Fi, in order “to achieve an even higher level of 
system integration that collects location-based information”.483 
Generally, tags read events (TREs) can be anonymous at first, but can later be 
converted into personally identifiable location information. For example, the unique ID 
number of RFID implants can automatically be coupled with a debit or credit card when 
an implantee makes a purchase in a shop that contains RFID readers. Such information 
could later be used to identify and track the implantee and target personalized, real-
time, location-based advertisements, either via nearby screens or via mobile phones, 
as the person passes by any RFID reader associated with the same shop or company.  
Linking HIMs to the implantee’s bank account, debit card or credit card number 
could also enable the use of HIMs to make cashless transactions,484 which is perhaps 
why some correlate HIMs with the ‘Mark of the Beast’ as prophesized in the Bible.485 
When an implantee’s right arm or hand is scanned, followed by the entering of a PIN, 
the transaction can be executed.486 HIMs can, therefore, also enhance the ability of re-
tailers and marketers to meticulously record the consumer habits of individuals.  
483 see VeriChip Corp.’s 10-K Annual Report for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2007, p. 16, available at: http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1347022/000136231008001657/c72788e10vk.htm
484 ADS revealed at the ID World 2003 International Congress in Paris, France, the company’s subdermal RFID solution 
called VeriPay, which allows the implant to be used to make payments. see McCullagh, Declan.”Chip implant gets 
cash under your skin” (CNET News, 25 November 2003), available at: http://news.cnet.com/2100-1041-5111637.html
485 “He causes all, both small and great, rich and poor, free and slave, to receive a mark on their right hand or on their 
foreheads, and that no one may buy or sell except one who has the mark or the name of the beast, or the number of his 
name”. (Revelation 13:16).
486 VISA and MasterCard have already developed and deployed contactless smartcards, which make use of RFID, such 
as MasterCard’s PayPass card. Other examples include Exxon Mobil’s SpeedPass. In an article, published by TIME 
Magazine in 1998, entitled “The Big Bank Theory” Joshua Cooper Ramo, et al., proclaimed, “Your daughter can store 
the money any way she wants--on her laptop, on a debit card, even (in the not too distant future) on a chip implanted 
under her skin”.  The question is will this prove true within the next ten years? 
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However, the concern over remotely tracking people’s movements does not only 
pertain to RFID and/or GPS implants. Although HIMs are the ultimate person-locating 
device or generator/transmitter of location information, GPS enabled hand-held devices 
or smartphones and even traditional mobile phones are already capable of being used 
to track or locate users.487 The risk is so high that the Secret Service strongly advocated 
that US President Barack Obama give up his Blackberry for security purposes, since 
there was a high risk that his location could be determined. Even the Bluetooth signal 
emitted from mobile phones can be used to track users, as demonstrated by Bath Uni-
versity’s Cityware project.488
Moreover, RFID tags can be embedded in practically anything people buy or wear, 
from clothes, watches and shoes to items in a woman’s purse such as lipstick, and, 
similar to RFID implants, can be used to track and identify persons (Albrecht and Mc-
Intyre, 2005). People throughout the day normally carry these items. RFID tags are 
already being embedded in a number of consumer goods. Equally, personally identifi-
able information (or personal data) can be linked to the unique numbers of the RFID 
tags embedded in these items when they are purchased using a credit or debit card.489 
As Linda D. Koontz, Director of Information Management Issues at the US Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), testified, “once a tagged item is associated with a 
particular individual, personally identifiable information can be obtained and then ag-
gregated to develop a profile of the individual”.490 
7.3.2 Location information
HIMs can generate practically limitless amounts of location information on individu-
als. Here, location information, however, is not limited to where an individual lives or 
487 The location of traditional cell phones can also be determined or “triangulated”, albeit less accurately.
488 The discontinued Cityware project tracked mobile phone users at various locations to study patterns of how people 
move around cities. The participating users required a Facebook account and the Cityware application and needed to 
register the Bluetooth ID of their mobile phone. The researchers had set up nodes around the UK and in the US, which 
constantly scanned for Bluetooth-enabled devices in a given area, and then relayed information to servers, which com-
pared the IDs of the devices with the enabled Facebook profiles.  see “Bluetooth helps Facebook friends”, (BBC News, 
16 August 2007), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6949473.stm
489 see FTC staff report on RFID, p. 14. 
490 Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House 
of Representatives, PRIVACY: Key Challenges Facing Federal Agencies, Statement of Linda D. Koontz, Director of 
Information Management Issues, 17 May 2006, GAO-06-777T, p. 16, available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06777t.pdf
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works and the street addresses thereof, but rather pertains to either information on their 
daily movements tracked and stored over a prolonged period of time (‘mobility data’) 
and/or their accurate, real-time, physical location at any given moment. For the pur-
poses of this dissertation, location information includes, in addition to ordinary street 
addresses, both geographic coordinates and TREs. 
Location information should be considered a category of personal information 
when it is personally identifiable or can later potentially be construed as such. Loca-
tion information/data, as the EU’s ‘ePrivacy Directive’ distinguishes in Article 2, is not 
identical to traffic data processed for the purpose of carrying out a transmission on an 
electronic communications network or for the billing thereof, but rather is data which 
indicates the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly avail-
able electronic communications service in order to provide a ‘value added service’ (or 
location-based service).491
The intrinsic market value of the location information generated by HIMs in the 
so-called ‘information age’ could potentially result in HIM service providers and/or 
data controllers succumbing to lucrative temptations and disclosing their customer’s 
location information to a variety of third parties, such as insurance companies, retailers, 
marketers, data brokers and even law enforcement agencies. As Masters and Michael 
argue, “[t]he main temptation will be in the value of the data and how it can be used not 
only to sell value-added services but separate service-sets that rely on location informa-
tion” (2006, p. 32). Under a ‘surveillance-for-profit’ scheme, locations, for example, 
where one travels, eats and shops on a daily basis are just a few examples of informa-
tion that is very valuable to retailers and marketers (Karim, 2004, p. 495). Location 
information can, for example, enable location-based advertising (LBA) in real-time. 
Thus, location information has a huge potential of becoming a key asset within the 
‘knowledge-based economy’ of tomorrow’s ‘ubiquitous information society’. The loca-
tion information generated by smartphones has already begun to be provided to market-
ers to target advertisements based on a person’s real-time location and travel patterns,492 
and TechnoCom Corporation, for example, has launched SpotOn GPS, a LBA platform 
for mobile phones. 
However, personally-identifiable location information, as a whole, is considerably 
more privacy-intrusive than simply revealing the places where a person, on a daily ba-
491 The ePrivacy Directive explicitly regulates ‘location data’, requiring that the use of non-anonymous location data is 
particularly restricted to the extent necessary to provide the value added service, and clarifies the scope of the required 
informed consent (Article 9), and the scope of use without informed consent. 
492 see Clifford, Stephanie. “Advertisers Get a Trove of Clues in Smartphones” (The New York Times, 11 March 2009), 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/business/media/11target.html
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sis, shops or eats. As emphasized by the EU’s Article 29 Working Party, the processing 
of location information is a particularly sensitive matter.493
7.3.3 Social and privacy implications
Indeed, location information can reveal not just where an individual travels, but po-
tentially more sensitive information associated with where he/she has been, including 
a person’s consumer habits and more private or personal affairs and activities. For ex-
ample, as Jack Dempsey, currently Vice President for Public Policy at the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, inquires,
What if your insurer finds out you’re into rock climbing or late-night ca-
rousing in the red-light district? What if your employer knows you’re be-
ing treated for a sexually transmitted disease at a local clinic? The potential 
is there for inferences to be drawn about you based on knowledge of your 
whereabouts.494  
An experiment, carried out by Michael et al. (2006), demonstrated the sensitivity of 
location information. This study involved a participant who had their daily movements 
tracked for just two weeks.  Each day during the two-week study, the participant carried 
a Magellan Meridian Gold handheld device either in a bag he carried around or in his 
pocket. The GPS device was setup to collect location data every three seconds. At the 
end of each day this data was uploaded into the GIS software “DiscoverAus Streets & 
Tracks”. The study showed that tracking a person’s movements over a period of time is 
relatively easy and can create a detailed profile of that person, including where he/she 
lives, works and engages in social activities, simply based on his/her daily travel rou-
tines (see Michael et al., 2006).  As partly demonstrated in a more recent study, involv-
ing mobile phone users,495 a person’s movements tracked over a specific period of time 
493 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion on the use of location data with a view to providing value-added services, November 
2005 (WP 115), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp115_en.pdf
494 Romero, Simon. “Location Devices’ Use Rises, Prompting Privacy Concerns” (New York Times, 4 March 2001), avail-
able at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E04E1DC123BF937A35750C0A9679C8B63&sec=&spon=
&pagewanted=print
495 The whereabouts of more than 100,000 mobile phone users were tracked in an attempt to build a comprehensive picture 
of human movements. see Fildes, Jonathan. “Mobile phones expose human habits” (BBC News, 4 June 2008), available 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7433128.stm 
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can be used to construct a profile of that person. These profiles, for example, can be 
used by the private sector for conducting market research and categorizing people and 
can also be useful for law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, the privacy implications 
of tracking a person’s movements and/or disclosing a person’s location information 
also depend, to a certain point, on the type of activities that person engages in.
The ability of HIMs (or simply RFID tags) to identify/track individuals can thus 
lead to the development of profiles based on their movements and whereabouts. These 
studies have also shown that location information can be used for analyzing an indi-
vidual’s past movements in order to potentially determine a person’s future movements. 
Even an individual’s social interactions/social relationships can be potentially deter-
mined.496 Location information, as a result, significantly further adds to the capability 
of creating “digital dossiers” on every person (Solove, 2004) in possession of a mobile 
phone/smartphone or implanted with a HIM. 
Furthermore, since implantees will essentially not know when their RFID implant 
has been read and by whom, they must then bear an even greater risk of losing control 
of their personal data, if the relevant safeguards are not implemented to prevent this 
from happening.
The widespread deployment and use of RFID implants (or RFID tags) and RFID 
readers, whereby the implants/tags become a critical element in the granting or denying 
of physical access or the granting or denying of certain advantages, could also poten-
tially add to the “digital divide”497 and broaden discrimination in the digital age, as the 
non-implanted are faced with increasing disadvantages in a ubiquitous information so-
ciety. However, since the digital divide is mostly an issue, at present, of not being able 
to afford the technology, in addition to not knowing how to use it, and RFID technology 
in general is rapidly becoming cheaper and is very easy to use, RFID implants will not 
necessarily add to the digital divide. But, if the people who refuse to be implanted are 
increasingly disadvantaged and discriminated against, and the law does nothing about 
it, then RFID implants will indeed rapidly add to the digital divide.
496 Ibid.
497 There is little consensus over the overall definition of the term “digital divide”, but it essentially refers to the growing 
gap between those who have access to ICT and those who do not or the difference between the “haves” and the “have-
nots” of ICT (see Hilbert, 2011, p. 5). Hilbert (2011) argues that the “[d]ifferences in definitions arise because scholars 
distinguish between (1) the kinds of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in question; (2) the choice of 
subject; (3) diverse attributes of the chosen subjects; and (4) levels of adoption, going from plain access to effective 
usage with real impact” (p. 2). see Hilbert, Martin. The end justifies the definition: the manifold outlooks on the digital 
divide and their practical usefulness for policy-making (Telecommunications Policy, Volume 35, Issue 8, 2011), pp. 
715-736, available at: http://martinhilbert.net/ManifoldDigitalDivide_Hilbert_AAM.pdf
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While there are already valid concerns over the privacy threats of RFID, there are 
lots of unknowns. The need for further validating these threats can only come from the 
deployment of RFID applications. However, applying the precautionary principle here 
would imply that any potential widespread deployment of RFID implants should be put 
on hold, even before there is hard evidence concerning their tracking capabilities, until 
we are certain of all the privacy and social implications and the means and precondi-
tions for addressing or preventing them.
7.3.4 A means of control
Human identification and tracking goes beyond privacy, serving as a powerful means 
of control. As Mark Weiser asserts, in referring to ubiquitous computing, “the problem, 
while often couched in terms of privacy, is really one of control”.498 If left unchecked, 
HIMs could pose a serious threat not just to privacy, but also to liberty and human dig-
nity, as the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) equally 
points out.499 As Melvin Gutterman further asserts: 
[t]he ability to move about freely without constant supervision by the govern-
ment is an important source of individual liberty that must be addressed. A 
fear of systematic observation, even in public places, destroys this sense of 
freedom (1988, p. 706). 
HIMs, or RFID technology in general, could have a ‘chilling effect’ on the free-
dom of movement, whereby people, concerned that their movements could be tracked 
and recorded, self-impose limitations on where they actually travel. Even worse, RFID 
implants could lead to controlled or restricted movement. For example, if RFID im-
plants are used as travel passes for mass public transportation, a person could easily be 
electronically and remotely denied access. Contactless smart cards are already widely 
used and could similarly be used to restrict access to mass public transportation. RFID 
implants (or RFID embedded ID cards/passports) could also have a ‘chilling effect’ 
on the freedom of association, since government agents could potentially use RFID 
498 Weiser, Mark. The Computer for the Twentieth-First Century (Scientific American, Vol. 265, No. 3, September 1991), 
pp. 94-104.
499 OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN GROUP ON ETHICS IN SCIENCE AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO THE EURO-
PEAN COMMISSION, Opinion No. 20, Adopted on 16/03/2005.
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readers to deliberately determine who is present at a demonstration. Unfortunately, 
however, these potential threats to personal freedom, posed by RFID and GPS, are be-
ing ignored, for the most part, by human rights and civil rights organizations and within 
human rights reports.
HIMs could serve as a powerful tool of mass control and mass management. For 
Dobson and Fisher (2003), electronically tracking people’s movements and generating 
location information can lead to a “new form of slavery characterized by location con-
trol” or what they term “geoslavery”.500 Herbert (2006) similarly links human tracking 
to “geoslavery” and further associates the mandatory implantation of identification and 
tracking devices to slavery control mechanisms, such as branding.501 Whether or not 
HIMs (or any other personal location-tracking device) will lead to “geoslavery”, their 
widespread deployment could certainly bring about mass categorization. 
In essence, if left unchecked, HIMs could be the last drop in the bucket needed to 
give rise to an age where omnipresent scrutiny and continuous, real-time surveillance is 
commonplace and limitless, a society where there will in effect be truly nowhere to hide 
in a global, automated, digital information surveillance-tracking grid that will become 
increasingly impossible to escape.502
7.3.5 Internet of Persons
Proponents of RFID and major investors behind its development and deployment envi-
sion the integration or ‘bridging’, so to speak, of the physical and virtual/digital world 
in what is now commonly known as the “Internet of Things” (IoT).503 The IoT is defined 
as a “network of interconnected objects, from books to cars, from electrical appliances 
to food”.504 In a full-blown deployment of IoT, billions of physical objects are embed-
500 see Dobson, Jerome E. and Fisher, Peter F. Geoslavery (IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 2003).
501 In linking mandatory RFID/GPS implants to a form of slavery, Herbert (2006) also argues that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment of the US Constitution could serve as a basis of prohibiting any mandatory implantation.
502 see e.g. O’Harrow, Robert. No place to hide (Free Press, 2005).
503 see the First International Conference on the Internet of Things, Adjunct Proceedings, available at: http://www.iot2008.
org/adjunctproceedings.pdf
504 COM(2009) 278 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Internet of Things – An action plan for Europe, 
p. 2.
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ded with RFID tags and assigned, for instance, Electronic Product Codes (EPCs),505 
allowing these objects to be identified and tracked in real-time either in a closed or open 
network.506 When an RFID reader reads or interrogates an RFID tag embedded in an 
object, the EPC number is communicated to computers or mobile devices running rel-
evant middleware, which can then use EPCglobal’s Object Name Service (ONS), an au-
tomated networking service based on the Domain Name Service (DNS), which directs 
objects (instead of computers) to websites/web-based databases, in order to identify 
and track the object and enable access to the stored information on the object.507 This 
information can include, in addition to other general product information, its location 
history or TREs based on the last occasions where the object’s embedded RFID tag 
was read. Specific locations, such as a warehouse, shop or even a store shelf, can also 
be electronically identified using a Global Location Number (GLN), giving rise to the 
so-called “Internet of Places”.508 As pointed out in the OECD paper on “RFID: Drivers, 
Challenges and Public Policy Considerations”, “the information infrastructures associ-
ated with RFID, in particular with UHF [ultra high frequency] RFID, will increasingly 
be accessed across IP networks, private intranets and the public Internet”.509
Essentially, the data from RFID tags can be captured by RFID readers and wire-
lessly transmitted to computer databases over a network, stored on a server and made 
accessible anywhere in the world via the Internet, using a web-based application or even 
a search engine. The objects could then potentially be converted into what Bruce Ster-
ling refers to as “spimes”, objects that are location-aware, self-registering and uniquely 
505 EPCs, first developed by MIT’s AutoID Center, are basically standardized codes for RFID tags. If RFID tags indeed 
eventually replace bar codes completely, as RFID technology advances and becomes cheaper to reproduce, then, 
as generally purported, EPCs could one day replace Universal Product Codes (UPCs). see Grossman, Lisa. “New 
RFID Tag Could Mean the End of Bar Codes” (Wired, 26 March 2010), available at: http://www.wired.com/wired-
science/2010/03/rfid/
506 The assigning of IP addresses to objects has called into question the feasibility or rationale of considering IP addresses 
as personal data. 
507 For further explanation, see “Object Name Service (ONS), Version 1.0”, EPCglobal Ratified Specification, October 4, 
2005, available at: http://www.gs1.org/gsmp/kc/epcglobal/ons/ons_1_0-standard-20051004.pdf
508 An “Internet of Places” is “where information specific to places can be readily picked up by devices and users in 
specific locations”. see Cooper, Joshua and Anne James. Challenges for Database Management in the Internet of 
Things (IETE Technical Review, Vol. 26, Issue No. 5, August 2009), available at: http://tr.ietejournals.org/text.
asp?2009/26/5/320/55275
509 OECD (2006), “Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID): Drivers, Challenges and Public Policy Considerations”, 
OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 110, OECD Publishing, p. 18.
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identifiable, and thus traceable in space and time.510 With the gradual transition from 
IPv4 at 32 bits to IPv6 at 128 bits, there will be more than enough IP addresses for prac-
tically every single object and human on Earth.511 On the whole, such a scheme could 
bring about ‘ubiquitous positioning’ or an “everyware” world.512 
IoT is considered an integral part of the so-called “Future Internet” and is widely 
supported by industry stakeholders and other actors. IoT is also receiving public funding 
and widespread deployment is expected within the next several years. The IP for Smart 
Objects Alliance (IPSO Alliance), whose members include Cisco, Google and Intel, is 
a testament to the backing of the ICT industry’s major players towards IoT and using IP 
as the network for the connection of personal and household ‘smart’ objects/devices.513 
Interesting enough, CIA Director David Petraeus discussed about the emergence of the 
IoT and the transformational ability of these smart devices to help the CIA execute their 
clandestine activities and gather immense quantities of geolocation data on individuals. 
Petraeus explained that “items of interest will be located, identified, monitored, and 
remotely controlled through technologies such as radio-frequency identification, sensor 
networks, tiny embedded servers, and energy harvesters – all connected to the next-
generation internet using abundant, low-cost, and high-power computing”.514 
While the deployment of RFID is spreading and the industry is growing, IoT is still, 
nonetheless, a promising vision and currently not a reality.515 It will also require a vast 
amount of additional data storage space, which is already an issue.516 In spite of this, IoT 
510 Sterling, Bruce. Shaping Things (MIT Press, 2005).
511 For further explanation see Embedded, Everywhere: A Research Agenda for Network Systems of Embedded Computers, 
Report from the Committee on Networked Systems of Embedded Computers, Computer Science and Telecommunica-
tions Board, National Research Council (National Academic Press, Washington, DC, 2001).
512 see Greenfield, Adam. Everyware: The Dawning Age of Ubiquitous Computing (New Riders Publishing, 2006).
513 “Smart objects” are essentially objects that are location-aware, possess processing capabilities and are able to ‘com-
municate’ with other objects. 
514 Ackerman, Spencer. “CIA Chief: We’ll Spy on You Through Your Dishwasher” (Wired blogs, Danger Room, 15 March 
2012), available at: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/page/2/
515 For instance, according to a survey in 2009 conducted by Eurostat, only 3% of enterprises in the EU27 use RFID 
technology. see Eurostat news release at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/4-19012010-BP/EN/4-
19012010-BP-EN.PDF
516 see a special report on managing information from the Economist, titled “Data, data everywhere”, Feb. 2010.
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has already called into question the adequacy of the current legal framework in the US 
and the EU and the potential need for new legislation and/or a new governance model.517
But, we are now witnessing just the beginning of this location-aware revolution. 
As the ultimate vehicles of LBS and location awareness, HIMs could take us to the 
next level – an ‘Internet of Persons’. In the same way RFID tags will usher in IoT, 
RFID implants will carry on the evolution of the Internet, and could ultimately bring 
about an “Internet of Persons” (see Figure 1), giving a whole new meaning to being 
inter-connected to one another or to ‘networked individuals’ or ‘social networking’ in 
tomorrow’s ubiquitous information society. This evolution is arguably only a natural 
development with the growing trend of increasing mobility, ubiquity, traceability, iden-
tifiability and heterogeneity of components of the information society, and the growing 
enterprise for achieving unlimited storage space, bandwidth and Internet access points.
517 see, for further discussion, for example: Weber, Rolf H. Internet of things – Need for a new legal environment? (Com-




















Figure 1: Potential evolution of the Internet
Part II 185
RFID implants, assigned IP addresses and interfaced with the Internet, could in ac-
tuality link implantees with the virtual space, breaking the boundaries between the bio-
logical and the digital, and indirectly between each other.518 The “Internet of Persons”, 
for instance, could be based on the EarthSearch Communications’ AutoSearchRFID 
unique solution, which combines data from RFID readers with GPS transmitters’ re-
al-time, location-reporting capabilities. While the system was developed for tracking 
goods or assets, a similar system could be used for RFID implantees. In any case, the 
TREs, together with the location information of the RFID readers, could be communi-
cated to servers and made available via the Internet (see Figure 2).
As RFID or GPS implantees are transformed into two-way transmitters of infor-
mation, both emitting as well as receiving data, and active generators of information, 
rather than passive receivers, “there is no more we as in we human beings, the “we” is 
an information space like any other” (van Kranenburg, 2008, p. 18). Implantees will 
become one with the global information space and part of the Internet, changing the 
nature of the human body. This would potentially mark the beginnings of “Internet-
enabled people”, a concept Vinton Cerf519 envisaged more than a decade ago,520 which 
could enhance the “web presence” of people, meaning that people will become acces-
sible via the Internet through the automatic correlation between a web resource and 
their physical location, as envisaged by the Hewlett Packard’s Internet and Mobile Sys-
tems Laboratory.521 Already, an individual in the US has become the first person to 
be implanted with a pacemaker connected wirelessly to the Internet that can transmit 
518 Already, in Japan, cattle have their own IPv6 addresses, enabling farmers to identify and track the cattle throughout the 
entire production lifecycle.
519 Vinton Cerf, often called “the father of the Internet”, was instrumental in the creation of email, the development of 
TC/IP technology and the founding of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which he 
chaired for seven years. At present, Cerf is Google’s Chief Internet Evangelist.
520 Cerf, Vinton. “What Will Replace The Internet?” (TIME Magazine, 19 June, 2000), available at: http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,997263,00.html
 (In the same article, Cerf gives the following example of the conception of Internet-enabled people. “The speech pro-
cessor used today in cochlear implants for the hearing impaired could easily be connected to the Internet; listening to 
Internet radio could soon be a direct computer-to-brain experience!”). 
521 see Kindberg, Tim., et al. People, Places, Things: Web Presence for the Real World (Internet and Mobile Systems 
Laboratory, HP Laboratories Palo Alto, HPL-2000-16, February, 2000), available at: http://www.hpl.hp.com/techre-
ports/2001/HPL-2001-279.pdf 
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information to her doctor.522 RFID implants and the corresponding infrastructure could 
change not just our relationship and interaction with objects, electronic devices, public 
or private infrastructure and with each other, but also how we view ourselves and our 
bodies, now merged in a networked ‘intelligent’ environment. RFID implants, as tech-
nologies of human enhancement,523 could thus eventually play a significant early role in 
the transhumanism movement.524 
522 Gruber, Ben. “First Wi-Fi Pacemaker in the US gives patient freedom” (Reuters, 10 August 2009), available at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5790AK20090810
 Such a move is yet another example of the trend of increasing convergence of ICT and life sciences.  see Weber, 
Karsten. The Next Step: Privacy Invasions by Biometrics and ICT Implants (Ubiquity, Vol. 7, Issue 45, 2005), available 
at: www.acm.org/ubiquity/views/pf/v7i45_weber.pdf
523 The human enhancement abilities include, for example, the ability of implantees to automatically open doors and to 
pay for items.
524 Transhumanism refers to the potential future merger of man and machine, what Ray Kurzwell and others refer to as 
“singularity”, which also describes the era when artificial intelligence is equal to that of human intelligence. Transhu-
manism aims to augment human capabilities. HIMs are merely just the beginning. 
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Since HIMs can be interfaced with the Internet, there is the possibility of implant-
ees being able to choose via a web application to automatically have their real-time lo-
cation information posted on their social networking webpage or blog or even perhaps 
sent via services such as Twitter,525 which would mean that a person’s location informa-
tion could be publicly available to anyone with access to the Internet. This information 
could thus also potentially be searchable on a search engine, such as Google. This 
would lead to what the Royal Academy of Engineering terms “Google spacetime”,526 
whereby the location of a specified individual at some particular time and date can be 
searched on Google or another search engine, essentially again converting people into 
Sterling’s “spimes” (2005). Even more, similar to Alcatel-Lucent’s touchatag solutions 
(formerly known as Tikitag) and the concept of ‘augmented reality’, when a RFID 
implant is read by an RFID-enabled smartphone, for instance, the relevant implantee’s 
personal website or social networking webpage could be launched on a smartphone, 
tablet PC or other MCD.527 
While RFID implants can move us beyond today’s Internet and past IoT, GPS 
implants can propel us beyond today’s location-aware applications. GPS implants can 
improve the ability of being automatically notified of the location of a friend if and 
when he or she is within a certain distance nearby or being able to look up a friend’s 
real-time location, regardless if RFID readers are present, via the Internet using, for 
instance, a smartphone.
7.3.6 Nearly there
The path towards the ultimate location-aware world that HIMs promise has already 
been initiated. A continuous wave of GPS-equipped smartphones and tablet PCs and a 
multitude of GPS tracking devices or personal locating devices (PLDs)528 and servic-
525 Foursquare, a location-based social application, already enables users to automatically integrate their location “check-
ins” with their tweets on Twitter.
526 Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance: Challenges of Technological Change (The Royal Academy of Engineering, 
London, 2007), available at: http://www.raeng.org.uk/policy/reports/pdf/dilemmas_of_privacy_and_surveillance_re-
port.pdf
527 Already, the Astonishing Tribe, a Swedish mobile software developer, has developed software, which runs on camera-
equipped smartphones, that can recognize a person’s face and then launch links to that person’s social networking 
websites on a smartphone/mobile device. The system integrates facial recognition, augmented reality and social net-
working. This development has been dubbed “augmented ID”. For more info, see http://www.tat.se
528 see section 7.7 for an outline of the multitude of GPS tracking devices and PLDs (and corresponding services), which 
have recently hit the market and may serve as an alternative to GPS implants.
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es529 have hit the market over the past couple years, and the LBS market is also growing 
at a remarkable rate. In addition, the location-aware and processing capabilities of the 
microchips for smartphones are continuously advancing.530 
As a result, millions of people are walking around with a device (i.e. a smartphone), 
albeit not implanted, but rather carried around in their pocket or purse, that can accu-
rately pinpoint, track and transmit where they are at all times and, with a location-aware 
application, use that location information, in combination with web-based data, to find 
out what and who is nearby or provide other LBS.531 The iPhone and Google’s Android 
smartphones have a multitude of applications that tap into the available location infor-
mation generated via GPS or the available cell phone data.532 Even applications, such as 
games, that do not require location information to serve their purpose collect location 
information. Likewise, the Palm Pre smartphone, for example, transmits the user’s loca-
tion information back to Palm’s servers without the user’s permission and even when 
no location-aware application has been activated on the Pre, as programmer Joey Hess 
discovered.533 The same was also later discovered about Google’s Android smartphones 
and Apple’s iPhone.534
Google has already launched an “Add Location” feature, which automatically adds 
location information to the sender’s signature in Gmail, but this is based on the sender’s 
device IP address as opposed to geographic coordinates derived from GPS. Develop-
529 Personal locating services include, for example, OnStar’s “Family Link” service, which allows for vehicles equipped 
with OnStar to be tracked and authorized individuals to monitor the vehicle movements via the OnStar’s website.
530 For instance, Broadcom has began to market the 4752 microchip for smartphones that can pinpoint the phone’s location 
with ultimate precision, potentially within a few centimeters both outdoors and indoors, by receiving GPS, cell-phone 
and Wi-Fi signals and also input from gyroscopes, altimeters, etc. For further information, see Mims, Christopher. “A 
new microchip knows just where you are, indoors and out”
 (MIT: Technology Review, 9, April 2012), available at: http://www.technologyreview.com/
communications/40075/?p1=A1
531 see Honan, Mathew. “I Am Here: One Man’s Experiment With the Location-Aware Lifestyle” (Wired Magazine, 19 
January 2008), available at: http://www.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/magazine/17-02/lp_guineapig
532 The Garmin-Asus’ Nüvifone G60, for instance, had also planned to put location-awareness as an integral part of its 
capabilities, whereby location information provided by GPS is integrated into everything, from emails, text messages 
and photos to social networking and even gaming
533 see Joey Hess’ explanation, available at: http://kitenet.net/~joey/blog/entry/Palm_Pre_privacy/
534 The security analyst Samy Kamkar recently discovered that Google’s HTC Android smartphone collected its location 
every few seconds and directly transmitted the location data, including a unique phone identifier, to Google several 
times an hour. see Angwin, Julia., Jennifer Valentino-Devries. “Apple, Google Collect User Data” (Wall Street Journal, 
Technology, 22 April 2011).
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ers of web browsers are now more and more ensuring that their software supports both 
location-aware web-based applications and location-aware web browsing. Mozilla’s 
Firefox now enables web applications to automatically know where the user is located, 
which will, for example, provide local search results without the need to include a post-
code in the search query.  
People are more and more revealing what they are currently doing via Twitter, 
what is currently on their mind via Facebook, and what they are currently working on 
via LinkedIn.  Now, letting people, or the world for that matter, know where you are 
precisely continuously in real-time is increasingly becoming popular. This popular-
ity will likely only increase, since Twitter has integrated location data into ‘tweets’ 
through geo-tagging, whereby location information can automatically be annotated to 
a person’s tweets, and Facebook has also announced that it plans to integrate location-
based features.
There are already now a multitude of dedicated location-aware applications, which 
enable users to reveal exactly where they are in real-time. These applications, which 
operate on GPS-equipped smartphones and tablet PCs, are changing our daily lives. 
As Mathew Honan explains, “[t]his one input – our coordinates – has the potential to 
change all the outputs. Where we shop, who we talk to, what we read, what we search 
for, where we go – they all change once we merge location and the Web”.535 In addition 
to the LBS available on smartphones, there are other services, systems or devices that 
are capable of collecting and subsequently retaining location information, such as intel-
ligent transportation systems (ITS) and automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) or 
automotive number plate recognition (ANPR) systems. However, while many of the 
location-aware applications on smartphones, for example, simply enable location-rele-
vant searches, such as nearby restaurants and venues,536 a number of these applications 
are in fact focused on keeping track of the movements of individuals.
LifeAware not only tracks you via your smartphone, it also allows you to con-
nect with other people running the application on their smartphones, showing you their 
current location.537 Loopt provides a service, whereby users can discover where their 
friends are located and even what they are doing via detailed, interactive maps on their 
535 see Honan, Mathew. “I Am Here: One Man’s Experiment With the Location-Aware Lifestyle” (Wired Magazine, 19 
January 2008), available at: http://www.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/magazine/17-02/lp_guineapig
536 see Biba, Erin. “Inside the GPS Revolution: 10 Applications That Make the Most of Location” (Wired Magazine, 19 
January 2008), available at:  http://www.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/magazine/17-02/lp_10coolapps?currentPage=3
537  LifeAware, available at: http://www.lifeaware.net/
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smartphones.538 Highlig.ht and Ban.jo alert users when their (Facebook) friends are 
nearby. Sonar539 also determines if any friends (or friends of friends) are close by based 
on a user’s Facebook networks. Sniff lets users instantly locate their friends anywhere in 
real-time using their smartphone. Glancee even lets you know when other people with 
similar interests are nearby. WhosHere also enables users to locate people in real-time 
that match their profile anywhere in the world.  Other location-based services include 
Foursquare and the location-based social network websites Whrrl540 and BrightKite.541 
Another smartphone application called Glympse enables users to broadcast where they 
are in real-time. GTX Corp. has developed an iPhone application called LOCiMe, 
which converts the smartphone into a 2-way GPS receiver, allowing users to locate 
their friends and transmit their location to others. 
Google has also launched Latitude, free software that enables people to always 
keep track of each other using their smartphones. Latitude could potentially be used 
as a tool, for example, by parents to keep tabs on their children’s’ location.  However, 
it can be used by anyone to find anyone else, assuming permission is given.542 On the 
other hand, Latitude, like Loopt, apparently does not keep a log of the real-time loca-
tion data. On the other hand, Latitude is set by default as a website with authorization 
to Gmail accounts. The latest addition to Google’s Latitude is the “Public Location 
Badge”, which enables users to share their location on their blog or website, but without 
the ability to limit who will be able to access this location information, since it will be 
publicly available to everyone with access to the Internet.  
Furthermore, Sprint launched the Business Mobility Framework,543 which allows 
employers to track employees, and other companies have also launched similar sys-
tems. It is already common for GPS to be used to track certain categories of employees 
in their vehicles, such as taxi drivers544 and contractors, whether they like it or not, and 
538 Loopt, available at: http://www.loopt.com/
539 Sonar, available at: http://sonar.me
540 Whrrl, available at: http://www.whrrl.com/
541 Brightkite, available at: http://brightkite.com/
542 Google Mobile, available at: http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/2009/02/locate-your-friends-in-real-time-with.html
543 Sprint, available at: http://www.sprint.com/business/products/products/bmf.html
544 see Karni, Annie. “GPS Concerns Taxi Drivers” (New York Sun, 5 January 2007), available at: http://www.nysun.com/
new-york/gps-concerns-taxi-drivers/46133/
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the law does little to prohibit this activity. RFID is also already increasingly being used 
to register the comings and goings of employees at their place of work.
However, unlike the LBS or location-aware applications available on smartphones, 
the location information generated by HIMs, at present, may be more difficult for im-
plantees to manage. For example, HIMs make it impossible to falsify one’s location and 
smartphones do not normally broadcast an individual’s identity, unlike RFID implants. 
Smartphones can simply be left at home or the LBS on smartphones can be deactivated. 
In addition, most smartphones, at least for now, normally do not constantly transmit 
their location. 
7.4 POTENTIAL SECURITY AND WELL-BEING BENEFITS 
The common good of public security and security of critical infrastructure, in addition 
to the other benefits, which HIMs could help to enhance, is perhaps why people might 
be open to their widespread deployment.  There are indeed various legitimate non-med-
ical uses of HIMs, ranging from identifying employees at secure facilities to locating a 
missing child and tracking criminals.  
The occurrence of child abductions every year in the US is disturbing,545 while 
the number of involuntary missing children is daunting.546 This has led some parents 
and RFID/GPS profiteers, such as VeriChip/ADS, to suggest implanting HIMs in chil-
dren. Indeed, if an abducted child had been implanted with a RFID implant, his or her 
545 On the other hand, Frank Furedi argues that the fear of parents over their child being kidnapped is not justified by the 
figures and that this fear is mostly hyped by the media (2006, p. 32). However, according to a 2002 report by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, in 1999 there were an estimated 33,000 nonfamily child abductions and 115 child abductions 
of the stereotypical type in the US. “A nonfamily abduction occurs when a nonfamily perpetrator takes a child by the 
use of physical force or threat of bodily harm or detains a child for at least 1 hour in an isolated place by the use of 
physical force or threat of bodily harm without lawful authority or parental permission; or when a child who is younger 
than 15 years old or is mentally incompetent, without lawful authority or parental permission, is taken or detained by or 
voluntarily accompanies a nonfamily perpetrator who conceals the child’s whereabouts, demands ransom, or expresses 
the intention to keep the child permanently.” “Stereotypical kidnappings are the particular type of nonfamily abduction 
that receives the most media attention and involves a stranger or slight acquaintance who detains the child overnight, 
transports the child at least 50 miles, holds the child for ransom, abducts the child with intent to keep the child perma-
nently, or kills the child. They represent an extremely small portion of all missing children”. see Sedlak, Andrea J., et al. 
“National Estimates of Missing Children: An Overview” in National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, 
and Thrownaway Children. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice, October 2002), pp. 4-7, available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/196465.pdf
546 However, nearly a third of all missing children have benign explanations, but account for many of the reported cases 
to the police. see Ibid., p. 6.
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location could be determined if the child comes near to a RFID reader linked to the 
Internet.547 However, RFID implants could be potentially destroyed using microwaves 
or obstructed by covering the implantee’s arm with metal. In extreme cases, the im-
plantee’s arm or hand could either be cut off or his or her captors could simply carve 
the HIM out.548 
On the other hand, if a child implanted with a GPS implant was kidnapped or 
abducted, his or her exact, real-time location could be provided without delay to the 
police and enable AMBER Alerts distributed via text messages based on the physical 
location of subscribers determined via their smartphone or their own HIM, inform-
ing people that a child of a certain description has gone missing in their vicinity or is 
located in their vicinity. This is especially important since experience has shown that 
an abducted child’s chance of survival dramatically decreases after the first day, and so 
the ability to locate the kidnapped child immediately is crucial. However, since nearly 
all reported cases of missing children have benign explanations,549 the ability of parents 
to immediately and easily locate their children through GPS via the Internet could, in 
theory, reduce avoidable emergency calls. Additionally, if a child implanted with a GPS 
implant were to become lost, for example, in a forest, a search and rescue team would 
effortlessly be able to locate him or her.
But, even the GPS signal received by GPS implants can be ‘spoofed’, as dem-
onstrated by researchers at Cornell University, who spent more than one year build-
ing equipment that can transmit fake GPS signals capable of fooling receivers.550 This 
would result in transmitting the wrong signal to the implant and inaccurate location 
information to the HIM service provider, rendering the GPS implant not very helpful 
to the implantee if he/she indeed needed to be located as a consequence of being kid-
napped or of becoming involuntary lost or missing. GPS signals can also be potentially 
‘jammed’ using commercially available jamming devices.
547 Solusat, the Mexican distributor of the VeriChip, is marketing the device as an emergency ID tag called VeriKid. see 
Scheeres, Julia. “Tracking Junior With a Microchip” (Wired News, 10 October 2003), available at: http://www.wired.
com/science/discoveries/news/2003/10/60771
548 Perhaps, even a child wearing something which states, “I have an implant” could have the similar deterrent effect that 
signs placed in homes stating “Beware of Dog” or other home security warning stickers may have.
549 see Sedlak, Andrea J., et al. “National Estimates of Missing Children: An Overview” in National Incidence Studies 
of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, October 2002), available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/196465.pdf
550 Ju, Anne. “Researchers raise uncomfortable questions by showing how GPS navigation devices can be duped” (Cornell 
Chronicle, 19 September 2008), available at: http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/Sept08/GPSSpoofing.aj.html
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HIMs can also provide a secure form of identification, but this is debatable (see 
Section 7.5 for further discussion). Unlike conventional forms of identification, such 
as ID cards or passports, HIMs cannot be lost or stolen. RFID implants, for example, 
could be used to verify the identity of a person before granting their entry into secure 
sites, such as nuclear facilities. RFID implants and the strategic deployment of fixed 
and mobile RFID readers can theoretically provide companies or government agencies 
with the ability to both unmistakably identify employees and track their comings and 
goings and other movements. This is especially important in restricted access areas, 
such as nuclear facilities and luggage sorting halls at airports, where physical access 
technology plays a crucial role. RFID implants in this context could play a significant 
role in national security.
HIMs can also provide an extra layer of banking security, whereby an ATM ma-
chine or a bank teller can authenticate the identity of a customer by using a RFID 
reader. As such, if the data stored on HIMs is secure, HIMs can help to prevent fraud 
and identify theft. Equally, PCs could come equipped with RFID readers which are then 
able to authenticate a user via his or her implant, adding yet another layer of security to 
Internet banking or e-commerce. Already, there are computers that come equipped with 
fingerprint biometric scanners and software. 
HIMs could also be used in ‘smart gun’ technology. In April 2004, ADS announced 
a partnership with gun manufacturer FN Manufacturing to produce a prototype of a gun 
that can only be fired if operated by their owner identified with a RFID tag implanted in 
his or her hand.551  The concept behind the prototype is that a RFID reader in the gun reads 
the HIM’s unique identification number and sends a digital signal unlocking the trigger 
so it can be fired.  If the person who handles the gun does not have a HIM or the RFID 
reader does not recognize a HIM’s unique ID number, then the gun will remain locked. 
Prisoners convicted of violent crimes could be implanted with RFID microchips 
to actively track their movements within prisons or with GPS implants to immediately 
locate them if they happen to escape prison. Parolees of violent crimes could also be 
implanted with RFID/GPS implants to either actively or passively track or monitor their 
movements and whereabouts, in order for a law enforcement agency to be immediately 
notified of an offenders’ growing proximity to the stored addresses of the victims of 
their previous crimes. 
HIMs implanted into convicted pedophiles/sex offenders could help to better keep 
track of their location or monitor their movements in real-time, regardless if they are 
551 see “No Chip in Arm, No Shot From Gun” (Associated Press, 14 April 2004), available at: http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2004/04/63066
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registered or not in compliance with Megan’s Law.552 An application called Offender 
Locator, for example, is available on the iPhone, which displays the names, addresses, 
faces and criminal records of registered sex offenders near the user’s location in real-
time via the iPhone’s GPS capability.
The location information generated by HIMs, let alone smartphones, will surely 
be useful to the continued development of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), 
which aims to combine or “fuse” information controlled by all levels of government, 
including information held by the private sector, for subsequent analysis in the fight 
against terrorism.553 In fact, the Executive Summary of the Fusion Center Guidelines, 
developed by the Department of Justice, recommends at minimum the attainment of ac-
cess to location information. Governmental access to location information maintained 
by the private sector is yet another example of the cooperation between the US Govern-
ment and the private sector in collecting and storing data within the emerging security-
industrial complex that Robert O’Harrow (2005) warns us about in No Place to Hide.
Finally, RFID technology, whereby tiny RFID microchips are covertly tagged (or 
even implanted) onto targeted individuals (terrorists), could also be potentially used to 
locate and track the targeted individuals for termination by way of UAVs. However, 
these RFID tags are far more advanced than the current RFID implants discussed here. 
These capabilities are reportedly being developed and demonstrated by the US military, 
as part of the GWOT, and are purportedly just one component of the classified “Clan-
destine Tagging, Tracking, and Locating” (CTTL) program.554 
7.5 SECURITY RISKS AND DRAWBACKS
While HIMs offer a number of security benefits, even if most are currently hypothetical, 
many of the security risks and drawbacks of HIMs, and the associated technology of 
RFID and GPS, are serious and real. The security benefits of HIMs could be compro-
mised, if these security risks and drawbacks are not dealt with accordingly.
552 Megan’s Law is the name given to the laws in the US requiring law enforcement authorities to make information avail-
able to the public regarding registered sex offenders. At the Federal level, the Sexual Offender (Jacob Wetterling) Act 
of 1994 requires convicted child sex offenders or pedophiles to notify local law enforcement agencies of any change of 
address after being released from prison. This information is publicly available.
553 The 9/11 Commission Act focused on establishing the Homeland Security Department’s fusion center program. 
554 see Weinberger, Sharon. “What is Woodward’s Secret Weapon in Iraq?” (Wired, 9 September 2008), available at: http://
www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/09/whats-the-milit/
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As the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) affirmed, “[a]ttempts to improve speed and efficiency 
through using RFID to track individuals raise important privacy and information secu-
rity issues”.555 The US GAO observed, with regards to RFID microchips embedded in 
passports (ePassports) and ID cards, in a report titled Information Security: Radio Fre-
quency Identification Technology in the Federal Government [hereinafter called “GAO 
RFID Report”], that “[w]ithout effective security controls, data on the tag can be read 
by any compliant reader; data transmitted through the air can be intercepted and read by 
unauthorized devices; and data stored in the databases can be accessed by unauthorized 
users”.556 Moreover, in a staff report on RFID, the FTC points out, “security concerns 
are likely to arise in connection with interoperable tags, which can be read by different 
enterprises sharing information associated with those tags”.557 
IT security experts have been warning about the security risks of RFID tags for 
some time now, and even have demonstrated those risks. ‘Ethical hacker’ Chris Paget 
has famously demonstrated using a low-cost RFID reader that he could surreptitiously 
read and clone the EPC Generation 2 RFID tags embedded in US passport cards (not 
to be confused with US ePassports) and Enhanced Driver’s Licenses. The Hacker’s 
Choice, a group of international experts on computer security, provided an emulator ap-
plet for copying ePassports and demonstrated their considerable security loopholes.558 
The VeriChip RFID implant is based on ISO 11784/85, the same international stan-
dard that regulates animal-implantable RFID microchips. However, ISO 11784/85 is 
not well-known for ensuring the security and integrity of the data held on the micro-
chips. Identity theft via RFID implants is especially a grave (data) security concern.559 
555 The Use of RFID for Human Identification: A Draft Report from DHS Emerging Applications and Technology Subcom-
mittee to the Full Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee, Version 1.0, p. 3, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_advcom_rpt_rfid_draft.pdf
 (This precise statement was removed from the final adopted version of the report)
556 Information Security: Radio Frequency Identification Technology in the Federal Government, The United States Gov-
ernment Accounting Office, May 2005, p. 19, available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05551.pdf
557 FTC staff report on RFID, p. 16.
558 see The Hacker’s Choice explanation, available at: http://freeworld.thc.org/thc-epassport/
559 Identity theft is already the most significant consumer complaint. For instance, during 2009, identity theft was by far 
the number 1 consumer complaint, accounting for 21% of all consumer complaints in the US. see the 2009 Consumer 
Sentinel Network Data Book, Federal Trade Commission, February 2010.
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As demonstrated by Annalee Newitz and Jonathan Westhues,560 VeriChip’s RFID im-
plant, which have no adequate security features, can be ‘cloned’.561 Directions on how 
to do so were made available on the Internet.562 Jonathan Westhues also explained on 
his website about another vulnerability of VeriChip’s implant using another type of 
attack called a “replay attack”, which refers to when an attacker replays an earlier 
transmitted unique identification number.563 Researchers from John Hopkins University 
and RSA Laboratories also demonstrated that the data on an RFID tag can be stolen by 
reading the tag’s signal, then ‘cracking’ the tag’s encryption key and creating a ‘clone’ 
of the RFID tag. The tag used even had a 40-bit encryption key.564 A group of doctors 
from the American Medical Informatics Association equally recognized that VeriChip’s 
RFID implant is vulnerable to attacks.565 Thus, RFID implants are currently vulnerable 
because the microchips can be cloned or spoofed, especially if the implant is based on 
inadequate standards. 
The hosts of Mythbusters, a popular TV show produced by the Discovery Chan-
nel, wanted to demonstrate in an episode segment “how hackable, how reliable, how 
trackable” are RFID microchips. VISA, MasterCard and American Express, which all 
have a certain interest in using RFID for contactless payment, apparently pressured the 
Discovery Channel to refrain from airing this episode.566 In the end, the show pursued a 
different topic during their episode on RFID. 
Furthermore, a group of computer experts from Vrije Universiteit demonstrated 
that it is also possible to transmit a virus or malware software onto RFID tags, causing 
560 Fulton, Nic. “High-tech cloning” (Reuters, 22 July 2006), available at: http://blogs.reuters.com/blog/2006/07/22/high-
tech-cloning/
561 The act of ‘cloning’ a RFID tag, also known as ‘spoofing’, is similar to the way credit cards can be copied, known as 
‘skimming’, whereby an account number and other data needed to clone a credit card is covertly copied. But, RFID tags 
do not need to be physically taken, in order to be copied.
562 see Jonathan Westhues’ website, available at: http://cq.cx/verichip.pl
563 Ibid.
564 see Bono, Steve., et al. Security analysis of a cryptographically-enabled RFID device, USENIX Security Symposium 
Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Volume 14, 2005.
565 see Halamka, John., et al. The Security Implications of VeriChip Cloning (Journal of the American Medical Informatics 
Association, Volume 13, Issue 6, 2006), pp. 601-607.
566 see Leyden, John. “Mythbusters RFID episode axed after ‘pressure’ from credit card firms”, The Register, 3 September 
2008, available at: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/09/03/mythbusters_gagged/
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unwanted actions to occur and jeopardizing the databases linked to the tags.567  Any 
RFID system, which transmits information over the Internet, is equally subject to cyber 
attacks, and many of the same security dilemmas of RFID microchips are, accordingly, 
relevant to RFID implants. Therefore, RFID implants and the creation of an ‘Internet 
of Persons’ could add a new dimension to cybercrime or hi-tech crime, now one of the 
leading criminal activities, whereby human bodies themselves, as opposed to just com-
puters, become the target of cybercriminals and vulnerable to a cyber attack. As a result, 
it is conceivable that HIMs and, therefore, human beings themselves, in a way, could be 
infected with a virus or malware software and that a computer virus pandemic caused 
by RFID implants is a possibility.568 Indeed, Mark Gasson, a scientist at the University 
of Reading, became the first human to be infected with a computer virus by infecting 
his RFID implant. Gasson is also currently researching the potential risks associated 
with other electronic devices implanted into humans, in addition to RFID implants, 
such as cochlear implants and pacemakers.569 Sandler et al. (2010) have equally raised 
their concerns over the security vulnerabilities of the software code of (wireless) im-
plantable medical devices.570
The RFID microchips, however, are not the only vulnerability of the system. The 
middleware/software and associated databases are also subject to security risks. The 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) cites, one of the potential risks associated with 
the VeriChip’s RFID implant, are “compromised information security”.571 Although an 
implant’s ID number is essentially just a number and basically inconsequential without 
additional access to the integrated database(s), there is the threat that a hacker or an 
unauthorized third party, other than the implantee or authorized data controller, could 
indeed gain access to the associated data. Therefore, another major security threat to 
the implantee is the potential for unauthorized access to his/her electronic health data, 
567 Rieback, M.R., et al. RFID Viruses and Worms (Department of Computer Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2006), 
available at: http://www.rfidvirus.org
568 Interestingly, I wrote about this possibility at least a year before the news broke on unique Mark Gasson’s research 
project. 
569 see Palmer, Maija. “Scientist ‘infects himself’ with computer virus”, (Financial Times, 26 May, 2010), available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2e2f5ea4-68b5-11df-96f1-00144feab49a.html
570 Equally, any software-controlled, wireless medical device could be vulnerable. 
 see, e.g., Darlene, Storm. “Feds pressed to protect wireless medical devices from hackers” (ComputerWorld, 11 April 
2012), available at: http://blogs.computerworld.com/20015/feds_pressed_to_protect_wireless_medical_devices_from_
hackers?source=rss_blogs
571 Federal Register, Volume 69, Number 237, 10 December 2004, pp. 71702-71704.
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location information or any other personal information associated with the HIM and 
stored on the multiple associated databases.
Other security concerns pertain to the contactless nature and non-direct line-of-
sight capability of RFID technology. As a result, RFID normally operates unnoticeably, 
making it difficult if not impossible for people to know when they are being identi-
fied and/or tracked.572 Without strong security standards, the information contained on 
HIMs can therefore be read without the implantee’s knowledge or consent, leaving 
RFID implantees considerably deprived of the ability to control the information others 
may know about them.
With regards to the security drawbacks of prospective GPS implants, relying too 
much on GPS to track and monitor the movements of parolees of violent crimes and 
sex offenders could result in providing a false sense of security for society as a whole, 
as some have pointed out.573 GPS tracking is certainly not a silver bullet for preventing 
crime, as was shown with the murder of 13-year-old Alycia Nipp by a sex offender who 
was under monitoring via a GPS bracelet.574 But, this particular sex offender was under 
passive monitoring, as opposed to active monitoring. Nevertheless, the sex offender 
or parolee could simply become unconcerned that he is being monitored and commit 
another crime regardless. 
Paradoxically, as easily as an implantee can be found by law enforcement agencies, 
if he or she were to be kidnapped or was to become lost, criminals could also intention-
ally locate an implantee. The availability of location information, for instance, could 
lead to a stalker somehow accessing that information, if adequate safeguards are not put 
in place. As the National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV) warns, RFID 
can be used by abusers to track or stalk their victims.575 The same is obviously true and 
even worse for GPS and just about any location-based service. 
572 see The Use of RFID for Human Identify Verification, Report No. 2006-02, Data Privacy & Integrity Advisory Commit-
tee, Adopted 6 December 2006, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_advcom_12-2006_
rpt_RFID.pdf
573 see McLaughlin, Eliott C. and Patrick Oppmann. “Sex offender kills teen while under GPS monitoring, police say” 
(CNN.com, 12 March 2009) available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/03/12/sex.offender.gps/index.html
574 Ibid.
575 see a paper prepared by the NNEDV, available at: http://www.aclunc.org/issues/technology/asset_upload_file364_7757.
pdf 
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7.6 SCOPE OF DEPLOYMENT 
7.6.1 Actual deployment in the US
The research that led to the development of RFID occurred decades ago, however, the 
innovation steps that have translated the research and development into various market-
able products and solutions, such as access control cards and identity cards, and ser-
vices for supply chain management, is relatively recent. HIMs are just one of the latest 
innovation concepts developed using RFID technology.
HIMs are not theoretical or science fiction, they are real and here. The concerns 
over the deployment of HIMs are not premature. The deployment of HIMs is indeed 
spreading, however, just not as much as some proponents may like.
VeriChip’s576 previously publicly stated goals of implanting millions of Americans 
with their implantable RFID tags, has so far not been successful. As of 17 March 2008, 
616 people have had VeriChip’s RFID implant implanted.577  But, this number is likely 
higher when including those who have been implanted outside the US. Moreover, this 
number does not include the number of people who have implanted an implantable 
RFID tag/microchip independent of VeriChip (see below for further explanation).
VeriChip had focused on targeting people with medical conditions, such as dia-
betes and Alzheimer’s disease or dementia, and senior citizens. As part of a study on 
the VeriMed Patient Identification System, VeriChip implanted their RFID implants in 
200 individuals suffering from Alzheimer’s disease and other forms of dementia, as 
well as their caregivers.578  A number of diabetics have also been implanted. In addi-
tion, VeriChip equipped a large bus as a mobile “chipping station”, also known as the 
576 In 2009, VeriChip Corporation changed its name to PositiveID Corporation after completing its acquisition of Steel 
Vault Corporation. Throughout this dissertation, however, the company will still be known as VeriChip to avoid confu-
sion. Nevertheless, the new company still markets their RFID implant (VeriChip), but has also now taken the “capabili-
ties of RFID implantable microchips beyond simple identification” to create the “GlucoChip”, which “combines an 
embedded bio-sensor system on an implanted RFID microchip”. “One potential application of this bio-sensor system is 
an implantable, bio-sensing RFID microchip that measures glucose levels in the body in real time”. Further information 
is available at: http://www.positiveidcorp.com/products_glucochip.html
577 see VeriChip Corp.’s 10-K Annual Report for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2007, p. 13, available at: http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1347022/000136231008001657/c72788e10vk.htm
578  see VeriChip Corp., Press Release, 22 February 2003, “VeriChip Corporation Partners with Alzheimer’s Commu-
nity Care to Conduct Study of VeriMed Patient Identification System”, available at: http://www.verichipcorp.com/
news/1172151146
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“chip mobile”.579 As of 31 December 2007, more than 200 hospitals and other medi-
cal facilities have adopted the VeriMed Patient Identification System protocol in their 
emergency rooms and have become a part of the network.580 
During the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief, US Disaster Mortuary Operational 
Response Team (DMORT) and health officials in Mississippi’s Harrison County im-
planted RFID implants, donated by VeriChip, to speed up or facilitate the process of 
identifying corpses.581 The system is now marketed as VeriTrace. In 2007, VeriChip 
reportedly managed to convince the State of Georgia to buy a package of the company’s 
VeriTrace system which consisted of 500 RFID implants, 5 customized Ricoh 500SE 
digital cameras capable of receiving both RFID and GPS data wirelessly and adding 
geographical identification metadata (or GPS coordinates) to the image (known as geo-
tagging), 5 VeriTrace Bluetooth handheld readers, and a web-enabled database. The 
system can identify, track and automatically record each implant’s ID number along 
with the GPS coordinates captured by the Ricoh cameras embedded in the images, 
which enables the precise cataloging of all data and images related to human remains 
after a disaster.582
In February 2006, RFID implants were also infamously implanted in employees at 
CityWatcher.com, a company in Cincinnati, Ohio, with the help of Six Sigma Security, 
to establish an access control system at the company’s secure data center.583 Although 
it was not exactly a condition of employment, it would have been difficult for some 
employees to work there meaningfully without a HIM. 
Nevertheless, the objective of privacy advocates to put VeriChip Corp. out of busi-
ness might in fact one day materialize. VeriChip Corp.’s implant business has yet to 
generate a viable profit for the company (as of 2009), while the company’s future is 
579 see VeriChip’s FAQ webpage, available at: http://www.verichipcorp.com/content/company/corporatefaq
580 see VeriChip Corp.’s 10-K Annual Report for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2007, p. 13, available at: http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1347022/000136231008001657/c72788e10vk.htm
581 see Kanellos, Michael. “RFID chips used to track dead after Katrina” (CNET News, 16 September 2005), available at: 
http://www.news.com/RFID-chips-used-to-track-dead-after-Katrina/2100-11390_3-5869708.html?tag=nw.2; 
 RFID implants were also implanted in the bodies of victims of the Tsunami in Thailand. see Meyer, H.J., et al. Implanta-
tion of radio frequency identification device (RFID) microchip in disaster victim identification (DVI). (Forensic Science 
International, Volume 157, Issue 2, 2006), pp. 168-71.
582 see VeriChip Corp., Press Release, available at: http://www.businesswire.com/news/google/20070509005155/en
583 see “US group implants electronic tags in workers” (Financial Times, 12 February 2006), available at: http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/ec414700-9bf4-11da-8baa-0000779e2340.html
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still in doubt. But, the potential privacy threat of HIMs will persist, regardless of the 
existence of VeriChip Corp. 
Although VeriChip Corp. is the only official or FDA approved provider of human 
implantable RFID tags, going through VeriChip Corp. is not the only way of getting a 
HIM implanted. VeriChip Corp. does not have a patent or monopoly on glass encap-
sulated RFID tags. There are a number of other glass encapsulated RFID tag manu-
facturers and distributors, such as Trovan, Destron Fearing (a subsidiary of Digital 
Angel584) and Philips. Only that these glass encapsulated RFID tags are not marketed, 
promoted or approved for human implantation, but rather for implantation in animals. 
Nonetheless, any small, glass encapsulated RFID tag could easily be bought and used 
for human implantation. 
This is indeed what is actually occurring. These so-called “guerrilla taggers” are 
the latest pioneers of a “brave new world”, having RFID implants implanted in the less 
conventional way. Amal Graafstra is one of the more well-known. He chose not to go 
through VeriChip because it uses a proprietary system and he also did not want to sign 
up for the global VeriChip subscriber registry. He has two RFID implants, one in each 
hand. His left hand contains a 3mm x 13mm EM4102 type glass RFID Ampoule tag 
that was implanted by a cosmetic surgeon. His right hand contains a 2mm x 12mm Phil-
ips HITAG 2048 S implant with crypto-security features and 255 bytes of read-write 
memory storage space. It was implanted by a family doctor using an Avid injector kit 
just like the ones used on pets. Graafstra’s development is an example of user-driven in-
novation (UDI). He has developed the means to access his front door, car door, and log 
into his computer using his RFID implants, and has written a book called RFID Toys, 
which details how to develop these and other RFID-enabled projects. Explanations, 
pictures and videos can be downloaded from his website.585 There are numerous other 
guerrilla taggers (perhaps hundreds) around the world who have also engaged in do-
it-yourself RFID implantation. Nancy Nisbet, a Canadian artist, is another well-known 
guerrilla tagger. Of course, they are all copycats of Kevin Warwick, the renown Profes-
sor of Cybernetics at the University of Reading and author of I Cyborg,586 who had a 
RFID chip implanted in 1998 (later removed) allowing him to automatically open doors 
584 The current President and CEO of Digital Angel Corporation, Joseph J. Grillo, has extensive experience in identification 
and tracking technology. He was formerly the President and CEO of the Global Technologies Division of Assa Abloy, 
and before that managed the Identification Technology business unit of Assa Abloy. Before that, he was President of 
HID.
585 see Amal Graafstra’s website, available at: http://amal.net/rfid.html  
586 Warwick, Kevin. I Cyborg (Century, 2002).
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and turn on lights, and four years later a micro electrode array surgically implanted into 
the median nerve fibers of his left arm allowing him to be connected to the Internet and 
control a robotic arm from afar.  
The development of the GPS implant, on the other hand, is still most likely in its 
near final stages of development and miniaturization, according to ADS, which ap-
parently had successfully tested a working prototype several years ago,587 consistent 
with the company’s previous public statements made repeatedly that it intended on 
developing a HIM with GPS tracking capabilities. ADS/Digital Angel, formerly the 
largest shareholder of VeriChip Corp., is the most notable company publicly involved 
in the R&D of GPS implants and acquired the rights to U.S. Patent No. 5,629,678 
in 1999.588 But, a GPS implant has yet to hit the consumer market, and ADS/Digital 
Angel has since removed this information from the Internet and altered its website 
and apparently its business plan.589 A patent application for a GPS implant for animals 
was filed with the U.S. Patent Office.590 The patent application cites the technology 
used in the GPS implant apparently developed by ADS/Digital Angel.591 Nonetheless, 
it is perhaps not incredibly farfetched to assume that national intelligence agencies or 
secret government-funded research projects are or were also working to develop GPS 
implants or may have already done so. Though, there is no publicly available proof to 
this statement. 
Nevertheless, the technology, however, is not really the obstacle to the widespread 
deployment of HIMs, whether RFID or GPS-based, and nor is the law for that matter. 
The difficulties VeriChip Corp. and ADS have faced, for instance, and the obstacles to the 
587 see Applied Digital Solutions Inc., Press Release, 13 May 2003, “Applied Digital Solutions Announces Working 
Prototype of Subdermal GPS Personal Location Device”, available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/
is_2003_May_13/ai_101629083
588 see Applied Digital Solutions, Inc., Press Release, 15 December 1999, “APPLIED DIGITAL SOLUTIONS ACQUIRES 
RIGHTS TO WORLD’S FIRST DIGITAL DEVICE - IMPLANTABLE IN HUMANS - WITH APPLICATIONS IN 
E-BUSINESS TO BUSINESS SECURITY, HEALTH CARE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE” (retrieved through Inter-
net Archive’s Wayback Machine), available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20000511001424/www.digitalangel.net/
pr_12_15_99.htm
589 This information, nonetheless, can also be retrieved through the use of Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. see, for 
instance, Digital Angel’s website dated July 11, 2000, available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20000711033923/http://
www.digitalangel.net/
590 see U.S. Patent Application No. 20090009388, filed by Carole A. Wangrud on 8 January 2009, which claims to be a 
system for monitoring and tracking the location of animals comprising of a GPS implant designed to be transplanted 
subcutaneously.
591 Ibid., para. 0025.
Part II 203
widespread deployment of HIMs pertain rather to the uneasiness of the public towards 
HIMs. As VeriChip Corp. notes in its 2007 10-K report, privacy concerns and negative 
media coverage are significant risks to its business, acknowledging that people may not 
be willing to be implanted and that physicians may be reluctant to recommend the proce-
dure.592 Other obstacles include the fact that VeriChip’s RFID implant costs around $200 
and is not covered by private healthcare insurance companies or by Medicare/Medicaid. 
The perception of the public towards HIMs and their effects might slowly change. 
We are already seeing the general acceptance of the deployment of numerous other 
tracking technologies, devices, applications and schemes, many of which have similar 
effects (see sections 7.3.6 and 7.7). HIMs are arguably just the next step.
7.6.2 Potential deployment 
The potential greater (or perhaps widespread) deployment of HIMs is arguably not 
farfetched. On the basis that the implantation of HIMs is cheap and quick and that the 
technology is already in place, the futurist Matthew Sollenberger predicted in 2007 
that “[t]here is at least a low probability of chipping becoming widespread within 10 
years”.593 Wolfgang Grulke, a former IBM executive, winner of the prestigious IBM 
Outstanding Innovation Award and Chairman of FutureWorld International, has equally 
predicted that HIMs will be common in a decade or so. As a report of the consortium of 
the SWAMI project594 agrees, 
[i]ndeed, it is not impossible to imagine a day when almost everyone will have 
implantable devices, not only for tracking their whereabouts, but also for moni-
toring their physiological condition. At the same time, there may be consider-
able social pressure, perhaps even legal requirements, for individuals to bear 
592 see VeriChip Corp.’s 10-K Annual Report for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2007, pp. 34-35, available at: http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1347022/000136231008001657/c72788e10vk.htm
593 Sollenberger, Matthew. “Chipping People” (Social Technologies, 12 November 2007), available at: http://www.so-
cialtechnologies.com/FileView.aspx?fileName=PressRelease11122007.pdf
594 The SWAMI (Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence) project aimed to provide an overview of the key social, 
legal and ethical implications of ambient intelligence and highlight the privacy threats.
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such implants as a security measure. One could further foresee such implants 
interacting with the “intelligence”-embedded, networked environment too.595
More recently, in a roadmap on current and future trends, Richard Watson included 
as a possibility that by 2025-2035 all babies born will be implanted with GPS and ID 
chips.596
Kevin Haggerty, an expert on surveillance and Professor of Sociology, wrote an 
article in the Toronto Star explaining evocatively how this could develop in the US.597 
Haggerty describes a scenario whereby the Government starts off implanting stigma-
tized groups, such as pedophiles or sex offenders and criminals, and then suggests 
that illegal aliens and soldiers be implanted, until eventually a majority of Americans 
become implanted for one reason or another. As Haggerty asserts, it is “[b]est to con-
template these dystopian potentials before we proffer the tender forearms of our sons 
and daughters”.598 
In other words, there is a likelihood that the mandatory implantation of HIMs for 
sex offenders and parolees of violent crimes for public security purposes will not cause 
most people to speak up in protest. Then, the mandatory implantation of HIMs in sol-
diers for their safety will likely not cause uproar from private citizens. Then, the man-
datory implantation of HIMs in employees at secure facilities, such as nuclear power 
plants, again for the sake of public security, will likely make sense to many people, 
especially those who do not work at these facilities. As the mandatory implantation pro-
gresses with additional justifications, more and more people will be implanted with a 
HIM until there are few categories of people leftover that do not meet the requirements 
for mandatory implantation.599 
595 Friedewald, M., R. Lindner & D. Wright (eds.), “Policy Options to Counteract Threats and Vulnerabilities in Am-
bient Intelligence”, SWAMI Deliverable D3: A report of the SWAMI consortium to the European Commission un-
der contract 006507, June 2006, (Draft version), p. 37, available at: http://www.isi.fhg.de/publ/downloads/isi06b24/
SWAMI_D3_030706.pdf
596 see Trends & Technology Timeline 2010+ , available at: http://nowandnext.com/PDF/trends_and_technology_time-
line_2010.pdf





Therefore, the famous words of Friedrich Gustav Emil Martin Niemöller may be 
relevant here for the potential deployment of HIMs.  In speeches and in a poem, refer-
ring to the Nazis, the German pastor and theologian famously states:
In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn’t speak up be-
cause I wasn’t a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn’t speak 
up because I wasn’t a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn’t 
speak up because I wasn’t a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics 
and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Catholic. Then they came for me – 
and by that time there was nobody left to speak up.
If RFID does become the primary method of identification, human beings will then 
commonly be electronically identified for verification purposes. For reasons of homeland 
security, RFID tags are already being embedded in US passports, enhanced state driver’s 
licenses and ID cards, and in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) cards. 
RFID implants are naturally the next step in electronic identification (eID). Dr. Richard 
Seelig, formerly VP for Medical Affairs at VeriChip, similarly advocated that RFID im-
plants “could function as a theft-proof, counterfeit-proof ID, like having a driver’s license 
embedded under your skin”.600 RFID implants could thus potentially serve as a significant 
component of a ‘universal identification system’, whether desirable or not. 
In line with these plans perhaps, VeriChip acquired Steel Vault Corporation, a 
credit reporting and identity security service provider, to form a combined company 
called PositiveID. As VeriChip (now known as PositiveID) noted, in its quarterly 10-Q 
report, “[b]eginning in the fourth quarter of 2009, with the acquisition of Steel Vault, 
the Company intends to pursue its strategy to offer identification tools and technologies 
for consumers and businesses”.601 Perhaps, the acquisition of Steel Vault could also be 
linked to the possible long-term intention of linking HIMs to financial information or 
credit card data.
RFID implants could also replace ordinary keys or RFID security clearance badg-
es/contactless cards as the means of opening doors or gaining access to secure areas. 
Already, for example, there was talk in Texas and in the US Congress on whether or not 
600 Grossman, Lev. “Meet the Chipsons” (Time Magazine, 11 March 2002), available at: http://www.time.com/time/maga-
zine/article/0,9171,1001972-2,00.html
601 Positive ID Corporation, Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2009.
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airport employees should be mandated to have a microchip implanted.602 Employees 
themselves could essentially become their entrance or security pass. Since RFID is 
already used immensely in the form of contactless cards for physical access control at 
places of business, replacing RFID cards with RFID implants will not require a great 
deal of further investment. However, in addition to keeping track of employees’ com-
ings and goings for time registration, HIMs (like RFID-embedded access cards) could 
also keep track of their movements within the workplace or office space and not just 
when entering or exiting the building.
There have been escalating calls for HIMs to be implanted into convicted pedo-
philes/sex offenders, violent criminals and even into HIV carriers. For example, in 
Oklahoma legislators debated whether to authorize HIMs in prisoners convicted of vio-
lent crimes.603 With the overcrowding of prisons in the US, particularly in California, 
and a nationwide prison population now at over two million and growing, GPS implants 
could be used to relieve overcrowded prisons and rising costs by freeing people accused 
of non-violent crimes or could even be used as an alternative to prison for certain non-
violent crimes. In the US, like in the UK, electronic monitoring in the form of GPS 
bracelets has been commonly introduced as a condition of being granted bail, an early 
release or parole. There are already tens of thousands of electronically tracked offend-
ers in the US.604 GPS bracelets are essentially just one step behind GPS implants and, 
according to Steve Aninye, President of Omnilink Systems, “the [US] justice system is 
interested in an implantable [GPS] device”.605 RFID implants could also be implanted 
into prisoners convicted of violent crimes and still in prison, which is equally just one 
step ahead of the RFID bracelets, developed by Alanco Technologies, being worn by 
thousands of inmates within several prisons across the US. 
HIMs could be implanted in immigrants when they enter the US and used to track 
their movements and to locate them once their work visa has expired. Scott R. Sil-
verman, the Chief Executive Officer of VeriChip, and largest shareholder, similarly 
proposed implanting HIMs in immigrants and guest workers during an interview on 
602 see a KENS 5 Eyewitness News broadcast video on 14 May 2007 available on YouTube, at: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Keo2TR1Zouw
603 Talley, Tim. “House rejects microchip implants for violent criminals” (Associated Press, 25 May 2007), available at: 
http://www.examiner-enterprise.com/articles/2007/05/24/news/state/news440.txt
604 see Hunt, V. Daniel., Albert Puglia, and Mike Puglia. RFID-A Guideline to Radio Frequency Identification (Wiley, 
2007), p. 81. 
605 Cozzens, Tracy. “Implant Issues More than Skin Deep” (GPS World, 1 June 2006), available at: http://uc.gpsworld.com/
gpsuc/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=364980
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“Fox & Friends”, a program on FoxNews, adding that “We [VeriChip] have talked 
to many people in Washington about using it....”606 HIMs could also be used to track 
border crossings of US citizens.  Already, RFID smart cards have been tested at the US-
Mexico border and Washington State and the DHS are testing licenses with embedded 
RFID microchips.
RFID implants could be implanted in soldiers as a means of identifying their corps-
es, while GPS implants could monitor individual troop movements in a battlefield. 
GPS, after all, was apparently developed in the first place to monitor the movements of 
troops and equipment. VeriChip has already lobbied the Pentagon to replace military 
dog tags with HIMs,607 and the RFID bracelets, developed by Precision Dynamics Cor-
poration and Texas Instruments, have been deployed in Iraq to track the location and 
status of wounded soldiers.608 In addition, police officers could also be required to have 
a RFID implant implanted in order to deploy ‘smart guns’, or a GPS implant in order to 
instantly determine the closest officer to dispatch to a crime scene. 
HIMs could even be implanted in children in order to tackle poor attendance or tar-
diness and record the entering and exiting on school buses. As a pre-requisite to fully-
fledged GPS implants, school buses could instead be fitted with GPS devices to enable 
parents to know the bus’s current location by logging onto a secure website. There have 
already been calls for mandating that children wear RFID tags or to attach them to their 
school bags609 and pilot programs to test the effectiveness of such schemes.610  
There is even a potentially strong market for HIMs in sports, based on their ca-
pability for tracking the performance of athletes. Already, RFID tags were used in the 
2007 Boston Marathon.611 
606 “Verichip Injects Itself Into Immigration Debate” (Spy Chips, 18 May 2006), available at: http://www.spychips.com/
press-releases/verichip-immigration.html
607 see Francis, David and Myers, Bill. “Company trying to get under soldiers’ skin” (The Examiner, 21 August 2006), 
available at: http://www.examiner.com/a-232630~Company_trying_to_get_under_soldiers__skin.html      
608 Precision Dynamics Corp., Press Release, 20 May 2003, available at: http://www.pdcorp.com/en-us/company/pr2003-
pdc-rfid-navy-use.html 
609 Leff, L. “Students ordered to wear tracking tags” (Associated Press, 9 February 2005), available at: http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/6942751/ 
610 Gutierrez, David. “U.S. School District to Begin Microchipping Students” (Natural News, 16 June 2008), available at: 
http://www.naturalnews.com/023445.html
611  see O’Connor, Fred. “RFID helps the Boston Marathon run” (PC World, 9 April 2007), available at: http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/09/AR2007040901011.html
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The increase in web-based digital or electronic medical/health records or ‘health 
IT’, as part of the greater movement towards e-Health, may coincide with the increased 
implantation of HIMs, particularly if Medicare or private insurance companies cover 
the costs (Spivey, 2009). During the beginning of 2009, US President Barack Obama 
announced his plan to computerize the entire country’s health records within five 
years.612 Companies with a vested interest in the technology, such as Philips, and lobby-
ing organizations, such as the Center for Health Transformation, are promoting RFID 
technology as the main component of electronic health records (EHR). RFID technol-
ogy has already been significantly deployed within the healthcare sector in the US 
(Cannataci, 2011).
This would be consistent with the strong potential for RFID implants to become a 
carrier of the Unique Health Identifier (UHID), as Spivey (2009) asserts.613 The UHID is 
a number composed of 28 numeric digits, which will eventually serve to facilitate the na-
tionwide electronic availability of personally identifiable health/medical information.614 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated the billions of 
dollars needed to bring about the widespread digitization of medical records.615 The bill 
also extensively provides the necessary provisions for EHRs and sets a goal for the cre-
ation and utilization of an EHR for each US citizen by 2014,616 i.e. within five years, as 
President Obama earlier announced. Of course, (web-based) EHRs present additional 
data security and serious privacy concerns for personal health data that this dissertation 
will not go into.
RFID implants and associated web-based databases, such as those of VeriChip, fit 
in perfectly with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s definition of “health 
information technology” as the “hardware, software, integrated technologies or related 
612 see Goldman, David. “Obama’s big idea: Digital health records” (CNN, 12 January, 2009), available at: http://money.
cnn.com/2009/01/12/technology/stimulus_health_care/index.htm
613 see Spivey, Crystal. Breathing New Life Into HIPAA’s UHID – Is The FDA’s Green Light To The VeriChip™ The Prince 
Charming Sleeping Beauty Has Been Waiting For? (9 DePaul Journal of Health Care Law, 2005-06), pp. 1317-1342.
614 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Public Law 104-191.
 However, as widely recognized among privacy law experts, the problem is that the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act 1996 (HIPAA), the federal medical privacy bill, does not cover web-based medical records.
615 Incorporating new and unrelated legislation into spending bills is not unheard of. For example, the Real ID Act 2005 
was astonishingly attached to a spending bill. See Division B of H.R.1268, An act making Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
2005.
616  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Sec. 3001, (3)(A)(ii).
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licenses, intellectual property, upgrades, or packaged solutions sold as services that 
are designed for or support the use by healthcare entities or patients for the electronic 
creation, maintenance, access, or exchange of health information”.617 
Already, manufacturers of implantable medical devices sold in the US are required 
by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 to ensure that im-
plantable medical devices are identifiable and trackable via a ‘unique device identifier’ 
(UDI). RFID technology is increasingly being used to electronically track medical de-
vices. An implantable medical device with an embedded RFID microchip could poten-
tially have similar identification and tracking capabilities to RFID implants.
Perhaps, the next step would be for the US Government to request health insurance 
providers to cover the costs of the RFID implant procedure. Medicare could also even-
tually cover the costs. In 2008, the American Medical Directors Association (AMDA) 
initiated a clinical study to evaluate whether VeriChip’s VeriMed Patient Identification 
System can improve patient outcomes. The study is meant to involve up to 10 facilities 
and 100 participants. Upon completion of the study, VeriChip intends to use the results 
to seek reimbursement approval from insurance companies and the Centers for Medi-
care & Medicaid Services.618 
A hospital in New Jersey (US) and the major health insurance provider Horizon 
Blue Cross Blue Shield began recruiting volunteers in 2006 to have a RFID implant 
implanted in a two-year trial to determine if the implants reduce healthcare costs.619 
Already, US President Obama has advocated that EHRs could create jobs and reduce 
healthcare costs in the long-term. As a result, there is perhaps a possibility that RFID 
implants could become more common, if they are viewed as a means of reducing 
healthcare costs in conjunction with EHRs. 
Moreover, VeriChip, the exclusive provider of RFID implants authorized for hu-
man implantation, announced that it has obtained exclusive licenses for two additional 
patents, which will help the company to develop implantable virus detection systems 
in humans. The patents, held by VeriChip partner Receptors LLC, relate to biosensors 
that can detect the H1N1 virus and other viruses, and biological threats. The technology 
will reportedly combine with VeriChip’s RFID implant technology to develop a ‘triage 
detection system’. 
617 Ibid., Sec. 3000 (5).
618 see VeriChip Corp., Press Release, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS137195+08-Jan-
2008+BW20080108
619  see M.L. Baker. “Insurers Study Implanting RFID Chips in Patients”, eWeek.com, 19 July 2006, available at: http://
www.eweek.com/c/a/Health-Care-IT/Insurers-Study-Implanting-RFID-Chips-in-Patients/
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While the ongoing economic crisis and existing health legislation is ripe for RFID 
implants, even global warming (or climate change), can be used as an excuse to track 
the movements of people and generate a carbon footprint report or ‘green report card’ 
for each and every person.620 This can already be done with GPS-equipped smartphones 
using the application Ecorio, which uses GPS to track every movement and uses the 
data to generate a personalized carbon footprint report,621 or via GPS devices in vehicles 
to levy a road tax by kilometer/mile, which was proposed in the Netherlands. Although 
this report would be incomplete, governments could one day perhaps use this informa-
tion to tax each person according to the results of their report or to monitor the use of 
their personal ‘carbon allowance’.622 
For now, HIMs are implanted voluntarily. Under the National Animal Identification 
System (NAIS), RFID ear tags or injectable RFID tags are being used to identify and 
track millions of livestock animals to enable the US Government to respond quickly 
to disease. The animals are each identified by a 15-digit Animal Identification Number 
(AIN). Some critics of the plan have already voiced their concerns that animals could 
be the forerunner of a similar system for humans.623 There is, however, no evidence that 
there are plans for HIMs to be mandated for individuals.
On the other hand, as Ramesh (1997) argues, “[a] national identification system 
via microchip implants could be achieved in two stages. Upon introduction as a vol-
untary system, the microchip implantation will appear to be palatable. After there is a 
familiarity with the procedure and knowledge of its benefits, implantation would be 
mandatory”.624 Indeed, history has demonstrated that something voluntary today can 
become mandatory tomorrow, or at least indirectly mandatory, since its possession 
could later become necessary to carry out ordinary daily activities. This is already the 
case today with ID cards in the US, and the same may potentially also prove true for 
620 see Ecorio, available at: http://www.ecorio.org
621 This concept is gaining traction. During the post-i2010 Public Hearing on “Priorities for a new strategy for European 
Information Society” held 23 September 2009 in Brussels, a representative from the mobile phone carrier Orange ex-
pressed interest in the potential of mobile phones to be used to collect data.
622 The idea for personal ‘carbon allowances’ for individuals was proposed by the Chairman of the UK’s Environment 
Agency, Lord Smith.
623 see Gumpert, David E. “Animal Tags for People?” (Business Week, 11 January 2007), available at: http://www.
businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/jan2007/sb20070111_186325.htm?chan=smallbiz_smallbiz+index+page_
today’s+top+stories 
624  Ramesh, Elaine M. Time Enough? Consequences of Human Microchip Implantation, Franklin Pierce Law Center 
(1997), available at: http://www.fplc.edu/risk/vol8/fall/ramesh.htm.
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HIMs. Moreover, once the coerced implantation of HIMs in parolees and in convicted 
pedophiles or other convicted criminals is put into effect and the public accepts the po-
tential security benefits, other coerced implantations could similarly materialize. 
However, HIMs do not necessarily have to be something that governments enforce 
upon us. Mandatory implantation may not be required as consumers begin to want 
HIMs anyhow or are enticed to want one on the basis of security, personal safety, con-
sumer and medical benefits. The ongoing proliferation of tracking technologies and of 
LBS on smartphones implies that consumers already accept location-aware applica-
tions and the amenities that location-awareness provides. If many people are already 
willingly, some quite enthusiastically, to broadcast their location, it is likely that these 
people will begin to accept or even desire RFID or GPS implants, particularly as digital 
inclusion (or e-Inclusion) increasingly becomes a means of social inclusion, or as digi-
tal exclusion (e-Exclusion) more and more translates into social exclusion.
HIMs could even become a status symbol or made to look fashionable, with the 
increasing array of hypothetical scenarios depicted in popular culture to familiarize so-
ciety with HIMs and to condition or program people’s acceptance through mainstream 
media and commercials.625 As Aarts and de Ruyter (2009) question “how long will it 
be before we accept the implantation of chips for non-medical reasons?” Further add-
ing, “[a]ttitudes to the body are already changing. Body piercing, tattoos and cosmetic 
surgery are much more common than a generation ago” (2009, p. 12).
Still, fear, above all else, and not the lure of fashion or the satisfaction of a desire, 
nor the struggle for efficiency or progress, will likely be the main catalyst for HIMs. 
Just like other tragic disasters and crises have led to negative effects on freedom and 
privacy, the threat of terrorism, the ever-increasing crime rate and apparently worsen-
ing global environmental crisis could lead to further tracking of people’s movements. 
625 There are numerous examples in mainstream media. The relevant clips that depict HIMs can be found on YouTube. In 
the film, Casino Royal (2006), the British spy James Bond 007, and in the film, Demolition Man, the character John 
Spartan are both implanted with a microchip in order to track their movements. In the television series Heroes (Series 3, 
Episode 14), one of the characters is even implanted with a “GPS implant”. In the BBC drama The Last Enemy (2008), 
a plot to implant everyone with a RFID tag is revealed. RFID implants are remarkably described as an “ID that can’t be 
lost, forged or stolen…Its content and function can be adapted to suit my needs. It can be my credit card. It can be door 
key, my car keys. I’ll never lose them again. Eventually it will become universal. Starting at school age, a tag for life”. 
In CSI Miami (episode 305), a murdered teenager’s VeriChip is removed and scanned to reveal her associated informa-
tion on a computer screen, which later helps in the investigation. In Mission: Impossible 2 (2000) a transponder chip is 
implanted into a main character. More recently, in the film Hunger Games, children are implanted with microchips to 
track their movements. In an IBM televised commercial several years ago on e-Business of the future, a supermarket 
shopper is shown stuffing RFID-tagged items under his coat and then automatically paying for the items by simply 
walking through a RFID gateway and without using a credit/debit card or mobile phone, which likely implies he had 
a RFID implant.
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Fear of global warming, fear of a terrorist attack, fear of being kidnapped or murdered 
and the fear of one’s child either being kidnapped or sexually offended are just a few 
examples. HIMs could slowly just become as ordinary as having an ID number or an 
RFID-embedded ID card or wearing clothing or carrying items with embedded RFID 
tags or carrying around GPS-equipped smartphones – all of which exist today.
Nonetheless, any widespread deployment and realization of the diverse practical 
applications of RFID will require not just interoperability and the necessary infrastruc-
ture, but also additional available space in the radio spectrum for the transmission of 
data over longer distances. This could be accommodated for through the complete swi-
tchover from analog to digital TV, which is occurring in the US and gradually in the EU.
7.6.3 Actual and potential international deployment
Kevin Haggerty also foresees that the escalation of HIMs will start in countries at the 
periphery of the Western world.626 Remarkably, his prediction is already gaining traction. 
In the Indonesian province of Papua, it was reported that carriers of HIV are to be 
implanted with microchips under a bill backed by the provincial parliament to track 
and punish anyone who deliberately infects others.627 In Mexico, the country’s Attorney 
General (former), Rafael Macedo, and members of his staff were reportedly implanted 
with RFID implants as a means of controlling access to a sensitive records room. Other 
people in Mexico are getting HIMs implanted, like the one developed by Xega, to 
counter the threat of being kidnapped. In addition, the Congressional Record shows that 
Colombian President Álvaro Uribe told (former) US Senator Arlen Specter (D-Pa) “he 
would consider having Colombian workers have microchips implanted into their bod-
ies before they are permitted to enter the United States to work on a seasonal basis”.628
HIMs are also slowly spreading beyond America’s borders into the Western world. 
In Barcelona, Spain and in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, the Baja Beach nightclubs in-
famously began to implant HIMs in those wanting to jump entrance lines, open doors 
to VIP lounges and pay for drinks without cash or debit/credit cards. However, much 
of this is just a publicity stunt of the nightclub’s owner. The parents of Danielle Duval, 
626 Haggerty, Kevin. “One generation is all they need” (The Star, 10 December 2006) available at: http://www.thestar.com/
sciencetech/article/136744
627 see “Indonesian AIDS patients face microchip monitoring” (Associated Press, 24 November 2008), available at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/24/indonesia-aids
628 Trip to Colombia, Peru, Brazil and Dominican Republic, U.S. Senate, 25 April 2006, p. S3495.
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an 11 year-old girl, reportedly took the extraordinary step of having their daughter im-
planted with a transponder microchip so that her movements could be traced if she were 
to be abducted. They decided to do so after the abduction and murder of the schoolgirls 
Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman.629 The issue came up again in the wake of the dis-
appearance of the British child Madeleine McCann in Portugal. The Times published 
an article asking whether children should be implanted.630 Even more controversial, a 
leaked British policy review document revealed that the British Government even con-
sidered implanting RFID implants in the mentally ill.631 
7.7 ALTERNATIVES TO HIMs
There are indeed alternative systems and/or devices to RFID and GPS implants on the 
market or in development that can fulfill, to a certain degree, the same goals. 
Direct competition for VeriChip’s human-implantable RFID tags for medical pur-
poses include the non-RFID, low-tech alternative of MedicAlert’s jewelry bracelets 
that are engraved with the wearer’s primary medical conditions and an ID number. 
However, MedicAlert’s bracelet is not linked to hospital databases and can easily be 
removed. Another potential alternative is “medical tattoos”, which can include basic 
information on a person’s chronic diseases or allergies. Other non-RFID alternatives for 
medical purposes include: smart chip cards, which can be used to both access the medi-
cal history of patients at hospitals and store medical history; the CARE Memory Band, 
which can be connected to a computer by medical personnel to access medical data 
stored on the wrist bracelet; and simple bar-code wristbands. However, since RFID is a 
type of ‘over-the-air’ technology it does not require direct line-of-sight and can be read 
through non-metallic materials, unlike bar codes. RFID microchips also have a larger 
memory storage capacity than bar codes.  The advantages of RFID tags have led to the 
belief that they will eventually replace bar codes in general, but this has yet to happen.
SmartWear Technologies produces wearable RFID devices that can equally be used 
to provide medical information to paramedics.  Other RFID alternatives for medical 
629 Wilson, Jamie. “Girl to get tracker implant to ease parents’ fears” (The Guardian, 3 September), available at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/sep/03/schools.childprotection2
630 Midgley, Carol. “Would an implanted chip help to keep my child safe?” (Times Online, 15 May 2007), available at: 
http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/families/article1788169.ece
631 Jones, George. “Microchips for mentally ill planned in shake-up” (The Telegraph, 18 January 2007), available at: http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1539716/Microchips-for-mentally-ill-planned-in-shake-up.html
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purposes include Precision Dynamics Corp.’s Smart Band RFID wristbands and Gen-
Tag’s RFID wireless skin patches, which can be used to identify patients and capture 
and verify data before delivering medication or conducting surgery. However, both the 
Smart Band and GenTag’s RFID wireless skin patches are designed for use after being 
admitted within hospitals and are disposable. The Smart Band is also marketed for use 
as a means of cashless purchases, keyless hotel entry and access control, while GenTag 
also markets its RFID wireless skin patches for use in entrance control, child ID and 
location tracking at amusement parks and for cashless payment transactions at hotels 
and casinos. Ident Technologies has developed a system named Skinplex®, which is 
composed of small signal generators worn closely on the body that transmit coded data 
to one or more receivers to identify and/or track the person concerned. 
The TSI PRISM system, developed by Alanco Technologies, Inc. for use in cor-
rectional facilities, uses a RFID-enabled wrist bracelet to monitor the location of prison 
inmates in real-time.632 To track children’s movements while in the park, Legoland in 
Denmark uses a combination of RFID tags in bracelets and Wi-Fi.633 
Once again, instead of implanting RFID microchips into the human body for iden-
tification purposes, the microchips can instead be embedded in ID cards or state driver’s 
licenses, a method, which is currently being piloted in the US. 
Alternatives to GPS implants, include GPS bracelets developed by Pro Tech or the 
GPS bracelets developed by Omnilink Systems that are combined with cellular technol-
ogy. GPS bracelets are already being attached to parolees and sex offenders to create 
“mobile exclusion zones”.634   RemoteMDx Inc. delivers a similar monitoring system 
to keep track of offenders no matter where they may be. Also on the market include 
Fujitsu’s Tag Locator V2, which uses GPS to detect its location and RFID to send that 
data along with its unique ID number to a reader, and Lego-James, a multi-faceted 
bracelet that allows parents to track the location of their children through 3G technol-
ogy and the use of a GPS receiver. BlackBox GPS’ personal locators, which resemble 
a pager, allows users to know where the wearer is located at all times anywhere in the 
world.635 TRACKiT is a similar GPS device and service that locates the object or person 
632 TSI Prism, at http://www.tsiprism.com; see Sofge, Erik. “High-Tech Lockup: Inside 4 Next-Gen Prison Security Sys-
tems” (PopularMechanics, 12 February 2008), available at: http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_
law/4248844.html?page=2
633 Collins, Jonathan. “Lost and Found in Legoland” (RFID Journal, 28 April 2004), available at: http://www.rfidjournal.
com/article/view/921/1/1
634 Omnilink, at http://www.omnilinksystems.com/solutions_domestic_violence_monitoring.php
635 BlackBox GPS, available at: http://www.blackboxgps.com/cms/
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the device is attached to and enables the user(s) to view the location on the Internet and 
receive sends text messages or emails if the tracked object or person ventures outside 
an invisible, customizable perimeter, also known as a ‘geo-fence’. XACT|TRAX and 
the Little Buddy Child Tracker are other similar devices. Lok8u produces Num8, an 
inexpensive device, which resembles a wristwatch, that can be used by parents to lo-
cate and track their children at all times via the Internet and via text messages on a cell 
phone. GTX Corp. has developed a “GPS smart shoe”, which has an embedded GPS 
chip and enables the wearer to view their location data in real-time on a Google map 
via a smartphone or PDA. Other less popular or less likely alternatives to GPS implants 
include wearable computers such as Eurotech’s Zypad WL 1000, which is a wrist-worn 
touch screen computer with GPS and Wi-Fi connectivity.
Alternatives for implantable military dog tags include the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency’s (DARPA)  personal radio beacons, which are worn on the 
soldier’s uniform and can provide location data without the use of GPS, and Thales’ 
MILTRAK, which is a device similar to a cell phone and also capable of transmitting 
and receiving location data. 
However, none of these alternatives entirely possess the benefits and attributes of 
a HIM. The fact that HIMs essentially cannot be easily lost, removed or tampered with 
is what might make them more appealing to parents, corporations, the medical industry 
and governments. HIMs are everlasting, convenient and cannot be forgotten. For con-
sumers, HIMs could be appealing because they are not uncomfortable to wear. 
7.8 LAWS, CODES, DECISIONS AND OTHER LEGAL/POLICY   
  INSTRUMENTS OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE IN THE US
7.8.1 Constitutionally protected rights
The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, which protects individuals from “un-
reasonable searches and seizures”, conducted by the US Government and serves as the 
basis of the right to privacy in the US, reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.
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The Fourth Amendment is invoked when the US Government infringes upon a 
person’s ‘reasonable expectation’ of privacy. 
Also relevant is the Fifth Amendment, which states that no individual “shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”.  In other words, in-
dividuals cannot forcibly incriminate themselves. However, only written or spoken 
words are considered self-incriminating and covered by the Fifth Amendment, while 
elements, such as blood samples or DNA samples, are not. In Schmerber v. California, 
for example, a case concerning whether or not blood forcibly withdrawn from Armando 
Schmerber while in hospital recovering from a traffic accident could be used to prove 
intoxication, the US Supreme Court affirmed, “blood test evidence, although an in-
criminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner’s testimony nor evidence 
relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible 
on privilege grounds”.636 
7.8.2 Federal statutory laws
Telecommunication companies have the capacity to collect vast amounts of informa-
tion on their customers when they use a telecommunication service. The Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 (hereinafter called the “Telecom Act”) terms this information Cus-
tomer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) and regulates when and how telecom 
companies may use and disclose CPNI to third parties.637   
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted formal rules, later codi-
fied in Federal regulations, requiring cell phones to be location-capable and wireless 
service providers to develop the capability for providing precise location information of 
wireless emergency callers, known as Enhanced 911 (E911) capabilities.638
Accordingly, the definition of CPNI639 was amended by the Wireless Communica-
tions and Public Safety Act of 1999640 to include “location” and subsection (f) was 
added to Section 222 of Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Part I, explicitly 
636 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
637 see Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Part I, § 222.
638 see Title 47 C.F.R. Ch. I, § 20.18.
639 see Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Part I, § 222 (h)(1)(A).
640 Public Law 106-81, 113 Stat. 1286 (1999).
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mandating, with certain exceptions, that “express prior authorization of the customer” 
is required to disclose, use or access call location information.641 
The growing use of mobile phones, or other wireless/digital communication tech-
nologies, also brought about the need for new legislation to ensure that the use of pen 
registers and trap and trace devices by law enforcement agencies is still effective, in 
order to preserve their ability to intercept communications and obtain “call-identify-
ing information”. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
(CALEA)642 provides that telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecom-
munications equipment ensure their equipment, facilities, and services are capable of 
being used by law enforcement for surveillance purposes.643 However, as CALEA spec-
ifies, “call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose 
the physical location of the subscriber” when “acquired solely pursuant to the authority 
for pen registers and trap and trace devices”.644
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986 (ECPA) regulates government 
access to private/stored electronic communications.645  Government entities require a 
court order for access, which may be issued if the government entity “offers specific 
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the con-
tents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, 
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”.646
With regards to the laws specifically relevant to RFID implants, the US Congress is 
paving the way forward for a national ID card embedded with an RFID microchip. The 
REAL ID Act of 2005 mandates that all state driver’s licenses and ID cards conform 
to certain standards.647 While ID cards are voluntary in the US, they are nonetheless 
required for a wide variety of everyday purposes. Although the REAL ID Act does not 
specifically require that driver’s licenses contain RFID, the REAL ID Act mandates that 
641 Exceptions to this rule include, for example, when there is a need to provide the location information of the caller to 
a public safety answering point, emergency medical service provider, public safety, fire service, or law enforcement 
official, etc., in order to respond to the caller’s emergency. see Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Part I, § 222(d)
(4)(A).
642 Public Law No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279. 
643 Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 9, Subchapter I, § 1002 (a).
644 Ibid., § 1002 (2) (B).
645 Public Law No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
646 Title 18 U.S.C Part I, Chapter 121 § 2703(d).
647 see Real ID Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-13, § 201-207.
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all state driver’s licenses and ID cards include machine-readable technology, among 
other requirements, and gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to do 
so.648 RFID is a type of machine-readable technology and, as already mentioned, RFID 
microchips are indeed being embedded in state driver’s licenses and in US passports.649 
However, few US states have implemented the REAL ID Act and even a number of US 
states have passed legislation rejecting the REAL ID Act. Since then, S. 1261, titled 
“Providing for Additional Security in States’ Identification Act of 2009” or the “Pass 
ID Act”, which is similar to the REAL ID Act, was proposed in the US Senate, possibly 
to replace the failed attempt by the REAL ID Act. 
The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 criminalizes the inten-
tional transfer, possession or use, without lawful authority, a “means of identification” of 
another person. A means of identification may include, in addition to any name, social 
security number, etc., a unique electronic identification number.650 Therefore, regardless 
whether or not a RFID implant is linked to personally identifiable information, the unique 
ID number of a RFID implant alone should qualify as personal identifiable information 
under US statutory law, since it legally constitutes a means of identification.
The printout of location information, generated by both GPS and RFID implants, 
could be considered originals and thus admissible as evidence in a court of law. As the 
Federal Rules of Legal Evidence confirms:
An “original” of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If 
data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output 
readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an “original”.651
Once again, however, wrongfully obtained evidence, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, may be excluded from criminal proceedings in a court of law,652 known as 
the “exclusionary rule”. As Rule 402 states: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other 
648 Ibid. § 205(a).
649 RFID tags are also being embedded in passports around the world, notably in EU Member States, to comply with US 
demands and international standards. 
650 see Public Law No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007, codified at Title 18, U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 47, § 1028 (d)(7).
651 Federal Rules of Legal Evidence, Article X, Rule 1001(3). 
652 see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissible.
7.8.3 Tort law
Tort law is relevant for the private use of the location information generated by HIMs. 
There are four invasion of privacy torts, of which one or more are recognized by courts 
in practically all states in the US, albeit to some extent and sometimes tentatively (Mc-
Clurg, 1995). The Restatement (Second) of Torts reads:
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for 
the resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in 652B; or 
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in 652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in 652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the 
public, as stated in 652E.653
The most potentially relevant of the four torts for the unauthorized collection and 
disclosure of location information is the tort of “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclu-
sion of another” (McClurg, 1995), which is defined as:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to 
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person.654
7.8.4 Case law
There is judicial precedent in the US regarding the use of tracking (or location-detect-
ing) devices by law enforcement agencies, which is relevant to the tracking capabilities 
of both GPS and RFID implants.
653 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652A (1977).
654 Ibid., § 652B.
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In United States v. Knotts, law enforcement agents placed a RF tracking device on 
a chloroform bottle that one of the defendants purchased and then followed him to what 
was later suspected to be a drug laboratory. The US Supreme Court held that the driver 
in his automobile had “no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another” while in public.655 The US Supreme Court also held:
The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, 
but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of [Darryl] Petschen’s 
automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory fac-
ulties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and 
technology afforded them in this case.656
Around a year later, in United States v. Karo, the US Supreme Court held that no 
showing of evidence or probable cause is required to observe information conveyed in 
areas observable to the public.657 Similarly, in Oliver v. United States, the US Supreme 
Court also held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in ‘open fields’.658 
Nevertheless, while United States v. Karo reaffirmed that an individual has no reason-
able expectation of privacy of his movements in public, the US Supreme Court recog-
nized that Fourth Amendment protections are applicable when the RF device moves out 
of a public place and into a private space.659 
Moreover, in Katz v. United States, the US Supreme Court earlier on held that 
whatever a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the pub-
lic, may be constitutionally protected”660 (emphasis added), as long as the person con-
cerned exhibits first “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”.661 This is 
commonly known as the Katz test.
655 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
656 Ibid., at 282.
657 see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
658 see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
659 see 468 U.S., at 714. 
660 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
661 Ibid., at 361. Concurring opinion of Justice Harlan.
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In Kyllo v. United States, the US Supreme Court infuses into the interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment the notion that law enforcement does not engage in a search un-
der the Fourth Amendment when it uses a technology or device that is in general public 
use.662 However, more recently, in United States v. Jones, the US Supreme Court ruled 
that the installation and use of a GPS tracking device to monitor vehicle movements 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
With regards to the legality of forced implantation, case law in the US has long rec-
ognized that individuals have the right to physically or bodily integrity and the protec-
tion from bodily intrusions. As Justice Cardozo asserts, “[e]very human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body”.663 
There are certain exceptions in light of the needs of society. For example, mandatory 
random drug tests for certain lines of work have been upheld. In Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives Association, the US Supreme Court ruled that drug and alcohol test-
ing of railroad employees, engaged in tasks that pose a threat to public safety if errors 
are to occur, was justified,664 and, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 
the US Supreme Court held that random drug testing of employees who carry firearms 
is equally justified.665 
With regards to the right to refuse to be identified, in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District 
Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, the US Supreme Court upheld that individuals are 
not permitted to refuse to identify themselves to a law enforcement officer during the 
conduct of an investigation.666 
662 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
663 Schloendorff v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914).
664 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
665 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
666 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
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7.8.5 State statutory laws
Although there are no federal statutory laws pertaining to HIMs, there are a number of 
relevant state legislative acts that have been signed into law.  For example, North Da-
kota Senate Bill 2415 (2007) prohibits anyone from requiring another person to have 
a HIM implanted. Wisconsin has a similar law, which requires that “[n]o person may 
require an individual to undergo the implanting of a microchip”.667 California Senate 
Bill 362 provides that no person may “require, coerce, or compel any other individual to 
undergo the subcutaneous implanting of an identification device”.668 Washington crimi-
nalized the unauthorized reading of an RFID identification device “for the purpose of 
fraud, identity theft, or for any other illegal purpose” as a class C felony”.669 In Penn-
sylvania, H.B. 2374 prohibits anyone from requiring another person to undergo the sub-
cutaneous implanting of an identification device. The bill passed Pennsylvania’s House 
of Representatives. Other state legislatures have also passed legislation prohibiting the 
involuntary implantation of HIMs. It is important, however, to point out here that these 
state laws have not banned HIMs, but have rather prohibited their forced implantation. 
A number of other states have introduced legislation relating to the use of RFID, but 
most address the use of RFID tags/microchips embedded in retail products. 
 Some legislative proposals pertaining to the use of RFID for tracking purposes 
have also failed to become law. In Rhode Island, H.B. 5929, which attempted to pro-
hibit the state’s Government from tracking the movement or identity of an employee, 
student or client as a condition of obtaining a benefit or services, actually made it to the 
state governor’s desk, but was strangely vetoed. The Identity Information Protection 
Act of 2005, among other security and privacy guarantees, attempted to make it a crime 
in California to “skim” (i.e. to scan in an unauthorized manner) an individual’s RFID-
enabled identification document in order to obtain personal data without the knowl-
edge of that individual.670  However, this balanced and thoughtful bill was vetoed.671 
667 see Wisconsin Statute 146.25.
668 see California Civil Code, Section 52.7 (a).
669 see Title 19, Chapter 19.300, § 19.300.020.
670 California Senate Bill 768.
671 The (former) Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, explained that he vetoed the legislation because it “may 
inhibit various state agencies from procuring technology that could enhance and streamline operations, reduce expenses 
and improve customer service to the public and may unnecessarily restrict state agencies” and “may unduly burden 
the numerous beneficial new applications of contactless technology”. see A Letter from the Governor of California to 
Members of the California State Senate, available at: http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/sb_768_veto.pdf
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A second attempt672 was also vetoed, but finally California Senate Bill 31 (2007) was 
signed into law, which makes skimming of RFID-enabled identification documents a 
crime punishable with imprisonment. In Maryland, H.B. 1401, which aimed to prohibit 
an employer from requiring or compelling an employee to undergo the subcutaneous 
implantation of a RFID tag, was not even put to a vote.
Existing laws, which address stalking and cyberstalking or electronic stalking, 
could be relevant to the tracking capabilities of HIMs. All 50 states, the District of 
Columbia and the US Government have enacted various laws making the act of stalk-
ing a felony (Miller, 2001, p. 36). Federal law is applicable in inter-state stalking.673 
Cyberstalking or electronic stalking is essentially the use of the Internet or a telecom-
munications or electronic communications device to threaten, harass or annoy another 
person. Federal law prohibits inter-state or foreign electronic stalking674 and a number 
of states have also prohibited electronic stalking.
Moreover, nearly all states have similar laws requiring convicted sex offenders and/
or certain individuals convicted of a felony to wear a GPS tracking device (GPS brace-
let), in order for police to track their movements. Important differences, however, are 
whether or not the decision to do so is based on individual based assessments (Hinson, 
2008). For example, Massachusetts Senate Bill No. 1351 provides for an individualized 
‘dangerousness assessment’, while Florida’s Jessica Lunford Act does not, as pointed 
out by Hinson (2008).675 There is, however, at present, no equivalent federal law on the 
electronic monitoring of convicted sex offenders. 
7.8.6 Administrative decisions
In 2004, the FDA approved the use of RFID implants as a Class II medical device.676 
This serves as the single most important official administrative decision regarding 
RFID implants (i.e. HIMs).
672 California Senate Bill 30 (Identity Information Protection Act of 2007).
673 Title 18 U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 110A, § 2261A; see Miller, Neal. Stalking Laws and Implementation Practices: A 
National Review for Policymakers and Practitioners (2001), p. 36, available at:  http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/197066.pdf
674 Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Part I, § 223.
675  see Hinson, Zoila. GPS monitoring and constitutional rights (43 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 
2008), pp. 285-288.
676  Federal Register, Volume 69, Number 237, 10 December 2004, pp. 71702-71704.
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7.8.7 Standards, guidelines and self-regulations (soft laws)
The privacy policy of VeriChip Corp. was first declared in a ‘Six Point Privacy State-
ment’, which read as follows: 
1. VeriChip should be voluntary and voluntary only. No person, no employer,  
 no government should force anyone to get “chipped.”
2. Privacy must be a priority at the highest levels of our organization and as  
 such we will have a Chief Privacy Officer who, with privacy experts, will  
 be charged with addressing the day-to-day global evolution of this technology.
3. We will immediately address privacy and patients’ rights in all consumer,  
 distributor and medical documents related to VeriChip
4. VeriChip subscribers are able have their chip removed and discontinued at  
 any time.
5. Privacy means different things to different people, so only the VeriChip cus- 
 tomer should designate the groups that may have access to his or her data 
 base information.
6. We pledge to thoughtfully, openly and considerately engage government,  
 privacy groups, the industry and consumers to assure that the adoption of  
 VeriChip and RFID technology is through education and unity rather than  
 isolation and division.
Since then, VeriChip’s full privacy policy has changed, and is no longer available 
on the company’s new website after changing its name to PositiveID.
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits unfair, deceptive or mis-
represented corporate practices. Unfair practices include, for instance, a failure to im-
plement a minimal level of security of personal information, while deceptive practices 
include a company’s failure to actually implement its own registered privacy policies/
codes of conduct. The FTC has the authority to enforce the promises companies make 
as a result of their privacy policies/codes of conduct regarding how they collect, use and 
secure personal information677 and the FTC has used this authority on numerous occa-
sions to challenge the data processing practices and policies of companies that cause 
harm to consumers.
Since doctors are meant to administer the implantation of HIMs, the American 
Medical Association (AMA), the largest professional organization of physicians and 
677 Title 15 U.S.C. § 41-58, as amended, Section 5 of the FTC Act. 
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patients in the US, established guidelines to protect patients receiving RFID implants,678 
which are a part of the AMA’s medical code of ethics. In the report, titled “Radio Fre-
quency ID Devices in Humans”, the AMA acknowledges the important ethical, legal 
and social issues raised by HIMs and advocates for a greater role of doctors regarding 
the non-medical uses of the technology.679 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued its Guidelines for 
Securing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems. The NIST elaborates how to 
address the privacy concerns of RFID in the context of the OECD Guidelines on the Pro-
tection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980). In addition, the OECD 
Policy Principles on Radio Frequency Identification were also finalized in 2008.
In recognition of the threats to privacy posed by GIS, the Urban and Regional In-
formation Systems Association (URISA) adopted the GIS Code of Ethics, advocating 
for the protection of individual privacy and the careful handling of new information 
discovered about individuals through GIS-based manipulations. 
The Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association (CTIA) adopted the 
Best Practices and Guidelines for Location Based Services, essentially highlighting 
the necessity of gaining a user’s consent before disclosing his/her location information. 
In addition, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) formed a Geolocation Working 
Group to develop a set of standards for handling users’ location information that en-
sures both interoperability and privacy.
678 Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, CEJA Report 5-A-07, available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama1/pub/upload/mm/467/ceja5a07.doc
679 Ibid.
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7.9 DEFICIENCIES AND DILEMMAS OF THE US LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Based on the principles of privacy and the criteria for determining the adequacy of a 
legal framework, as outlined in Chapter 3, significant legal deficiencies and dilemmas 
within US statutory laws, tort law and the ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy standard 
(as adopted by US courts) become clear. The ineffectiveness of the US legal framework 
in upholding the right to privacy against the intrusive capabilities of HIMs is, in this 
dissertation’s analysis, quite substantial.
First and foremost, in light of the US Supreme Court’s decisions in United States 
v. Knotts, United States v. Karo and Oliver v. United States, implantees may not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy of the location information generated by their HIMs 
as they move about in public. Location information collected by law enforcement agen-
cies via the scanning of RFID implants or monitoring of GPS implants is, at present, 
not protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
The case law also fails to uphold the general legal principle of proportionality or 
ensure that the scanning and/or monitoring of HIMs is proportionate to their purported 
legitimate aim(s). Given that there is essentially no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
public, as the law stands now, mass public surveillance and the tracking and recording 
of people’s movements out in public by the US Government, without any justification 
whatsoever, could be potentially lawful. Nevertheless, unwarranted mass public sur-
veillance should be considered disproportionate, unreasonable and inappropriate in a 
free and democratic society.
Although the US Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States, held that whatever a per-
son “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected”,680 if that person does not take extraordinary steps or affirmative 
measures to protect his or her privacy, as both Paton-Simpson (2000) and Kearns (1998) 
separately point out, he or she has no reasonable or subjective expectation of privacy.681 
This is essentially consistent with the findings of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in US 
v. Kyllo.682  “Thus the viewpoint is well established that anyone who does not behave 
as a ‘reasonable paranoid’ has waived any right to privacy” (Paton-Simpson, 2000, p. 
680 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
681 see Kearns, Thomas B. Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy 
Concerns (7 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 1998), pp. 975-1011, at 1005; Paton-Simpson, Elizabeth. Privacy 
and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places (50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 
2000), pp. 305-346, at 306.
682 US v. Kyllo. 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Circuit, 1999).
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306). This interpretation may especially hold true for those who have decided to have a 
HIM voluntarily implanted.
The “reasonable expectation” of privacy is additionally problematic, since it is 
presently defined by the privacy-intrusive capabilities of the latest technologies, their 
availability and the scope and manner of their deployment and use. For instance, con-
sistent with Kyllo v. United States,683 the mass deployment and widespread public use 
of RFID and GPS technology and GPS tracking devices, as the technologies become 
more and more readily available, without the appropriate safeguards in place, would 
surely diminish our privacy expectation level, both meaningfully and legally. As David 
Wood, in the Report on the Surveillance Society, argues, the reasonable expectation 
of privacy will surely be depressed if people “get used to” increasingly more surveil-
lance.684 Likewise, as Dr. Peter Zhou, ADS’ chief scientist at the time, similarly pro-
claimed, “[b]efore there may have been resistance, but not anymore. People are getting 
used to implants. New century, new trend”685 (emphasis added). In addition, as Minert 
(2006) points out, the problem is that the reasonable expectation could become just an 
echo of the government’s expectation of privacy (2006, pp. 1653-54). Moreover, the 
relatively widespread voluntary implantation of HIMs could also potentially indicate 
that people value privacy far less (or it could be interpreted as such) and, as Noah Feld-
man (Harvard law professor) argues, “the less we value it [privacy], the less our judicial 
institutions will protect it for us”.686
Although the ECPA regulates government access to stored electronic communi-
cations, communications from a tracking device is exempted from being included in 
electronic communications.687 A “tracking device” is defined as “an electronic or me-
chanical device, which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object”.688 
Both RFID and GPS implants are indeed types of tracking devices and, thus, may be 
explicitly excluded from the ECPA. 
683 see Kyllo v. United States, 533 US 27, 34.
684 see Wood, David Murakami (ed.). A Report on the Surveillance Society (2006), p. 80.
685 Gossett, Sherrie. “Implantable-chip company in financial straits” (WorldNetDaily, 4 March 2003), available at: http://
www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=31353
686 Feldman, Noah. “Strip-Search Case Reflects Death of American Privacy” (Bloomberg, 9 April 2012), available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-08/strip-search-case-reflects-death-of-american-privacy.html
687 Title 18 U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 119, § 2510(12)(c).
688 Title 18 U.S.C. Part II, Chapter 205, § 3117(b). 
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In addition, relevant case law is not grounded on statutory law and the legal frame-
work fails to provide adequate clarity and consistency. While Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that if law enforcement agents want to use or in-
stall a tracking device, they must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to do so, “[t]
he traditional statutory framework governing electronic surveillance does not provide 
law enforcement with clear-cut guidance” (Clark, 2006, p. 25). The law does not clearly 
delineate whether or not probable cause or simply reasonable suspicion under Title 18 
U.S.C Part I, Chapter 121 § 2703(d) is required for a warrant or court order requesting 
telecommunication companies to hand over cell-site information, whether historical, 
real-time or ‘prospective’, to government entities. Federal agencies are routinely ask-
ing US courts to order telecommunication companies to provide historical or real-time 
tracking/location data689 and the basis of the decision to do so is at the discretion of 
judges (Ibid.), rather than based on explicit provisions in statutory law. The US Jus-
tice Department recommends that Federal prosecutors seek warrants based on probable 
cause, in order to access location information.690 However, Federal judges differ as to 
whether the government actually requires probable cause to obtain a warrant to access 
the cell-site (location) information. Some judges have been granting warrants based 
not on probable cause, but rather based on considerable lower standards of suspicion 
(Ibid.). Local police officials are now also routinely using cell phones as a tracking tool 
“with little or no court oversight”.691
Essentially, there is general disagreement whether or not location data gathered/ob-
tained from cell phones/GPS-enabled smartphones/GPS tracking devices is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment and uncertainty about the procedures/requirements that law en-
forcement agencies must satisfy to access/use the location data, which has often enabled 
law enforcement agencies to access/use this data without probable cause or a warrant. 
689 As most recently revealed by the privacy activist Christopher Soghoian on his blog, Sprint Nextel provided law enforce-
ment agencies with customer location data more than 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009 made 
available through a web application developed by Sprint to handle the large volume of requests, according to a man-
ager of the company, who disclosed the information at a non-public conference, available at: http://paranoia.dubfire.
net/2009/12/8-million-reasons-for-real-surveillance.html
690 Nakashima, Ellen. “Cell phone Tracking Powers on Request: Secret Warrants Granted Without Probable Cause” (Wash-
ington Post, 23 November 2007), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/22/
AR2007112201444.html




Arguably, the US legal framework requires little or no evidence or degree of sus-
picion when tracking is destined to occur only in public places. As US Magistrate 
Judge James K. Bredar recognized, “[i]f acquisition of real-time cell site information 
is equivalent to a tracking device, it would seem the Government is not constitutionally 
required to obtain a warrant provided the phone remains in a public place where visual 
surveillance would be available”.692 Moreover, as US Magistrate Judge Gabriel Gore-
nstein pointed out, there is a difference between cell phones voluntarily carried and 
the Government’s covert placement and use of tracking devices. HIMs are voluntarily 
implanted, at least for now. When an individual has chosen to voluntarily carry a device 
and permit the transmission of its information to a third party, the Fourth Amendment 
is not implicated.693
The same legal reasoning for cell phones and cell site information could apply to 
the use of GPS implants (and other GPS tracking devices) for law enforcement surveil-
lance purposes when the implantee (or end-user) is in public (Ganz, 2005).694 Equally, 
warrantless RFID tracking within public areas could also be considered lawful.
Already, a number of Federal courts that have deliberated on GPS tracking have 
extended the legal reasoning of the US Supreme Court in United States v. Knotts and 
United States v. Karo to the use of GPS tracking devices.695 The 7th Circuit US Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Garcia, basing its decision on Knotts, upheld warrantless 
GPS tracking in public areas, denying that the use of a GPS tracking device constituted 
a search,696 by incorrectly comparing the use of GPS satellites for vehicle tracking to 
the use of satellite imaging or CCTV cameras for observing a vehicle’s route.697 The 
9th Circuit US Court of Appeals in United States v. Pineda-Moreno equally upheld that 
the use of a GPS tracking device by law enforcement agencies to monitor a person’s 
692 In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a 
Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers and the Production of Real Time Cell Site In-
formation, United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Memorandum Opinion, 28 November 2005, p. 13. 
693 see In Re Application of the United States of America for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records and 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, Opinion and Order, United States Magistrate Judge, Gabriel W. Gorenstein, 20 December 2005, p. 25. 
 The opinion is consistent with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
694 see Ganz, John S. It’s Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need Warrants to Use GPS Tracking Devices 
(95 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 2005). 
695 see, e.g., United States v. Moran, 349 F.Supp.2d 425 (NDNY, 2005).
696 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Circuit, 2007).
697 Ibid., at 997.
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movements in public is not considered a search under the Fourth Amendment and thus 
does not require a warrant.698
There are also a few State courts in the US that have clearly concluded that GPS 
tracking in public is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. For instance, the Dis-
trict IV Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that police are permitted to conduct warrant-
less GPS tracking, since the tracking does not constitute a search, as the law currently 
stands.699 Interesting enough, the law’s deficiency even caused the Wisconsin court to 
urge the state legislature to regulate police and private use of GPS tracking technology. 
In 2005, the Connecticut Appellate Court in Turner v. American Car Rental, Inc dis-
missed the intrusion upon seclusion tort claim, concluding that it was unaware of any 
legal precedent establishing that the installation of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle 
violates the privacy rights of the driver or that a driver has an expectation of privacy on 
a public highway.700 
On the other hand, certainly not every US court agrees. The District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Maynard701 reversed the drug conviction 
of Antoine Jones, which was significantly based on the location information gathered 
from a GPS tracking device installed on his vehicle without a warrant. The District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that warrantless GPS tracking violated the 
Fourth Amendment and that the location information obtained from the GPS tracking 
device was not public, concluding that Antoine Jones had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy of his movements. After the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturned Jones’ conviction, the Obama Administration petitioned the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals to rehear the case en banc. The petition was denied.702 
Some State courts have also ruled that GPS tracking requires a warrant. But, these 
decisions are premised on the respective State laws and State constitutions and not 
explicitly on Federal law or the Fourth Amendment,703 and there were also compelling 
dissenting opinions. 
698 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Circuit, 2010).
699 State v. Michael A. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 59 (District IV Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2009).
700 Turner v. American Car Rental, 884 A.2d 7 (Conn. App. Ct., 2005).
701 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Circuit, 2010).
702 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Circuit, 2010).
703 see, e.g., People v. Scott C. Weaver, 12 N.Y. 3d 433, 435 (New York Court of Appeals, 2009); Washington v. Jackson, 
150 Wash.  2d 251, 76 P3d 217 (2003).
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However, since there are conflicting decisions in the US among the circuit courts 
concerning the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking under the Fourth Amend-
ment, at the request of the US Government,704 the US Supreme Court indeed granted a 
writ of certiorari in the case US v. Jones to potentially resolve and clarify the issue.705 
It is important to point out that in United States v. Knotts the US Supreme Court 
ruled on RF tracking devices capable of enhancing the ability of law enforcement agents 
to conduct visual and physical surveillance, but the Court did not rule on GPS tracking 
capable of substituting or removing the need for visual or physical surveillance alto-
gether, as both the EFF and ACLU highlight in their amicus curiae brief,706 in support 
of the appellant in US v. Jones in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.707 
Moreover, the US Supreme Court also indicated in United States v. Knotts that 
other methods of more sophisticated electronic surveillance (i.e. GPS tracking) may 
require a different judgment708 and in Dow Chem. Co. v. United States judged that 
satellite imaging may constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, since it practi-
cally replaces, rather than enhances, the senses of law enforcement agents.709 Indeed, 
using GPS devices to constantly track a person’s movements for a prolonged period of 
time, replacing the need for law enforcement agents in the field, can divulge far greater 
amounts of data than using simple RF devices to assist law enforcement agents in the 
field when observing a person’s movements for a limited period of time.
Furthermore, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in United States 
v. Maynard710 convincingly held that Antoine Jones’ movements were actually not ex-
posed to the public, since “the likelihood a stranger would observe all those movements 
is not just remote, it is essentially nil”.711 Indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
704 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (April 15, 2011).
705 US v. Jones, USSC No. 10-1259, certiorari granted 6/27/11.
706 Amicus curiae literally means “friend of the court”. According to Rule 37(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the 
United States (adopted 17 July 2007), an amicus curiae brief “brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not 
already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court”. 
707 see Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation and American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital 
Area in Support of Appellant Jones, 3 March 2009.
708  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-284 (1983).
709  Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-239 (1986).
710 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Circuit, 2010).
711 Ibid., at 560.
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of Appeals made a strong argument in differentiating between the tracking of a ve-
hicle’s single journey and the prolonged, non-stop tracking of a vehicle. Emmett (2011) 
agrees with this argument.712 
But, as the US Government contends, the US Supreme Court in Knotts did not 
make this distinction.713 In addition, as the US Government also points out, the US 
Supreme Court in United States v. Karo did not judge that the length of time or dura-
tion was a factor in determining whether or not electronic tracking constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.714 
Up until 2011, the US Supreme Court had not yet had an occasion to deliberate on 
the legal questions concerning GPS tracking or to judge whether or not the installation 
and use of GPS tracking devices constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Since the US Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari in the case US v. Jones,715 
this occasion finally arrived. 
The US Supreme Court, in United States v. Jones, ended up ruling against the US 
Government (and some previous circuit court decisions), judging that the installation 
and use of a GPS tracking device to monitor the movements of a vehicle constitutes a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (i.e. concurring with the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals). But, as earlier predicted (see, e.g., Ganz, 2005), 
the Court did not explicitly rule that GPS tracking requires a warrant. Although, the 
minority concluded in their separate opinions that prolonged GPS tracking/monitoring 
could amount to a search requiring a warrant, the majority declined to decide whether 
or not the search in this specific case required a warrant. The Court argued that it was 
not required, in this particular case, to clarify whether or not electronic monitoring (i.e. 
GPS tracking/monitoring) for prolonged periods of time is an unconstitutional invasion 
of privacy or to judge whether this type of search was reasonable or unreasonable. As a 
result of procedural rules, the majority considered that argument forfeited. 
712 For example, Emmett (2011) argues: “Close consideration of both the duration of the electronic monitoring and the 
GPS technology that enabled the surveillance would have revealed that law enforcement obtained information of a type 
that was not available to the public through simple
 (or even technologically enhanced) visual surveillance” (Emmett, Caitlin. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, Tracking 
Down Individuals’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Information Age (41 Golden Gate University Law Review, 
2011), p. 26.
713 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2011), p. 14. 
714 Ibid., p. 15.
715 US v. Jones, USSC No. 10-1259, certiorari granted 6/27/11.
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 Given the conservative majority of the current US Supreme Court,716 the Court, 
as a result, neither contradicted United States v. Karo, which held that evidence or 
probable cause is not required to observe information conveyed in areas observable to 
the public,717 nor backpedaled on a landmark decision with regards to RF tracking in 
United States v. Knotts.  On the contrary, these decisions were essentially reaffirmed.  
Moreover, in light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States, 
which judged that the greater availability and more widespread the deployment and 
adoption of a particular technology the less reasonable expectation of privacy the public 
enjoys with respect to its use,718 the widespread availability of GPS tracking devices 
and the widespread use of GPS technology has significantly reduced the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy of one’s movements in public. Now that GPS tracking has already 
become a common practice in criminal investigations, this legal interpretation has only 
been amplified.
Therefore, the legal matter is still not closed and the conflicting decisions among 
the circuit courts are not fully settled. There is, as a result, no compelling way to foresee 
how the US Supreme Court, or other US courts, will rule on future warrantless GPS (or 
RFID) tracking cases. Essentially, the law, as it stands now, arguably still fails to pro-
vide foreseeability, consistency and clarity, regarding the use of tracking technologies 
by law enforcement agencies.
Unless significant changes manifest in the near future, in light of the relevant case 
law, the vacuum of law, the US Government’s warrantless wiretapping controversy, the 
increasing abuse of the National Security Letters process, the revealed “President’s Sur-
veillance Program” [referring to former US President George W. Bush], the PATRIOT 
Act, the Protect America Act of 2007, which amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (FISA) and removed the warrant requirement for government surveillance of 
international electronic communications, the increasing use of cell phones for real-time 
tracking and the increasing availability and widespread use of GPS technology, the 
signs are there that warrantless GPS tracking will only further develop as a common 
practice. Accordingly, there is still increasing pressure from the US Government to al-
low for warrantless GPS tracking.
716 For further discussion and analysis on the increasingly conservative judgments of the US Supreme Court, see Chemer-
insky, Erwin. The Conservative Assault on the Constitution (Simon & Schuster, 2010).
717 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
718 see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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In short, as a consequence of the legal deficiencies and dilemmas outlined above, 
the examination by law enforcement agencies of the location information generated by 
both RFID and GPS implants is, at present, not granted Fourth Amendment protections. 
Moreover, in light of the recent Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Ne-
vada,  542 U.S. 177  (2004) decision, which held that police may oblige a person to 
provide identification upon request when conducting an investigation, the reading of a 
person’s RFID implant, which constitutes a form of identification, may also arguably 
not constitute a search under the current legal framework (Herbert, 2006).
Furthermore, since the printouts of location information generated by GPS and 
RFID tracking may be considered originals and due to the interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment, as it stands now, the location information pertaining to HIMs could be 
used as potentially incriminating evidence in a court of law. The apparent lack of fore-
seeability and clarity of Fourth Amendment interpretations of electronic tracking in 
public, or the lack of specific Federal statutory rules concerning the use of or access to 
location information generated by RFID/GPS implants, may also quash the possibility 
of resorting to the ‘exclusionary rule’.
When it comes to the private sector, tort law is equally not applicable to the loca-
tion information generated by HIMs, as the current US legal framework stands, since 
it is generally accepted by courts in the US that “there is no liability for giving further 
publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye”, as elaborated in 
the comments of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.719 Hence, as McClurg (1995) right-
fully points out, the problem is not so much with the definition of the tort of intrusion, 
but rather the Restatement comments pertaining to that definition. As McClurg (1995) 
further points out, the adherence of US courts to the outmoded rule and viewpoint that 
privacy and seclusion, for the most part, cannot be intruded upon in public places ex-
hibits a deficient understanding of the purpose of privacy and the other civil liberties it 
is meant to defend. An additional problem with tort of intrusion of privacy, as Schwartz 
(2000) points out, is that the intrusion must be “highly offensive” 720 and that case law 
has shown that most stealthy intrusions are unlikely to be found sufficiently “objection-
able” (Schwartz, 2000, p. 778).
Significantly, the US legal framework is not up to date with the current technology. 
While there is no explicit Federal law that regulates the privacy implications of RFID or 
719 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D, comment b (1977). see, e.g., Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015, 
1018 (D. Kan. 1986)  (“The plaintiffs must show that there has been some aspect of their private affairs which has been 
intruded upon and does not apply to matters which occur in a public place or place otherwise open to the public eye”).
720  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B.
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the information collected and stored as a result of RFID technology, there are equally 
no specific statutes or regulations that sufficiently address the privacy implications of 
GPS tracking. Although Federal law regulates the disclosure of location information 
generated by cell phones (as part of CPNI), and also regulates governmental access 
to private/stored electronic communications, the law, however, does not apply to the 
location information generated by RFID or GPS implants. As Reneger points out, the 
Telecom Act “offers no protection for people whose privacy is violated through non-
cell-phone-based collections of location information” (Reneger, 2002, p. 562). Herbert 
similarly agrees that while cell phone users may have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy of their call location information, “non-cellular forms of wireless products con-
taining GPS technology are not currently protected by any statutory location privacy 
protections” (Herbert, 2006, p. 445). Moreover, the meaning of location information is 
explicitly restricted to “call location information concerning the user of a commercial 
mobile service”,721 and therefore does not cover the more extensive location informa-
tion generated by HIMs or other similar PLDs. Consequently, with the exception to the 
CPNI of cell phones, as the law stands now, location information generated by devices 
other than cell phones is not afforded adequate privacy protection. This deficiency may 
be partly the result of the US piecemeal legal approach to protecting privacy, which is 
particularly sectoral rather than all-inclusive or comprehensive.
Under the US legal framework, “telecommunications carriers” are defined as “any 
provider of telecommunications services”.722 RFID or GPS implants could only come 
into the scope of the Telecom Act if companies like Digital Angel, ADS or VeriChip 
Corp. (now known as PositiveID), for example, were considered telecommunications 
carriers, commercial mobile service providers or joint venture partners. However, none 
of these companies are considered as any of these types of entities. As a result, there 
are arguably little or no legal barriers, at present, that prevent companies, like ADS or 
Digital Angel, from selling location information generated by HIMs to third parties.
One of the other main dilemmas is that the US legal framework does not have 
comprehensive, cross-sectoral privacy legislation equivalent to the EU’s Data Protec-
tion Directive,723 which is binding on both private entities and public authorities (except 
721 Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Part I, § 222(f).
722 Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Subchapter I, § 153(44). “Telecommunications” are defined as the “transmission, between or 
among points specified by the use, of information of the user’s choosing without change in the form or content of the 
information sent and received”. Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Subchapter I, § 153(43).
723 Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data.
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for law enforcement agencies). The EU’s Data Protection Directive even affects entities 
without activities or operations in the EU, since the Directive regulates the transfer of 
personal data from EU Member States to any third party outside the EU. Article 25 re-
quires that personal data from the EU must not be transferred to any country outside the 
EU unless that country has “adequate” privacy protections. A conflict between the US 
and EU over whether or not privacy laws in the US were adequate or up to par with the 
EU’s Data Protection Directive may have arguably resulted in the US-EU ‘Safe Har-
bor’ arrangement, in order to alleviate some of the differences, whereby US companies 
voluntarily self-certify their adherence to the safe harbor requirements or participate in 
a self-regulatory organization that adheres to the requirements. However, the need for 
the ‘safe harbor’ agreement in the first place only revealed an agreement that the US 
legal framework, in terms of privacy protection, is relatively weak and inadequate in 
comparison to the EU legal framework.
Instead of comprehensive privacy legislation, the US relies on a hodgepodge of a 
number of statutory laws covering separately different sectors or themes. But, as Re-
idenberg argues, “sectoral regulations are reactive and inconsistent” and the “gap-filling 
approach also leaves many areas of information processing untouched and runs counter 
to the cross-sectoral nature of modern data processing” (Reidenberg, 2000). Indeed, none 
of the US sectoral laws, for instance, can be applied adequately to RFID applications.  
On the other hand, the EU’s Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) does ap-
ply to the processing of personal data by RFID technology.724 Nevertheless, even though 
the EU has far superior privacy law, the EC has recognized that there are indeed difficul-
ties in applying the Data Protection Directive to new technologies, even if the Directive 
is meant to be technologically neutral or independent. The EC has further recognized that 
it may be necessary to develop additional specific provisions or new legislation to defend 
against the new threats posed by RFID and other technological developments.725 The EU 
plans to replace the Data Protection Directive with a General Data Protection Regulation, 
and is considering the formulation of specific legislation or lex specialis, with respect to 
724 The EU’s Article 29 Working Party on data protection has established that the Data Protection Directive strictly applies 
to the personal data collected through RFID and that the data protection principles should be implemented within RFID 
technology. see Article 29 Working Party, Working document on data protection issues related to RFID technology, 
January 2005 (WP 105).
725 see Com (2007) 87 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
follow-up of the Work Programme for better implementation of the Data Protection Directive.
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the Data Protection Directive, to address the special privacy issues surrounding RFID.726 
The EC also felt that there was a need to specify that the ‘ePrivacy Directive’727 explic-
itly applies to RFID.728 The EC has also adopted a set of recommendations to ensure the 
protection of privacy and personal data in applications supported by RFID technology,729 
but the recommendations are more focused on RFID applications used in retail trade 
activities.730
726 see Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Future networks and the Internet: Early Challenges regarding the “Internet of Things”, p. 8; COM(2007) 96 
Final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: steps to-
wards a policy Framework, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/
dir_citizens_rights_en.pdf
727 Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic com-
munications sector. 
728 see COM(2007) 698 final. Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUN-
CIL amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications net-
works, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation, p. 19, para. 28; see 
Directive 2009/136/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 25 November 2009, recital 
56. Accordingly, Article 3 of the ePrivacy Directive, which defines the scope of the directive, was revised to include 
“public communications networks supporting data collection and identification devices”. The amendments ensure that 
the EU’s data protection legal framework covers RFID. For further discussion, see Cannataci, Joseph A. Recent devel-
opments in privacy and healthcare: Different paths for RFID in Europe and North America? (International Journal of 
RF Technologies, Volume 2, 2010/2011), pp. 173–187.
729 C(2009) 3200 final, Commission Recommendation of 12.5.2009 on the implementation of privacy and data protection 
principles in applications supported by radio-frequency identification. 
 The recommendation calls for a PIA framework for RFID. The European Commission will later analyze the impact 
of the recommendation on companies, public entities and citizens (Cannataci, 2011). If the impact is adequate, then 
perhaps specific rule-making for RFID applications may be put aside (Cannataci, 2011).
730 I attended the 3rd closed meeting of the RFID Recommendation Implementation Informal Working Group at the EC. 
Present at the meeting were industry associations, standardization bodies, public authorities and a representative from 
the Article 29 Working Party. The first goal of the group was to establish an agreed upon generic pan-European PIA 
Framework for RFID applications (RFID PIA) with the endorsement of the Article 29 Working Party. This was ac-
complished in February 2011. The ultimate seal of approval came in April 2011, when the RFID PIA was officially 
signed by the European Commission Vice President (Neelie Kroes), the Chairman of the Article 29 Working Party 
(Jacob Kohnstamm), the Executive Director of the European Network and Information Security Agency (Udo Helm-
brecht) and various retail and RFID industry representatives, including GS1 and the European Retail Round Table (For 
further information/explanation, see Cannataci, 2011). The RFID PIA framework is the first of its kind in Europe, and 
supplementary templates and checklists are to be developed for specific RFID applications. It is important to point out 
that while the RFID PIA framework is a step in the right direction, the main problem is that it will only be applicable to 
RFID application service providers, and not to the developers of RFID infrastructures/systems. This is, unfortunately, 
consistent with the Data Protection Directive.
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In addition, the EC has also recognized the opinion of the European Group on Eth-
ics (EGE) that “non-medical ICT implants [HIMs] in the human body are not explicitly 
covered by existing legislation, particularly in terms of privacy and data protection”.731 
The EGE recommended that the EC initiate legislation on HIMs.732 Surely, without 
equally comprehensive privacy legislation, the US legal framework is in far worse 
shape and, above all, requires specific legislation on RFID, let alone for HIMs. 
Since there is no Federal law yet on RFID technology whatsoever, there is also 
essentially a lack of legal consistency concerning RFID in the US, as the relatively 
few existing State laws on RFID vary considerably in substance, scope and purpose. 
Most of the State laws address the use of RFID tags embedded in retail products or 
identity documents. Moreover, some of the State laws that address RFID technology 
are insufficient and are not without their own flaws. For example, in Washington, the 
State law criminalizes the unauthorized reading of an RFID identification device, “for 
the purpose of fraud, identity theft, or for any other illegal purpose”, as a class C felo-
ny.733 Thus, this law only prohibits reading an individual’s RFID identification when it 
is done so for illegal purposes and does not prohibit the reading for identification and 
tracking purposes alone. Nevertheless, as EPIC Executive Director Marc Rotenberg 
pointed out in a prepared testimony before the House of Representatives Oversight 
Committee’s Information Policy, Census and National Archives Subcommittee, the US 
Government typically acts only after the identity theft has occurred.734
However, while there is no Federal statutory law clearly regulating the use of GPS 
tracking devices, some states, such as California, have statutory laws regulating the 
activity. California Penal Code Section 637.7 (a) mandates: “No person or entity in this 
state shall use an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of 
a person”. But, this law is clearly only applicable to persons in vehicles, and therefore 
does not explicitly cover GPS tracking via smartphones or GPS implants. For instance, 
Subsection (b) states: “This section shall not apply when the registered owner, lesser, 
or lessee of a vehicle has consented to the use of the electronic tracking device with re-
spect to that vehicle”. Moreover, Subsection (d) defines an “electronic tracking device” 
731 Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission, Opinion No. 
20, Adopted on 16/03/2005, Section 6.5.4.
732 Ibid. 
733 see Title 19, Chapter 19.300, § 19.300.020.
734 see Marc Rotenberg’s prepared testimony, available at: http://informationpolicy.oversight.house.gov/docu-
ments/20090617111417.pdf
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as “any device attached to a vehicle or other movable thing that reveals its location or 
movement by transmission of electronic signals”.
Moreover, although state legislatures in the US have also enacted breach notifica-
tion laws concerning personal data, there is no Federal law yet,735 which would be ideal 
for any nationwide breach and for establishing common notification standards. Instead, 
state laws can vary somewhat on the process behind the notification of breaches.
The DHS claims that the Privacy Act 1974 regulates the data collected through 
RFID, stating the following:  
When RFID is used for human tracking, the data collected will undoubtedly 
comprise a “system of records” under the Privacy Act of 1974. People should 
have at least the rights accorded them by that law when they are identified 
using RFID. Systems using RFID technology are, of course, also subject to 
the E-Government Act’s Privacy Impact Assessment [PIA] requirements736 
(emphasis added).
The Privacy Act 1974 does not restrict the content of a “record” to education, finan-
cial transactions, medical history and criminal or employment history and may indeed be 
applicable to data collected through RFID technology. However, in accordance with the 
current legal standpoint of jurisprudence in the US, concerning the absence of privacy 
while in public, and the lack of legal clarity concerning the privacy of location informa-
tion, the Privacy Act 1974 arguably may not be applicable to the location information col-
lected via RFID implants/microchips and RFID readers in public spaces.  If the US legal 
735 Senator Patrick Leahy recently introduced S.1490, entitled “the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009”, 
which could have provided for a national standard for data breach notification.  More recently, the Secure and Fortify 
Electronic Data Act (the “SAFE Data Act”) was proposed in the US House of Representatives, which aims to establish 
Federal (i.e. nationwide) breach notification requirements, overriding all existing state breach notification laws. With 
the recently adopted EU Telecom Package and revision of the ‘ePrivacy’ Directive, the EU has already passed laws 
requiring communications service providers to notify consumers of security/data breaches. see Directive 2002/58/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector; Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 November 2009.
736 The Use of RFID for Human Identification: A Draft Report from DHS Emerging Applications and Technology Subcom-
mittee to the Full Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee, Version 1.0, p. 4, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_advcom_rpt_rfid_draft.pdf
 This statement was partially amended in the final version. Instead of writing “when RFID is used for human tracking”, 
the final version writes “when an RFID-enabled system is used to collect data about individuals”. see The Use of RFID 
for Human Identify Verification, Report No. 2006-02, Data Privacy & Integrity Advisory Committee, Adopted 6 De-
cember 2006, p. 4, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_advcom_12-2006_rpt_RFID.pdf
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framework does not prohibit the use of location information obtained by law enforcement 
agencies via GPS tracking devices without a warrant, it would be hard to imagine how the 
US legal framework would effectively regulate or prohibit the use of location information 
generated and transmitted to third parties via HIMs voluntarily implanted. 
Nevertheless, even if the Privacy Act 1974 is somehow interpreted to be applicable 
in regulating the storage/processing of location information collected through RFID 
readers placed in the public space, this is only possible for the location information col-
lected, stored and used by the US Government. The Privacy Act 1974 is only applicable 
to agencies and the term “agency” is specifically defined as: 
any executive department, military department, Government corporation, 
Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive 
branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), 
or any independent regulatory agency.737 
Therefore, the Privacy Act 1974 is in no way applicable to HIM service providers, 
which may store the location information generated by HIMs, or any other private data 
controller for that matter. Moreover, the Privacy Act 1974 does not prohibit the US 
Government from buying vast quantities of personal information from commercial data 
brokers, which is in fact an ongoing trend.
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs)738 may be required to evaluate how personal 
information in identifiable form will be collected, maintained and disseminated using 
RFID, however, this is also only applicable to personal information held (and technolo-
gies/systems used) by the US Government (i.e. Federal public agencies). A PIA was in 
fact conducted regarding RFID technology, but this specifically pertained to RFID tags 
embedded in government documents, and not the general use of RFID technology for 
other applications. Moreover, as Cannataci highlights, PIAs in the US are not being used 
to induce the implementation of technical measures to safeguard privacy (2011, p. 182).
In addition, the US legal framework, pertaining to privacy protection, relies primar-
ily on private sector self-regulations (privacy policies, voluntary standards or codes of 
conduct), whereby self-regulations and internal self-reporting are often preferred over 
737 Title 5 U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 5, Subchapter II, § 552(f).
738 In US law, a PIA is described as “an analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling conforms to appli-
cable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy, (ii) to determine the risks and effects of collecting, 
maintaining and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic information system, and (iii) to examine 
and evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks” (E-
Government Act of 2002, Section 208).
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‘hard’ laws and (external) scrutiny.  Moreover, the US approach to privacy protection 
generally promotes the view that self-regulations are friendlier towards the freedom of 
information and commerce and the promotion of innovation. The rationale behind this 
may be based on the laissez-faire economic theory, whereby the belief is that the market 
usually ends up regulating itself. While there are indeed a number of examples of this 
rationale proving true, such as the controversy surrounding the unveiling of Intel Cor-
poration’s Pentium III microchip in January 1999 (Werner, 2008),739 there are plenty of 
more examples proving it to be untrue.
Self-regulations or codes of conduct, without the existence of binding ‘hard’ laws 
to establish the minimum standards as their basis, can barely be considered reliable. 
Consumers/citizens especially cannot depend on self-regulations/codes of conduct 
when the self-regulations are themselves insufficient and stagnant and cater to the self-
interests and requests of major industry players. The over-reliance solely on self-reg-
ulations may result in requirements guided by the “invisible hand”, not requirements 
imposed by transparent, binding laws. This approach raises concerns of the lack of 
accountability and supervision. The same mistake of over-relying on investment banks 
and other financial institutions to self-regulate the risky financial derivatives market 
was made over the last decade and we have now witnessed the enormous negative 
consequences of that system. This approach is not relied upon or trusted for regulating 
product safety or the use of chemicals, and there is also little reason it should be relied 
upon or trusted for safeguarding privacy.
Self-regulations have proved to be insufficient to address threats to privacy. For 
instance, Schwartz (1999) rightfully argued early on that industry self-regulations are 
inadequate to regulate online privacy. As EPIC later showed, self-regulations indeed 
have seriously failed to provide online privacy and regulate the use of cookies.740 Self-
regulations have also failed to ensure the appropriate content and availability of privacy 
policies for social networking websites.741 The World Privacy Forum has also highlight-
ed that self-regulation initiatives (e.g. the Networking Advertising Initiative) have been 
739 The original design for Intel’s processor microchip had a serial number embedded within the hardware code that could 
enable online marketers to identify and track Internet users. Consumer boycott threats led to Intel removing the iden-
tification system. see Clausing, Jeri. “Intel Alters Plan Said to Undermine PC User’s Privacy” (New York Times, 26 
January 1999), p. Al; Werner, Matthew. Google and Ye Shall Be Found: Privacy, Search Queries, and the Recognition 
of a Qualified Privilege (34 Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal 313, 2008).
740 Jay Hoofnagle, Chris. Privacy Self Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment, EPIC, 4 March 2005, available at: http://
epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf
741 see Bonneau, Joseph and Sören Preibusch. The Privacy Jungle: On the market for data protection in social networks 
(WEISS, 2009).
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inadequate to defend consumer’s privacy against online targeted behavioral advertising 
technologies.742 As a result of the failures, EPIC recommended that the FTC “should 
abandon its faith in self-regulation”, concluding that “[s]elf-regulatory systems have 
served to stall Congress while anesthetizing the public to increasingly invasive business 
practices”.743 
Unfortunately, however, with regards to RFID, the US Government regrettably be-
lieves, for now at least, that self-regulations are sufficient to regulate RFID. Some at 
the FTC have concluded that “technology-specific privacy legislation is unnecessary at 
this juncture” regarding RFID.744 But, self-regulations are obviously only effective to 
the extent to which companies comply. While, in the US, Better Business Bureaus can 
be leveraged to help put into effect self-regulations, this approach relies on voluntary 
compliance. Moreover, while the FTC has the authority to enforce a company’s privacy 
policy/code of conduct, no rights of private legal action are available under the FTC 
Act. Therefore, it may also be unrealistic to claim that the current approach adequately 
satisfies the principle of enforcement/redress. 
Without comprehensive privacy legislation in the US or Federal statutory laws that 
explicitly regulate HIMs and protect or restrict access to location information gener-
ated by them, we are left to rely on the self-regulations and good will of companies 
like ADS/Digital Angel and VeriChip Corp. However, companies, such as Digital An-
gel or VeriChip Corp., can gain considerably from selling location information. More-
over, the privacy policy of VeriChip Corp., like with other US companies, is subject to 
changes.745 As VeriChip Corp. themselves previously declared, “[w]e reserve the right 
742 World Privacy Forum, “The Network Advertising Initiative: Failing at Consumer Protection and at Self-Regulation”, 
November 2007. 
 But, this did not at all prevent the FTC from doubling down on its self-regulation policies, which later published the 
FTC Staff Report, “Self-Regulatory Principles For Online Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technol-
ogy” (February 2009). 
 Hirsch has equally highlighted that the reliance on self-regulations and the Network Advertising Initiative to control the 
use of online targeted advertising has been largely unsuccessful or ineffective. see Hirsch, Dennis. Law and Policy of 
Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation or Co-Regulation (Seattle University Law Review, Vol. 34, Issue 2, 2011), 
pp. 439-480.
 The industry association, Digital Advertising Alliance, also adopted in 2010 a “Self-Regulatory Program for Online 
Behavioral Advertising”, but its success is equally questionable. 
743 Jay Hoofnagle, Chris. Privacy Self Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment, EPIC, 4 March 2005, available at: http://
epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf
744 FTC staff report on RFID, p. 20.
745 For instance, Facebook is constantly changing its privacy policies. 
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to change our Privacy Policy”.746 Although ADS/Digital Angel proclaims their policy 
now is not to release the data they collect to third parties, their policy was different 
before. As Edmundson (2005) reveals, the privacy policy of Digital Angel (formerly a 
major shareholder of VeriChip Corp.), which was previously available on their corpo-
rate website, actually stated, in contrary, that “[w]e [Digital Angel] may, from time to 
time, share, sell or rent some of your personal information with third parties with who 
we have a business relationship […]”.747 
The AMA’s Code of Ethics, the GIS Code of Ethics, the proposed creation of geo-
location standards by W3C, and other self-regulations or industry guidelines, as signifi-
cant as they may be, are not a valid replacement for legally binding ‘hard’ laws enforce-
able in a court. Other privacy guidelines on RFID, such as CTIA’s Best Practices and 
Guidelines for Location Based Services, do not cover RFID technology, and the RFID 
Privacy Guidelines developed by the Center for Democracy and Technology do not 
even mention human-implantable RFID microchips.
Although the FDA determined that VeriChip’s RFID implants are regulated medi-
cal devices, in accordance with the Section 201 (h)(2) of the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), “when marketed [intended] to provide information to assist 
in the diagnosis or treatment of injury or illness”,748 they are not regulated medical de-
vices with regards to their intended uses for security, financial and personal identifica-
tion purposes.749 
Essentially, without a federal law specifically stipulating otherwise, the legal frame-
work may be potentially inadequate to ensure that HIMs are only implanted voluntarily 
and, therefore, may fail to uphold the principle of consent. Indeed, RFID implants 
are implanted into the body using a syringe and, therefore, forced implantation should 
naturally be considered a violation of the right to bodily integrity, as Ramesh (1997) 
rightfully points out.750 The Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment and even potentially 
the Thirteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, as Herbert argues, including the 
Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause, should also put a stop to forced im-
746 see VeriChip Corp., available at: http://www.verichipcorp.com/content/company/privacy
747 Edmundson, Kristen E. Global Positioning System Implants: Must Consumer Privacy Be Lost in order for People to be 
Found (38 Indiana Law Review 207, 2005), pp. 207-238, at: 215-216. 
748 see a letter written by David E. Troy, Chief Counsel for the FDA, to Jeffrey N. Gibbs, a lawyer representing ADS, in 17 
October 2002, available at: http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/dec03/120503/81n-0033p-sup0003-vol86.pdf
749 Ibid.
750 see Ramesh, Elaine M. Time Enough? Consequences of Human Microchip Implantation, Franklin Pierce Law Center 
(1997) available at: http://www.fplc.edu/risk/vol8/fall/ramesh.htm.
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plantation (Herbert, 2006). Moreover, the liberty-based approach in the US to privacy 
would also strongly oppose the mandated implantation of HIMs.751
However, although the right to bodily integrity is clearly established by the US 
Constitution and case law, forced vaccinations, termed “countermeasures”, are never-
theless considered lawful, in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, when 
the US Government issues a declaration asserting that the occurrence of “an actual or 
potential bioterrorist incident or other actual or potential public health emergency”.752 
Already forced flu and pneumococcal vaccinations on young children in New Jersey 
were previously approved by the state’s Public Health Council. With past precedence 
and the necessary laws enacted, if the H1N1 virus (also known as the “swine flu”) does 
in fact become a genuine pandemic, forced vaccinations nationwide are therefore not 
farfetched (at least it was previously not farfetched during 2009), especially for nurses, 
teachers, etc. While travelling to some countries requires travelers to be vaccinated 
beforehand and some universities in the US (e.g., the University of Alabama) could 
mandate that students must be vaccinated before being allowed to enroll, this is more of 
a condition of exercising a privilege, rather than mandatory vaccination.
With numerous other threats to security, the US Government could also possibly 
invoke the changing standard of what is considered a ‘reasonable’ infringement of pri-
vacy as the potential basis of the mandatory implantation of HIMs for certain categories 
of people, if, for example, crime reached epic proportions or if there was another major 
terrorist attack. As Herbert (2006) further argues, in light of legal jurisprudence, while 
GPS bracelets are less intrusive than HIMs, this does not necessarily mean US courts 
will rule HIMs to be anymore unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment than GPS 
bracelets (Herbert, 2006, pp. 442-43). 
Moreover, with regards to stalking, the laws in several states, as pointed out by 
Miller (2001), have provisions that restrict their applicability.753  In North Carolina, for 
example, stalking refers only to instances where the stalker follows or is in the physi-
cal presence of the victim754 and in Maryland the State law defines stalking in terms of 
751 For further discussion, see Whitman, James. Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty (113 Yale Law 
Journal 1151, 2003).
752 see Public Law 107-296, Section 304.
753 see Miller, Neal. Stalking Laws and Implementation Practices: A National Review for Policymakers and Practitioners 
(2001), p. 36, available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197066.pdf
754 see N.C. Gen. Stat., § 14-277.3.
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approaching or pursuing a person.755 Since then, state and federal laws have provided 
for stalking by means of telecommunication devices. However, while federal law now 
covers cyberstalking or stalking using electronic devices, the law is only applicable 
when the stalker or perpetrator has threatened, harassed or intentionally annoyed an-
other person (Miller, 2001). Therefore, stalking laws are arguably not applicable to the 
use of telecommunication/electronic communication devices to purely track or monitor 
the movements of another person using electronic or digital means (Miller, 2001). 
Furthermore, the law, at present, is neither anticipatory of the further advancement 
of the technology in the very near future. Today, a separate legal framework is more or 
less applied for the information society/virtual world and the physical world. However, 
as the physical world and virtual world are more and more merged or ‘bridged’ so to 
speak, due to the potential of an ‘Internet of Things’ and an ‘Internet of Persons’, this 
separation is deficient and increasingly no longer valid.  
In summary, in light of the above legal deficiencies and dilemmas, the law, as it 
stands now, is unable to adequately protect the privacy and civil liberties of implantees, 
uphold the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment, ensure privacy against the intru-
sive capabilities of HIMs or other PLDs, provide for the reasonable privacy of location 
information in an age of increasing location-awareness, and permanently guarantee the 
voluntary implantation of HIMs. 
7.10 RECOMMENDATIONS ON ENHANCING THE US LEGAL FRAME  
 WORK
As US Vice President Joseph Biden (then US Senator) notably expressed, when listing 
potential landmark decisions for the 21st Century, during the US Supreme Court confir-
mation hearings for Justice John Roberts in September 2005:
Can a microscopic tag be implanted in a person’s body to track his every 
movement? There’s actual discussion about that. You will rule on that — 
mark my words — before your tenure is over.756  
755 see Md. Code Ann., art. 27, §124.
756 “Transcript: Day One of the Roberts Hearings” (Washington Post, 13 September 2005), available at: http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/linkset/2005/09/14/LI2005091402149.html
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However, once again, if we adopt the “originalist” or “textualist” approach to under-
standing the US Constitution, then entirely new laws should be adopted, when deemed 
necessary, by elected legislators/representatives. Therefore, instead of relying on the 
US Supreme Court to judge in the future (sometime in the next 10-15 years) on the 
legality of HIMs and to finally rule on the legality of prolonged, widespread electronic 
tracking of individuals or to clarify the definitive standard for the US Government to be 
permitted to access location information, the US Congress should proactively formu-
late and adopt comprehensive Federal legislation. Specific laws for HIMs and location 
information would eliminate the excessive dependence on US courts to fill in the legal 
vacuum with altering and opposing judicial interpretations. After all, the legislative 
branch, once again, is meant to create law, as opposed to the judicial branch, which is 
principally meant to apply it. Besides, as outlined earlier, based on the relevant legal 
precedent, it may be unfavorable, in this case, to solely rely on the US Supreme Court. 
Nevertheless, it will probably take at least 15 years or more and the widespread 
deployment of HIMs before the US Congress adopts comprehensive legislation regu-
lating HIMs. As Herbert argues, “[t]he lack of substantial legislative movement in the 
field of tracking technology renders it unlikely that there will be a federal legislative 
response to human implants in the near future” (2006, p. 443). Moreover, as Herbert 
further points out, “it is far more probable that a majority in the current [109th] Congress 
will continue to defer to the marketplace for potential corrective action aimed at avoid-
ing privacy intrusions” (2006, p. 413). This is consistent with the overall US policy and 
approach to privacy protection, whereby legislation is adopted only after the privacy 
threat becomes serious. It is also consistent with the arguably mistaken belief that regu-
lations are still premature for RFID applications. 
Legislation should establish specific privacy safeguards to counter the serious 
threats to privacy posed by both RFID and GPS technology, particularly in the wake of 
HIMs being developed and deployed. Still, such legislation should also be comprehen-
sible and flexible enough, and thus applicable to location information regardless of the 
technology (system, device, etc.) used, and to all entities and services that generate or 
require access to location information. With a flexible approach, LBS, location-aware 
applications and human tracking activities are broadly covered in an increasing loca-
tion-aware world. Nevertheless, the legal rules for HIMs will need to be particularly 
more restrictive and precise than, for example, the use of a GPS tracking device by an 
employer in a company-owned vehicle to track their employees only during working 
hours (Herbert, 2006) or the use of a tracking device in a rented vehicle.
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There have been a number of attempts to pass federal legislation regulating RFID. 
For instance, in 2004, the Opt Out of ID Chips Act757 was introduced in the US House 
of Representatives, but ended up being unsuccessful. Although federal legislation on 
regulating RFID has suffered strong opposition, there are exceptional supporters within 
the US Congress.758  There have also been attempts to pass legislation to regulate and 
protect the privacy of location information in general. 759 
Specific laws, regulations and adaptations in the legal framework are required to 
safeguard privacy against the threats posed by HIMs and other location-based services. 
These laws and regulations will not necessarily thwart innovation or commerce per-
taining to RFID and GPS. On the contrary, specific laws and regulations could facili-
tate further development and deployment, ensuring the consumer confidence and trust 
necessary to open the market to the array of security and commercial benefits HIMs, 
and other RFID and GPS applications, can indeed provide.760 Without specific federal 
regulations, both the private and public sector will face public opposition from all di-
rections to the widespread deployment of HIMs. As RAND Europe equally asserts, the 
lack of specific mandates is an obstacle to the further deployment of RFID, suggesting 
that legislation, supported by public information campaigns, will address the privacy 
concerns and uncertainties of the general public towards RFID.761 The uncertainties of 
the scope of data protection rules and the concept of personal data are also a main cause 
of regulatory uncertainty for industry players and investors in RFID applications, as 
revealed by the 2006 RFID public consultation in Europe.762 Still, there are those who 
757 H.R. 4673, 108th Congress (2004).
758 US Senator Patrick Leahy, a consistent defender of privacy, has persistently warned that RFID technology must be 
federally regulated and has called for congressional hearings on the technology. see Remarks of US Senator Leahy, 
“The Dawn of Micro Monitoring: Its Promise, and Its Challenges to Privacy and Security,” Conference On “Video 
Surveillance: Legal And Technological Challenges”, Georgetown University Law Center, 23 March 2004, available at: 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200403/032304.html
759 see S.1164, The Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001, Section 2, introduced unsuccessfully by former US Senator 
John Edwards during the 107th session of Congress. 
760 I sent an email to VeriChip’s VP for Investor Relations along those lines and inquired about the company’s views and 
suggestions for potential legislation. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, I never received a reply. 
761 see Anna-Marie Wilamovska, et al. Study on the requirements and options for RFID applications in healthcare, RAND 
Europe (2008), Prepared for the Directorate General Information Society and Media of the European Commission, pp. 
54-56.
762 SEC(2007)312, Results of the online consultation on future RFID technology policy. 
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argue that additional laws could dampen the innovation of new technologies. But, of 
course this depends on the specific content of those laws.
With the use of RFID and GPS to potentially track and record the movements of 
people and the consequential threats to privacy in public, the moment is now more than 
ever to address privacy out in public. As Ramesh (1997) declares, with regards to HIMs, 
“[t]he time to prevent grievous intrusion into personal privacy by enacting appropriate 
legislative safeguards is now, rather when it is too late”.763
Embedding physical objects with RFID tags and the growth of IoT also requires spe-
cific legislation, but RFID applications involving individuals, in particular, requires spe-
cial attention. While state level legislation that addresses RFID/GPS implants and human 
tracking is a good start, Federal legislation is ideal. Federal laws regulating HIMs and 
government access to location information would prevent differing state laws. Moreover, 
the privacy and civil liberty concerns pertaining to HIMs and location information are 
naturally inter-state issues as people travel across state lines. In any case, as Garfinkel et 
al. (2005) similarly propose, the law must apply the core principles of privacy protection 
to RFID systems, which is equally true for both RFID and GPS implants.
7.10.1 Consent
First and foremost, based on the principle of consent, and the general understanding con-
cerning the autonomy of individuals, a Federal law, more comprehensive than the state 
laws of Wisconsin, North Dakota and California, must explicitly prohibit any private or 
public entity from mandating or requiring an individual to have a HIM implanted or any 
other foreseeable tracking or identification mechanism instilled for whatever reason, al-
beit with certain exceptions. Although consent implies that an individual equally has the 
right to withdraw his or her consent, the law must also specifically guarantee the right 
to request the HIM to be temporarily deactivated (if possible) or permanently removed.
The implantation of HIMs should not only at be voluntary (with certain excep-
tions), but should also never be a condition of exercising another right, including, but 
not limited to, the right to receive welfare or social security benefits, to work, to vote, 
to open a bank account, to conduct a commercial transaction, to travel, to take out 
insurance, to receive medical treatment or to be granted physical access to public or 
semi-public spaces and, with certain exceptions (see below), government-managed 
buildings. Hospitals must be prohibited from requiring newly born children to be im-
763 see Ramesh, Elaine M. Time Enough? Consequences of Human Microchip Implantation, Franklin Pierce Law Center 
(1997), available at: http://www.fplc.edu/risk/vol8/fall/ramesh.htm
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planted. Moreover, any individual who consents to be implanted with a HIM, or any 
other identification or tracking device, must be at least 18 years of age, as Katherine 
Albrecht equally advocates.764  But, parents (or legal guardians) may give their consent 
for their minor children to be implanted. 
No individual should be discriminated against by any entity simply because they 
refuse to have a HIM implanted (or to be tracked by any other device for that matter) 
nor favored in any way simply because they consented to have a HIM implanted, as 
advocated by Katherine Albrecht, the Director of CASPIAN, a consumer privacy or-
ganization, in her legislative proposals concerning HIMs.765 Equally, as Spivey (2005) 
asserts, insurance companies should be prohibited from offering incentives, such as a 
price reduction or other advantages, in return for their consent to be implanted with a 
HIM.766 Any other incentive, discount, or other program that favors implantees must 
also be prohibited. On the other hand, individuals should equally not be discriminated 
against for consenting to have a HIM implanted.
Consent, however, may not always be appropriate or required, and may even be at 
times contrary to the public good and needs of society. Extremely narrow exceptions 
may apply to convicted violent criminals and the worst sex offenders, where relevant 
in the vital interest of public security. These individuals could potentially be compelled 
by the Government to be implanted with a HIM as a condition of parole, subject to 
Eighth Amendment considerations regarding the prohibition of cruel and inhuman pun-
ishment and due process considerations embodied under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
While Herbert (2006) argues that the Thirteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, 
which prohibits slavery or forced servitude, could also serve as a basis for prohibiting 
any mandatory implantation, by comparing mandatory implantation to slavery, there 
is indeed an exception for the punishment of a crime. Nonetheless, only courts should 
decide, in accordance with the law, which violent criminal should be compelled to 
be implanted with a HIM, and not the police nor any other law enforcement agency. 
Moreover, the basis of the decision should be strictly based on individualized assess-
ments of danger, as opposed to simply mandating, for example, that all sex offenders be 
implanted, in order to completely avoid legal challenges, as Hinson (2008) argues with 
764 see Katherine Albrecht’s Bodily Integrity Act, available at: http://www.antichips.com/anti-chipping-bill-v07-numbered.
pdf
765 see Katherine Albrecht’s Bodily Integrity Act, available at: http://www.antichips.com/anti-chipping-bill-v07-numbered.
pdf
766 see Spivey, Crystal. Breathing New Life Into HIPAA’s UHID – Is The FDA’s Green Light To The VeriChip™ The Prince 
Charming Sleeping Beauty Has Been Waiting For? (9 DePaul Journal of Health Care Law, 2005-06), pp. 1317-1342, 
at 1340.
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regards to GPS bracelets. Once the conditions of parole are fully satisfied, the RFID 
or GPS implant in a convicted violent criminal or sex offender may be removed, if re-
quested by the qualified parolee and equally approved by a court of law. 
In addition, certain government employees, which require the highest-level of se-
curity, may perhaps reasonably be compelled to be implanted with a HIM as a condi-
tion of employment. However, they too must have the right to request the immediate 
removal of the HIM, if they have resigned or their employment contract has terminated 
or they have been dismissed. On the other hand, in no circumstances whatsoever, may 
private entities compel an individual to be implanted. 
Any application that removes or diminishes an individual’s anonymity with regards 
to RFID technology must also be prohibited,767 unless the person concerned gives his or 
her express consent. Accordingly, the law must prohibit the coupling of the unique ID 
number of a HIM or any other RFID microchip to information associated with credit 
or debit cards and any personal information, including name, address, date of birth, 
telephone number and social security number, unless the person concerned expressly 
consents otherwise. Equally, the type of information associated with an RFID implant 
should be at the discretion of the implantee concerned, but narrow exceptions may ap-
ply to certain convicted violent criminals and sex offenders.
A person’s consent to collect location information through their HIM may also entail 
the permission to store it for a certain period of time, since that occurs automatically. 
However, granting permission to collect and temporarily store location information does 
not entail the permission to disclose it to third parties, without additional explicit permis-
sion/consent to do so. The opt-in standard of consent alone must be mandated for the 
processing or disclosing of location information, lawfully collected and retained through 
HIMs, or any other RFID tag and/or PLD and/or location-aware device, on each separate 
occasion. Opt-in consent will endow implantees an opportunity to decide whether or not 
to allow their location information to be disclosed, essentially returning, for the most part, 
their ability to control what others may know about them. The opt-in standard of consent 
in the US is customary. As the FCC points out, most privacy laws in the US “do not em-
ploy an opt-out approach but rather require an individual’s explicit consent before private 
information is disclosed or employed for secondary purposes”.768 HIM service provid-
ers, data controllers and any other provider of personal tracking or LBS must maintain 
a record of the opt-in consent and the details of any disclosure of location information, 
including the name of the third party and the specific purpose of the disclosure. The opt-
767 see FTC staff report on RFID, p. 20. 
768 Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 07-22, 13 March 2007, p. 26. 
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in consent must also be explicit and should be invalid if the data subject is not genuinely 
informed of the purpose(s) of the disclosure (see section 7.10.7). 
Similar to the exceptions found in the ECPA, exceptions to the opt-in consent rule, 
with regards to the disclosing or processing of an implantee’s location information, may 
include the reasonable belief that the disclosure is necessary for emergency response 
purposes, the fact that the person concerned is knowingly missing or has been kid-
napped, the need to execute contractual obligations or the need to comply with lawful 
requests from law enforcement agencies in possession of a warrant.
7.10.2 Proportionality
The non-consensual based implantation of HIMs must only be permitted if the reasons 
for doing so are legitimate and proportionate in a democratic and free society. If a less 
intrusive alternative to HIMs is available, which accomplishes similar objectives and pro-
vides similar security benefits, then perhaps that alternative should be used instead. But, 
as explained earlier, a true alternative to HIMs is not really available at the moment.  
Moreover, the quantity and scope of the location information collected and any other 
personal data associated with HIMs, or any other PLD or location-aware device for that 
matter, should be in line with the objectives and purposes for which the data was col-
lected in the first place, as specified, for example, in a HIM purpose declaration attached 
to a standard or tailor-made service provider agreement. No more data than is required to 
fulfill the specified purposes should be collected and/or linked to the HIM, in accordance 
with both the principle of proportionality and the principle of data minimization.
7.10.3 Purpose specification 
Those individuals who have consented to have a HIM implanted or have been lawfully 
compelled to do so, do not simply forfeit their right to privacy and should nonetheless 
enjoy certain privacy protections and legal safeguards.
The law must prohibit any entity from accessing or monitoring the location infor-
mation of a person implanted with a HIM, or in any way in possession of a locating/
tracking device or embedded RFID tag (i.e. the data subject), outside the designated 
area and/or scope and specified purpose the same individual has given his/her opt-in 
consent to have his/her movements to be tracked, such as a secure area or office space, 
regardless if he/she is traveling in public and especially when he/she is off-duty. Certain 
exceptions may apply to law enforcement agencies with a proper warrant. 
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A HIM purpose declaration/end-user agreement/service contract can serve as the 
legal, as opposed to technological, means of providing not just the opt-in consent, but 
the basis for any private legal action against a data controller who intentionally collects, 
monitors or accesses the location information of an implantee beyond the specified 
and legitimate purposes agreed upon. The purpose declaration can be included in a 
standard service provider agreement/service contract, binding all relevant data control-
lers, service providers and any other applicable party, taking into account the relevant 
laws/regulations. With regards to RFID implantees, the purpose declaration, as the EC 
similarly recommends for other RFID applications, should specify which data is col-
lected, which association, if any, from the RFID tag to personal data is made, and what 
the possible privacy risks are.769 
However, as the EU’s Article 29 Working Party points out, “the principle of pur-
pose limitation may be more difficult to apply and to control”,770 without solving the 
drawbacks of RFID interoperability and ensuring that only authorized readers can read 
RFID tags.771 Moreover, if RFID implants are to serve as means of identification for 
private individuals, then the implants should only respond to trusted RFID readers, in 
conformity with the “Law of Directed Identity”.772 Where necessary, human-centric 
RFID systems should provide for mutual authentication, whereby only authorized read-
ers can read the RFID microchips.773 As proposed by the Article 29 Working Party, one 
way is to limit the initial query of readers to target only relevant RFID tags in the first 
place, thereby realizing the collection limitation principle at the protocol level.774 Simi-
larly, Floerkemeier et al. (2005) proposed that the fair information principles (FIPs) can 
be incorporated at the “reader-to-tag protocol level”, whereby they are implemented 
769 see Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Commission Recom-
mendation on the implementation of privacy and data protection principles in applications supported by radio-frequency 
identification “RFID Privacy, Data Protection and Security Recommendation” {C(2009) 3200 final}.
770 see Working document on data protection issues related to RFID technology, WP 105, 19 January 2005.
771 Ibid.
772 The Law of Directed Identity is law number four of the seven Laws of Identity, which were formulated by Kim Cam-
eron, together with other experts online, in order to improve trust in the security and privacy of Internet use. The Laws 
of Identity are available at: http://www.identityblog.com
773 see Article 29 Working Party, Working document on data protection issues related to RFID technology, WP 105, 19 
January, 2005.
774 Ibid., p. 6. 
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directly at the point of data collection, rather than afterwards,775 similar to how W3C’s 
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) integrated machine readable privacy 
policies into the browser-to-server protocol, allowing for a user’s web browser to auto-
matically read the privacy policy of a website, compare it with the user’s preferences, 
and automatically take action on behalf of the user by either permitting or blocking 
the transfer of his/her personal data.776 The incorporation of the FIPs directly into the 
underlying protocol could also better enable both consumers (data subjects) and data 
controllers to enforce the corresponding regulations.777 
In the case of RFID implantees, they could potentially set their privacy preferences, 
whereby only RFID readers that match these preferences would be allowed to read the 
RFID implant. As the managers of the RFID Ecosystem778 proposed with regards to 
non-implantable RFID tags, RFID implantees could similarly specify rules that de-
scribe which TREs should be accessible to which users and which TREs should be 
deleted automatically (see Rastogi et al., 2007). But, as the managers of the project also 
point out, this could limit the utility of the system (Ibid.). Juels and Brainard (2004) 
had earlier suggested a similar idea, which they termed “soft blocking”, whereby the 
data subjects also set their privacy preferences and the RFID readers are designed to 
comply accordingly. Alternatively, Ayoade et al. (2007) proposed a system called an 
Authentication Processing Framework (APF) that can potentially authenticate readers 
before they can access the RFID tag’s information in a specific system. The idea is that 
RFID tags and readers are registered on a database, which then authenticates the read-
ers before being allowed to read the information contained on the registered RFID tags.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (see Schulzrinne, H. et al., 2009) has 
also proposed a protocol-independent model for access to location information. The 
model includes a Location Generator (LG) that determines location information, a Lo-
cation Server (LS) that authorizes access to location information, a Location Recipi-
ent (LR) that requests and receives location information, and a Rule Maker (RM) that 
775 see Floerkemeier, Christian., et al. Scanning with a Purpose – Supporting the Fair Information Principles in RFID 
Protocols, Distributed Systems Group, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (2005), p. 1, available at: http://www.
vs.inf.ethz.ch/res/papers/floerkem2004-rfidprivacy.pdf
776 Ibid. p. 2.
777 Ibid.
778 The RFID Ecosystem is a building-wide RFID project at the University of Washington using thousands of tags and 
hundreds of readers. The purpose of the project is to demonstrate the risks, benefits, and challenges of user-centered 
RFID systems and to propose technological solutions to minimizing privacy loss. see RFID Ecosystem, available at: 
http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/index.html
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writes authorization policies. An authorization policy is a set of rules that regulates an 
entity’s activities with respect to privacy-sensitive information, in this case location 
information. The rule set allows the user to restrict the retention and to enforce access 
restrictions on location information, including prohibiting any dissemination to certain 
individuals, during particular times or when in a specific location. The model can also 
enable the user to control how long the LR may retain the location information and 
further distribute it.779
The ‘Internet of Persons’ may equally be based on a system whereby the Inter-
net is leveraged, but access to the location information of any RFID/GPS implantee is 
restricted to those who are registered for the service, logged-in with a username and 
password and have explicit permission from the implantee concerned to access that 
information. Therefore, although the means of finding and sharing location information 
may be available via the Internet, the actual ability to share that information is managed 
by the implantee.
In addition, the technological, as opposed to legal, means of restricting the track-
ing of an individual’s movements beyond the area in which they have given consent to 
be tracked may also consist of setting up a so-called “digital territory”.780 In this case, 
a “digital territory” is simultaneously applied to both the physical and virtual space 
(Beslay and Hakala, 2007). With regards to HIMs, once an implantee moves outside the 
designated “digital territory”, for instance, the ‘bridge’ that merges the physical space 
with the virtual space (Ibid.) is temporarily severed until the implantee re-enters into 
the designated “digital territory”. 
While obfuscation and anonymity are somewhat suitable technical solutions for 
other LBS or location-aware applications, these approaches may not be completely 
suitable for HIMs, since the purpose of HIMs is to in fact accurately identify and track 
the implantee, albeit under certain conditions, in accordance with the proposed laws 
and as specified within the implantee’s service provider agreement and/or HIM purpose 
declaration. However, the location information should be rendered anonymous once 
it is no longer required for the specified purposes it was collected and retained in the 
first place. Nonetheless, anonymity may be useful to hide the location of individuals 
in certain areas or during certain time periods. Moreover, as the EC recommends as an 
779 see Schulzrinne, H. et al., “Geolocation Policy: A Document Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences for Location-
Information”, The Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet Draft, February 2009, available at: http://www.ietf.org/id/
draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-21.txt
780 For further discussion, see, for example, Beslay, Laurent., and H. Hakala. “Digital Territory: bubbles” in Paul T. Kidd 
(ed.) European Visions for the Knowledge Age: A Quest for New Horizons in the Information Society (Cheshire Hen-
bury, 2007).
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option, a RFID tag could use pseudonyms, whereby the tag can respond with different 
ID numbers, but the authorized back-office of the system is able to match the different 
ID numbers to the same RFID tag, whereas this would be much more difficult for an 
unauthorized party.781
7.10.4 Use limitation 
While RFID implants are associated with data controllers, they do not necessarily re-
quire a wireless service provider. GPS implants, on the other hand, require a service 
provider, as a result of the required use of a cellular network and the desired storage of 
the location information. As a service to the customer (i.e. the GPS implantee or data 
subject), the location information generated by GPS implants should be stored for a 
certain period of time, in case law enforcement agencies, for instance, need to locate 
the implantee if he/she is either kidnapped or goes missing. 
However, any location information generated by both RFID and GPS implants should 
be deleted or at least rendered anonymous once it is no longer required for the specified 
purposes (for example, after 7 days) or should only be retained, in its identifiable form, for 
a period of time proportionate to the purposes for which it was collected, unless otherwise 
authorized to be retained for a greater period of time by the implantees concerned. 
In addition, the location information should only be retained as long as the service 
provider or data controller requires it in order to provide the particular services that the 
implantees have authorized. As the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee of 
the DHS similarly proposes, in order to avoid ‘function creep’,782 the data collected by 
781 see Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Commission Recom-
mendation on the implementation of privacy and data protection principles in applications supported by radio-frequency 
identification “RFID Privacy, Data Protection and Security Recommendation” {C(2009) 3200 final}
782 The term “function creep” refers to any additional use of personal data beyond the specified purposes for which the per-
sonal data was permitted to be collected in the first place. Function creep occurs when “personal data collected for one 
specific purpose and in order to fulfill one function, are used for completely different purposes, which are totally unre-
lated to the ones for which they were initially collected”. Tzanou, Maria. The EU as an Emerging Surveillance Society: 
The Function Creep Case Study and Challenges to Privacy and Data Protection (4 Vienna Online Journal on Interna-
tional Constitutional Law, 2010), p. 421. Function creep “constitutes a breach to the purpose limitation principle” (Ibid.)
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RFID technology should only be used for the stated objective and kept “for only as long 
as necessary to meet the original objective for which it was collected”.783 
A number of difficulties may still arise in enforcing a prohibition on reading RFID 
implants or other RFID tags on a person without the knowledge and/or permission of 
that person. To serve as an additional deterrent, the law could potentially also mandate 
that all RFID readers manufactured for sale in the US make a sound audible within 
several feet from the reader whenever a HIM or other RFID tag is read, in order to 
better alert individuals that a RFID tag/microchip has been read. It is already common 
for RFID readers to make a sound when used in access control systems, such as those 
found at places of business. Such a measure would be similar to the bill introduced by 
US Congressman Peter King, which aims to require cell phones containing digital cam-
eras to make a sound when a photo is taken using them, in order to inform individuals 
that a photo has been taken nearby.784 
The law should also prohibit the use of read-write tags for the manufacture of 
HIMs and mandate that HIMs remain passive and are manufactured from read-only or 
WORM tags. In the case of HIMs manufactured from read-only tags, the data stored on 
the HIMs should be limited to the unique ID number. In the case of HIMs manufactured 
from WORM tags, the implantee may request additional information, such as date of 
birth, in addition to the unique ID number, to be stored on the HIM. While there is no 
real need for the RFID implant to have much more than the unique ID number stored, 
RFID implantees themselves should alone have the final say. Nevertheless, it is recom-
mended that only the unique ID number be stored on the RFID implant, as any storage 
of additional personal data would significantly increase the threat to privacy and data 
security risk. 
Furthermore, the law should also regulate the procedure for implanting HIMs. 
While the law cannot necessarily prohibit someone from implanting a RFID implant by 
themselves, it can prohibit the business of implanting HIMs at any place other than li-
censed clinics, including tattoo or piercing parlors. Moreover, there should be an estab-
lished protocol regulating not just the implantation of HIMs, but also their removal. A 
standard waiver agreement should also be adopted and used by all the licensed clinics.
783 The Use of RFID for Human Identify Verification, Report No. 2006-02, Data Privacy & Integrity Advisory Committee, 
Adopted 6 December 2006, p. 11, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_advcom_12-2006_
rpt_RFID.pdf
784 see H.R. 414, entitled “Camera Phone Predator Alert Act”, introduced 9 January 2009. The text of this proposal, how-
ever, is already outdated since other devices, such as Apple’s iPods and iPads, now have integrated cameras. In Japan, 
camera phones are already required to make a shutter sound when used.
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7.10.5 Enforcement, accountability and redress
Any individual who coerces or compels or otherwise requires another individual to be 
implanted with a HIM, or in any way implants a HIM in a person without that person’s 
consent, should be subject to criminal penalties. Each violation should be considered 
a felony, rather than a misdemeanor offense, since it is a serious violation of bodily 
integrity and a form of physical assault. 
Anyone implanted with a RFID implant, or in any way in possession of a RFID tag, 
is still potentially broadcasting their identity to anyone or anything with a RFID reader 
several centimeters to a couple feet away. The law should, therefore, criminalize the 
eavesdropping of RFID implants, without that person’s explicit consent, unless done 
so by law enforcement agencies, in accordance with the law. Accordingly, RFID data 
transmissions concerning individuals should explicitly be deemed a form of electronic 
communication, thereby causing the ECPA to apply.785  
Similarly, the monitoring or interception of the signals of a GPS implant (or any 
other GPD device) without the knowledge and consent of that person, unless done so by 
law enforcement agents (under certain circumstances), must also be prohibited. 
In order to criminalize the unauthorized interception of the radio signals broad-
casted from GPS implants, the ECPA needs to be amended to remove the exception 
concerning tracking devices (Karim, 2004) and/or the broadcasting of location infor-
mation, in any form or from any (electronic) source, should also be deemed a form of 
electronic communication. 
It is also critical that statutory law explicitly regards GPS tracking (i.e. electronic 
tracking) as a search and ensures that the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply 
(Hutchins, 2007).786 Equally, when law enforcement agents seek to access or monitor 
the location information stored on the databases of service providers, for example, in 
order to conduct an investigation/gather criminal intelligence, statutory law should also 
specify that a warrant is needed, thereby applying the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment (Hutchins, 2007) and adjusting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.787 How-
785 see Levary, Reuven R., et al. “RFID, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Law” (RFID Journal, 14 February 2005), avail-
able at: http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1401/1/128/
786 see Hutchins, Renee. Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment (UCLA Law Review, Vol. 55, 
No. 1, 2007), pp. 409-465.
787 see S.1212, titled “Geolocation and Privacy Surveillance (GPS) Act”, introduced 15 June 2011 in Senate by Senator 
Ron Wyden (D-OR), Sec. 2602. The bill failed to become law.
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ever, certain exceptions may apply, in line with existing Federal wiretapping laws.788 
Warrants, for example, should not be required if the individual has presumably been kid-
napped or has specifically requested assistance.789  The law must also explicitly clarify, 
once and for all, that probable cause alone is required to obtain a warrant or court order 
to track the movements of an individual and/or to gain access to personally-identifiable 
location information, based on the belief that the concerned person has committed, 
is committing or will commit a crime.790 If deemed necessary or helpful at the initial 
stages, a dedicated and independent oversight committee could supervise the number of 
such warrants sought after and obtained, while also ensuring the legal requirements are 
being fulfilled. The statutory laws, however, should not alter existing legislation on the 
authority of intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveillance.791
With regards to the private sector, the law must also hold HIM service providers and 
any other provider of personal locating services, or controller/processor of location infor-
mation, accountable, if they gather and/or disclose an individual’s location information to 
any private third party without the explicit permission of the person concerned and/or in 
violation of a standard service provider agreement/HIM purpose declaration. The right to 
private action against the service providers (or private sector data controllers/processors) 
should, therefore, also be afforded to implantees who have suffered damages as a result of 
the unlawful collection and/or disclosure or processing activities.
Accordingly, tort law relevant to privacy intrusion must also be re-defined, where-
by location information may pertain to one’s private affairs and the disclosure of loca-
tion information may constitute an invasion upon one’s seclusion. This will enable an 
adversely affected individual, whose location information was unlawfully disclosed/
processed, to bring private legal action against any violator and to potentially receive 
compensation. In order to re-define tort law and permit invasions of privacy in public 
places to be actionable, McClurg (1995) proposes that the tort of seclusion should take 
into account, among other factors, the “magnitude of the intrusion, including the dura-
tion, extent, and the means of intrusion” (McClurg, 1995).
In order to ensure that the service providers/data controllers are not capable of 
potentially evading US law, the databases and web-servers associated with US-based 
788 see 18 USC §2511; S.1212, titled “Geolocation and Privacy Surveillance (GPS) Act”.
789 S.1212, titled “Geolocation and Privacy Surveillance (GPS) Act”, Sec. 2604.
790 see S.854, titled “The Electronic Rights for the 21st Century Act”, Sec. 102, introduced in the US Senate by Senator 
Patrick Leahy in 1999. The bill failed to become law.
791 S.1212, titled “Geolocation and Privacy Surveillance (GPS) Act”.
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HIM service providers should be prohibited from being placed in locations outside the 
jurisdiction of the US.
7.10.6 Access and participation
The law must mandate the ability for implantees to request access to all the information 
lawfully stored in databases associated with their HIM and be able to delete or correct 
any such information, at least up to the point permitted so by the service provider agree-
ment and HIM purpose declaration, where applicable. 
In the case of implantees under the age of 13, in accordance with the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), the parents or guardians must have the right to 
access all the information associated with their child’s HIM. 
Implantees should also have the ability to manage and control how their location 
information is shared and with whom. As the managers of the RFID Ecosystem pro-
posed and later demonstrated, data subjects can use a web interface to control/manage 
all the location information (and other data) associated with RFID tags.792 In the case of 
RFID implants, implantees should also be able to set privacy preferences, as explained 
previously in section 7.10.3. The sharing of location information associated with GPS 
implants could equally be managed online using the protocol-independent model pro-
posed by the IETF.793 A similar system has already been created by Useful Networks 
and applied to their sniff (Social Network Integrated Friend Finder) location-aware ap-
plication for smartphones.794
Another potential technological solution, albeit farfetched, would be to use RFID 
microchips with an on/off switch for RFID implants, giving greater control to the im-
plantee. The idea is based on the so-called “right to the silence of the chip”. However, 
knowing when the implant is on or off is another matter.795  Perhaps, an on/off switch 
792 see Welbourne, E., et al. Challenges for Pervasive RFID-based Infrastructure, PERTEC 2007, Workshop on Perva-
sive RFID/NFC Technology and Applications, 19 March 2007, available at: http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/images/
welbourne-pertec-07.pdf
793 Schulzrinne, H. et al., “Geolocation Policy: A Document Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences for Location In-
formation”, The Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet Draft, February 2009, available at: http://www.ietf.org/id/
draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-21.txt
794 Useful Networks, at: http://www.useful-networks.com/site/products/community/
795 see Paturi, Prasad. “Switching Off Credit Card Fraud” (RFID Journal, 12 September 2005), available at: http://www.
rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1843/1/82/
260 Human-implantable microchips: location-awareness & the dawn of the internet of persons
could equally be used for GPS implants. A more realistic solution, on the other hand, 
is the RFID Guardian, developed by a group of researchers, coordinated by Melanie 
Rieback, from Vrije University Amsterdam. The prototype RFID Guardian is battery-
powered and performs 2-way RFID communications, acting both like an RFID reader 
and an RFID tag. The tool could potentially be an implantee’s technological means for 
detecting the nearby presence of RFID readers, jamming an RFID reader’s capability 
of reading their RFID implant and for providing implantees the ability to control ac-
cess and authentication.796 Ideally and for practical purposes, the RFID Guardian will 
need to be small enough in order to be embedded, for example, within smartphones or 
other mobile computing devices.797 The development of radio-reflective shields worn 
over the area of the body where the implant is located, however, is likely an easier non-
technological alternative to the RFID Guardian or on/off switch.
7.10.7 Notice and awareness
As the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee of the DHS proposed, “[i]ndi-
viduals should know how and why RFID technology is being used, including what 
information is being collected and by whom”.798  RFID readers in public space must 
be clearly visible and not covertly hidden. Standardized and generic icons or emblems 
must also be clearly visible in order to indicate that RFID readers are present nearby799 
or inform individuals that they are entering into a “RFID-read zone” similar to the way 
the presence of CCTV cameras is indicated.800 The responsibility of ensuring that this 
notice is clearly present, accurate and appropriate should fall on both the data control-
lers and the entity, whether public or private, that has permitted the installation of RFID 
readers in the specific public space. The signs must accurately reveal the identity and 
contact information of the data controllers. The signs could also briefly explain the 
limited purpose and extent of the data collection.
796 For more information on the RFID Guardian project/device, see: http://www.rfidguardian.org
797 Ibid.
798 The Use of RFID for Human Identify Verification, Report No. 2006-02, Data Privacy & Integrity Advisory Committee, 
Adopted 6 December 2006, p. 11, at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_advcom_12-2006_rpt_RFID.
pdf
799 Ibid. 
800 see Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Commission Recom-
mendation on the implementation of privacy and data protection principles in applications supported by radio-frequency 
identification “RFID Privacy, Data Protection and Security Recommendation” {C(2009) 3200 final}.
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Preferably, a “universal accepted symbol” should be established, as proposed, al-
beit unsuccessfully, in a New Hampshire bill.801 A standard gold icon can already be 
found on passports from around the world indicating that the passport is embedded with 
a RFID microchip, but this is not suitable for RFID readers in public spaces. The Asso-
ciation for Automatic Identification and Mobility (AIM) has already developed a RFID 
emblem free for use, but it is nonetheless still the intellectual property of AIM. An 
ISO RFID emblem is currently in development. Once adopted, the ISO RFID emblem 
would be suitable for use in the US and could substitute the need for the US to create 
and adopt its own emblem. The ISO RFID emblem will contain the data controller’s 
name and contact information.802
The implantees should, once again, also be informed via the standardized HIM pur-
pose declaration/end-user agreement/service contract on the purposes of the collection 
and processing of their personal data.
In addition, the concerned implantees should be notified, where possible, of any 
unauthorized access and/or disclosure of the location information or other personal 
information associated with their HIM or of any security breach concerning such infor-
mation.803 Implantees should also have the option of being notified of any authorized 
access of their location information and should have the option of receiving recurring 
notices on who has been authorized to access this information, obviously with excep-
tion to legitimate law enforcement activities.
7.10.8 Security 
As the DHS Privacy Office Annual Report to Congress (2007-2008) recommended, 
several concepts and approaches reflected in the OECD Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems and Networks could be adapted to support the implementation of 
the OECD Privacy Guidelines.
Any RFID system, especially when involving human beings, as opposed to physical 
objects or animals, should be carefully designed to prevent the risk of various attacks, 
such as spoofing or cloning, encryption key cracking and eavesdropping or unauthorized 
801 N.H. H.R. 203 (defining “universally accepted symbol” as “a graphical system designed to provide a standard way to 
show the presence of an RFID transponder, its frequency, and data structure”). 
802 Europe, however, is in the process of creating its own RFID emblem.
803 US Senator Patrick Leahy introduced S.1490, titled “The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009”, which 
provided for a national standard for data breach notification.
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interception. As one commenter urged during the FTC workshop on RFID, “[a]uthoriza-
tion, authentication, and encryption for RFID . . . [should] be developed and applied on 
a routine basis to ensure trustworthiness of RFID radio communications”.804 Therefore, 
RFID implants for human use must no longer be based on the ISO11784/85 standard.
Accordingly, the law should mandate that RFID implants incorporate cryptograph-
ic functionalities and use symmetric encryption with a minimum key size of 128 bits, 
which requires the application of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Feldhofer 
et al., 2004). A 128-bit encryption key requires over fifty years to crack with the capa-
bilities of modern computers and the data contained on a RFID tag is basically useless if 
the encryption key cannot be cracked.805 Alternatively, instead of using key encryption, 
RFID implants could adopt Verayo’s authentication solution called “Physical Unclon-
able Functions” (PUFs), which is comprised of tiny, low power circuit primitives that 
exploit the unlimited, unique variations of the electrical behavior of each silicon chip.806 
Moreover, since HIMs are a component of an information network, the law must 
equally mandate that the network itself and the databases that store location informa-
tion and the personal data associated with any type of HIM (or any other PLD) are 
equally secure. 
A public authority (or authorized third party certification body) can certify that 
manufacturers of HIMs, data controllers and service providers are meeting these stan-
dards. A similar option was recommended by the EC for RFID applications.807 Any 
relevant party that fails to implement these security measures may then be held liable.
Accordingly, official RFID security guidelines will be helpful. The German Federal 
Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
or BSI), for example, has already developed Technical Guidelines on how to implement 
RFID applications/systems in a secure, but functional way, in order to better ensure the 
privacy of the associated personal data. The BSI recommended that these Technical 
Guidelines be incorporated into the pan-European PIA Framework for RFID applica-
804 FTC staff report on RFID, p. 20.
805 see Williams, Lorraine C. A Discussion of the Importance of Key Length in Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptography, 
SANS Institute, GIAC practical repository, 2002, p. 3, available at: http://www.giac.org/certified_professionals/prac-
ticals/gsec/0848.php
806 see Verayo, available at: http://www.verayo.com/technology.html
807 see Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Commission Recom-
mendation on the implementation of privacy and data protection principles in applications supported by radio-frequency 
identification, “RFID Privacy, Data Protection and Security Recommendation” {C(2009) 3200 final}, 5.2.3., Option I.c.
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tions.808 The BSI also plans to offer a certification service that certifies the adequate 
implementation of these Technical Guidelines.
7.10.9 Privacy Impact Assessment
In addition, the US Government should also formally adopt a comprehensive RFID PIA 
framework809 that is similar (though not identical) to the European version.810 The PIA 
should be compulsory for any RFID application that involves personal data, regardless 
whether that data is held by public or private entities.811  
Accordingly, the law should be altered to require PIAs for both public and private 
entities, and the requirement should additionally also be relevant for all instances where 
data processing activities may pose threats to the privacy of data subjects. 
Like the EU’s RFID PIA framework, the US framework should include the require-
ment to specifically carry out an ex-ante assessment/evaluation of the data protection 
risks and threats to privacy and, based on the assessment, to identify and evaluate mea-
sures to counter, mitigate, prevent and/or eliminate these risks and threats.812 Further-
more, similar to the EU’s PIA framework, the US PIA framework could be primarily 
808 The BSI presented this recommendation during the 3rd meeting of the RFID Recommendation Implementation In-
formal Working Group at the EC. During the meeting, the establishment of the European RFID PIA was discussed. 
Industry associations, standardization bodies, public authorities and a representative from the Article 29 Working Party 
were present at the meeting.
809 In US law, a PIA is described as “an analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling conforms to appli-
cable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy, (ii) to determine the risks and effects of collecting, 
maintaining and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic information system, and (iii) to examine 
and evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks” (E-
Government Act of 2002, Section 208).
810 see Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications, 12 January 2011, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/documents/infso-2011-00068.pdf
811 As a step further, PIAs should be mandatory before the deployment of any IT system which involves personal data, 
regardless of the sector (see Cannataci, 2011). Cannataci also argues that this may be possible in the EU by 2015, as part 
of the EC’s wider review of data protection policy options (2011, p. 180).
812 For further discussion, see Cannataci, Joseph A. Recent developments in privacy and healthcare: Different paths for 
RFID in Europe and North America? (International Journal of RF Technologies, Volume 2, 2010/2011), pp. 173-187.
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developed by significant industry players/stakeholders and reviewed and approved by 
regulators.813 
However, contrary to the EU’s RFID PIA, the US framework should also be ap-
plicable to the manufacturers/developers of RFID infrastructures/systems, and not only 
RFID application service providers. Therefore, a PIA should be carried out in both 
stages – before a RFID infrastructure/system is developed and deployed, and before 
a RFID application/service is developed and deployed. Accordingly, PIAs should be 
required for both IT service providers and manufacturers/developers.  
7.10.10 Definitions
The definition of location information would need to be formulated in a way to cover 
not only the extensively more intrusive location information HIMs are capable of gen-
erating, but to ensure, as far as possible, technological neutrality for protecting the 
privacy of the movements of individuals overall. Instead of the limited scope of loca-
tion information to telephones, cell phones and computers, as understood within the 
Telecom Act (and perhaps also by Article 2 of the ePrivacy Directive814), the definition 
should read as follows:
Location information shall either mean the precise physical location of an 
identifiable individual at any given moment and/or any collection of the daily 
movements of that individual tracked over any given period of time, using 
any means, whether in public or private areas, and shall include, but not lim-
ited to, geographic coordinates, street addresses, buildings, landmarks and 
tag read events, where relevant.
Only then will the privacy of location information or ‘location privacy’ have real 
meaning and effect in a court of law in the US.  
The definition of a tracking device should also be expanded to include not just elec-
tronic devices, such as RFID microchips and GPS devices, but any other automatic iden-
813 see Spiekermann, Sarah. “The RFID PIA – developed by industry, agreed by regulators” in David Wright and Paul de 
Hert (eds.), Privacy Impact Assessment: Engaging Stakeholders in Protecting Privacy (Springer, 2012).
814 Article 2(c) of the ePrivacy Directive defines location data as “any data processed in an electronic communications 
network, indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available electronic com-
munications service”.
Part II 265
tification technology, which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.815 
Other automatic identification technologies include Somark’s ID system, which is based 
on “a biocompatible ink tattoo with chipless RFID functionality”816 and QR code (2D bar-
code) tattoos. This will allow the law to cover all existing, foreseeable and unforeseeable 
advancements in human tracking, as similarly pointed out by Albrecht.817 Accordingly, 
the modified definition of a tracking device should read as follows: 
A tracking device shall mean any device, mechanism or system which permits 
the tracking of the movement of an individual and/or object carried by an 
individual, either by storing and/or transmitting location information and/or 
transmitting the identity of an individual via any associated number, symbol, 
mark or other individual identifier.
Cyberstalking/electronic tracking laws should be amended to eliminate the restric-
tion that cyberstalking occurs only when the perpetrator threatens, harasses or annoys 
another person by means of a telecommunications device. This will allow for the prohi-
bition of the use of any tracking device, including HIMs, or any other RFID microchip 
or GPS tracking device, for the unauthorized tracking of another person, unless done so 
by law enforcement agencies with a proper warrant.
The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 should already clearly 
cover identity theft via RFID implants and, therefore, the legislation does not necessar-
ily need to be amended to explicitly include the unique ID number of HIMs.
7.10.11 Constitutional and case law considerations 
Above and beyond explicitly regulating HIMs and the use of the location information 
generated by them, US courts must begin to recognize accordingly that there is an 
increasing overlap between the private sphere and the public sphere and also that the 
physical world and the virtual world are gradually merging, as a result of the potential 
for Internet of Things, Internet of Persons and Ambient Intelligence/ubiquitous com-
815 see Katherine’s Albrecht’s AntiChips website, available at: http://www.antichips.com
816 Somark, available at: http://www.somarkinnovations.com
817 see Katherine’s Albrecht’s AntiChips website, available at: http://www.antichips.com
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puting. Only then will the desired rules concerning HIMs, for instance, and the defini-
tion and adequate protection of location information turn out to be legally feasible.
The law must first better accommodate for the fact that one’s privacy can indeed 
be violated while out in public. The analysis of the Fourth Amendment by US courts 
must, therefore, shift the primary focus concerning the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy from simply where the search is conducted to the nature, content and purpose of 
the collected information itself (Karim, 2004). Moreover, the reasonable expectation 
of privacy should rather be driven by the common understandings of the level of pri-
vacy society expects overall when out in public. Nissenbaum’s “alternative account of 
privacy in terms of “contextual integrity”” (2004, p. 106) is equally relevant and may 
also be helpful for understanding the scope of privacy out in public and how it relates 
to public surveillance. In addition, the courts should also focus more on whether the 
loss of privacy is desirable or undesirable (Gavison, 1980). In any case, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy out in public should not be held hostage by the scale of the avail-
ability, deployment and use of PITs capable of mass public surveillance. 
Regardless if individuals carry around a GPS-enabled smartphone, mobile phone 
or PLD or have an HIM implanted, it is probably fair to say that most people have a rea-
sonable expectation that their movements or constant whereabouts in public should not 
be tracked or disclosed without their explicit knowledge and consent, unless done so by 
law enforcement agencies with a warrant backed by probable cause. In fact, the major-
ity of people believe their movements and whereabouts should be afforded the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment, albeit to a certain extent. For example, as a survey 
conducted in California previously showed, 72% of respondents supported legal limits 
on law enforcement access to location information generated by mobile phones.818 
Ultimately, courts should officially recognize the notion of ‘public privacy’, which 
also deserves protection in tort applications (McClurg, 1995).  Stalking laws, as Mc-
Clurg additionally points out, may already constitute the implied recognition of ‘public 
privacy’ (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, given that the location information generated by RFID implants or 
constantly transmitted by GPS implants or GPS-enabled smartphones can also be self-
incriminating, as Ramesh (1997) points out, the Fifth Amendment should be applied to 
this location information by categorizing its transmission as a ‘communicative act’.819 
818 see King, Jennifer and Chris Jay Hoofnagle. A Supermajority of Californians Supports Limits on Law Enforcement Ac-
cess to Cell Phone Location Information (18 April 2008), p. 8.
819 see Ramesh, Elaine M. Time Enough? Consequences of Human Microchip Implantation, Franklin Pierce Law Center 
(1997), available at: http://www.fplc.edu/risk/vol8/fall/ramesh.htm. 
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7.10.12 The international dimension
As a matter of DHS policy, known as the “Mixed Use Policy”, any personal informa-
tion processed in connection with a ‘mixed system’820 by the DHS should be treated as 
if it were subject to the Privacy Act 1974, regardless of whether the information per-
tains to a US citizen, LPR, visitor, or alien.821 Since implantees from foreign countries 
who travel to the US should enjoy the same privacy protection rights, the “Mixed Use 
Policy” should equally be applied to HIMs and any associated databases.
7.11 CONCLUDING REMARKS
RFID or GPS implants do not necessarily need to be banned, as there are public secu-
rity and personal safety gains, commercial advantages and healthcare delivery benefits 
to them. Besides, a total ban on HIMs would be an extreme measure and would not 
necessarily stop with HIMs. Banning HIMs could call into question why other similar 
or related technologies are not equally banned. Moreover, as the use of RFID and GPS 
technology grows evermore rapidly, people will, more than likely, accept the existence 
of HIMs and recognize these benefits, especially if the deployment of HIMs is carried 
out legitimately and proportionally.
While the security and commercial gains of the widespread deployment and greater 
use of RFID and GPS technology should be welcomed, the US legal framework, in 
particular, lacks the appropriate laws to ensure that both the associated privacy threats 
and security risks are tackled accordingly. However, this is not just a policy or legal is-
sue, but also a matter of technology. Tested technological solutions, mandated by law, 
are also required.  
The establishment and implementation of the required legal and technological 
safeguards should both ensure that the prospective widespread deployment and use of 
HIMs, and other applications of RFID and GPS technology, does not erode privacy and 
personal freedom, while also ensuring that the benefits of RFID and GPS technology, 
whether security, health, social or commercial, are maintained.
820 A mixed system is a system that contains information on both US and non-US citizens.
821 see DHS Privacy Office memorandum, Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum Number 2007-1 (“Mixed Use Policy”), 
issued on 19 January 2007.
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8.1 THE NEW THREATS TO PRIVACY
Today, when it comes to privacy issues, there is just too much talk about digital services 
and social networking websites, such as Facebook,822 and perhaps not enough attention 
paid to the potential impending reality that both clothes and walls could be rendered 
obsolete in terms of protecting privacy, thoughts could potentially be read, DNA analy-
sis could become even more extensive and widespread, the deployment of UAVs could 
be routine for domestic surveillance, every object or person could be identified and 
tracked, and every activity out in public could be potentially recorded. Already, body 
scanners have been deployed at airports around the world, location tracking is com-
monplace and the advanced surveillance capabilities of CCTV cameras are widespread.
The methods and means of privacy invasion and mass surveillance have never been 
greater, as the threat to privacy, at present, is often directly relative to the existence and 
deployment of PITs. On top of that, the threat to privacy and liberty, posed by the lat-
est PITs, are radical, unique and new, and are an affront to all domains and spheres of 
privacy. For instance, never before has technology been able to potentially see through 
clothes, read people’s minds, track every movement or automatically analyze and pos-
sibly predict human behavior. 
These new threats to privacy are real and here, and are not hypothetical or poten-
tial. Body scanners are rapidly being deployed, enhancements to CCTV cameras are 
increasingly being carried out and the scope and capabilities of RFID and GPS applica-
tions is evermore advancing. While HIMs have not yet reached a critical mass, given the 
circumstances, there is arguably real potential for their significantly greater (or perhaps 
widespread) deployment to occur within the next 10 years. 
The threats to privacy from PITs are not homogenous and the threats can emanate 
for different reasons and from different causes. For instance, the threats can come from 
822 Indeed, however, the threats to privacy posed by Facebook (and other social networking websites) should not be over-
looked and are increasingly becoming worrisome.
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the abuse or misuse of the privacy-intrusive capabilities of technologies (i.e. when users 
of PITs intentionally or unintentionally violate privacy and/or data protection laws), or 
simply from the technology itself regardless of how it is used, or from the intended or 
unintended purposes of the technology.  Moreover, not of all the threats can be predict-
ed and these uncertainties are in themselves a threat and equally should not be ignored 
(Sollie and Düwell, 2009).
The increasing development, deployment and use of body scanners, HIMs, and 
CCTV microphones and loudspeakers, not to mention the many other PITs in existence 
or in development, are changing, where applicable, the level of privacy we enjoy over 
our physical bodies and the nature of our public space. With the advancement of the lat-
est PITs, the risks, threat level and temptation of abuse have drastically increased. The 
means of privacy invasion and mass surveillance have never been greater and the threats 
to privacy and liberty posed by the latest PITs are uniquely new. 
However, that does not mean that any or all of the PITs addressed should be com-
pletely banned. That would require a complex explanation and methodology of deter-
mining what technologies should be considered acceptable and unacceptable based on 
a comprehensive ethical framework on evaluating technology.823
On the contrary, these technologies should arguably be embraced, as long as the ad-
equate legal framework is in place. Although PITs pose serious threats to privacy, they 
offer in return a common good, i.e. potential benefits in terms of security, convenience, 
electronic commerce and, in the case of RFID implants, also improved and safer health-
care delivery. Nevertheless, while benefits exist, the threats and risks persist.
8.2 BEYOND PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION 
If left unchecked and without the adequate legal framework in place, the latest PITs 
threaten not just the right to privacy, but other individual civil liberties as well. The latest 
PITs pose a threat to other civil liberties by causing a ‘chilling’ effect on fundamental 
rights, such as the freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of movement – 
freedoms, which are necessary in a free and democratic modern state. This is particularly 
true for technologies capable of mass public surveillance.824 For instance, the intrusive 
823 For further discussion, see Sollie, Paul and Marcus Duwell (eds)., Evaluating New Technologies: Methodological Prob-
lems For The Ethical Assessment Of Technology Developments (Springer, 2009).
824 For further discussion, see the Memorandum by Victoria Williams for the House of Lords Constitution Committee 
inquiry into the impact of surveillance and data collection upon the privacy of citizens, available at: http://www.publica-
tions.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/8051402.htm
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capabilities of HIMs could have a ‘chilling’ effect on the freedom of movement, as people 
become more cautious where they travel. HIMs, or the RFID microchips in travel cards 
for that matter, could also be used to interfere with the freedom of movement by denying 
or ‘digitally cutting-off’ a person’s access to mass public transportation. The capability 
of CCTV microphones, if left unchecked, could potentially have a ‘chilling’ effect both 
on the freedom of expression out in public and the freedom of assembly, and, thus, could 
also frustrate the right to protest peacefully. CCTV loudspeakers could especially have a 
detrimental effect on personal autonomy and dignity. 
Besides, the right to privacy and data protection laws are not always enough to 
defend liberty or check every threat posed by the latest PITs. In the US, the freedom 
from unreasonable search, embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, 
serves as the basis of the reasonable expectation of privacy. But, this expectation is 
subjective and vulnerable to the constantly advancing development and deployment of 
PITs. Moreover, even though location information can potentially reveal sensitive per-
sonal information, the location information generated by RFID and GPS applications 
is not necessarily or adequately afforded the protections of the Fourth Amendment, due 
to the current ambiguous division of what is private and what is public, and the lack of 
a legal recognition of privacy out in public. 
In the EU and the UK, data protection laws were formulated, for the most part, to 
control personal data, which is conventionally understood to mean information that 
relates to identified or identifiable individuals. But, this formulation also certainly has 
its downsides. For instance, even though the images produced by (fully-intrusive) body 
scanners are seriously privacy-invasive, the images may not necessarily always consti-
tute personal data or data in personally identifiable form per se, since a person arguably 
cannot be identified from the images alone, and therefore data protection laws alone 
may not be applicable or sufficient for regulating body scanners. While the recording 
of general sound out in public by CCTV microphones is intrusive, it is also arguably 
not considered personal data per se and, therefore, is not covered by data protection 
laws in the UK (since it is not focused on any particular individual, in accordance with 
UK case law). Data protection laws also do not apply to CCTV loudspeakers, since the 
loudspeakers are not used to process personal data, but CCTV loudspeakers, nonethe-
less, may pose a threat to the right to be left alone. Likewise, even when the use of RFID 
272 Conclusions of Part II
microchips is not initially linked specifically to identified individuals, threats to privacy 
still remain, since the data could potentially later be used, nonetheless, to identify, track 
and profile individuals. This brings us to the next downside. Data protection laws do 
not apply to anonymized data. However, with advanced data mining techniques and 
group profiling (i.e. the categorization of people), the effects could be just as bad as 
(or even worse than) processing personal data.825 Moreover, while the Data Protection 
Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) is certainly applicable for transactional acts, the Direc-
tive may not cover adequately non-transactional acts, such as interactions/relationships 
and opinions.
Applying the principles of privacy/data protection alone, therefore, cannot entirely 
address the potential impacts and threats of public surveillance technologies. As Vic-
toria Williams equally reminds us, in order to assess the impact of public surveillance 
schemes, the consideration of the effects on personal autonomy is required, concluding 
that lawmakers must also assess how the observation of public places creates a risk of 
‘chilling’ the right to exercise the freedom of speech and assembly.826 Accordingly, the 
right to privacy and other civil liberties or human rights need to be protected in an in-
tegrated manner. The legal framework should, as a result, not only focus on the right to 
privacy and data protection, but rather also emphasize on safeguarding other fundamen-
tal rights, where applicable, and better extending the regulation of privacy infringement 
into other domains, such as the human body and the public sphere. Hence, the legal 
and technical solutions for addressing the intrusive capabilities of PITs must not only 
be concerned with the right to privacy, but should also take into consideration, where 
applicable, other civil liberties and social and moral issues simultaneously.  
8.3 DEFICIENCIES OF THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
The legal framework in the US, as it stands now, is unequipped, for the most part, to 
meaningfully counteract the privacy threats posed by body scanners and HIMs, while 
the UK legal framework is equally inadequate to regulate CCTV microphones and 
CCTV loudspeakers. In terms of fulfilling the principles of privacy, with regards to 
these latest technologies, the deficiencies and dilemmas of the US and UK legal frame-
825 For that reason, the Article 29 Working Party specifically addresses this issue and argues that the scope of Directive 
95/46/EC applies to targeted profiling/online behavioral advertising. see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 
171, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 22 June 2010.
826 see supra note 824.
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works are evident. As deducted from the case studies, the deficiencies of the current 
legal framework, pertaining to privacy/data protection in the US and the UK/EU, are 
partly due to the fact that traditional policy or legal-based solutions focus predomi-
nantly on data controllers/processors, service providers and operators/users of PITs, as 
opposed to their developers/manufacturers. This approach fails to address the privacy-
intrusiveness of the technologies concerned at the design stage.
While there are certainly significant deficiencies in the US and UK legal frame-
works, with regards to the latest PITs, neither legal framework necessarily requires a 
complete overhaul. Instead, the legal frameworks require both amendments to existing 
laws, and new laws based on what continues to remain valid. 
Moreover, while some might argue that the privacy principles are losing validity, 
particularly in light of the latest technologies and the impending ubiquitous information 
society; this is only true if we let this occur. As demonstrated through the case stud-
ies, the common principles of privacy protection can still form the foundation to work 
from, and there is no need to reinvent the wheel at this juncture. The current principles 
of privacy indeed remain as the basis of assessing the adequacy of a legal framework in 
terms of protecting privacy and continue to be relevant and valid both for formulating 
new legislation and designing for privacy. However, this does not mean that there is no 
need whatsoever now or in the future to revisit the privacy principles, where necessary, 
or to even establish and add new principles.827 
Nevertheless, what is most essential is that there are adequate means, mechanisms 
and methodologies for enforcing and implementing the existing privacy principles 
against the evermore advancement of technology. Although both the US and UK/EU le-
gal framework express the goals and elements of privacy protection, the practical rules 
on how to realize them are inadequate. Without adequate and specific rules in practice, 
the developers of body scanners, HIMs and CCTV microphones and loudspeakers, for 
example, are left to voluntarily determine their own way of realizing these goals, and 
thus their level of responsibility for doing so or lack thereof.
Indeed, there is a vacuum of law, which must be dealt with accordingly, in order 
to bring the law up to speed with the latest threats to privacy and other civil liberties 
posed by the latest technologies. Throughout this dissertation, the recommendations 
on dealing with the deficiencies of the US and UK legal frameworks primarily focused 
on both legislative/policy and technological solutions, based on the widely established 
fundamental principles of privacy, as opposed to overhauling or reversing the problem-
827 Indeed, the OECD Secretariat supports a “global privacy dialogue” that is intended to revisit the 1980 OECD Guide-
lines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. see the DHS Privacy Office Annual Report 
to Congress, July 2007-July 2008, p. 77.
274 Conclusions of Part II
atic, altering (and potentially somewhat outdated) analysis and interpretation of courts 
within the US and UK.
While there is, to a certain extent, already a legal basis for PBD within the US and 
UK/EU legal frameworks (see section 9.6), the prevailing deficiency concerns the fact 
that the relevant provisions are primarily only applicable directly to data controllers 
and service providers, as opposed to the designers and/or manufacturers of the PITs 
themselves. Data protection/privacy laws and regulations have all too often focused on 
requiring data controllers/processors to comply. Unfortunately, even the draft proposal 
for an EU General Data Protection Regulation,828 while indeed a step in the right direc-
tion, proposes data protection by design (i.e. PBD) requirements that are erroneously 
only applicable to data controllers.829 
Although the laws could have an indirect effect on manufacturers, whereby the data 
controllers in turn compel or put pressure on manufacturers, this has evidently proved 
insufficient. Instead, the law should specifically emphasize additional obligations on 
the manufacturers/developers.
Part II evaluated/assessed the adequacy of the legal frameworks in the US and the 
UK and proposed some of the necessary amendments to enhance these legal frame-
works, in order to ensure that the right to privacy is preserved, in light of the intrusive 
capabilities of the four particular PITs addressed. In addition to the proposed legal 
solutions, a number of technical and/or design solutions were proposed for each PIT. 
Technical and design solutions for the sake of protecting privacy are collectively known 
as “privacy by design”. The next chapter (Chapter 9) outlines what is specifically meant 
by “privacy by design”.
828 see Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11/4 draft.
829 Ibid., Article 23.
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9 Privacy by design
9.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Privacy by Design (PBD) is a relatively novel concept that is now at the centre of the 
privacy debate among legal scholars and lawmakers/policy makers.
Section 9.2 outlines the concept, origins and premise of privacy of design. Sec-
tion 9.3 gives a brief overview of the overall methodology behind privacy by design. 
Section 9.4 summarizes the privacy by design possibilities for the four case studies. 
Section 9.5 explains the similarities and differences between privacy by design and 
privacy-enhancing technologies. Section 9.6 outlines the applicability of privacy by 
design within the US and EU/UK legal frameworks. Section 9.7 provides an overview 
of the growing recognition among legal scholars and policy makers of the benefits and 
necessity of privacy by design. Section 9.8 outlines the potential increase in the use 
of privacy-enhancing technology/privacy by design. Section 9.9 explains why there is 
a growing need for privacy by design, due to the increasing lack of trust of citizens/
consumers. Section 9.10 explains why privacy by design can potentially be good for 
business. Section 9.11 outlines some of the criticism of privacy by design. Section 9.12 
outlines some of the practical challenges of implementing PBD. Section 9.13 concludes 
with some ending remarks.
9.2 CONCEPT AND ORIGINS OF PBD
 
Technology, and its rapid advancement thereof, has increasingly received attention 
from the field of ethics, which has evolved from being fully occupied on theory to fo-
cusing on the sensitivity to values ‘‘built in’’ to technology and the process of doing so 
(Albrechtslund, 2007, p. 64). Hence, value sensitive design (VSD) or similarly “values 
in design” (see Flanagan et al., 2008) was born. ‘‘Value Sensitive Design is a theoreti-
cally grounded approach to the design of technology that accounts for human values in 
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a principled and comprehensive manner throughout the design process’’ (Friedman et 
al., 2002, p. 1). VSD assumes:
that human values, norms, moral considerations can be imparted to the things 
we make and use and it construes information technology (and other tech-
nologies for that matter) as a formidable force which can be used to make the 
world a better place, especially when we take the trouble of reflecting on its 
ethical aspects in advance (van den Hoven, 2007, p. 67).
In terms of ICT, VSD is not the same as “digital ethics”, which “refers to human ethi-
cal behaviour when using digital devices (or, more generally, ICTs)” (emphasis added).830 
Instead, VSD emphasizes the social and ethical responsibility of scientists, inventors, en-
gineers or designers when researching, inventing, engineering and/or designing technolo-
gies that have or could have a potentially profound effect (negative or positive) on society. 
By combining values and norms with the development of technology or ‘embedding eth-
ics’ into technology (Aarts and de Ruyter, 2009, p. 11), VSD can create what is known 
as “normative technology”. Although VSD was first proposed in connection with ICT, it 
has wider applications (van den Hoven, 2007, p. 67). For example, VSD may even apply 
to the manner in which bombs/missiles are designed and developed to better comply with 
international laws of armed conflict and other human norms.
In Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lessig (1999)831 outlined how regulating 
technology has four interacting and complimentary modalities, dimensions or mecha-
nisms: laws; norms; market; and physical architecture, and how the effective regula-
tion of technology can be achieved through the optimal combination of these elements. 
Computer code, for Lessig, is a form of architecture and, thus, has similar abilities 
to regulate human behavior (Grimmelmann, 2005). Lessig was essentially one of the 
first authors to highlight how computer code and the Internet’s architecture/protocols 
can be more effective in regulating online activities and ensuring online privacy than 
written legal code or a website’s privacy policies. For Lessig, computer code could 
also give users greater control over how their personal data is used, a concept Lessig 
terms “privacy control” (Schwartz, 2000). Machine-to-machine protocol, for instance, 
could enable a web browser and website to negotiate, on behalf of the individual web 
830 Barbat, Boldur., Andrei Moiceanu, Hermina Anghelescu. “Enabling Humans to Control the Ethical Behaviour of Per-
suasive Agents” in Eugene Loos, Leslie Haddon and Enid Mante-Meijer (eds.) The social dynamics of information and 
communication technology (Ashgate, 2008), pp. 191-203, at 193-94.
831 An updated version of the book came out in 2006. Lessig, Lawrence. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 
(Basic Books, 2006).
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user, based on the personalized privacy preferences set by the user.832 W3C’s Platform 
for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) is significantly based on this concept (Schwartz, 
2000). As a result of Lessig’s work, the use of computer code to implement legal code 
and regulate or restrict human conduct/behavior is now widely known as “code as law” 
(or “law as code”).833
Reidenberg (1998, 2000), for instance, similarly argues that data protection/privacy 
is collectively derived from politics, economics and technologies, whereby the politi-
cal model employs laws, the economic model employs market norms/self-regulations 
and the Lex informatica model applies the use of technologies/technical protocols.834 
Reidenberg (2000) equally points out that “the most direct regulation of information 
processing comes from the technological rules built into network infrastructures by 
industry rather than from law itself” and “these technical rules define the capabilities of 
networks such as the Internet to invade or protect privacy”.835 
Gaining insight from Lessig, other legal scholars have further built on the con-
cept of “code as law” and have likewise voiced their belief in the important role com-
puter code, design-based solutions and ‘normative technology’ can play in regulating 
technologies (see, e.g., Tien, 2004; Leenes and Koops, 2005; Grimmelmann, 2005; 
Brownsword, 2005; Hildebrandt, 2009; Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010; Yeung and Dix-
on-Woods, 2010).
Grimmelmann (2005) critiques, for various reasons, Lessig’s assumption that code 
is a form of architecture, while acknowledging the very effective role software/com-
puter code can play in regulating human behavior and the importance of different mo-
dalities of regulation. Instead, Grimmelmann argues that “computer software is its own 
distinctive modality of regulation, and it needs to be treated as such” (2005, p. 1722). 
832 see Lessig, Lawrence. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), p. 160. For further discussion, see 
Schwartz, Paul M. Beyond Lessig’s code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Informa-
tion Practices (Wisconsin Law Review, Volume 2000, Issue No. 4, 2000), pp. 743-787.
833 see Lessig, Lawrence. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999).
834 Reidenberg Joel. Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology (Texas Law 
Review, Volume 76, No. 3, 1998), pp 553-93.; Reidenberg, Joel R. Privacy Protection and the Interdependence of Law, 
Technology and Self-Regulation (2000), available at: http://reidenberg.home.sprynet.com/Interdependence.htm
835 Ibid.
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For Grimmelmann, three basic characteristics of software make it different: software is 
automated;836 software is immediate;837 and software is plastic.838 
Privacy by design839 (PBD) is essentially both a form of VSD and “code as law”. 
Similarly, PBD is the realization of values, in this case the principles of privacy and 
corresponding rules/regulations, via the physical design, technical specifications, archi-
tecture and/or computer code of the device, system, technology or service concerned, 
where applicable. The aim of PBD is to design and develop a system or device (i.e. soft-
ware and/or hardware) in a way that supports and materializes those principles, values 
and rules as goals and functions, whereby that system or device then becomes ‘privacy-
aware’ or ‘privacy-friendly’. Through PBD, which Hildebrandt and Koops (2010) term 
“ambient law” when applied to “ambient intelligence”, the legal protections and legal 
norms are essentially articulated within the technical infrastructure and there is a move-
ment from simply legal protection to legal protection by design (see Hildebrandt and 
Koops, 2010). In other words, PBD can be defined as practical measures, in the form of 
technological and design-based solutions, aimed at bolstering privacy/data protection 
laws, better ensuring or almost guaranteeing compliance, and minimizing the privacy-
intrusive capabilities of the technologies concerned. Thus, PBD is part of the emer-
gence of a new paradigm to protecting privacy, “in which system designers conduct 
privacy risk assessments and incorporate privacy as a fundamental design parameter” 
(Duncan, 2007). However, PBD is more than ethical design (or VSD), since it is also 
based on law and must be both technological and legal at the same time (Hildebrandt 
and Koops, 2010). 
Perhaps, further building on Lessig’s notion, Gaurda and Zannone (2009) also 
articulated PBD as an approach to bridging the difficult gap between legal (natural) 
language and computer/machine language to develop “privacy-aware systems”.840 This 
836 “Once set in motion by a programmer, a computer program makes its determinations mechanically, without further 
human intervention” (Grimmelmann, p. 1723).
837 “Rather than relying on sanctions imposed after the fact to enforce its rules, it simply prevents the forbidden behavior 
from occurring” (Grimmelmann, p. 1723).
838 “Programmers can implement almost any system they can imagine and describe precisely” (Grimmelmann, p. 1723).
839 Ann Cavoukian, Ontario’s Informational and Privacy Commissioner, first coined the term “privacy by design” dur-
ing the 1990s. see Cavoukian, Ann. Privacy by Design (2009). Cavoukian has been a key outspoken supporter of the 
widespread adoption of PBD, and now also refers to PBD (i.e. the designing of technology to be privacy-friendly) as 
“smart privacy”. 
840  Guarda, Paolo., and Nicola Zannone. Towards the development of privacy-aware systems (Information and Software 
Technology, Volume 51, Issue 2, February 2009), pp. 337-350.
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branch of PBD especially focuses on the use of software or computer code as a means 
of enforcing privacy rules and regulations. One of the goals of PBD, therefore, could be 
to create devices or systems that are capable of effectively implementing laws and rules 
that we as humans understand in the form of legal natural language (LNL) and devices, 
systems, computers, etc. understand in the form of legal machine language (LML).841 
This approach has been proposed/developed for enhancing the “safety intelligence” of 
Next Generation Robots (NGRs)842 and may also be applicable for better ensuring the 
privacy friendliness/privacy awareness of other technologies.  
The premise behind PBD is that it is likely more effective to enforce laws/rules 
at the manufacturer/design-level, as opposed to the user-level, by engineering into the 
relevant system or device the (legal) requirements, where applicable. This is known 
as “legal requirements engineering” (Schmidt and Franken, 2003). In the case of pri-
vacy, “legal requirements engineering” can be more specifically termed “privacy engi-
neering”, which is essentially just another name for PBD. Kenny and Borking (2002) 
defined “privacy engineering” “as a systematic effort to embed privacy relevant legal 
primitives into technical and governance design”.843   
As opposed to being centered on technology users and data controllers, PBD is 
ideally centered on technology developers/providers and manufacturers. The focus of 
privacy law and the burden of compliance, responsibility or liability are, therefore, 
shifted to the designers/engineers and manufacturers/developers of the technologies 
(software or hardware) concerned and further away from the operators or controllers of 
these technologies and/or the application service providers. While there is still a need 
for controllers and service providers to also implement PBD, there is, nonetheless, a 
shift in focus brought about by PBD, placing manufacturers/developers at the center of 
implementing privacy/data protection laws.
Although the focus of this dissertation is primarily on the manufacturers of hard-
ware (i.e. body scanners, RFID microchips, CCTV systems), PBD is certainly also 
applicable to digital services/products/technologies,844 since the use of computer code 
841 see Yueh-Hsuan Weng, Chien-Hsun Chen and Cheun-Tsai Sun. “Safety Intelligence and Legal Machine Language-Do 
we need the Three Laws of Robotics?”, in Yoshihiko Takahashi (ed.) Service Robot Applications (InTech Education & 
Publishing, August 2008), available at: http://works.bepress.com/weng_yueh_hsuan/3
842 Ibid.
843 Kenny, Steve. and John Borking. The value of privacy engineering (Journal of Information, Law and Technology 2, 
2002), available at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2002_1/kenny/
844 Digital services include, for example: online social media/networking services (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.); 
cloud computing (e.g. Google Docs); e-mail (e.g. Gmail, Hotmail, etc.); and web advertising services/tools. 
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is one tool in the PBD toolbox.  In fact, a recent FTC Staff Report, titled “Protecting 
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change”, which contains a somewhat extensive 
discussion on PBD, focuses primarily on applying PBD to digital services.845 Indeed, 
digital services/products certainly may pose some of the most serious threats to privacy 
at present, but when it comes to PITs this is just the tip of the iceberg.
However, it is also important to emphasize here that PBD does not only necessarily 
pertain to technical specifications, technological solutions or computer code, but also 
to the actual physical design or architecture of the device or system concerned. Take for 
example an automated teller machine (ATM). As Little et al. (2005) distinctively point 
out, the physical design (i.e. the height of ATMs, surrounding barriers, and size of the 
computer screens) equally affect the privacy of the user’s personal identification num-
ber (PIN) and information displayed on the screen, and ability thereof to cover up this 
information, as much as the technical security specifications of the ATM’s internal sys-
tem itself.846 In a similar sense, PBD also applies to voting booths or enclosures, which 
require a certain (physical) design in order to better ensure the sanctity of one’s vote. 
When PBD does pertain to a technological solution, the solution also does not 
necessarily need to be so sophisticated. PBD solutions range in degree of sophistica-
tion, from advanced privacy algorithms for the images generated by public surveillance 
cameras or body scanners to simple snapshot sound effects for digital cameras or the 
use of only optional data fields in the design of information systems as far as possible 
(Borking, 2010).
It is also important to stress that the goal of PBD is not to manage the evolution of 
technology. Therefore, PBD should theoretically not be viewed as hostile to innovation. 
Instead, PBD simply seeks to ensure that privacy is taken into consideration or built-in 
at the earliest stage of the device or system’s lifecycle, i.e. when the device or system 
is being designed and manufactured, as opposed to ‘glued on’ or ‘bolted on’ after the 
device or system has already been developed (Cavoukian, 2009). In essence, PBD is 
meant to serve not as a barrier to technology, but rather as a guided driver of technologi-
cal development. 
845 As a follow-up to the preliminary FTC Staff Report, the FTC Final Report, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of 
Rapid Change”, was published in March 2012, available at: http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf
846 see Little, Linda., Pam Briggs and Lynne Coventry. Public space systems: Designing for privacy? (International Journal 
of Human-Computer Studies, Volume 63, Issues 1-2, July 2005), pp. 254-268. 
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Nevertheless, PBD should be considered as a full lifecycle approach (i.e. at every 
stage in the product’s development, starting from conceptualization).847 As the Privacy 
By Design Report from the UK’s ICO equally points out:
For a privacy by design approach to be effective, it must take into account 
the full lifecycle of any system or process, from the earliest stages of the 
system business case, through requirements gathering and design, to deliv-
ery, testing, operations, and out to the final decommissioning of the system. 
This lifetime approach ensures that privacy controls are stronger, simpler and 
therefore cheaper to implement, harder to by-pass, and fully embedded in the 
system as part of its core functionality.848
PBD is part of a paradigm shift to enforcing privacy laws and addressing privacy 
concerns through design practices. The shift began with ‘code as law’, but has now 
evolved to a more holistic approach for fully regulating the technical specifications/
architecture of a device/system for the sake of safeguarding privacy. Above all, PBD 
can be considered a product of a growing movement, whereby design is positioned 
front and center for solving problems, as promoted by Berger (2009), and a growing 
emphasis on designing hardware and software in the context of social practices and hu-
man needs, as advocated by the European Society of Socially Embedded Technologies 
(EUSSET).849 
Thus, here design is not about aesthetics, but about utility. For example, there is 
also a design practice known as ‘design for all’, whereby objects, devices, buildings, 
etc. are designed to be accessible and useful for as many people as possible, including 
the elderly and disabled.850 ‘Green by design’ is another design practice, whereby ob-
jects, buildings, etc. are designed to have the lowest ‘carbon footprint’. The same goes 
for reducing the greenhouse gases emitted from automobiles and the energy consump-
tion of buildings, where the design and development stages may often critically define 
the environmental impacts of the final products. Based on the same premise why ‘green 
847 see the FTC Final Report, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change”, March 2012, available at: http://
ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf
848 Privacy By Design Report, Information Commissioner’s Office, 2008, p. 7, available at: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/
documents/pdb_report_html/privacy_by_design_report_v2.pdf
849 see EUSSET’s position paper, available at: http://www.eusset.eu/uploads/media/MANIFESTO.pdf
850 Similar to PBD, ‘design for all’ does not necessarily require high-tech technological solutions, and can range from 
simply large dialing buttons on a telephone to highly advanced brain-to-computer interfaces (BCI).
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by design’ is now considered necessary to save the planet, and ‘design for all’ is con-
sidered necessary to meet the needs of the elderly or those with disabilities, ‘privacy by 
design’ may also be necessary to safeguard privacy in the 21st Century. 
PBD can also be viewed as part of the growing recognition in the need for ethically 
and legally sound research and technological development (RTD), in line with human 
rights laws, and the consideration of the societal issues concerning RTD. PBD, in this 
sense, can be a way of governing RTD, ensuring that RTD is in line with the principles 
of privacy and ethics, and can serve as a means of balancing the societal demands for 
the preservation of privacy and the societal needs and goals of RTD.
An analogy of PBD is the engineering of the requirements of traffic, environmental 
and fuel efficiency laws within automobiles. Some vehicles even have built-in limita-
tions on their maximum speed capability, which is obviously more effective in enforc-
ing the speed limit, than mandating that drivers do not exceed a 120-140 kilometer-per-
hour (kmph) speed limit in cars that can reach speeds up to 260 kmph or more. As the 
Royal Academy of Engineering similarly points out, “[j]ust as security features have 
been incorporated into car design, privacy protecting features should be incorporated 
into the design of products and services that rely on divulging personal information”.851 
9.3 PBD METHODOLOGY
The execution of PBD is not fixed and there are a variety of different approaches. Es-
sentially, “there is no well established and worldwide accepted view on the way privacy 
protection and the consolidation thereof can be built into software” (van Blarkom, G.W. 
et al., 2003, p. 2). The same is true for PBD overall. 
On this note, the consortium for the Privacy Incorporated Software Agents (PISA) 
project, funded under the European Framework Programme, set out to establish an 
accepted methodology for incorporating privacy protection into software and to ad-
dress the technical challenges of data protection. The project developed Privacy En-
hancing Technologies (PETs), which can protect the privacy of individuals when they 
use services provided through software agents.852 In doing so, the PISA project also 
formulated a process that included analyzing the legal requirements to determine the 
851 Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance: Challenges of Technological Change (The Royal Academy of Engineering, 
London, 2007), p. 7, available at: http://www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/list/reports/dilemmas_of_privacy_and_
surveillance_report.pdf
852 see van Blarkom, G.W., J.J. Borking, J.G.E. Olk (eds.). The Handbook of Privacy and Privacy-Enhancing Technolo-
gies: The Case of Intelligent Software Agents (2003).
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required human behavior, then translating privacy laws and data protection rules into 
design or technical solutions for each requirement, based on the “engineering psychol-
ogy” approach, and subsequently conducting a privacy audit.853 It is, however, also first 
necessary to investigate the privacy threats or risks posed by the technology concerned. 
While the Handbook of Privacy and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (van Blar-
kom, G.W. et al., 2003), created by the PISA project consortium, provides a methodol-
ogy for designing for privacy, it is more relevant for developing PETs and middleware 
to protect privacy, than for PBD. The methodology, called “Design Embedded Privacy 
Risk Management” (DEPREM), was developed to realize “privacy knowledge engi-
neering” (PYKE), in order to build the privacy principles and data protection rules, 
based on the formulation of ontologies,854 into an intelligent software agent (Ibid., p. 
169). Ontologies can help to provide the common language and understanding nec-
essary for incorporating the principles of privacy into the design and architecture of 
technologies (van Blarkom, G.W. et al., 2003) and, therefore, for interpreting legal code 
into technical/computer code, thereby also potentially helping to bridge the difficult 
gap between natural language and computer language (see Gaurda and Zannone, 2009). 
The methodology formulated by the PISA consortium may be certainly helpful for 
formulating an overall process of designing for privacy that is repeatable. Essentially, 
the overall objective and approach of PBD is to go from written privacy/data protection 
laws, regulations, privacy principles, norms and civil liberties that regulate human be-
havior and grant individuals certain rights/freedoms to the realization of technological/
design solutions that minimize the intrusive capabilities of a device, product or service 
and implement those laws and principles (see Figure 3).
853 see Patrick, A.S., and Kenny, S. From Privacy Legislation to Interface Design: Implementing Information Privacy in 
Human-Computer Interfaces.  Paper presented at the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop (PET2003), Dresden, 
Germany, 26-28 March, 2003, p. 2.
854 Ontologies are formal machine understandable descriptions of terms or concepts and the relationships between those 
terms or concepts in a particular domain (van Blarkom, G.W. et al., 2003, p. 169).
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It is important to note, once again however, that the design and technical require-
ments must be directed at the designers, engineers, developers and manufacturers of PITs 
and not, or at least not solely, at the data controllers and/or operators and/or processors 
and/or application service providers. This is a policy mistake the PISA consortium pro-
moted, contrary to the value and purpose of PBD, which requires intervention before the 
main technical and design specifications of the product, device or service are set in stone. 
On the other hand, the PISA consortium should not necessarily be blamed, as they 
were merely applying the law, since Directive 95/46/EC is only applicable to data pro-
tection controllers and processors. However, solely directing technical requirements to 
data controllers/processors may overestimate their technical abilities and resources. As 
the Article 29 Working Party points out, data controllers can hardly be considered in 
a position to take any relevant data/privacy protection measures by themselves even if 
they wanted to.855 This approach may also underestimate the difficulty and inefficiency 
of incorporating privacy protection solutions after the devices/systems have already 
been developed and deployed.
855 see Article 29 Working Party, The Future of Privacy, 1 December 2009, WP 168.
Figure 3: PBD overview
LAW
Privacy principles, data 






Minimizes the intrusive 
capabilities of PITs
PRIVACY BY DESIGN
Intervention in the production chain
Part III 287
9.4 PBD SOLUTIONS: BODY SCANNERS, HIMS, CCTV MICROPHONES,  
 LOUDSPEAKERS
 
While practical challenges exist, the numerous proposals for safeguarding privacy, in 
light of the deployment and use of body scanners, HIMs, and CCTV microphones and 
loudspeakers, as earlier explained and recommended, include credible and feasible 
technical/PBD solutions mandated by law. For those who believe that PBD is a great 
idea in theory, but question its effectiveness in practice, need only to consider some of 
the technical or PBD solutions proposed and outlined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this dis-
sertation and those already being developed, tested and deployed. 
PBD solutions for body scanners include the built-in use of privacy filters or pri-
vacy algorithms for body scanners, the remote separation of the console where the im-
ages are viewed from where the passengers are scanned, encryption and secure cable 
connections. The use of ‘intelligent detection software’ to discern dangerous objects, 
instead of using human screeners, is also a potentially viable PBD solution, but may 
still require further development and testing. 
PBD solutions for HIMs include, for example, embedded encryption and protocol-
level controls in RFID implants, and secure web interfaces to enable implantees or 
other end-users of location-aware devices, PLDs and LBS to access and participate in 
the generation, storage and availability of their location information.
PBD solutions for CCTV microphones include, for example, the use of artificial 
intelligence/software agents to permanently limit the activation of the recording capa-
bilities of the microphones only when certain sounds considered dangerous or threaten-
ing are detected. PBD solutions for CCTV loudspeakers include the use of pre-recorded 
messages to permanently limit what can be communicated through the loudspeakers, 
computer applications to register and track the use of the loudspeakers, and the po-
288 Privacy by design
tential use of artificial intelligence/software agents to automatically activate the pre-
recorded messages exclusive of human involvement. 
The potential use of artificial intelligence/software agents for CCTV microphones 
and loudspeakers could also be applied to the video recording capabilities of public 
surveillance CCTV cameras. For instance, the panoptic feelings, undue surveillance 
and collateral intrusion brought about by the widespread deployment of public CCTV 
cameras, which people must involuntarily endure, can be diminished by designing and 
developing CCTV cameras that only begin to record video when a suspected crime or 
anti-social act is actually taking place, ignoring ordinary activities and preventing their 
subsequent scrutiny, as the Royal Academy of Engineering proposes. A software algo-
rithm could be used to process images in real-time and distinguish between suspicious 
behavior or illegal activities and innocent behavior or legal activities.856 However, while 
the use of intelligent software in public surveillance CCTV camera systems is growing, 
much more intense and difficult research is still required.
There are also PBD solutions for some of the other latest PITs either still in the 
R&D phase or already deployed and in use. PBD solutions for UAVs include lim-
iting the resolution capability of the video systems and cameras attached to UAVs. 
PBD solutions for DNA profiles stored on national DNA databases include limiting the 
creation and exchange of DNA profiles to chromosome zones containing no genetic 
expression (i.e. not known to provide information about specific hereditary characteris-
tics), as recommended by the Council of the EU.857 PBD solutions for ALPR systems 
include limiting the vehicle license plate numbers stored on databases connected to 
an ALPR system to solely those that are being targeted by law enforcement agencies 
for legitimate purposes, thereby preventing the blanket tracking of the movements of 
all vehicles. The potential PBD solutions for neurotechnologies, however, are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, while possible PBD solutions to minimize the threats to 
privacy posed by the LEXID® are also uncertain at present time. 
856 see Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance: Challenges of Technological Change (The Royal Academy of Engineering, 
London, 2007), p. 42, available at: http://www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/list/reports/dilemmas_of_privacy_and_
surveillance_report.pdf
857 see Council Resolution of 25 June 2001 on the exchange of DNA analysis results (2001/C 187/01).
Part III 289
9.5 PBD VS. PETS
Similar to the basis of the escalating promotion of data protection through PETs,858 the 
benefits of PBD are “premised on the view that it is better to build safeguards in than 
to bolt them on”859 and on the valid assumption that it is much more difficult to violate 
or avoid laws embedded in system code than laws simply written on paper (van Blar-
kom, G.W. et al., 2003). PETs are technologies that do not threaten privacy, but instead 
help to protect it by translating ‘soft’ legal text into ‘hard’ system specifications (Ibid., 
p. 49). The PISA (Privacy Incorporated Software Agent) project consortium defines 
PETs as “a system of ICT measures protecting informational privacy by eliminating or 
minimizing personal data thereby preventing unnecessary or unwanted processing of 
personal data, without the loss of the functionality of the information system” (Ibid., p. 
33). PETs mainly comprise of encryption, pseudonymization and anonymization soft-
ware, firewalls, and other privacy protection tools developed primarily to better ensure 
the security of personal data. Nevertheless, as initially conceptualized, PETs, like PBD, 
are also intended to be built into the architecture or fabric of an information system (or 
technology, device, etc.) at the very outset.860
However, while the concept of and premise behind PETs are similar to PBD, PETs 
and PBD are not the same. PETs are effective (software) technologies or ICT measures, 
but they can still be circumvented or penetrated, albeit with a level of difficulty that de-
pends on the sophistication of the PET. In addition, anonymization techniques are vulner-
able, since anonymized data can be de-anonymized by combining various large datasets 
and through sophisticated data mining techniques. As Walden points out, “[a]chieving 
effective anonymisation may be a challenging task, from both a technical and compli-
ance perspective. Sophisticated data analysis and data mining techniques on supposedly 
anonymous data may eventually yield data that does ‘directly or indirectly’ relate to a 
858 see COM/2007/0228 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Pro-
moting Data Protection by Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs); Data Protection Technical Guidance Note: Privacy 
enhancing technologies (PETs), Office of the Information Commissioner 11/4/06;
859 Williams, Victoria. Privacy Impact Assessment and the Social Aspects of Public Surveillance (Evidence for the House 
of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution inquiry into The Impact of Surveillance and Data Collection upon the 
Privacy of Citizens and their Relationship with the State), p. 6. 
860 see Hes, Ronald. and John Borking (eds.), Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: The path to anonymity (Registratiekamer, 
The Hague, August 2000), available at: www.cbpweb.nl/downloads_av/av11.pdf 
 (The groundbreaking work identifies the conditions that should be considered when developing an information system 
to be privacy-friendly, and clearly presents a few examples of information systems as models for designers/developers, 
which are meant to be helpful when developing/designing/engineering these types of information systems.)
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specific individual, thus rendering it ‘personal data’ subject to the Directive [Directive 
95/46/EC]” (Walden, 2002, p. 227). Furthermore, as Walden (2002) additionally points 
out, “retention of the original data set by a data controller provides the opportunity for any 
anonymisation process to be reversed at the data controller’s discretion” (Ibid.). 
On the other hand, the circumvention of PBD solutions is essentially meant to be 
(practically) impossible or exceptionally difficult, since it would mean attempting to force 
the device/system concerned to perform an act it is not designed or engineered to do or 
is not capable of doing (in its present form).  The privacy risk or threat of technologies 
and/or the potential for abuse or misuse of the privacy-intrusive capabilities of PITs by 
the controllers or operators of these technologies is permanently removed, for the most 
part, through the regulation and minimization (or elimination) of those risks, threats and 
capabilities. Thus, PBD aims to design or engineer away, as far as possible, the ability to 
abuse or misuse the privacy-intrusive capabilities of PITs and to oblige or induce opera-
tors/controllers of PITs to appropriately/legitimately use the technologies. 861
Furthermore, PBD goes beyond PETs. Whereas PETs are mainly technical/techno-
logical or software-based solutions/ICT measures for protecting privacy and maintain-
ing data security, PBD, as Cavoukian advocates, also includes ‘privacy-friendly’ both 
physical design/architectural solutions and technological/software-based solutions, and 
business practices/processes and modes of operation.862 In addition, PBD emphasizes 
the need to implement PETs, but also requires privacy by default settings and the nec-
essary tools to allow users to participate in the protection and management of their 
personal data (e.g. access controls, user participation tools, etc.).863 Therefore, PBD is 
ideally a more comprehensive, holistic approach for avoiding the privacy threats and 
risks in the first place. 
Another difference of PBD solutions from PETs is that the design/architectural and 
technical solutions are normally unique and tailored to the particular system, technol-
ogy or device concerned. The solutions can be developed to address specific threats to 
privacy, beyond the general threats to the privacy and security of personal data, posed 
by the latest technologies. PETs, on the other hand, are generally homogeneous and are 
mainly focused on data security.
Moreover, while PETs are often mainly focused on ICT privacy/security issues, 
PBD, as opposed to PETs, can potentially address the privacy threats of not just ICT, but 
861 For further discussion, see Cavoukian, Ann. Privacy by Design (2009).
862 see Ann Cavoukian’s “7 Foundational Principles of Privacy by Design”,  Originally Published: August 2009, Revised: 
January 2011, available at: http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf
863 For further discussion, see Article 29 Working Party, The Future of Privacy, 1 December 2009, WP 168, p. 13.
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also the threats posed by other types of PITs (e.g. imaging technologies), as demonstrated 
in this dissertation. Hence, PBD does not just apply to IT systems, but may apply to just 
about any type of device, system, service or technology, albeit to a certain extent. 
Finally, PBD can also help to address concerns beyond the protection of privacy/
personal data, such as the ‘chilling’ of the freedom of speech and freedom of move-
ment, and to address other general or specific societal impacts.
9.6 PBD IN THE CURRENT US AND UK/EU LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
While the words “privacy by design” (or “data protection by design”) are not specifi-
cally found in the current legal framework in the US and UK/EU, and the current data 
protection legal framework and privacy policies certainly do not seek to influence the 
basic architecture of computer systems/information technology (Agre and Rotenberg, 
1997, p. 3),864 the role of technical means to protecting privacy, however, can be found 
in the US and UK/EU legal framework, albeit primarily in the area of data security, 
rather than for protecting privacy overall.
US legal framework
 
Within the US, the concept of PBD is briefly found in the Privacy Act 1974. Gov-
ernment agencies are required to:
establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to 
insure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against any 
anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity which could result 
in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any indi-
vidual on whom information is maintained (emphasis added).865
Section 1173 of the HIPAA similarly requires healthcare providers, health plans 
and healthcare clearinghouses, which maintain or transmit health information, to im-
plement technical and physical safeguards in order to “ensure the integrity and confi-
dentiality of the information” and “to protect against any reasonably anticipated--(i) 
864 But, this may be about to change. Article 23 of the EC’s draft proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation 
(COM(2012) 11/4 draft) is dedicated to “data protection by design” requirements (albeit applicable to data controllers).
865 Title 5, U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 5, Subchapter II, § 552a (e) (10).
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threats or hazards to the security or integrity of the information; and (ii) unauthorized 
uses or disclosures of the information”.
In addition, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) is responsible for issuing Vot-
ing System Standards (VSS). For instance, in compliance with The Help America Vote 
Act of 2002, the FEC issued a VSS to preserve the privacy and confidentiality of the 
ballot. The VSS, for example, require that all voting booths or enclosures “[p]rovide 
privacy for the voter, and be designed in such a way as to prevent observation of the 
ballot by any person other than the voter”.866 
EU legal framework
In the EU, the concept of PBD is found much more frequently within the legal 
framework. Most significantly, the concept can be found in Directive 95/46/EC, how-
ever, the Directive nonetheless does not apply to manufactures or developers. Article 
17, paragraph 1 requires that data controllers “must implement appropriate technical 
and organizational measures to protect personal data”. Paragraph 2 of Article 17 further 
requires that the “controller must, where processing is carried out on his behalf, choose 
a processor who provides sufficient guarantees in respect of the technical security mea-
sures and organisational measures governing the processing to be carried out and must 
ensure compliance with those measures”. Recital 46 requires “that appropriate techni-
cal and organizational measures be taken, both at the time of the design of the process-
ing system and at the time of the processing itself, particularly in order to maintain 
security and thereby to prevent any unauthorized processing”.  Schedule 1, Part II, 11 
(a) of the DPA identically transposes Article 17 of Directive 95/46/EC into UK law.867 
Moreover, the right of access for data subjects to the “knowledge of the logic involved 
in any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the automated 
decisions”, as stipulated by Article 12 of Directive 95/46/EC, could also be considered 
866 Federal Election Commission, Voting System Standards (2002), Volume I, Section 3, § 3.2.4.1 c.
867 Some EU member states, however, have taken Article 17 a step beyond mainly ensuring data security. Article 13 of Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens (the Netherlands Personal Data Protection Act) requires (unofficial translation provided 
by the Dutch Data Protection Authority):
 The responsible party shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to secure personal data against 
loss or against any form of unlawful processing. These measures shall guarantee an appropriate level of security, tak-
ing into account the state of the art and the costs of implementation, and having regard to the risks associated with the 
processing and the nature of the data to be protected. These measures shall also aim at preventing unnecessary collection 
and further processing of personal data (emphasis added).
Part III 293
a mechanism for regulating the development of processing systems and better ensuring 
its transparency.
Article 4.1 of the ePrivacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC) requires that a “pro-
vider of a publicly available electronic communications service must take appropriate 
technical and organisational measures to safeguard security of its services, if necessary 
in conjunction with the provider of the public communications network with respect to 
network security”. Recital 20 further affirms that “[s]ervice providers should take ap-
propriate measures to safeguard the security of their services” and “[t]he requirement 
to inform subscribers of particular security risks does not discharge a service provider 
from the obligation to take, at its own costs, appropriate and immediate measures to 
remedy any new, unforeseen security risks and restore the normal security level of the 
service”. Recital 46 of Directive 2002/58/EC recognized that “[t]he existence of specif-
ic rules for electronic communications services alongside general rules for other com-
ponents necessary for the provision of such services may not facilitate the protection 
of personal data and privacy in a technologically neutral way” and “[i]t may therefore 
be necessary to adopt measures requiring manufacturers of certain types of equipment 
used for electronic communications services to construct their product in such a way 
as to incorporate safeguards to ensure that the personal data and privacy of the user 
and subscriber are protected” (emphasis added). Article 14(3) provides that “[w]here 
required, measures may be adopted to ensure that terminal equipment is constructed in 
a way that is compatible with the right of users to protect and control the use of their 
personal data, in accordance with Directive 1999/5/EC and Council Decision 87/95/
EEC of 22 December 1986 on standardization in the field of information technology 
and communications”.
Article 3.3(c) of Directive 1999/5/EC,868 which covers radio equipment and tele-
communications terminal equipment, delineates that certain apparatuses may be re-
quired to incorporate “safeguards to ensure that the personal data and privacy of the 
user and of the subscriber are protected”.
There is also some case law in the EU relevant to PBD (or Lex Informatica).  For in-
stance, in Germany the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the general right of person-
868 Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 1999 on radio equipment and telecom-
munications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their conformity
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ality (Article 2.1 in conjunction with Article 1.1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG)) 
guarantees the fundamental right to the confidentiality and integrity of IT systems.869
Thus, in summary, while there is already a legal basis for PBD in the US and EU, 
currently this mostly takes the form of PETs and pertains to data security. More im-
portantly, the existing provisions are only applicable to data controllers and/or service 
providers, with the exception of Article 3.3(c) of Directive 1999/5/EC and Article 14(3) 
and Recital 46 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
9.7 GROWING WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION 
There is a growing recognition in the US and the EU, among privacy experts/legal 
scholars, governmental bodies, policy makers, data protection/privacy commissioners 
and NGOs around the world, that PBD is essential to protecting privacy. 
While some privacy experts, such as the Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario Ann Cavoukian, have long recognized the value of PBD in protecting privacy 
and have advocated for its widespread adoption, in the past several years, as Gaurda 
and Zannone (2009) explain, efforts to safeguard privacy have nevertheless still focused 
on the development of privacy policies, languages, models, standards and user prefer-
ences. But, these efforts have offered no practical tools or means for supporting those 
privacy policies, etc. (Gaurda and Zannone, 2009). However, this could soon change. 
The efforts to safeguard privacy are indeed gradually moving towards the focus on de-
veloping those practical tools and means/measures. 
In a policy paper, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) Peter Hustinx 
affirmed, “privacy and data protection requirements need to be highlighted and applied 
as soon as possible in the life cycle of new technological developments in order to con-
tribute to a better implementation of the data protection legal framework”.870 The EDPS 
further added, “the European RTD [research and technological developments] efforts 
constitute a very good opportunity to accomplish these goals and the EDPS considers 
that the principle of ‘privacy by design’ should represent an inherent part of these RTD 
869 BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 vom 27.2.2008, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 267), available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
rs20080227_1bvr037007.html
 For further discussion on the significance of the German ruling for Lex Informatica, see Cannataci, Joseph A. Lex Per-
sonalitatis: Personality, Law and Technology in the 21st Century (Acta Universitatis Lucian Blaga 219, 2008).
870 EDPS and EU Research and Technological Development, Policy paper, Brussels, 28 April 2008, p. 2.    
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initiatives”.871 The EDPS Peter Hustinx has continued to be an important supporter and 
outspoken promoter of PBD in the EU.872
In line with this policy, the EC has indeed funded a number of relevant projects 
to help integrate privacy, human rights, legal, social and ethical considerations and 
discourse into research and technological development. Projects, such as, DISCREET, 
PISA, PRIME and PrivacyOS, are aimed at developing the technical means to protect-
ing privacy, albeit more related to PETs and middleware solutions as opposed to wide-
ranging PBD solutions and architectures. Project DETECTER, however, specifically 
aims to positively influence the design and development of detection technologies (bio-
metrics, video surveillance, GPS, RFID and audio-bugging), which are used in counter-
terrorism activities, by engaging in dialogue with the manufacturers and users of these 
technologies on human rights standards. The ICTETHICS project aims to develop an 
integrated non-technical approach to addressing the ethical, legal and social aspects of 
ICT. The PRACTIS project aims to assess the potential impacts on privacy from emerg-
ing technologies, such as nanotechnology, biotechnology and neurotechnology, and ex-
plore methods of embedding privacy considerations in the development process of new 
technologies. The ETICA project aims to identify ethical issues arising from ICT in 
the coming 10-15 years. In addition, the PRESCIENT873 project also “aims to provide 
an early identification of privacy and ethical issues arising from emerging technologies 
and their relevance for EC policy”.874 
In an earlier opinion on better implementing the Data Protection Directive, the 
EDPS recommended that measures to better comply with the data protection principles 
should “build on the concept of ‘privacy by design’, ensuring that the architecture of 
new technologies is developed and constructed by taking properly into account the 
principles of data protection”.875 The EDPS further added that “[t]he promotion of 
privacy-compliant technological products should be a crucial element in a context in 
871 Ibid.
872 In his closing speech at the third annual international conference Computers, Privacy and Data Protection on Janu-
ary 29-30 2010 in Brussels, I was glad to especially hear the EDPS emphasize the important need to begin regulating 
manufacturers of ICT for the sake of privacy.
873 An acronym for: “Privacy and Emerging Sciences and Technologies”
874 Prescient project, available at: http://www.prescient-project.eu
875 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the follow-up of the Work Programme for better implementation of the Data Protection 
Directive (2007/C 255/01), para. 63.
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which ubiquitous computing is fast developing”.876 The EDPS also explicitly stressed, 
once again, the utmost importance of implementing PBD in practice and integrating 
PBD into the EU legal framework.877 
As a result, the EDPS has strongly stressed, on numerous occasions, the critical 
significance of PBD to defend against the ubiquitous nature of RFID applications, call-
ing for the “mandatory deployment of RFID applications with the appropriate technical 
features or ‘privacy by design’”.878 The EC has agreed and equally expressed its belief 
that “privacy and information security features should be built into RFID applications 
before their widespread use (principle of ‘security and privacy-by-design’)”.879 How-
ever, while the EC recommends the use of PBD to help implement privacy and data 
protection principles in RFID applications, the recommendations are again exclusively 
focused on the providers of those applications and the related data controllers, and not 
the developers/manufacturers of RFID tags and readers.  
Earlier this year, European Commissioner for Justice, Liberty and Fundamental 
Rights, Viviane Reding, announced plans to strengthen the Data Protection Directive 
by requiring that new technologies and processes include PBD, noting that privacy and 
data protection are not always considered during the development of ICT products and 
services and calling for this shortcoming to be remedied.880 Much more broadly, the EC 
has also fully endorsed PBD as a component of Europe’s forthcoming Digital Agenda 
by affirming that PBD must be widely applied within relevant ICT technologies, in 
order to effectively enforce the right to privacy and the protection of personal data.881 
876 Ibid.
877 see Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on Promoting Trust in the Information Society by Fostering 
Data Protection and Privacy, 10 March 2010. 
878 see Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ‘Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: steps towards a policy framework’ COM(2007) 96 (2008/C 101/01).
879 C(2009) 3200 final, Commission Recommendation of 12.5.2009 on the implementation of privacy and data protection 
principles in applications supported by radio-frequency identification. 
880 “EU Commission outlines plans to strengthen privacy law” (OUT-LAW News, 29 January 2010), available at: http://
www.out-law.com/page-10712
881 see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions, A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245.
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 Indeed, the EC’s proposal for an EU General Data Protection Regulation882 has dedi-
cated an entire article to PBD, requiring data controllers to “implement mechanisms for 
ensuring that, by default, only those personal data are processed which are necessary for 
each specific purpose of the processing and are especially not be collected or retained 
beyond the minimum necessary for those purposes, both in terms of the amount of the 
data and the time of their storage”883 and empowers the EC to adopt delegated acts for the 
purpose of specifying the requirements for appropriate measures/mechanisms for imple-
menting data protection by design applicable for products and services.884
The Article 29 Working Party previously weighed in heavily. In a widely acclaimed 
position paper on the “Future of Privacy”, adopted in December 2009, the advisory 
body explicitly endorses the view that PBD is one of the critical requirements for pro-
tecting privacy in the future, and recommends that the revision of Directive 95/46/EC 
should be innovative by introducing provisions on PBD. PBD is required, the Article 
29 Working Party argues, in order to “counterbalance” the risks to individual privacy 
posed by the latest technological developments. Most significantly, the position paper 
affirms that PBD requirements for ICT should be binding not just for data controllers, 
but also for technology designers and producers.885 The Article 29 Working Party also 
essentially points out that while Article 17 and Recital 46 of Directive 95/46/EC are 
helpful towards the promotion of PBD, in practice these provisions are insufficient. 
There was, however, a missed opportunity to more clearly stress that PBD goes beyond 
PETs, and should be deeply rooted in the physical architecture and overall design of 
any device or system. 
In the Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program, 
written by DARPA, the significance of built-in safeguards to reduce potential abuse of 
technologies capable of mass surveillance was highlighted. The report listed safeguards 
such as regulating the research and development of surveillance technologies and imple-
menting security measures to prevent unauthorized access (2003, pp. 33-35).
The DHS Privacy Office has developed the official guidance, Privacy Technology 
Implementation Guide (PTIG), which is a procedural guide for technology managers 
and developers on how to integrate privacy protections in the early stages of the devel-
882 see Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11/4 draft.
883 Ibid., Article 23, para. 2.
884 Ibid., Article 23, para. 3.
885 Article 29 Working Party, The Future of Privacy, 1 December 2009, WP 168, p. 13.
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opment of IT systems that collect, process, or produce personal data. In addition, the 
FTC published a Staff Report, titled “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid 
Change”, which emphasizes the potentially important role of PBD.886
A conference held by the UK’s ICO on PBD and its accompanying report clearly 
recognized the merits of PBD.887 In another report, the Royal Academy of Engineering 
affirmatively expressed the value in ‘designing for privacy’ and recommended both 
technical and legal solutions to some of the new privacy dilemmas we face today.888  
The international conferences of data protection and privacy commissioners have 
also consistently supported the development and implementation of PBD. For instance, 
at the 31st International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners in 
Madrid, a workshop on PBD was held and attended by numerous distinguished experts 
and officials, and at the 32nd International Conference of Data Protection and Priva-
cy Commissioners a Resolution on Privacy by Design, declaring PBD as an essential 
component of fundamental privacy protection, was endorsed by data protection/privacy 
commissioners around the world.
In a letter to Chairman and CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt, signed by the heads of 
nine data protection authorities from different parts of the world, including the Chair-
man of the Article 29 Working Party, Jacob Kohnstamm, the sponsors called upon 
Google, and all other organizations entrusted with personal information, “to incorpo-
rate fundamental privacy principles directly into the design of new online services”.889
Moreover, a growing number of authors are also arguing in favor of focusing on 
technical solutions to enforce privacy policies and laws, as opposed to relying merely 
on humans to do so (see, e.g., Karat et al., 2005; Leenes and Koops, 2005; Albrecht-
slund, 2007; Gaurda and Zannone, 2009; Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010).
886 As a follow-up to the preliminary FTC Staff Report, the FTC Final Report, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of 
Rapid Change”, was published in March 2012, available at: http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf
887 Privacy By Design Report, Information Commissioner’s Office, 2008, available at: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/docu-
ments/pdb_report_html/privacy_by_design_report_v2.pdf
888 see Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance: Challenges of Technological Change (The Royal Academy of Engineering, 
London, 2007), available at: http://www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/list/reports/dilemmas_of_privacy_and_sur-
veillance_report.pdf
889 The letter, dated April 19, 2010, is available at: http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/let_100420_e.pdf
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9.8 POTENTIALLY GROWING APPLICATION
Data controllers are increasingly using PETs, as revealed by a Eurobarometer sur-
vey conducted in 2008. According to the survey, 52% of data controllers interviewed 
throughout the EU stated that they have used PETs (e.g. encryption tools and anony-
mization software) for enhancing the privacy protection of their databases, which, in 
comparison with the survey results of 2003, is a substantial increase.890 This increase 
is perhaps partly due to their increased awareness of PETs. Nevertheless, while the 
increased usage of PETs is certainly welcoming, the survey results show that half of 
all data controllers still do not use PETs.  However, the next survey may reveal further 
increase in the use of PETs. 
As explained earlier, PBD goes beyond PETs, so the survey does not provide empiri-
cal evidence on the scope of PBD use. However, the employment of PBD solutions does 
already exist in different ways, albeit subtly and not so clearly.  For example, ATMs are 
already designed to take into account privacy requirements891 and voting booths are also 
developed to better ensure the privacy of one’s vote. Facebook, while far from perfect, has 
also (partially) adopted a PBD approach by allowing users to more easily select their ac-
count settings for sharing their information and by allowing users to access an expanded 
data archive on their account history. Google’s “dashboard” and default settings may also 
be another example of PBD. But, the solutions for Facebook and Google could potentially 
be removed or backtracked altogether, and are more like PETs than PBD. The adoption of 
the opt-in approach and the use of privacy-friendly settings by default for a number of de-
vices and digital services are also examples of PBD. And, the already deployed software 
solutions for body scanners to protect privacy and the remote separation of the console, 
where the images are viewed from where the passengers are scanned, are other potential 
examples. Still, many of these PBD solutions deployed are not externally certified and the 
law does not mandate nor encourage their deployment.  
890 see Flash Eurobarometer No 226, Data protection perceptions among data controllers, survey conducted by The Gal-
lup Organization Hungary upon the request of the Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security of the European 
Commission, Analytical Report, February 2008.
891 see Little, Linda., Pam Briggs and Lynne Coventry. Public space systems: Designing for privacy? (International Journal 
of Human-Computer Studies, Volume 63, Issues 1-2, July 2005), pp. 254-268.
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9.9 LACK OF TRUST 
The recognition in the value of PBD might have something to do with the public’s lack 
of trust in governments, companies, data controllers and their agents to deploy and use 
PITs ethically, justifiably and in accordance with the law and fundamental principles of 
privacy. For example, we are increasingly learning of the misuse of access to the vast 
quantities of personal data stored on databases by government/law enforcement agents 
and of the deception of certain companies regarding the collection and use of location 
information.
As a result, there are valid points of view that we are more likely better-off relying 
on the ability to control technological development in a way that safeguards the right to 
privacy, rather than only attempting to control individuals to comply with privacy laws/
principles.892 As Masters and Michael (2006) point out, “given that humans do not by 
nature trust others to safeguard their own individual privacy, in controlling technology 
we feel we can also control access to any social implications stemming from it” (2006, 
p. 37). Interestingly, in the words of former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greens-
pan, “[i]ndeed, the most effective means to counter technology’s erosion of privacy is 
technology itself”.893 
These assumptions are re-enforced by the public’s potentially growing lack of trust 
in governments and companies to safeguard their right to privacy. The consequence of 
this may also have detrimental effects on the legitimacy of governments, which will 
likely only become worse as PITs further evolve and their deployment expands.
It is also widely accepted that trust is key to economic growth and prosperity (RI-
SEPTIS Report, 2009, p. 14). As a Booz & Company 2008 study similarly affirms:
The difference between “getting Digital Confidence right” in a best-case sce-
nario and “getting it wrong” in a worst-case scenario adds up to €124 billion, 
or almost 30 percent of the total market at stake—approximately 1 percent of 
total EU-27+2 GDP in 2012! The combined downside of failing to establish 
Digital Confidence is, at €78 billion, far greater than the upside at €46 bil-
lion—primarily driven by the effects of Privacy and Data Protection as well 
as Network Integrity and Quality of Service, which impact all the revenue 
892 see Masters, A. and K. Michael. Lend me your arms: the use and implications of humancentric RFID (Faculty of Infor-
matics, University of Wollongong, 2006).
893 Alan Greenspan’s words at a Conference on Privacy in the Information Age (Salt Lake City, 7 April 1997), available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/1997/19970307.htm
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areas of the digital economy and the level of use and number of users across 
the major revenue categories.894
Therefore, the growing lack of trust in companies to ensure privacy, data protection 
and data security will increasingly result in missed business opportunities and sluggish 
innovation (Williams, 2009, p. 78). In the long run, this lack of trust could seriously 
impact the bottom-line of companies.
9.10 A UNIQUE SELLING POINT
Although up until the late 1990s relatively “little work has been done to evaluate the 
economic impact of privacy policy” (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997, p. 22) or to study the 
“economics of privacy”895 or to explore how privacy can be monetized, since then the 
topic has indeed grown into its own area of specialty.896  
There is now a growing understanding that privacy can overall help the bottom-line 
of companies.897  In addition, it is now increasingly recognized that companies can po-
tentially improve the trust of their customers by safeguarding their privacy, thereby im-
proving their reputation and image (Borking, 2010). By implementing PBD measures 
and/or engaging in other privacy-friendly practices, companies can also reduce their 
894 Digital Confidence – Searching the next wave of digital growth (Booz & Company, Liberty Global Policy Series, 2008), 
p. 9.
895 see Posner., Richard. The economics of privacy (American Economic Review, Vol. 71, Issue 2, 1981), pp. 405-409; 
Posner, Richard. An economic theory of privacy (Regulation, 19-26, 1978).
896 see, e.g. Taylor, Curtis R. Private demands and demands for privacy: Dynamic pricing and the market for customer 
information (Technical report, Department of Economics, Duke University, 2002); Acquisti. Alessandro. “Security of 
Personal Information and Privacy: Technological Solutions and Economic Incentives” in J. Camp and R. Lewis (eds.), 
The Economics of Information Security (Kluwer, 2004).  For additional examples of papers/books on the “economics of 
privacy”, see Acquisti’s academic website at: http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/economics-privacy.htm
897 John Borking, for instance, has conducted significant research on the costs of privacy risks for businesses and quantify-
ing the economic justifications for organizations to invest in privacy risk-reducing technical solutions, such as PETs. 
see Borking, John. “Assessing investments mitigating privacy risks” in Laurens Mommers, Hans Franken, Jaap van 
den Herik, Franke van der Klaauw and Gerrit-Jan Zwenne (eds.) Het binnenste buiten; Liber amicorum ter gelegenheid 
van het emeritaat van Prof.dr.Aernout H.J.Schmidt, Hoogleraar Recht en Informatica te Leiden (eLaw@Leiden, 2010), 
pp. 255-273.
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risk of legal liabilities898 and prevent potentially bad publicity. Basically, in the words of 
Harriet Pearson, IBM’s Chief Privacy Officer, “privacy is good for business”.899  
Just as companies are increasingly realizing that “going green” and designing and 
manufacturing products in an environmentally-friendly manner is good for business 
and the investment of doing so will pay off in the long-run, so too are companies in-
creasingly realizing that designing technologies in a privacy-friendly manner could 
drive their business forward and provide the products and services that both govern-
ments and consumers demand.900  
Indeed, there is a business case for privacy-friendly practices and commercial/eco-
nomic benefits and competitive advantages for companies that implement PBD solu-
tions and PETs.901 As Rob van Kranenburg pointed out, PBD “is not only culturally 
and socially productive but business wise fostering privacy as a unique selling point” 
(emphasis added).902 The recognition that engaging in privacy-friendly practices may 
also be part of a marketing strategy might explain the fact why marketing managers for 
data controllers were actually the respondents, of a 2008 Eurobarometer survey, most 
likely to say that their company used PETs.903 In short, as “going green” is increasingly 
translating into profit, being privacy-friendly could also increasingly mean legal stabil-
ity, profitability and marketability for companies in the long-run.
898 see Holmes, Allan. The Profits in Privacy  (CIO Magazine, 15 March 2006), available at: http://www.cio.com/ar-
ticle/19070/The_Profits_in_Customer_Privacy
899 see an interview with IBM’s Chief Privacy Officer Harriet Pearson, available at: http://www.03.ibm.com/innovation/us/
customerloyalty/harriet_pearson_interview.shtml
900 For example, Hewlett-Packard (HP) has recognized the value of PBD for business. see Privacy by Design: Essential for 
Organizational Accountability and Strong Business Practices, (November 2009), co-authored by Scott Taylor (Chief 
Privacy Officer of HP), Ann Cavoukian (Information & Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada) and Martin E. Abrams 
(Senior Policy Advisor and Executive Director, Centre for Information Policy Leadership, Hunton & Williams LLP).
901 John Borking, for instance, has also conducted research on the economic benefits of PETs. see Borking, John. “As-
sessing investments mitigating privacy risks” in Laurens Mommers, Hans Franken, Jaap van den Herik, Franke van 
der Klaauw and Gerrit-Jan Zwenne (eds.) Het binnenste buiten; Liber amicorum ter gelegenheid van het emeritaat van 
Prof.dr.Aernout H.J.Schmidt, Hoogleraar Recht en Informatica te Leiden (eLaw@Leiden, 2010), pp. 255-273.
902 van Kranenburg, Rob. The Internet of Things: A critique of ambient technology and the all-seeing network of RFID, 
Network Notebooks 02, Institute of Network Cultures (2008), p. 49, available at: http://www.networkcultures.org/_up-
loads/notebook2_theinternetofthings.pdf
903 see Flash Eurobarometer No 226, Data protection perceptions among data controllers, survey conducted by The Gal-
lup Organization Hungary upon the request of the Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security of the European 
Commission, Analytical Report, February 2008.
Part III 303
9.11 POTENTIAL CRITICISM 
A number of legal authors/scholars have, to some extent, criticized Lessig’s “code as 
law” for various reasons. The concept is certainly not immune to criticism.
Gutwirth et al. (2008) essentially argue that Lessig disregarded the politics, dynam-
ics and complexity of lawmaking and how legal practitioners and courts operate in the 
real world. They also question the viability of achieving an “optimal mix” of Lessig’s 
four dimensions/modalities of regulation.904  
Schwartz (2000) also criticizes Lessig’s concept of “privacy-control”, arguing that 
“privacy-control seeks to place the individual at the center of decision making about 
personal information use, but it can instead help us to accept smoke screens that dis-
guise information privacy practices and lead to choices that are bad for individuals and 
for society”.905 Schwartz argues that Lessig’s “technological solution, privacy-code, 
which relies on measures such as P3P, is likely to form such a smoke screen”.906 
Schwartz (2000) further questions the effectiveness of over relying on individual con-
trol of personal data to reach optimal levels of privacy, as a result of ‘market failures’ and 
failures of private agreements.907 Schwartz argues, “due to the extent of the failure in the 
privacy market, the law at present should generally seek to minimize harms that flow from 
reliance on bargaining among consumers and data processors”.908 Moreover, Schwartz 
(2000) rightfully points out that Lessig’s approach to individual privacy control is mostly 
not relevant for law enforcement purposes, since law enforcement agencies are generally 
not required to obtain permission to carry out surveillance operations.909
As values, norms or rules are increasingly being built into technology, some au-
thors, including, for example, Koops (2007), have questioned the compatibility of the 
“code as law” and PBD approach with the democratic system, if not sanctioned by 
904 Gutwirth, Serge., Paul De Hert,. and Laurent De Sutter. “The trouble with technology regulation from a legal perspec-
tive. Why Lessig’s ‘optimal mix’ will not work” in Brownsword, R. and Yeung, K. (eds.) Regulating Technologies (Hart 
Publishers, 2008), pp. 193-218.
905 Schwartz, Paul M. Beyond Lessig’s code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Informa-
tion Practices (Wisconsin Law Review, Volume 2000, Issue No. 4, 2000), pp. 743-787, at 760.
906 Ibid.
907 Ibid., p. 782.
908 Ibid.
909 Ibid., p. 784.
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elected representatives in accordance with the law.910 Indeed, “code as law” may argu-
ably be one way of bypassing regular democratic procedures of lawmaking and/or law 
enforcement to regulate or restrict human behavior and activities. Computer program-
mers/engineers, in this sense, could theoretically become the new lawmakers of the 21st 
Century, acting at the request of either corporations or governments.
Additional criticism of PBD may come from those who argue that such an ap-
proach to regulating technological development may stifle innovation. For further dis-
cussion on why this argument, while not without merit, overlooks the potential benefits 
of PBD on promoting deployment and innovation of future and emerging technologies 
through the increased trust and confidence of consumers/citizens, see section 10.13.
9.12 PRACTICAL CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING PBD
 
In addition to the criticism of PBD, the practical challenges of implementing PBD and 
embedding the fundamental principles of privacy into the design/architecture of ICT 
and other PITs in reality should also not be ignored. Evidently, ‘translating’ written 
legal norms/principles into design solutions/computer code or bridging the significant 
differences between legal (natural) language and computer/machine language is a chal-
lenge.911  Indeed, the extent to which legal protection can be programmed, engineered 
or automated is open to discussion, and there is currently no single widely accepted 
methodology or approach for translating privacy/data protection laws into technologi-
cal/design solutions. 
First of all, it is difficult to balance the need for specificity with the benefits and 
needs of flexibility (see section 10.5 for further discussion on flexibility vs. specificity). 
There are some benefits from the flexibility and ambiguity often intrinsic in natural 
language, which will be forgone due to the specificity and rigidity of machine/computer 
language. As Grimmelmann argues, “[b]ecause a computer, rather than a person, makes 
a program’s decisions, rules encoded in software are free from ambiguity, discretion, 
and subversion” (2005, p. 1723). The challenges generally concern the flexibility of 
human interpretations and understanding of natural language, and how this also differs 
or conflicts with the rigidity of machine/computer language interpretation (for further 
910 see Koops, Bert-Jaap. Criteria for Normative Technology: An Essay on the Acceptability of ‘Code as Law’ in Light of 
Democratic and Constitutional Values (Tilburg University Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 007/2007, 2007).
911 For further discussion, see Guarda, Paolo., and Nicola Zannone. Towards the development of privacy-aware systems 
(Information and Software Technology, Volume 51, Issue 2, February 2009), pp. 337-350.
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discussion, see, e.g., Grimmelmann, 2005). For instance, lawmakers/legal practitioners 
may interpret or understand the legal norms/privacy principles differently, given the 
lack of overall consensus on what constitutes privacy, and these interpretations may 
also change over time (see section 2.2 for further discussion), causing the ‘translation’ 
to be further complex. And, “[a]s the complexity of particularized rules increases, their 
formal realizability decreases” (Grimmelmann, 2005, p.1733). Technology/design-
based solutions work best for areas/matters where there is a consensus on meanings, 
but is certainly more challenging where there is significant disagreement (Yeung and 
Dixon-Woods, 2010). 
In addition, some of the legal norms/privacy principles may not be specific or de-
tailed enough, which may call into question the ability of programmers/engineers to 
effectively develop/implement PBD solutions for realizing the privacy principles/le-
gal norms in a methodical and consistent way.912 As Grimmelmann explains, when “a 
programmer attempts to envision as precisely as possible the details of the process by 
which she would like that task carried out. This precision is necessary because she must 
express her intention in the text of a computer program — a list of instructions, written 
in one of a number of artificial languages intelligible to a computer. Compared with hu-
man languages, these languages are highly constrained. Each of her instructions carries 
a fixed and precise meaning” (2005, p. 1728). 
Therefore, the PBD requirements will need to be detailed and precise enough, in 
order to equally ensure that developers/manufacturers are able to clearly identify or de-
termine what is specifically required.913 Then, developers/manufacturers/engineers will 
also be better able to develop/implement specific, concrete PBD-based solutions for 
complying with these specific requirements and norms, while still taking into consider-
ation the specific characteristics and privacy threats/risks of different devices, systems 
or technologies concerned. Equally, the principles of privacy and other legal privacy 
norms will also need to be as specific as possible, in order for computer programmers to 
effectively codify the principles/norms through computer code. Nevertheless, as Grim-
melmann also points out, even the most precise rules could still provoke a certain de-
gree of discretion and facts are still vulnerable to preconceptions and other “non-legal 
sensibilities” (Grimmelmann, 2005, p. 1733). 
But, while specificity is required, at the same time, it is clear that PBD legislation 
and the concept of PBD will also need to be technologically neutral, goal-orientated 
912 see Pasic, Aljosa. “Privacy by Design: An industry perspective on the challenges and opportunities of privacy”, avail-
able at: http://www.eurescom.eu/?id=531
913 Ibid.
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and general or flexible enough to ensure that all technologies, devices, systems, etc. and 
domains are covered. Also, the PBD requirements will need to be flexible enough to al-
low and encourage the development of innovative PBD solutions. It will be challenging 
to find the right balance.
Furthermore, the success and utility of the development and implementation of 
the required technical and design solutions is also dependent on the means, abilities, 
capacities and resources of the developers/manufacturers. The implementation of PBD 
equally depends on the availability of the required skills and know-how of program-
mers/engineers.914 Undoubtedly, the development of certified-compliant PBD solutions 
and certified engineers/programmers will be a lengthy and complex process and will 
demand substantial investment and dedicated resources.915
In order to support developers/manufacturers to even begin to overcome these 
challenges, a variety of steps, actions and measures will need to be carried out (see 
section 10.17).
9.13 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The benefits and value of PBD are now increasingly recognized or apparent. But, PBD 
is not a panacea for defending privacy and the concept is certainly not immune to 
criticism. In addition, the significant challenges and difficulties of legislating for PBD, 
implementing/enforcing PBD and monitoring, measuring or assessing its effectiveness 
cannot be overlooked. 
914 Ibid.
915 For further discussion, see Ibid.
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10.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Section 10.2 outlines the challenges lawmakers face in order to keep up with technolog-
ical development. Section 10.3 further explains how PBD, as the critical combination 
of law and technology, is a solution. Section 10.4 clarifies that PBD is not a substitute 
for law. Section 10.5 explains the need to balance flexibility with specificity. Section 
10.6 proposes PBD legislation as a radical solution to counter the radical capabilities of 
the latest PITs. Section 10.7 and Section 10.8 provides an overview of the mechanisms 
and steps for implementing and enforcing the proposed legislative solution. Section 
10.9 proposes a certification-scheme for PBD. Section 10.10 explains the requirements 
for designing for privacy, while Section 10.11 outlines what constitutes adequate PBD. 
Section 10.12 outlines the negative effects of overregulation and overprescribing the 
PBD solutions. Section 10.13 argues how PBD could increase the deployment and 
innovation of technologies. Section 10.14 sums up how PBD can jointly safeguard 
and enhance privacy, liberty and security in the 21st Century. Section 10.15 clarifies 
the continued need for privacy-friendly alternatives, regardless of PBD. Section 10.16 
counters some potential criticism of PBD. Section 10.17 outlines some recommenda-
tions to overcome the practical challenges of PBD. Section 10.18 explains the need to 
engage stakeholders and other relevant actors to further overcome the challenges and 
realize the potential of PBD. Section 10.19 clarifies that PBD, while it may be an ef-
fective solution, is not a panacea. Section 10.20 sums up the final overall conclusions 
of the dissertation.
The overall problems, root causes, objectives, recommendations and countermea-
sures addressed by this dissertation are mapped out and summarized in an A3 Report 
(see: Annex I). Once again, it is important to note that the A3 Report was developed 
only after the overall research findings and conclusions were established. Moreover, the 
overall conclusions, which are elaborated in more detail and brought into focus in the 
subsequent sections, are based on the analysis and conclusions from the case studies.
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An overview of the intrusive capabilities of the specific PITs addressed and the 
corresponding most relevant laws and self-regulations, legal deficiencies, and proposed 
key recommended legal and technological solutions are outlined in a summary table 
(see: Annex II). 
10.2 KEEPING UP WITH THE TECHNOLOGY.
PITs, with ever-greater intrusive capabilities, will likely always evolve faster than privacy/
data protection laws. The speed of lawmaking has essentially been (and will likely con-
tinue to be) slow, while the speed of technological development, innovation and deploy-
ment has been increasingly rapid. A single innovation can lead to multiple innovations, 
which in turn can lead to exponentially more innovations. And, for every new, innovative 
PIT developed/deployed, the law is even further behind the technology. 
Privacy/data protection laws, applicable only to data controllers and users of PITs, 
are probably much less able to withstand the new technological developments. How-
ever, the rapidly changing and advancing nature of technology is not a justification for 
not being able to equip the law with the practical means of standing a better chance of 
adequately defending the right to privacy and other civil liberties. For far too long, the 
difficulty of keeping up with technology has brought some doubt over the ability of 
lawmaking/policymaking to do something concrete to ensure privacy. This skepticism 
has also perhaps partially led to politically delegitimizing or foiling, especially in the 
US, legislative attempts to pass new and comprehensive privacy laws. 
On the other hand, as demonstrated through the case studies, privacy/data protec-
tion laws, directly applicable to the manufacturers/developers of PITs, are better suited 
to more effectively safeguard privacy and liberty against the threats posed by existing 
technologies and future and emerging technologies. But, before the adoption of new 
policies and laws can be achieved, lawmakers and policymakers need to be influenced 
and convinced, through concrete solutions and validated real-life demonstrations, that 
privacy can be engineered into PITs. By providing the actual ability to take concrete 
steps, PBD can offer the necessary preconditions for addressing privacy concerns on a 
political and economic level (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997).   
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10.3 PBD: A CRITICAL COMBINATION OF TECHNOLOGY AND LAW
Privacy is not just a policy, theoretical or legal issue that can be maintained with pure-
ly legal or policy-orientated solutions. Privacy laws are only as good as the controls, 
means or measures for implementing those laws and, therefore, in order to realize the 
promise of the privacy laws, the practical implementation is required. If not effectively 
implemented, law, no matter how strict or comprehensive, is just a ‘paper tiger’. As the 
Article 29 Working Party similarly argues, “[d]ata protection must move from ‘theory to 
practice’. Legal requirements must be translated into real data protection measures”.916 
Or, as Reidenberg (2000) argues, “law is necessary to establish the public policy objec-
tives, but insufficient to assure the implementation of fair information practices”.
The minimization of the threats/risks posed by the highly intrusive capabilities of 
PITs will likely continue to prove farfetched and difficult to realize, without practical 
measures and by relying solely on the behavior of people to comply with the law and to 
appropriately use PITs. After all, no matter how strict and comprehensive privacy laws 
are formulated and how unambiguously the right to privacy is delineated and inter-
preted, there will always be attempts to violate those laws and infringe upon the right to 
privacy. In response, practical measures in the form of technological and design (PBD) 
solutions can bolster the law and better ensure or even almost guarantee its compliance. 
Solutions or fixes based on technology, code and architectures are, therefore, critical.
Essentially, in terms of privacy and other civil liberties, technology can be both a 
threat and a solution. In other words, technology can provide the powerful instruments 
of surveillance and privacy intrusion, but also the effective controls over these activi-
ties. For all four PITs (i.e. case studies) specifically addressed, technical or design solu-
tions/measures played an important, often essential, role in regulating and minimizing 
the threats to privacy and individual liberty. Indeed, the proposed recommendations to 
enhance the legal frameworks in the US and UK are based heavily on technological or 
design solutions for implementing existing privacy principles and laws, and the creation 
of new laws that require these solutions be implemented. 
For body scanners, it is essential that the devices do not generate images that are 
unnecessarily graphic, which can be accomplished using software algorithms, and that 
the devices have restricted storage capabilities. For CCTV microphones, it essential 
that the technology used is not capable of recording conversations out in public, with-
out first being legitimately triggered by certain sounds using artificial intelligence. For 
CCTV loudspeakers, it is essential that their design does not give control room opera-
916 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 173, Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of accountability, 13 July 2010, 
p. 3.
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tors the capability to say whatever they want from afar and out loud. It is also important 
that their use is automatically tracked and logged. And, for HIMs, marketed and sold 
for human implantation, without technological approaches, protecting the privacy of 
RFID or GPS implantees will be incredibly difficult. It is essential that RFID implants 
possess strong encryption and it is important that the privacy principles are incorpo-
rated at the “reader-to-tag protocol level”. It is also important that implantees are able 
to set ‘privacy preferences’, where appropriate, which is only possible through techno-
logical approaches. 
Furthermore, the ubiquitous information society, which HIMs and other RFID ap-
plications could form a key part of, will bring about difficulties to preserve privacy 
without PBD solutions or built-in privacy awareness (see Langheinrich, 2001). PBD 
will especially be imperative in a ubiquitous information society, where it will likely 
prove difficult to determine all the responsible entities and to enforce privacy/data pro-
tection laws in the traditional way. PBD will also be evermore important as ICT be-
comes increasingly pervasive and entrenched within society and everyday life, from 
the deployment of smart electricity meters and smart electricity distribution grids917 to 
e-health, e-commerce and e-government applications.
Privacy is just too important to solely rely on operators of PITs and data control-
lers to uphold the principles of privacy. Technology more than likely can do a better 
job. Operators and data controllers comply with privacy laws and principles irregularly, 
inconsistently, subjectively, manually and with errors. Operators or controllers, whether 
private or public, and service providers are either prone to make mistakes in handling 
personal data or are prone to abuse or misuse the powerful intrusive capabilities of 
PITs, both of which have reportedly occurred countless times, not to mention those 
incidents that have gone unreported. Technology, on the other hand, in theory, can ap-
ply privacy laws and principles constantly, consistently, objectively, mechanically and 
without errors, improving both the rate and quality and effectiveness of privacy compli-
ance. Rather than solely regulating the ways in which the capabilities of technology is 
used, with PBD those capabilities are regulated and minimized in the first place. 
In addition, as the Article 29 Working Party again similarly points out, data control-
lers (i.e. private enterprises and public sector bodies) are often merely users of ICT and 
917 The white paper from the Future of Privacy Forum, SmartPrivacy for Smart Grids: Embedding Privacy into the Design 
of Electricity Conservation (November 2009), argues in favor of implementing PBD for smart grids and warns about the 
threats to privacy posed by smart grids. For example, as the white paper points out, by revealing what appliances and 
devices a household uses, how much and when, the electricity provider can determine personal habits, behaviors and 
lifestyles. There are indeed legitimate privacy concerns surrounding smart grids that should not be simply overlooked, 
but the full privacy implications of smart grids are unknown, and therefore PBD here is a key preventive measure. 
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can hardly be considered in a position to take any relevant security or data/privacy pro-
tection measures by themselves even if they wanted to.918 More appropriately, therefore, 
requirements should fall on the ICT manufacturers/developers.
Besides, in an emerging ubiquitous information society, where ICT deployment 
and use is increasingly pervasive, it will only become even harder to know who are all 
the data controllers and, thus, more difficult to always determine who should be held 
accountable. The enforcement and effectiveness of privacy laws, like in any legal field, 
requires the capacity to allocate responsibility to the appropriate parties for complying 
with the relevant regulations and to hold those accountable who fail to comply. There-
fore, not being able to determine the responsible data controllers in an increasingly 
ubiquitous information society will substantially weaken the function and meaning of 
the privacy laws and principles.  
Shifting the focal point of obligations to the developers/manufacturers of PITs and 
putting less weight on the operators and data controllers is also particularly important 
in public surveillance terms, for example with regards to CCTV microphones and loud-
speakers and RFID/GPS implants, since there seems to be no clear way of determin-
ing the extent to which privacy exists in public, especially when public surveillance 
technologies are so widespread and many argue that there is no privacy out in public. 
Furthermore, PBD will become even more critical as the deployment of ubicomp, AmI 
and the Internet of Things/Internet of Persons becomes a reality causing the extreme 
difficulty of implementing the legal requirements and the privacy principles, such as the 
principles of consent/choice and notice/awareness, within public settings. Essentially, 
exercising choice in an unregulated (or inadequately regulated) ubiquitous information 
society means making a decision between going out in public or staying home or be-
coming a “digital hermit”,919 and this is not really a choice at all.920 
PBD is also especially critical for protecting privacy in a world of increasing cross-
border data flows, for example, as a result of the increase in ‘cloud computing’, global 
databases and online social networks. This problem is especially accentuated, since dif-
ferent legal jurisdictions have different degrees of adequacy in data protection rules. As 
Reidenberg (2000) points out, “the inevitability of conflict between comprehensive legal 
standards, as found in Europe, and ad hoc protections, as seen in the United States, place 
the issue of fair treatment of personal information at the center of global information 
918 see Article 29 Working Party, The Future of Privacy, 1 December 2009, WP 168.
919 see Cave, J., et al. Trends in connectivity technologies and their socio-economic impacts, Final report of the study: 
Policy Options for the Ubiquitous Internet Society, (RAND Europe, July 2009), p. 19.
920 Ibid.
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transfers”. PBD can better ensure the consistent protection of personal data, to a certain 
extent, regardless of geographic location, legal jurisdiction or the adequacy of the legal 
framework, since “mechanisms that automate the implementation of data policies will 
facilitate uniformity across the areas of law and marketplace” (Reidenberg, 2000).
Therefore, in summary, PBD is imperative when the legal questions are left wide 
open, the legal solutions are ambiguous or extremely difficult to enforce/implement or 
when essentially there are no applicable laws or those laws are inadequate. 
Nevertheless, at present the technical emphasis, found both in law and industry 
standards (such as ISO/IETF 27000-series, ISO/IEC 17799:2005(E) and ISO/IEC 
13335-1:2004), is all too often focused on data security. While data security is an im-
portant element in privacy protection, it is just one principle of protecting privacy and 
not the whole picture. As a result, there is a lack of guidance, rules and established 
industry standards on the technical solutions to ensuring privacy overall,921 whether 
concerning one’s body, activities or behavior out in public. 
There are indeed legal provisions that mandate technological solutions, but, for the 
most part, they emphasize only data security. An emphasis on data security is especially 
not sufficient to address the type of threats posed by the latest PITs. As outlined, many of 
the latest PITs pose a threat to privacy beyond the consequences of unauthorized access 
to personal information. The ability to see through clothes or walls, listen and record 
public conversations, conduct wide-area aerial surveillance, perform brain scans or get 
into people’s heads, and constantly track people’s movements are just a few examples 
of privacy threats that data security nor information privacy alone can nowhere near ad-
equately address. Moreover, given the legal requirements for safeguarding privacy and 
the different privacy risks, the law must significantly go beyond legal provisions that 
only mandate technical solutions for data security (Borking, 2010). Therefore, privacy 
by design is what is called for and not just data security by design.  Besides, a mere 
emphasis on data security alone to address privacy threats implies that it is basically 
always legitimate to collect personal data, as long as it is kept secure.
Where applicable, a holistic approach must be taken, whereby all the privacy prin-
ciples are incorporated into the design of the system or device concerned.  As opposed 
to only emphasizing on the security of personal data, the technical solutions should, for 
instance, also control what personal data may be collected or accessed, when and how it 
may be collected and accessed, for how long it may be stored, and provide data subjects 
the means to access their stored personal data. 
921  see Online consultation comments on the European Commission staff paper “Early Challenges to the Internet of 
Things”, Comments submitted by CA, Inc., p. 6, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/li-
brary/index_en.htm
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Without taking into consideration the other principles of privacy, within the design 
and functionality of the relevant system or device, a diminishing realization or viability 
of those principles will eventually result. For example, with regards to the access/par-
ticipation privacy principle, while a data subject’s right to request access to the infor-
mation stored on them by a data controller is provided for within, e.g., Directive 95/46/
EC, the implementation of this right will likely be too difficult, impractical or costly, if 
the relevant system has not been designed or developed in the first place to execute this 
request efficiently and cost-effectively.
The principles of privacy protection must be built into PITs all at once, where ap-
plicable, before their deployment and activation, as opposed to merely bolting them on 
in a piecemeal, incremental approach sometime after the threat arises. As van Blarkom, 
G.W. et al., argue “the postponement of dealing with personal data implications ‘until 
a later phase’, may easily lead to an information system that is contrary to privacy ad-
aptations” (van Blarkom, G.W. et al., 2003, p. 8).  “Certain measures may have been 
necessary very early on when developing the system before much of this system has 
been ‘cast in stone’” (Ibid.). We have already seen the problem with, for example, 
Google Street View’s approach to ensuring privacy by blurring faces and license plates 
after the images were generated, the service was put online, complaints were made 
and the damage had already been done. Unsurprisingly, this approach still more than 
likely leaves tens of thousands of people still potentially identifiable, especially if the 
ability to zoom in extensively exists. The zoom in capability also allows users to look 
into people’s homes. Instead, a method of ensuring all the privacy principles, where ap-
plicable, should have been automatically applied at the moment when the images were 
being generated by the special cameras on Google’s Street View vehicles.922 We have 
also already seen the consequences of developing the Internet without privacy and secu-
rity issues fully taken into consideration at the very beginning. Perhaps, if the Internet 
was designed and developed with privacy/security taken into consideration, some of 
the significant cyber-security challenges we increasingly face today would have been 
minimized. As ICT increasingly becomes evermore pervasive, hopefully the ICT in-
dustry will not repeat the same mistake with the development and deployment of RFID 
applications, neurotechnology applications, software agents, intelligent transportation 
systems and smart electricity distribution grids.
PBD can potentially address almost any threat to privacy at the earliest possible 
stage of a PIT’s lifecycle – i.e. during the research, design and development stages. Ac-
cordingly, the built-in technical solutions should be realized before the PIT is deployed 
922 The lack of privacy considerations when developing Google Street View has also likely brought about the fact that 
Google’s Street View vehicles have also reportedly collected data transmitted on private, non-secure Wi-Fi networks.
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and in use, rather than addressing the corresponding privacy threat with a hodgepodge 
of technological band-aids hastily stuck on after the injuries to privacy could occur 
or have already occurred.  In other words, PBD is not about decorating a cactus tree 
to look like a Christmas tree that will likely prick you anyhow; it is about growing 
that Christmas tree. As argued in the European Disappearing Computer Privacy Design 
Guidelines, which forms a part of the ‘Ambient Agoras’ project coordinated by the Inte-
grated Publication and Information Systems Institute (IPSI) of the German Fraunhofer 
Gesellschaft (FhG), “[p]rivacy enhancement is better obtained by actively constructing 
a system exactly tailored to specific goals than by trying to defend ex-post a poor design 
against misuse or attacks”.923 
However, neither law nor technology alone can ensure privacy is maintained and 
both are not self-sufficient (Reidenberg, 2000). As Reidenberg (2000) further argues, both 
forms of regulation “embody inherent limitations that preclude adequacy for effective 
protection of privacy”. Therefore, a combination or mixture of law and technology is 
required to safeguard privacy. PBD is that critical combination of law and technology.
10.4 NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR LAW
Indeed, while PBD may significantly ease the dependence of privacy/data protection on 
user-level regulations and the compliance thereof, legislative instruments or other legal 
instruments will not simply become obsolete with technological solutions. As Bruce 
Schneier, a renowned security technologist and author, similarly points out, while tech-
nology is key to protecting privacy, in the end, as Schneier emphasizes, privacy boils 
down to the existence of laws and legal protections.924 PBD solutions (nor computer 
code) are not a substitute or replacement for law, but rather are complementary to law. 
Advocates of PBD do not propose to replace lawmakers with computer programmers 
or engineers. Similarly, computer code, when used to enforce privacy/data protection 
laws, does not become law, but remains as the technical means to enforce the laws (see 
Dommering, 2006). For instance, as Schwartz argues, a technical solution like P3P is 
necessary to provide the machine-to-machine protocol to enable a web browser and 
website to negotiate privacy standards, but laws are also necessary to require that those 
923 Lahlou, Saadi. and Jegou, Francois. European Disappearing Computer Privacy Design Guidelines, Version 1, Ambient 
Agoras Report D15.4, Disappearing Computer Initiative (Oct. 2003), p. 4.
924 Schneier, Bruce. “Strong Laws, Smart Tech Can Stop Abusive ‘Data Reuse’” (Wired News, 28 June 2007), available at: 
http://www.schneier.com/essay-175.html
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negotiations take place (2000, p. 759). Besides, PBD should be based on law (see, e.g., 
Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010). 
As far as possible, technological/design solutions for protecting privacy aim to 
minimize the intrusive capabilities of the technology concerned and to realize the fun-
damental principles of privacy. The solutions, however, will often not be able to entirely 
eliminate the privacy-intrusive capabilities of all PITs, and some solutions will be vul-
nerable to hackers. Moreover, since certain PITs will need to be intrusive, e.g. for law 
enforcement purposes/surveillance activities, constitutional and other legal protections 
will, thus, still need to be significantly relied upon. 
Thus, PBD solutions, in the end, are just as important as the laws, rules, regula-
tions, principles and norms that mandate or require these solutions be implemented, 
influence the end result of PBD, provide the legal control mechanisms to intervene 
in the chain of production, specify the liability of not complying, punish those who 
illegally hacked or intentionally circumvented the PBD-based solution, ensure trans-
parency and establish the enforcement and audit mechanisms. There will also certainly 
still be a need to regulate human behavior or the ways in which PITs are deployed and 
used. In addition, the law altogether must be capable of ensuring that the inappropriate 
or unlawful development and use of PITs is not committed with impunity and that there 
are explicit penalties for violations, available remedies for victims and enforcement 
mechanisms in place.
Regulating the design and manufacture of PITs alone, therefore, is not enough. 
Regulations on the deployment and use of body scanners, HIMs and enhanced CCTV 
capabilities are still required. For this reason, throughout the dissertation, an assortment 
of different legal proposals was targeted at both the manufacturers/developers of PITs 
and the operators/users of PITs and/or data controllers. 
Yet, the nature and content of these user-level regulations can still depend on the 
design of the PIT concerned, and vice-versa. For instance, laws that specify when the use 
of body scanners may be reasonable and according to what level of suspicion, in accor-
dance with the Fourth Amendment, are dependent, for instance, on the final design and 
specifications of the body scanners, i.e. their level of intrusive capability in the first place.
Even though HIMs and the system thereof can be designed in a way that aims to 
secure the privacy of the implantee, this does not mean all people should be required to 
have a HIM implanted or that their implantation should be a condition of exercising other 
rights. In addition, HIMs, even with integrated PBD solutions, will still collect location 
information. The law must, therefore, also clarify what are the appropriate circumstances 
surrounding the use of HIMs and the location information generated by them.
Although CCTV microphones can be designed to only detect and record certain 
sounds that we all agree are threatening, this does not mean that the law should not 
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regulate what can be done with those recordings afterwards. While developing CCTV 
loudspeakers in a way that does not permit operators to freely say what they want pre-
vents abuse and reduces the power to disturb and agitate the right to be left alone, the 
law must still specify where the loudspeakers may be deployed and when their use is 
justified and/or proportionate to legitimate aims. 
10.5 FLEXIBILITY VS. SPECIFICITY 
The law, in terms of privacy protection, is often enhanced either with greater specificity 
through additional specific legislation or additional specific provisions/amendments in 
existing laws. Specificity helps to allow the law to be predictable and consistent, remov-
ing ambiguity, and is also necessary for ensuring enforceability. However, both greater 
precision and clarity and sufficient room for flexibility is needed. Flexibility allows for 
the adjustment to new circumstances or the emergence of new technologies, which is 
especially required in a world of constantly advancing PITs. But, where PBD and ex-
isting legislation might not provide adequate safeguards for the most privacy-intrusive 
and disruptive technologies, further specific regulations should also not be overlooked.
Sometimes flexibility in law is effective, while at other times more specificity is 
required. For instance, the legal definition of personal data and the definitions of what 
constitute PITs, location information and tracking devices require flexibility, in order to 
ensure all applicable technologies, devices, etc. are broadly covered now and in the fu-
ture. On the other hand, the definition of location information also requires a certain level 
of specificity, in order to cancel any doubts or close any legal loopholes concerning the 
privacy of location information. Moreover, stipulating where and when location tracking 
is lawful and stipulating which particular sounds and words, for example, may activate 
CCTV microphones to begin recording clearly require a certain degree of specificity. 
Potential PBD legislation, in particular, also requires flexibility, since it is nearly 
impossible to delineate every design and technical requirement and also unhelpful to 
overly prescribe the PBD solutions. The goal indeed, therefore, is for the potential PBD 
legislation to be as broad and comprehensive as possible when mandating the imple-
mentation of PBD solutions. Nevertheless, the PBD solutions will also need to consider 
the specific characteristics and privacy threats/risks of the different devices, systems or 
technologies concerned.  
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10.6 RADICAL CHANGES FOR RADICAL CAPABILITIES  
The dissertation research has shown that although body scanners, HIMs and CCTV 
microphones and CCTV loudspeakers pose a significant threat to privacy and liberty, 
this threat is not insurmountable. New and enforceable regulations can help to ensure 
that the development, deployment and use of the latest PITs are regulated adequately.
While the specific legal and technical solutions recommended for body scanners, 
HIMs and CCTV microphones and CCTV loudspeakers can potentially address the 
unique threats posed by each PIT, it is, nonetheless, not realistically possible and may 
indeed be impossible for lawmaking to always keep up with technological develop-
ments through ex-post lawmaking. It is neither feasible nor ideal to legislate for each 
and every new technology after it has been deployed or has hit the market or to legislate 
for every subject matter or domain in terms of privacy protection on a case-by-case 
basis. This approach will likely continue to result in the adoption of legal solutions that 
are, for the most part, too little too late and inadequate within years, and vulnerable to 
the wording and interpretations of the provisions. It is also neither feasible to rely on 
closing all the relevant legal loopholes or solving all the deficiencies in the law, where 
applicable, with legal amendments or additional sectoral, technology-dependent laws. 
Besides, the legal framework in the US, for instance, is already excessively fragmented. 
Moreover, ex-post lawmaking often takes considerable time and, for certain activities 
and technologies, it may already be too late.925 New and radical technologies (and cor-
responding new and radical capabilities) require new and radical changes to current 
approaches for safeguarding privacy.
Although formulating comprehensive, technology-independent data protection/
privacy legislation, in the traditional sense, is certainly a great start, such legislation 
can neither possibly cover all threats to privacy posed by the latest technologies in exis-
tence, let alone those yet to be developed or imagined. Essentially, the most comprehen-
sive and far-reaching privacy legislation in the world, Directive 95/46/EC, cannot even 
address all the present and future threats to privacy, and for that reason the European 
Commission has proposed a new General Data Protection Regulation to replace Direc-
tive 95/46/EC. Moreover, as Reidenberg (2000) points out, enforceability is another 
limitation on the efficacy of comprehensive legislation, in the traditional sense. While 
Directive 95/46/EC establishes enforcement mechanisms, global data processing poses 
significant challenges to their effectiveness (Reidenberg, 2000).
925 see, e.g., Cave, J., et al. Trends in connectivity technologies and their socio-economic impacts, Final report of the study: 
Policy Options for the Ubiquitous Internet Society, (RAND Europe, July 2009), p. 17.
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The RISEPTIS Advisory Report rightfully advocates for ensuring that the devel-
opment of law is “closely interlinked to technological progress”, however, rather er-
roneously argues in favor of doing so in a reactive manner (2009, p. 31). In order to 
genuinely stay ahead of the game and to overcome the difficulty of legislating and 
keeping up with the development of technology, lawmakers need to be proactive and 
not reactive, looking forward rather than backward, in addressing the implications of 
PITs beyond tomorrow. Instead of reactively interlinking law with technological prog-
ress, in the words of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “we need to synchronize 
our technological progress with our principles”.926 The law must steer the development 
of technology, and not the other way around, through ex-ante lawmaking, in combina-
tion with ex-post laws. As Cave et al. (2009) argue “rapid and potentially disruptive 
technological development and the possibility of profound and irreversible impact upon 
human characteristics and development call for a careful balance of ex ante and ex post 
regulation” (Cave et al., 2009, p. 16). On this basis, legislators can and should ‘future-
proof’ lawmaking pertaining to technology, and should develop ex-ante solutions for 
protecting privacy and ensuring other democratic principles/values that stand a far bet-
ter chance of being adequate in the long-term and are better equipped for withstanding 
the test of time. 
Going forward, a fresh, one-size-fits-all (legal wise) and technologically neutral/
technologically independent legal method is required, as far as possible. The PBD ap-
proach to upholding privacy (and other civil liberties) can be potentially applied to just 
about any PIT and is arguably a feasible solution to the difficulty of keeping up with 
technology. PBD is a more practical substitute to legislating for each and every new 
technology, whether already deployed, in the R&D stages or yet to be imagined, that 
poses a threat to privacy, irrespective of the legal framework. 
Although each technology (i.e. PIT) may require specific, individualized PBD so-
lutions in their own right and, therefore, the PBD solutions cannot be technologically 
neutral, the underlying neutral approach is to require any technology (system, device, 
service, etc.) to be designed in a way that incorporates all the principles of privacy, 
926 see the prepared text of the speech US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered at the Newseum in Washington DC 
on the topic of Internet Freedom (21 January, 2010), available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.
htm
 Similarly, European Commissioner Viviane Redding, formerly of DG Information Society & Media (DG INFSO), 
and now responsible for DG Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, stated, during a DG INFSO staff general 
assembly on 12 February 2010, “although I am not going to be your commissioner anymore, I am going to be still your 
policy maker”. What this means, I think, is that Commissioner Redding believes that ICT research and technological 
development, an area she was previously responsible for, should be aligned with the principles of justice and fundamen-
tal rights, an area she will now be responsible for.
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where applicable, through built-in technical and design safeguards. Thus, PBD should 
be viewed as the core of permanently defending privacy against the threats to privacy 
and liberty posed by PITs, rather than temporary fixes at the periphery. While there may 
be some distinctions on how different actors (governed by different laws and needs) 
may be involved in using the same technology for different purposes, especially in 
light of creating PBD policies/requirements, the PBD approach is applicable regardless 
of the technology, legal framework or activity concerned. Overall, the PBD approach, 
therefore, should be technologically, entity and activity-neutral. 
The law should move away from focusing primarily on data controllers and the us-
ers/operators of PITs, and should instead impose PBD requirements/obligations on the 
manufacturers/developers to constrain the privacy-intrusive capabilities of PITs in the 
first place. Accordingly, new and comprehensive PBD legislation should be adopted, 
mandating that the principles of privacy must be engineered into all PITs (with cer-
tain exceptions) manufactured/developed for private use and/or commercial sale and 
government use in the jurisdiction concerned. On the other hand, once again certain 
technologies/devices, such as surveillance technologies, strictly used by governments/
competent authorities for law enforcement and/or military purposes, for example, may 
still need to be designed in way that more effectively violates privacy, while still com-
plying with the relevant laws and constitutional protections concerning their develop-
ment, deployment and use. Nevertheless, PBD requirements/obligations should overall 
still be applicable for technologies developed for law enforcement purposes.927  
Comprehensive legislation mandating PBD could also potentially refer to ISO 
standards on data security, as Agre recommends (1997, p. 25), which is known as the 
“co-regulation model”, whereby standardization is used to complement regulations. Al-
ternatively, explicit PBD provisions could instead be further incorporated into existing 
(privacy/data protection) legislation for different domains and technologies. Moreover, 
PBD provisions/requirements could also be incorporated into existing legislation on 
927 Importantly, this is consistent with the EC’s Proposal for a Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecu-
tion of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data, COM(2012) 10 
final, Brussels, 25.1.2012. Article 19 requires Member States to ensure that data controllers are complying with obliga-
tions arising from data protection by design and privacy by default.
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defective products and the liability of manufacturers thereof.928 However, adding some 
specific provisions to existing legislation may not be sufficient.
Either way, the legal requirements to implement PBD should be applicable, where 
relevant, to both private and public entities and both manufacturers/developers of hard-
ware and software (i.e. technology providers) and data controllers/service providers.
Accordingly, Article 23 of the official draft EU General Data Protection 
Regulation,929 which proposes data protection by design (i.e. PBD) requirements, should 
further stipulate that these requirements also apply to the manufacturers/developers of 
the products and services in question. The application of Article 23 (paragraphs 1 and 
2) to manufacturers/developers could bring greater legal clarity and purpose to para-
graph 3 of Article 23, which empowers the EC to adopt delegated acts specifying appro-
priate technical measures/mechanisms (i.e. PBD solutions) for implementing PBD for 
products and services.930 As a result, the draft proposal should also include a definition 
for “manufacturers” and “developers”, in order to diminish any legal ambiguity.  
For all practical reasons, however, it will be difficult, for the most part, to apply 
PBD legislation retroactively, i.e. to existing (or already developed and deployed) de-
vices/products/systems. PITs previously developed and deployed before the enactment 
of PBD legislation will certainly continue to exist in society and originations, and will 
thus need to continue to be regulated primarily by user-level and ex-post regulations, 
where applicable. Thus, there will be a period of transition before achieving the new 
reality and specific objectives PBD promises. To address this limitation, the concept of 
“Privacy by ReDesign” was developed to apply PBD to existing systems by ‘rethink-
ing, redesigning and reviving’ these existing systems in a way leading to the end goals 
of PBD.931 Additional shortfalls, constraints and limitations of the PBD approach are 
explained in section 10.19.
928 Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972; Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008; Directive 1999/34/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approxi-
mation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products.
929 see Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11/4 draft.
930 Article 23, para. 3, could potentially have an indirect effect on the manufacturers/ developers, since the specification 
of appropriate measures/mechanisms for implementing PBD for product and services would likely put pressure on the 
manufacturers/developers of those services/products to conform.
931 Seminar of the 33rd International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Privacy by ReDesign 
Workshop, Mexico City, Mexico, November 1, 2011.
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Ideally, both the US and EU, and beyond, should adopt PBD legislation, given the 
global nature of the privacy problems/threats at hand and of the Internet. For instance, 
PBD legislation in the EU would be pressed to regulate any Google services, for ex-
ample, that utilize servers based in the US. Nevertheless, even if only the EU initially 
passes fully-fledged PBD legislation (or incorporates additional PBD requirements into 
the draft General Data Protection Regulation), for regulating PITs (or initially just ICTs 
and digital services) manufactured/developed for use and/or sale and/or marketed in 
the EU, this would also have an impact in the US and on companies that do business 
in the EU. Furthermore, EU PBD legislation could alter US legislation. For example, 
REACH, the EU regulation on the safe usage of chemicals,932 has had an extra-territori-
al impact on US companies and has influenced US regulations, since entering into force 
in June 2007.933 Moreover, the mere existence of PBD legislation in the EU will likely 
also put pressure on the US Government to pass similar legislation.934 In any case, as 
Cannataci points out, EU-compliant ICT/information systems could eventually develop 
into the de facto standard for most devices, infrastructure, systems etc. deployed in the 
US (Cannataci, 2011, p. 185).  But, without common standards, between the US and the 
EU, interoperability issues will further emerge.
As outlined earlier, codes of conduct, voluntary best practice guidance, guidelines, 
privacy policies or other self-regulatory schemes are not absolute alternatives to bind-
ing law. There is ample evidence to indicate that laws should not and cannot be ditched 
in favor of industry self-regulations. For example, we have seen the negative conse-
quences of this within the banking sector. Industry self-regulation has also arguably 
failed to regulate online privacy.  Accordingly, while PBD legislation could form the 
basis of binding corporate rules, PBD requirements cannot and should not be laid down 
in more voluntary codes of conduct or self-regulations, but rather must be mandated 
by binding ‘hard’ laws. Similarly, we should not and cannot rely solely on companies 
(or government bodies) to always voluntarily comply with self-regulations. Technical 
932 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals 
Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regula-
tion (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 
93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC
933 see, e.g., Black, Harvey. Chemical Reaction: The U.S. Response to REACH (Environmental Health Perspectives 116, 
March 2008).
934 For further discussion on possible explanations for the convergences in data protection policies/laws between the US 
and Europe, see Bennett, Colin. Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States 
(Cornell University Press, 1992).
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solutions cost money and avoiding or delaying compliance may be the easy way out. 
Companies and governments do not enjoy a reputation of always volunteering to ab-
sorb these costs or to grasp the additional undertaking in the name of privacy or data 
security. The confidence of consumers and citizens in governments and particularly 
in companies, with regards to privacy and data protection, is already far from ideal.935 
While the trust and confidence of consumers and citizens can also partly be achieved 
through potentially enforceable codes of conduct or self-regulations, hard legislation 
has the highest positive impact due to the stronger possibility of enforcement.936 Al-
though codes of conduct, privacy policies, self-regulations, etc. on PBD can be poten-
tially enforced through supervisory authorities with enforcement powers, there are still 
no guarantees that these industry codes, policies or self-regulations will be adequate or 
compatible with the fundamental principles of privacy.
Besides, PBD should be implemented through ‘hard’ laws developed by political 
representatives, since this would be more consistent with the values of a democratic 
society, which require that “rule-making through technology must be shaped by public 
policy goals and debate” (Reidenberg, 2000). Therefore, if computer code can have the 
same, if not greater, effect in practice, then technological development must be brought 
into democratic processes. 
10.7 IMPLEMENTATION, ENFORCEMENT, MONITORING AND   
 EVALUATION 
In line with the typical phases in policymaking/lawmaking, once PBD legislation and 
policies are put in place and the measurable and feasible objectives/targets are fully 
formulated and established, the legislation must then be gradually implemented and 
enforced accordingly, subsequently monitored and, after a certain period of time, evalu-
ated on its effectiveness. Perhaps, a High Level Working Group (composed of mem-
935 Though consumers’/citizens’ trust in public institutions to handle their personal data appropriately and their level of 
confidence in privacy policies is not perfect, according to a Eurobarometer survey in 2008, more than a majority of EU 
citizens do have this trust and confidence in different types of public institutions. However, considerably less than a 
majority of EU citizens have this trust and confidence in companies, such as credit card companies, travel companies, 
market research companies and mail order companies. see Flash Eurobarometer Series #225, Data Protection in the 
European Union - Citizens’ Perceptions Survey, conducted by the Gallup Organization Hungary upon the request of the 
Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission, Analytical Report, February 2008.
936 see Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Commission Recom-
mendation on the implementation of privacy and data protection principles in applications supported by radio-frequency 
identification “RFID Privacy, Data Protection and Security Recommendation” {C(2009) 3200 final}
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bers from different public authorities and various stakeholder representatives) could 
be established to monitor, oversee and guide the initially complicated implementation/
enforcement of the PBD legislation.
The diagram below outlines the implementation/enforcement steps for PBD leg-
islation, including the main causes and effects, some of the preliminary indicators for 
measuring the enforcement, effectiveness and realization of the policy objectives/tar-
gets, and the links with other relevant key policy instruments/laws in the US and UK 
that serve as its basis. 
The implementation/enforcement mechanisms, consisting of certification bodies, 
privacy audits, conformity declarations, recalls and sanctions, are briefly explained fur-
ther in the following sections.
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After a certain period of time, e.g., 3-5 years, a review process should be externally 
commissioned to evaluate/assess the status of the implementation/enforcement and the 
effectiveness of the PBD legislation, in order to determine if any adjustments and/or 
further policy measures/instruments are needed.
The overall long-term responsibility for monitoring the implementation/enforce-
ment of the PBD legislation should reside with governmental data protection/privacy 
supervisory authorities.
10.8 ACCOUNTABILITY, SANCTIONS AND RECALLS
Manufacturers/developers (i.e. technology providers), in particular, should be held ac-
countable/liable for failing to incorporate adequate and verifiable PBD solutions/tech-
nical measures that do not include both privacy and security functions, where required 
and applicable.937 Likewise, manufacturers/developers should be held accountable/li-
able, under a similar liability structure, for ‘privacy defective’ devices/products and 
services that result from demonstrated negligence/fault and cause significant damages 
to a person as a consequence.938 
The legal accountability of the manufactures/developers can come through the ap-
plication of sanctions and product recalls, where deemed necessary. Sanctions could be 
imposed on the responsible manufacturers/developers and the individuals substantially 
affected may also be entitled to receive compensation.
In addition, where and when privacy/security failures emerge or non-compliance is 
discovered after the fact, whether intentionally or unintentionally, if the effects of the 
failure or non-compliance pose threats or risks to privacy and/or data security deemed 
to be serious, a recall of that product, device, etc. should also be enacted. A company’s 
desire to prevent or avoid the risk of needing to initiate a recall of their products, de-
vices, etc. could provide the necessary incentives to fulfill their obligations.
In the absence of an applicable manufacturer/developer within the concerned legal 
jurisdiction, then the designated official importer could also be potentially held respon-
937 For instance, Senator Patrick Leahy previously introduced S.1490, entitled “the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act 
of 2009”, which aims to hold software companies liable for security flaws or vulnerabilities and mandates that business 
entities implement data privacy and security technical and physical safeguards in the system’s design and imposes civil 
penalties on entities that fail to do so. While the legislation essentially covers ‘information privacy’, as opposed to the 
protection of privacy overall, this proposal has some similarities to the proposed PBD legislation. 
938 A perfect example of a privacy defective device/service includes certain models of the Trendnet home security cameras 
that were discovered to have flawed firmware allowing anyone to access online live feed without requiring a password. 
Part IV 327
sible for publicly declaring that the device, product, etc. complies with the relevant 
PBD requirements/laws.
Nevertheless, the liability of manufacturers/developers should be subject to certain 
exemptions. For starters, manufacturers/developers should not be held liable for the un-
lawful use and/or modification of their products/services, whether by government or other 
private entities. Furthermore, under certain exceptions, if manufacturers/developers can 
prove that the privacy violations are not the direct result of inadequate PBD solutions or 
the lack thereof, they may also be exempted from liability. Finally, the so-called “state of 
the art defense”939 should also exempt manufactures/developers from liability.
10.9 CERTIFIED PRIVACY-FRIENDLY
While privacy protection cannot necessarily be measured or quantified in the normal or 
traditional sense, a privacy compliance audit of the design of the PIT concerned could 
be conducted after the technical and/or architectural design solutions are built-in. The 
audit could serve to re-examine any residue privacy threats/risks and to determine or 
verify the quality and adequacy of the solutions in meeting certain objectives and com-
plying with the principles of privacy and relevant laws.
Serving as a quality assurance mechanism for PBD, a privacy certification scheme 
may be effective in verifying that a PIT has been designed adequately in terms of pri-
vacy protection and incorporates adequate technical solutions. However, the principles 
of privacy provide the goals that need to be met with PBD, but do not actually provide 
the methodologies for achieving these goals, nor for evaluating the adequacy of the end 
result of PBD. The certification scheme will, thus, require its own evaluation criteria 
and measurement techniques for determining the validity and adequacy of the PBD 
solutions for the devices, systems and services concerned. 
The certification scheme for PBD, however, should equally not only be based on a 
voluntary self-certification/self-declaration scheme, such as the ‘Safe Harbor’ scheme 
in the US. Instead, the scheme should be independent, external, mandatory and man-
aged/supervised by either a quasi-governmental or governmental certification body, 
preferably in conjunction with accredited private certification bodies, but not by pri-
939 For example, Article 7 of the EU Directive 1999/34/EC explains the “state of the art defense” exemption. Manufactures 
can be exempted from liability, if they can prove “that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when 
the product was put into circulation was not such as to enable the defect to be discovered.”
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vate entities alone.940 The privacy certification scheme should apply to just about any 
system, device or service capable of posing a threat to the right to privacy, and not just 
ICT devices or IT-based/digital services. The accredited certification bodies should be 
composed of privacy auditors qualified to verify that any device or system has the ap-
propriate built-in safeguards, design/architectural features and technical specifications, 
based on the principles of privacy and compliant with the relevant laws, and that these 
safeguards, features and specifications are not easy to bypass. 
But, as a first step, developers/manufacturers could potentially or initially avoid 
external intervention by signing binding ‘declarations of conformity’. If subsequent-
ly determined to be additionally required, external privacy auditors could conduct an 
evaluation of the devices, systems or services in question. In addition, random checks/
audits could also be carried out.
PITs or any other technology, device or system either presumed or verified to have 
the required/appropriate built-in safeguards, design features and technical specifica-
tions could be certified ‘privacy safe’, ‘privacy-compliant’ or ‘privacy-friendly’ and 
could be marked with a standard privacy logo or seal.941 In Europe, for example, the 
certification scheme EuroPriSe, initiated by the data protection authority of Germany 
and funded by the EC, has already adopted a ‘European Privacy Seal’, which is used 
to reveal to consumers that an IT product or IT-based service has been certified privacy 
safe and complies with the applicable EU data protection rules/principles. Other pri-
vacy seals include the Carnegie Mellon Usable Privacy & Security Lab’s so-called “nu-
trition label for privacy”. As the Article 29 Working Party points out, “[a]s certain seals 
become known for their rigorous testing, data controllers are likely to favour them inso-
far as they would give more compliance ‘comfort’ in addition to offering a competitive 
advantage”.942 An additional way of communicating the degree of privacy-friendliness 
of a device, technology or system could include the use of “privacy scores”, based on 
the results of the PBD certification audit, similar to the “privacy scores” developed by 
PrivacyChoice for websites.943 
Any privacy certification scheme, however, is only complementary to PIAs and 
should not be considered as the same thing. PIAs, for instance, are intended to be con-
ducted before and/or during the development of the technology (or service) concerned, 
940 A similar approach is used in the EU for the certification of organic products.
941 A similar approach is used in the EU for implementing ‘ecodesign’ requirements for energy-using appliances.
942 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 173, Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of accountability, Adopted on 13 
July 2010, p. 17.
943 see http://www.privacyscore.com
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in order to assess the potential threats to privacy posed by that technology.  Moreover, 
as Cannataci points out, PIAs could induce the implementation of technical measures 
to safeguard privacy (2011, p. 182) and, therefore, PIAs can still play an important role.
Privacy certification audits, on the other hand, are conducted, for the most part, 
after the technology has been developed with the relevant laws and privacy principles 
systematically taken into consideration during the research, design and development/
manufacturing phases. Thus, before the development stage, the developers/designers, 
together with privacy experts, will first need to carry out a PIA to carefully identify all 
the foreseeable privacy threats and vulnerabilities of the device, system or service, as 
far as possible, and assess the potential risks involved and set benchmarks for remov-
ing/minimizing these threats/risks.  
Furthermore, while there are established industry standards, implementing mea-
sures and audit mechanisms for ensuring data security, and, on top of that, compre-
hensive guidelines/checklists for conducting general and specific PIAs,944 additional 
standards, methodologies, indicators and mechanisms for auditing the adequacy, per-
formance and quality of PBD still need to be established, which embody all the prin-
ciples of privacy, where applicable, in an integrated approach. ISO has so far at least 
set up a working group to establish a standard for “privacy technologies”.945 The EC 
has also called for the introduction of a “European certification scheme for “privacy-
aware” technologies, products and services”.946 As the European Organisation for Se-
curity (EOS) recommends, the criteria for assessing/evaluating the adequacy of PBD 
solutions should equally be clear and precise.947 
944 see, e.g., the ICO PIA Handbook for guidelines on conducting PIAs, available at: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/docu-
ments/pia_handbook_html_v2/index.html;
 Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications, 12 January 2011, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/documents/infso-2011-00068.pdf
945 see JTC 1/SC 27/WG 5: Identity management and privacy technologies
946 COM(2009) 262 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - An area of 
freedom, security and justice serving the citizen.
947 see Pasic, Aljosa. “Privacy by Design: An industry perspective on the challenges and opportunities of privacy”, avail-
able at: http://www.eurescom.eu/?id=531
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10.10 DESIGNING FOR PRIVACY
It is now increasingly understood that, in order for citizens to enjoy adequate protec-
tion of privacy, in light of the digital age, the rapid advancement of technology and 
the challenges facing existing laws, manufactures/developers need to implement PBD 
solutions. This should not come as a surprise too many. Designing for an outcome is 
essential in just about all things. For example, if you want speed, safety and fuel ef-
ficiency in a car or airplane, then you must apply the principles of aerodynamics and 
safety during the design stages, which are then tried and tested. Moreover, if you want 
productivity and eco-friendliness, then you must design for it. The same concept and 
approach should possibly apply to privacy protection.
However, while the benefits of PBD are imaginable, it should also be noted, once 
again, that there is currently no widely accepted methodology or approach for specifi-
cally translating privacy/data protection laws into technological/design solutions and 
there are no accepted standards for auditing the adequacy and quality of PBD. However, 
valuable research has been conducted to progressively formulate a process. In general, 
a plausible process is to first analyze the legal framework to determine the required 
human behavior and then implement those requirements through technological/design 
solutions (van Blarkom, G.W. et al., 2003). After the PBD solutions are executed or 
physically realized, a privacy audit is subsequently conducted to determine if those 
requirements are fulfilled. Nonetheless, even though a common process is helpful, no 
single fixed methodology or approach is required, or even desirable, as PBD solutions 
should be somewhat tailored to the specific PIT concerned and, once again, should not 
be overprescribed.  
Since the degree of privacy reasonably expected from the use of PITs is relevant 
to the degree of privacy the design of those PITs affords, inadequate and poor quality 
design specifications will only negatively affect or lower our reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Take, for example, a bathroom stall or changing room door. Clearly, existing 
privacy laws cover privacy in a bathroom stall or changing room and prohibit the spying 
or unauthorized observation of a person inside one. But, that prohibition is only as good 
as the design of the bathroom stall’s or changing room’s door. If the doors are below 5 
feet (1.5 m), for example, or made of see through glass, then by simply walking past 
them, a person can easily and unintentionally see over the doors or right through them. 
Hence, any degree of privacy would be non-existent or unreasonably expected in these 
bathroom stalls or changing rooms simply because of the design of the doors, regard-
less whether the law clearly stipulates privacy in a bathroom or changing room.
In addition, any technological solution or architectural design for the sake of pri-
vacy must seek to transcend time, and therefore designers must attempt to anticipate, as 
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much as possible, the threats to privacy and other civil liberties posed by the technol-
ogy (device, system, etc.) in question. As Sollie and Düwell (2009) wisely point out, an 
anticipatory outlook is required when addressing new technologies. The ultimate goal 
is to develop technological solutions and/or architectural designs that are ‘future-proof’ 
for the longest period of time possible to counter-balance the difficulty of ‘future-proof-
ing’ purely legal solutions.
However, while the purpose of PBD is to effectively safeguard privacy and put into 
practice the principles of privacy, it must also not hinder or terminate the desired pur-
pose, effectiveness and utility of the device, product or service concerned, thereby ren-
dering it useless or ineffectual. Again, the right balance needs to be struck. Designing 
for privacy should also take into consideration the effects of over-engineering, which 
can cause a device or system to be more complicated than necessary and decrease its 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
Although the law preferably need not overly prescribe what PBD solutions need 
to be adopted and implemented, what is essential is that those solutions are goal-ori-
entated, adequate and focused on the minimum expected outcomes. As a final point, 
when it comes to designing for privacy, some common sense would also do some good. 
Consider, as an example, the previously explained analogy regarding bathroom stall/
changing room doors. 
10.11 ADEQUATE PRIVACY BY DESIGN
On the surface, the PBD solutions are adequate as long as they uphold all the privacy 
principles, where applicable, implement the relevant regulations, and ensure the mini-
mum expected outcomes. The technical solutions, as much as possible, must also not 
be capable of being bypassed and must be up-to-date and relative/proportionate to the 
privacy threat at hand.
When determining adequacy, we should assess the extent to which the PBD solu-
tions suitably match the threats to privacy, and the consequences thereof, posed by the 
technology concerned, evaluate the probability of the pertinent threats still occurring 
even after the PBD solutions are implemented, and assess the sensitivity of the personal 
data that may be processed. Hence, this is the reason why an assessment of the privacy 
threats/risks posed by the technology concerned (i.e. a PIA) must be conducted before 
and/or during the technological design/development.
In addition, the technical solutions should also take into consideration the imple-
mentation of other civil liberties, where applicable, and not just the right to privacy.
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10.12 OVERREGULATION
Specific technical solutions were recommended for each of the four PITs addressed. 
But, the law should not overly prescribe these solutions, in order to prevent the draw-
backs of overregulation. While the law should firmly mandate that public and private 
entities take the necessary steps to implement technical solutions when designing and 
developing PITs, it would be advisable for lawmakers not to get involved in determin-
ing and mandating exactly which are those solutions, and let the responsible industry 
players and other stakeholders work that out. But, in any case, those solutions must 
strictly be based on the defined privacy principles, norms and legal framework.  
There are not necessarily single fixed solutions that work for all PITs all the time. 
Each PIT might require different solutions, based, once again, on the specific charac-
teristics and privacy threats/risks of the technology concerned, and these solutions will 
also need to evolve as the technology evolves. Moreover, one-size-fits-all PBD solu-
tions could create resistance to innovative and more effective solutions. In this regard, 
privacy law and the approaches to PBD could learn extensively from environmental 
law/regulation and the approaches to ‘green by design’. 
As Hirsch notably argues, ‘command-and-control regulation’ applied in environ-
mental law, is not necessarily suitable for protecting privacy (2006, p. 33). In environ-
mental law, “regulators identify the best currently existing technology for controlling 
pollution in that industry (known as the “reference technology”)” and “either direct all 
facilities in the industry to install the chosen technology (this is known as a “design 
standard”)” or require that the facilities do not exceed the rate of pollution they would 
emit if they had used the reference technology (this is known as a “rate-based stan-
dard”) (Hirsch, 2006, p. 33).
As Hirsch (2006) further points out, with regards to environmental protection, 
“command-and-control also deters innovation in pollution prevention and locks in the 
current state of pollution control technology” (Hirsch, 2006, p.35). The same may hold 
true, as Hirsch (2006) argues, for privacy protection technologies.
While the “rate-based standard” may make somewhat more sense for protecting 
privacy than the “design standard”, since it may permit different methods or means for 
achieving the same goal, the “rate-based standard” still relies, in effect, on the reference 
technologies on which the rate is based, as Hirsch points out, and “almost all [com-
panies] choose the reference technologies so as to avoid any misunderstanding about 
compliance” (Hirsch, 2006, p. 34). As Hirsch further argues, “[b]y requiring firms to 
meet the best existing level of control technology, it gives them no incentive to exceed 
this level” and “the method is too slow for rapidly evolving industries” (2006, p. 35). 
Therefore, as Hirsch (2006) argues, both standards are just different types of command-
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and-control regulation and, as a result, both would likely not hold up against the rapidly 
evolving technological means of privacy intrusion.
The EDPS recommends that PBD could potentially adopt the ‘Best Available Tech-
niques’ (BATs)948 approach.949 However, BATs, which are also based on command-
and-control regulations, can impel companies to adopt technologies that are already 
available (Hirsch, 2006, p. 35), thereby diminishing the outlook for developing more 
innovative technologies that are not yet available.
Moreover, overprescribing the technical/PBD solutions to address the privacy 
threats of PITs could discourage the continuous development or enhancement of new 
solutions that could progressively achieve even better results. Unlike the EC’s draft 
General Data Protection Regulation, which gives the EC authority to mandate spe-
cific technical measures/solutions and standards, the proposed PBD legislation, as the 
US Department of Commerce similarly argues,950 should instead focus on ensuring 
the realization and implementation of the principles of privacy as a policy objective or 
outcome.951 If privacy laws are too prescriptive, as Hirsch also argues, they could stifle 
technological innovation for protecting privacy (2006, p. 36). Similarly, as the US De-
partment of Commerce also points out, “by requiring a particular technology, a regula-
tor may preclude the implementation of better privacy solutions and stifle innovation 
that benefits consumers and the economy”.952 
948 The term BAT (Best Available Technique or Best Available Technology) is another example of a concept that was first 
developed in the context of environmental protection, but its extension into other fields may be appropriate and con-
structive. Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control 
defines BATs as “the most effective and advanced stage in the development of activities and their methods of operation 
which indicate the practical suitability of particular techniques for providing in principle the basis for emission limit 
values designed to prevent and, where that is not practicable, generally to reduce emissions and the impact on the envi-
ronment as a whole” (Art. 2.11). Techniques include the use of technology.
949 see European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on the Communication from the Commission on an Action Plan 
for the Deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in Europe and the accompanying Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport 
Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other transport modes, 22 July 2009, available at: http://
www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2009/09-07-22_Intel-
ligent_Transport_Systems_EN.pdf
950 see US Department of Commerce, Informal Comment on the Draft General Data Protection Regulation and Draft Direc-
tive on Data Protection in Law Enforcement Investigations (16 January, 2012).
951 Ibid.
952 Ibid.
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Likewise, “[e]nhanced privacy protection will depend on the development of new 
technologies” (Hirsch, 2006, p. 36) and the success of PBD is equally dependent on the 
availability of the technology to bring about that success. The PBD method or approach 
to protecting privacy, therefore, benefits from the further development of technology 
and, as Hirsch emphasizes, “[t]his development requires regulatory methods that en-
courage innovation, not those that constrain it” (Ibid., p. 36). Furthermore, as the US 
Department of Commerce points out in response to the EC’s draft General Data Protec-
tion Regulation, “granting the [European] Commission the power to specify technical 
mechanisms may have the significant unintended consequences because technology 
developments outpace government regulation”.953 
Instead, the decisions on the specific technical measures/solutions and standards 
should be left open to a multi-stakeholder process.954 Companies and other entities 
should also be allowed to collectively and/or individually select and develop their own 
method, as long as the selected method is strictly based on the defined fundamental 
privacy principles and applicable laws. In addition, PBD could also potentially benefit 
from open technical standards and open collaboration/open innovation. 
The smart implementation of privacy protection measures will, thus, require smart 
regulations. If written smartly, regulations need not slow or halt the innovation of even 
better technical solutions for the benefit of privacy. Accordingly, PBD, and the privacy 
laws thereof, should adopt the next-generation regulatory approach, as opposed to an 
overly prescriptive command-and-control approach (Hirsch, 2006). Next-generation 
standards, such as Porter’s performance-based standards for promoting innovation in 
environmental protection (see Porter and van der Linde, 1995), which move away from 
both design standards and rate-based standards, are not based on reference technologies 
and may, therefore, potentially help to promote the innovation of PBD solutions for 
protecting privacy by encouraging companies to select/develop their own methods (see 
Hirsch, 2006, pp. 38-40). The Environmental Management Systems (EMS) may also 
offer a helpful model for the protection of privacy and the implementation process of 





10.13 FURTHERING DEPLOYMENT AND INNOVATION
Some might raise the argument that ex-ante regulations on technological development 
could jeopardize or stifle innovation (Cave et al., 2009, p. 17) or hamper technology 
deployment and, therefore, could, in the long-run, also impede economic growth and 
competitiveness (Ibid.). Similarly, some might argue that regulating the development of 
RFID and GPS applications, body scanners, and enhanced CCTV capabilities, among 
other technologies that are also in their initial phase, will present barriers to their de-
ployment and further advancement. The same argument often supports developing the 
technology first and asking questions and adopting guidelines later, and maybe, just 
maybe, if there is no other choice, and as the last resort, adopting relevant regulations 
only after a serious problem or incident arises. 
While the ability to innovate without permission should not be compromised, there 
is a need for re-adjustment. Instead of applying resistance to the inertia of technologi-
cal development, a more ‘guided hand’ approach is needed for steering technological 
development along a path that does not contradict privacy and other civil liberties and 
democratic values. This could move us away from the laissez-faire or “invisible hand” 
approach that has resulted in today’s current situation, particularly in the US, surround-
ing the unrestrained development of PITs, as it has also, to a certain extent, arguably 
resulted in the ongoing banking/financial industry crisis.
On the contrary, the hurdles to the substantial further deployment, innovation and 
mainstream take-up of GPS and RFID applications, including location-based services, 
for example, are partly due to the general perceptions, mistrust and concerns of the 
public, privacy activists and civil society as a result of the grave threats to privacy posed 
by these latest technologies and the disbelief in the adequacy of the legal framework to 
defend against the corresponding privacy threats/risks.
The societal acceptance of the latest technologies is partly interlinked with the pub-
lic’s trust that privacy is respected, and the societal acceptance is often a prerequisite 
for the deployment and use of the latest technologies. The further development, deploy-
ment and use of the latest ICTs is now arguably being held back, to a certain extent, 
due to the opposition of consumer protection organizations, the lack of trust among 
consumers/citizens concerning the privacy/data protection issues and the hesitation of 
manufactures. This hesitation is likely due to these uncertainties and the resulting in-
vestment risks. And, once again, the lack of trust can also potentially lead to missed 
business opportunities and stalled innovation (Williams, 2009, p. 78). 
RFID technology, in particular RFID implants, is a perfect case in point. If technol-
ogies or devices, such as RFID implants, are to succeed in achieving mass market take-
up, the appropriate legal framework and technological architecture is certainly required 
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to earn the critical trust of consumers/citizens. The anxieties of consumers/citizens can 
potentially be overcome with not just public relations, which aim to persuade the public 
of the benefits of adopting certain technologies, but also with an adequate legal frame-
work and the appropriate privacy safeguards. Actions often speak louder than words. 
Moreover, as a result of these perceptions, anxieties and legal deficiencies, manufactur-
ers and service providers are faced with ensuing uncertainties, which could be seriously 
holding back the mass deployment and further innovation of RFID applications.
Lawmakers can alleviate the resistance and backlash to new technologies and facil-
itate their roll out and mass market take-up through the adoption of an appropriate and 
predictable legal framework. Citizens/consumers can be afforded with sufficient safe-
guards and rights, and developers/manufacturers, data controllers or service providers 
with clear rules to follow. Specific and up-to-date regulations and PBD solutions will 
enable companies and governments to earn the long-lasting trust and confidence of con-
sumers/citizens over the use of PITs, thereby facilitating their widespread deployment 
and use, which in turn could further promote the necessary investments in innovation. 
Without specific and up-to-date regulations and safeguards, credit cards, for example, 
would not be able to flourish or function and e-commerce would not be what it is today, 
as consumers would not have had the required trust in these products or services when 
they were first launched.
Specific legal regulations on the design, development and manufacture of PITs 
could also enable the developers to design and manufacture them without concerns or 
uncertainties over the future legality and liability of their investment. Without specific 
regulations, the developers have no definitive standards to follow. In addition, the ab-
sence of specific regulations could further stifle innovation and lead to uncertainties and 
confusion for both industry players and consumers alike.  As the RISEPTIS Advisory 
Board also points out, with regards to e-services, appropriate technical and legal infra-
structures will remove barriers to innovation, as businesses will only invest in e-service 
solutions if the legal obligations are clear (RISEPTIS Report, 2009, p. 14).
Moreover, some PBD solutions or concepts could perhaps be innovative in them-
selves and could lead to further innovation in other related or even unrelated areas. For 
example, the innovative technology behind Brijot’s ‘intelligent detection engines’ or 
L-3’s automatic threat recognition (ATR) capabilities for body scanners, developed to 
better ensure both the privacy and security of air travelers, could also potentially have 
additional applications and/or could open up additional business opportunities. 
Therefore, in addition to protecting privacy, PBD could potentially overall play an 
essential role in establishing a legal environment that facilitates greater investment in 
new technologies and, as a result, further innovation, by sending a clear signal to manu-
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facturers/developers on how to move forward with certainty, backed by the confidence, 
trust and acceptance of consumers/citizens.
10.14 SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Numerous technologies/infrastructures, which have already been deployed (e.g. body 
scanners, UAVs, sensor networks, data centers, CCTV cameras, GPS tracking devices, 
etc.), clearly pose a threat to privacy/liberty.  But, these technologies also offer security 
gains that cannot be ignored, and their deployment may be justified in many respects.
However, protecting privacy and maintaining national/public security is not nec-
essarily a zero-sum game and a choice does not need to be made between protecting 
privacy and maintaining security (Cavoukian, 2009). Just like there are strong argu-
ments in favor of achieving economic growth in an environmentally-friendly manner, 
national/public security can evidently also be maintained in a privacy-friendly manner. 
Similarly, complying with laws, ethical values or norms does not necessarily cancel 
the security utility of technologies. Even the most morally questionable technologies 
can be designed to be ‘value sensitive’, while still maintaining their effectiveness. For 
example, missiles/bombs designed in a ‘value sensitive’ manner, in order to enable 
military leaders to better comply with the Geneva Conventions, certainly does not can-
cel their ability to destroy targets. Bombs/missiles are designed and manufactured to 
kill enemy combatants on the opposing side during a war or to cause immense destruc-
tion to the enemy’s infrastructure (evidently in the name of security). For a long time, 
bombs/missiles were designed and manufactured to kill indiscriminately and were not 
designed to ensure attack precision. That ability to ensure precision was not available. 
Today, bombs/missiles are still developed to kill and cause destruction. But, at least 
now most bombs/missiles dropped or launched by the US, for example, during a mili-
tary operation, are designed to strike a target with precision using GPS guidance, while 
minimizing the destruction of civilian infrastructure and lives. These bombs are com-
monly known as “smart bombs”. This approach has proved to not only better comply 
with international laws of war and with overall human values; it has proved to be more 
beneficial for achieving certain military objectives.
The idea is that we do not always need to think in terms of privacy/liberty vs. securi-
ty. In fact, in many ways, privacy/liberty vs. security is an increasingly false dichotomy, 
and we can achieve both at the same time. Especially, through PBD and certain choices 
of architectures used, the trade-off argument between privacy/liberty and security is 
less and less valid (Cavoukian, 2009). Privacy/liberty does not need to be sacrificed and 
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we can implement certain boundaries, without losing the security benefits or utility of 
PITs. There are clear technological examples demonstrating this to be true.  
As deducted from the case studies, designing and developing body scanners, HIMs 
and CCTV microphones and loudspeakers, along with other PITs, in a privacy-friendly 
manner, in order to better comply with privacy laws and principles, not only does not 
cancel the national/public security benefits these PITs can provide, the proposed PBD 
solutions can potentially help to better realize or amplify those benefits. 
The automatic employment of privacy algorithms/software solutions when body 
scanner images are generated, together with intelligent detection engines or ATR capa-
bilities, can (potentially) help airport screeners/security officers to detect/locate threats 
by highlighting objects and reducing human errors. At the same time, these measures 
better protect the privacy of the human body (passengers) by reducing the unnecessary 
level of graphic detail contained in the images and/or potentially doing away with the 
need for remote human operators to directly view the images. Built-in limitations on 
storing, printing and transmitting the body scanner images can also better ensure the 
privacy principles are implemented. Regulating the design and manufacture of body 
scanners, and thereby limiting their intrusive capability, will arguably lead to their 
greater deployment and employment at airports (and maybe at other areas/locations 
on a case-by-case basis, e.g. train stations or major sports stadiums), which may be 
beneficial for security overall.  
Strong encryption in RFID implants, which prevents ‘cloning’ and the unauthor-
ized access to the information contained on the implants, and protocol-level controls, 
which can ensure that only authorized readers are able to read RFID implants, also 
allows for the security benefits of electronic identification and tracking to be realized, 
where and when appropriate. 
Designing and developing CCTV microphones to pick up only on dangerous 
sounds, such as gun shots, explosions and breaking glass, allows the microphones to 
only focus on the sounds and scenes worthy of being detected and recorded, and de-
serving of the immediate attention of CCTV operators. The potential sound detection 
capability of microphones attached to CCTV cameras can enhance the ability of the 
cameras and CCTV operators to aid in criminal investigations and support public se-
curity, remove the blind spots of CCTV cameras and reduce the number of cameras 
needed to cover a larger area, while at the same time can facilitate a certain level of pri-
vacy out in public and minimize the unnecessary intrusion upon the public interactions 
of citizens. Moreover, this system can more effectively and efficiently employ/deploy 
CCTV control room operators for the sake public security.
Designing and developing CCTV loudspeakers in a way that enables their use to 
be registered and prevents abuse, for instance, also allows the operators to accurately 
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document and analyze where and how the loudspeakers can be more effectively used 
and deployed.  
Therefore, PBD can provide potentially effective means for avoiding the (false) 
dichotomy of privacy vs. security (Cavoukian, 2009)955 and, for that reason; PBD may 
be a pragmatic and integrated approach for safeguarding privacy, liberty and security 
in the 21st Century.
10.15 PRIVACY-FRIENDLY ALTERNATIVES 
Even though body scanners, HIMs and enhanced surveillance capabilities may argu-
ably be the most effective in preserving security in their respective field or domain, and 
the threats to privacy they pose can be minimized, there may be alternative devices or 
means available that are more privacy-friendly (or privacy-compliant), but arguably 
also provide similar benefits. Many of these alternatives were described in the previous 
chapters, and some should be further explored in future studies to definitively deter-
mine their pros and cons in more detail.
In any case, the least privacy-invasive technology overall should be used, in accor-
dance with the principle of proportionality, as long as it is capable of providing similar 
benefits, for example, in terms of security. If the more privacy-friendly alternative is 
not used, the legal and factual reasons for not doing so should be justified accordingly.
10.16 COUNTERING POTENTIAL CRITICISM OF PBD
In response to potential criticism (see section 9.11), PBD does not rely excessively on 
individual “privacy control”. Indeed, PBD is an answer to Schwartz’s (2000) criticism 
of “code as law”, since PBD can serve as the means of automatically realizing the prin-
ciples of privacy. In other words, PBD aims to implement the mandatory and default 
rules/principles of privacy protection primarily in a self-executing manner, i.e. without 
the constant involvement of individual choice or human intervention.  
Moreover, while politics and market dynamics should obviously not be ignored, 
the effectiveness of PBD is not overly contingent on finding the “optimal mix” of the 
different modalities/dimensions of regulating technology development. Indeed, one of 
the main reasons for mandating PBD is to overcome current market failures and, above 
955 see also Ann Cavoukian’s “7 Foundational Principles of Privacy by Design”,  Originally Published: August 2009, Re-
vised: January 2011, available at: http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf
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all, PBD is about the implementation of privacy laws/principles primarily through tech-
nological/design solutions.
The PBD approach is also compatible with the way lawmakers, legal practitioners 
and courts operate in the real world. After all, the concept behind PBD already has a legal 
basis in the US and EU, and the EC’s draft proposal for a General Data Protection Regula-
tion proposes PBD requirements.  While the current (and proposed) privacy/data protec-
tion laws primarily apply to data controllers/processors, and not technology developers/
manufacturers, there is, nevertheless, also a legal basis for this approach. Patient safety, 
automobile safety and consumer and environmental protection laws, for instance, already 
regulate how certain products are designed and developed/manufactured.
Given that PBD will require traditional legal approaches and is not a substitute for 
law or lawmakers, but is rather meant to enforce existing laws, norms and principles 
(see section 10.4); there is also little or no reason to assume it is incompatible with 
democracy. As Schwartz similarly argues, the application of the privacy principles (or 
FIPs) ensures the involvement of our democratic institutions, and since PBD is based 
on the principles of privacy, lawmakers are already involved in the process of shaping 
the technological requirements and solutions (Schwartz, 2000, p. 787). 
Furthermore, Grimmelmann’s warranted analysis that computer code/software is 
also malleable and vulnerable, and is not the same as physical architecture,956 is offset 
by the fact that PBD includes both physical design/architectural solutions and techno-
logical/software solutions. PBD does not aim to equate the two types of solutions.
10.17 OVERCOMING SOME OF THE CHALLENGES
First of all, in order to ensure that the necessary PBD solutions can be developed ap-
propriately, the underlying PBD requirements mandated through PBD legislation will 
need to be clarified precisely and consistently.957
Furthermore, as the European Organisation for Security (EOS) also proposes, re-
search-funding programmes should fund studies that aim to identify and address the 
needs for the development of concrete, specific and viable PBD solutions.958 In line 
with these views, the European Commission (Trust & Security unit) plans to fund, un-
956  Grimmelmann, James. Regulation by Software (Yale Law Journal, Volume 114, 2005), pp. 1719-58.
957 For further discussion, see Pasic, Aljosa. “Privacy by Design: An industry perspective on the challenges and opportuni-
ties of privacy”, available at: http://www.eurescom.eu/?id=531
958 Ibid.
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der the Seventh Framework Programme (the EU’s main research-funding programme), 
projects that aim to facilitate the interplay between various stakeholders and actors, in 
order to preliminarily establish best practices, standards and a roadmap for promoting 
and implementing PBD.959 
Companies, researchers and other stakeholders could also receive public funding to 
develop and validate a variety of PBD solutions, and then identify and exchange best 
practices and lessons learned for implementing PBD solutions, based on established facts/
evidence and pilot demonstrations. This could also help to provide the required inspira-
tion, driving force and knowledge/evidence for developing/adopting PBD legislation and 
for developing a sort of checklist for PBD procedures. Subsequently, public funding could 
also be made available to establish dedicated PBD training programs for computer pro-
grammers/engineers and to communicate the identified best practices and lessons learned.
In addition, a rewarding scheme for the best PBD solutions could stimulate ex-
cellence in PBD and the engagement of highly qualified and creative designers and 
engineers. Adding PBD as a category to the International Design Excellence Awards 
(IDEA), for example, could help to stimulate the required excellence in PBD.
10.18 ENGAGING RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS AND OTHER ACTORS
The success of PBD will also require the engagement, inter-communication and infor-
mation/best practice exchange between a variety of relevant stakeholders and actors, 
from the manufacturers of PITs, and their engineers, programmers and designers, to 
lawmakers, regulators, policymakers, privacy commissioners, privacy officers, lawyers, 
certification bodies, certified PBD trainers, privacy certification auditors, research bod-
ies, data controllers/processors, operators, service providers, law enforcement agen-
cies, privacy law scholars and social scientists. For the most part, engineers and design-
ers will require certified training in PBD, and manufacturers/developers of PITs will 
require privacy law experts to further guide and advise their designers and engineers on 
the steps that are legally required for compliance. 
In order to reflect public concerns and public policy considerations, the involve-
ment/participation of citizens and/or of consumers/users, perhaps mostly through rep-
resentative organizations, in the design of PITs, should also play an important role in 
the adoption of the final product. As Reidenberg argues, “citizen participation is neces-
959 Indeed, at a networking session at the ICT Event 2010 in Brussels, which I attended, European Commission staff from 
the Trust & Security unit expressed their preference or intention to fund a Coordination Action that brings together 
stakeholders for the purpose of facilitating PBD.
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sary so that public values and goals are consistent across the three spheres of law, tech-
nology and market behavior and activities” (Reidenberg, 2000). Moreover, PBD could 
potentially benefit immensely from methods of collaborative design and production 
with interested citizens and/or consumers, where applicable, appropriate and feasible. 
The involvement of citizens and/or consumers could also facilitate the legitimacy and 
trustworthiness of the relevant PITs. 
Civil society and privacy commissioners can also help to advocate for the neces-
sary greater public and private investment and cooperation in the R&D of PBD solu-
tions (Cavoukian, 2009) and help to raise public awareness of the emergence of new 
technologies that pose a threat to privacy and other civil liberties.
If successful, PBD in the end could serve as a bridge between lawmakers, policy-
makers, practitioners, engineers/designers and academics, and thus potentially evolve 
into a policy instrument for overcoming the separation of the variety of relevant stake-
holders and actors, for minimizing the excessive division of their efforts to protect 
privacy and for identifying the concurrences, synergies and overlaps of their endeavors. 
10.19 LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS OF PBD
While PBD may be critical for protecting privacy against the intrusive capabilities of the 
latest technologies, in practice the approach is not a panacea for preventing all problems/
issues related to privacy intrusion. Certainly, legally mandating that technical solutions be 
implemented at the earliest stage of development is no magic bullet, not to mention the 
criticism of PBD (see section 9.11) and the challenges of implementing PBD (see section 
9.12). There is simply no magic bullet for completely guaranteeing privacy, nor any single 
way to completely ensure that governments, companies, data controllers and operators of 
PITs comply with all privacy laws and principles all the time.  
There will certainly still be moments when companies and governments violate 
privacy and design devices or systems that threaten privacy, whether deliberately or 
unintentionally, lawfully or unlawfully. After all, PITs are not the really causality of 
privacy infringement, but rather the means. Human behavior is the cause, and privacy 
invasion is the effect. It is for that reason why PITs must be designed in a way that 
regulates human behavior and minimizes the effects of that behavior. But, PBD will 
certainly not remove the need for doing so.  
No matter how PITs are designed/developed, their widespread deployment and use 
will likely always present concerns over the protection of privacy and liberty. Law does 
not perfectly regulate behavior and neither does technology. The PBD approach cannot 
entirely prevent every privacy violation conducted either accidently or intentionally. Just 
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like designing bombs/missiles to be ‘smart’ may be an effective way of better putting into 
practice the Geneva Conventions on the prohibition of killing civilians indiscriminately 
during a war, it does not mean that mistakes based on poor intelligence, for example, will 
not occur, or that militaries will never intentionally use ‘smart bombs’ to kill civilians.
PBD neither can answer nor solve all the critical legal questions. For example, while 
PBD can aim to develop location-based services and related products for consumer use 
in a privacy-friendly manner, it cannot determine the lawfulness in the US of warrantless 
GPS tracking conducted by law enforcement agencies or determine the privacy protec-
tions afforded to location information generated by HIMs (or mobiles phones and other 
PLDs) or the level of privacy afforded to citizens/consumers out in public. 
Again, as Sollie and Dowell (2009) argue, an anticipatory outlook is required when 
addressing new technologies. However, given that the ability of the designers and en-
gineers to imagine or anticipate all future scenarios is limited (Albrechtslund, 2007, 
p. 72), it is unlikely that all the intended and unintended eventual uses of a particular 
PIT, and the privacy threats thereof, can be foreseen at all times during the design and 
development stage or even after a PIA and privacy audit is conducted. For instance, 
predicting every privacy threat now and in the future will be particularly difficult in 
a ‘ubiquitous information society’. Any uncertainty or unawareness of all the privacy 
threats and implications of the technology in question is equally a predicament for 
PBD, particularly if the technology, device, infrastructure, system or service has never 
been deployed and used yet. Therefore, since the development of new technologies 
regularly occurs under conditions of uncertainty, as Sollie and Düwell (2009) point out, 
then the effectiveness of PBD may equally be uncertain and limited at times. 
In addition, as data controllers/processors and service providers increasingly use 
so many different technologies, devices, tools and systems, determining the specific 
technical problem or defect, identifying the responsible/liable party and establishing 
a link between the problem, defect or malfunction and the privacy damage is less and 
less obvious.960 For example, a RFID system could be composed of different types of 
RFID tags and readers, databases, fixed and mobile computing devices and software.961 
As a result of the (potential) lack of a clear understanding of responsibility/liability, the 
enforcement of PBD requirements will equally face obstacles and constraints.
960 see Trust in the Information Society: Research and Innovation on Security, Privacy and Trustworthiness in the Infor-
mation Society, A Report of the Advisory Board RISEPTIS, 2009, p. 13.  (RISEPTIS was composed of more than 30 
experts and was supported by an EC-financed ‘Coordination Action’ project, THINKTRUST, whose objective was to 
develop a research agenda for Trustworthy ICT).
961 see Cannataci, Joseph A. Recent developments in privacy and healthcare: Different paths for RFID in Europe and North 
America? (International Journal of RF Technologies, Volume 2, 2010/2011), pp. 173–187.
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While PBD can potentially better minimize the impact of the use of PITs by con-
trolling/minimizing the intrusive capability of the technology in the first place, care 
should be taken not to give the impression that technology developed under certain 
legal requirements is no longer susceptible to future ethical dilemmas or future techno-
logical advancements (Albrechtslund, 2007). PBD is susceptible to the inclination that 
PITs, or any technology for that matter, are often never really finished developing. As 
new capabilities are added, further unforeseen privacy implications may result. Though 
the goal is to design technology to be privacy-friendly in a way that transcends time, 
however, PBD must be an ongoing process that requires continuous advancement and 
re-assessment as PITs constantly advance. If PBD is not as dynamic as technological 
advancement, then just like laws, the PBD approach will also fall behind. For this rea-
son, as pointed out earlier, Hirsch argues that EMS may be a helpful model for PBD, 
since EMS often entails continuous improvement practices (Hirsch, 2006, pp. 60-63). 
Even with the methodical implementation of PIAs and PBD, unforeseen threats to pri-
vacy could still be encountered. Some PBD solutions themselves might later on result 
in unexpected privacy implications, as the technical solutions further advance. 
In addition, not all PBD solutions will be effective at present or in the future. Some 
solutions, even those based on the BATs at the time and designed in a way to be ‘future-
proof’ as far as possible, could prove deficient or insufficient later on or end up being 
susceptible to circumvention or even end up failing. As experience has shown, there is 
no absolute guarantee that any system or device is completely free of vulnerabilities or 
privacy risks, just as there is essentially no absolutely impenetrable security system or 
level of software encryption or error-free computer code. Specifically, for instance, as 
Grimmelmann points out, “software is vulnerable to failure in three related ways: It is 
buggy, it is hackable, and it is not robust” (Grimmelmann, 2005, p. 1742). Clearly, if a 
(PBD) software solution is hacked or somehow circumvented, the solution has not acted 
as an effective constraint (Ibid., p. 1731). A number of PETs, for example, developed for 
ensuring privacy and data security on the Internet, have already failed. During the initial 
phase, many of the new PBD solutions developed will likely fail or be circumvented.
While PBD solutions for protecting privacy aim to minimize the intrusive capabili-
ties of the technology concerned, PBD cannot address every privacy threat posed by 
every PIT, since not all privacy threats posed by the latest technologies can be designed 
or engineered away. As a case in point, PBD is understandably not an all-encompass-
ing solution to dealing with the very complex and dynamic privacy issues surrounding 
the greater use and advancement of DNA analysis and neurotechnology. Similarly, as 
Grimmelmann (2005) points out, technology/software cannot implement every rule. 
Consequently, there are certainly some privacy threats outside the scope of PBD solu-
tions, at least for the time being. 
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As outlined earlier (see section 10.4), technical and/or PBD solutions alone cannot 
in practice guarantee privacy, and Lessig’s other dimensions/modalities for regulating 
technology will also play an important role in the success of PBD. For starters, laws 
that mandate these solutions be implemented, specify the liability of not complying, 
provide for audit and enforcement mechanisms, provide legal remedies, provide the 
legal mechanisms to intervene in the chain of production, require the notice and con-
sent of data subjects, and regulate the general deployment and use of PITs are still 
required. Moreover, PBD alone cannot implement all of the relevant legal requirements. 
For instance, administrative processes, such as the requirements of organizational ac-
countability and notification requirements, cannot be implemented through PBD (van 
Blarkom, G.W. et al., 2003, p. 50). 
The market dynamics, which in a free market are normally beyond the control 
of the government, can also limit the success of PBD. The implementation of PBD 
depends, in part, on the willingness of manufacturers to comply. Since PBD solutions 
come at an additional cost, in order for PBD to be employed or implemented at an ac-
ceptable rate, the developers/manufacturers of PITs must also be convinced and fully 
aware of the value and financial justification or business benefits in complying and the 
financial costs, risks and liabilities of meager privacy controls/safeguards. As Borking 
points out, from a business perspective, it makes no sense to invest in a privacy protect-
ing solution if the actual costs of the solution are greater than the value it actually offers 
(Borking, 2010, p. 260). The value will increase as consumers increase their demand 
for privacy-friendly products and services. If consumers persistently continue to de-
mand that their privacy be protected, then so too will the demand for devices, systems 
and services that are designed in a privacy-friendly manner. However, the success of 
PBD will require not only companies to view the protection of privacy as profitable or 
financially justifiable. 
The political determination of lawmakers will also decide the extent to which PBD 
is realized. Reaping the benefits of PBD will equally require constructive political 
choices in addition to technical choices. Therefore, radically changing the way com-
panies and governments design, develop and procure PITs will require, not just new 
technological and legal solutions, but the basis to overcome economic and political 
reservations. Economic reservations can come from the extra costs and burdens of PBD 
and the political reservations will likely come in the form of hesitations in intervening 
further in the production chains of free enterprises in a market-driven, laissez-faire 
economy. Significant investment and resources from both the private and public sector 
will need to be allocated to carry out the necessary R&D and innovation, in order to re-
alize effective PBD solutions, tools and methods to implement and enforce the relevant 
privacy principles and laws thereof. 
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In order to induce politicians to take the necessary steps to pass new comprehen-
sive laws requiring the implementation of PBD in PITs, politicians will need to fur-
ther recognize the protection of privacy as an additional source of political legitimacy 
and recognize that it is indeed possible to engineer privacy into PITs. Moreover, like 
with environmentally-friendly devices, systems and services, the demand for privacy-
friendly devices, systems and services will also need to come from governments, and 
not just consumers. Since governments are significant buyers of PITs, the adoption/
implementation of policies in support of the public procurement and pre-commercial 
procurement of privacy-friendly devices and systems could set a good example and fur-
ther influence the design and development of PITs. Essentially, as long as the business 
case and business model is weak and the political will is absent, PBD will not take off, 
regardless of the legal framework in place.
Finally, the continuation of privacy values and norms and an expectation of privacy 
are required. Apparently, the “Internet Generation” (or the “Millennial Generation”) 
increasingly has less appreciation and expectation for privacy, and today’s teenagers 
could grow up to future adults who do not care a great deal about their privacy. The 
Founder and CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, also suggested that privacy is al-
ready no longer really a social norm and that sharing information instead has become 
the new norm,962 without basing his claim on any empirical evidence or statistics.963 
However, Zuckerberg has a vested interest in making this claim, which was anyhow 
proven, for the most part, erroneous or at least premature, as demonstrated by the up-
roar of Google Mail (Gmail) users just days after the launch of Google Buzz. None-
theless, if Zuckerberg’s claim ends up proving true, the demand for privacy-friendly 
devices and services, as a result, could significantly decline. This could also end up 
diminishing the widespread support and implementation of PBD.  
In sum, the general conclusions and policy recommendations of this dissertation, 
in support of PBD, are indeed limited by the ability of designers and engineers to envi-
962 Gaudin, Sharon. “Facebook CEO Zuckerberg causes stir over privacy” (Computerworld, 11 January 2010), 
available at: http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9143859/Facebook_CEO_Zuckerberg_causes_stir_over_
privacy?taxonomyId=16
963 A recent poll has perhaps contradicted Zuckerberg’s statement. The Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life 
Project found that young adults (ages 18-29) in fact are not indifferent about their online reputation. For example, 71% 
of young adults who are social networking users have changed their account privacy settings in order to limit what they 
share online. The results were based on data from telephone interviews conducted, between August and September 
2009, among a sample of 2,253 young adults in the US. see: Reputation Management and Social Media, Pew Internet 
and American Life Project, May 2010. 
 (But, the survey targeted young adults (ages 18-29) and not teenagers. Moreover, there is still relatively little empirical 
data on society’s overall perceptions of privacy and how, why and when it is most valued.)  
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sion the threats posed by PITs, their ability to design and engineer away the threats to 
privacy, their ability to keep up with the ever growing threats and intrusive capabilities 
of PITs, the ability of the legal framework to ensure implementation and compliance, 
the market dynamics, the consumer demand, the political will of lawmakers, and the 
persistence of key privacy values and norms.
10.20 FINAL CONCLUSIONS
PBD is the critical combination of technology and law that can potentially propel a 
legal framework forward to address not just information privacy and the new threats 
posed by body scanners, RFID/GPS implants and CCTV microphones and loudspeak-
ers, but also the incredible threats to privacy posed by other privacy-intrusive technolo-
gies. Adequate technical and design solutions, based on the well-established principles 
of privacy, can potentially convert the unrestrained, radical privacy-intrusive capabili-
ties of these technologies into prudent, privacy-friendly commercial and security gains.
For far too long, manufacturers/developers of PITs have been generally ignored by 
data protection/privacy legislation and, as a consequence, the laws have often fallen be-
hind new technological developments and have failed to address the privacy-intrusiveness 
of the technologies concerned at the design stage. Instead, new laws should mandate that 
the designers and developers of these technologies implement PBD solutions, where ap-
propriate, and punish those who fail to do so. Accordingly, more burdens will be placed 
on the designers and developers of these technologies, rather than overly relying on the 
goodwill and compliance of the data controllers, service providers and operators/users of 
these technologies.  As a result, the legal framework may be better equipped to stay apace 
with the rapidly changing and advancing technological threats to privacy.
Moreover, for far too long, the protection of privacy in the US and UK has been at the 
mercy of the legal interpretations of courts to fill-in the gaps and/or to address the legal is-
sues or deficiencies of existing data protection/privacy legislation. Instead of excessively 
relying on the sometimes altering and inconsistent legal interpretations of courts, com-
prehensive PBD legislation can bring about the required consistency and permanence.
In conclusion, PBD is arguably the best option there is, at present, to balance the 
(potential) trade-offs between privacy and liberty, on the one hand, and public security, 
convenience and commerce, on the other. While it is not necessarily possible to pre-
vent every conceivable violation of the right to privacy or fully address every threat to 
privacy, it is reasonably evident that practically any device or system is more likely not 
to jeopardize privacy and liberty if it is legally required to be designed and manufac-
tured with the relevant privacy principles built-in than if it is not required so. Although 
348 Overall conclusions & policy recommendations
technology/technical solutions cannot completely guarantee privacy and liberty, it can 
at least provide the circumstances and environment in which privacy and liberty stand 
a much better chance in the modern world. At the same time, technology will certainly 
still present challenges to privacy and civil liberties, albeit these challenges can be bet-
ter managed and addressed through PBD. 
Nonetheless, the dire reality is that the diminishment of privacy or the serious 
threats to privacy posed by the inertia of technological development run rampant is 
probably an issue just too big for PBD or any single legal or technical solution alone. 
But, taking no action is not an option either, as society is faced with increasing threats 
to privacy posed by the evermore advancement and deployment of PITs. The realistic 
objective of PBD is to separate the problem into achievable legal, policy and technical 
options for addressing the threats posed by the latest technologies now and in the fu-
ture. However, with the evermore advancement of privacy-threatening technologies, in 
any case, probably the best we can hope for and strive to achieve for now is at least to 
defend privacy and liberty for the foreseeable part of the 21st Century.
ANNEX I: A3 Report
PROBLEM 
 
Technology, meant to improve the security and wellbe-
ing of citizens, is posing a serious threat to privacy and 
liberty. If privacy and individual liberty are as danger-
ously at stake as easy to infringe upon, then the rapid 
and continuous technological advancement of PITs has 
and will increasingly continue to seriously jeopardize 
civil liberties.
CURRENT CONDITIONS
Privacy laws are not adequate to safeguard privacy 
and liberty against the privacy-intrusive capabilities 
of the latest technologies. 
- Why? The law does not ensure the enforcement of 
the fundamental principles of privacy for the latest 
PITs.
- Why? The legal framework is outdated.
- Why? The law is behind the technology, as techno-
logy is rapidly developing faster than the law.
- Why? Law making is generally a slow process and 
privacy laws are not concerned with having an in-
fluence on the development of technology.
- Why? Law making is primarily reactive or ex-post.
COUNTERMEASURES
 - Amendments and enhancements to the current legal 
framework;
 - Rules and regulations on the development of PITs;
 - Technological / design solutions for protecting privacy.
ACTION PLAN
 - Assess the legal framework against the criteria of ad-
equacy;
 - Identify the crucial deficiencies and dilemmas in the re-
spective legal frameworks where applicable;
 - Determine the necessary new laws, legal definitions, 
safeguards and interpretations, and technological and 
design solutions to minimize the impact on privacy 
brought about by the latest PITs;
 - Develop criteria for evaluating the truthfulness and ad-
equacy of the privacy
 - protection assertions of PITs concerned;
 - Accordingly, adopt and pass new and comprehensive 
legislation on privacy.
DESIRED OUTCOME
A legal and policy framework that effectively bal-
ances privacy and liberty on the one hand and secu-
rity on the other, ensures privacy protection law is 
up to date for many years to come, regardless of the 
technology concerned, and combines binding legal 
solutions with technological solutions, mandating 
that PITs are designed and developed manufactured 
with the principles of privacy taken into consider-
ation proactively or ex-ante.
FOLLOW-UP/IMPLEMENTATION
 - Invest in the R&D of privacy by design solutions 
(Government and private sector);
 - Establish a certification scheme to audit the adequa-
cy of the PBD solutions for PITs, inaccordance with 
the new law (Government);
 - Identify the foreseeable privacy threats and vulner-
abilities of the PITs concerned (as far as possible) 
and assess the potential risks involved (Developers 
of the PITs concerned).























Software algorithms; built-in restrictions on 
the capabilities of body scanners; amendment 
of the definition of a strip search; dedicated su-
pervision/oversight; harden the self-regulations 
of the TSA.
Strip search legally involves the removal of 
clothes; the relevant legal framework is: am-
biguous, fails to uphold the privacy principles, 
unforeseeable, and is over-dependent on alter-
ing, non-legally binding self-regulations.
TSA self-regulations.
Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution; 
Federal Rules of Legal Evidence; E-Govern-
ment Act of 2002; Katz v. United States (1967); 
United v. Epperson (4th Circuit, 1972); United 
States v. Skipwih (5th Circuit 1973); United 
States v. Ramsey (1977); Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
(1982); United States v. Knotts (1983); United 
Stats v. Vega-Barvo (11th Circuit, 1984); Jus-
tice v. City of Peachtree City (11th Circuit, 
2001); Kyllo v. United States (2001); Brent v. 
Ashley (11th Circuit, 2001); Amaechi v. West 
(4th Circuit, 2001).
Enables the conduct of a ‘virtual’ strip search 




Implementation of privacy principles; new defi-
nition of location information; legal recognition 
of ‘public privacy’; criminal penalties for eaves-
dropping on RFID implants; application of the 
Fourth Amendment to location information; 
HIM purpose declarations; the incorporation of 
privacy principles at the reader-to-tag protocol 
level; encryption; a web interface.
No federal law regulating RFID; forced vacci-
nations are potentially lawful; no legal recogni-
tion of the privacy of a person’s movements out 
in public; the Privacy Act of 1974 is not appli-
cable to HIM service providers.
AMA medical code of ethics; VeriChip’s pri-
vacy policy.
FTC Act; Privacy Act of 1974; California SB 
362; North Dakota SB 2415; Wisconsin Statute 
146.25; 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts;
Katz v. United States (1967); United States v. 
Karo (1984); Oliver v. United States (1984); 
Kyllo v. United States (2001).


























Implementation of the privacy principles; new compre-
hensive definition of location information; nationwide 
breach notification; legal recognition of ‘public privacy’; 
reformulation of relevant tort law; criminal penalties 
for unauthorized monitoring or interception of GPS im-
plants; amendments to the ECPA; application of Fourth 
Amendment protections to location information and GPS 
tracking; HIM purpose declarations.
GPS tracking is currently not considered a search and is 
permitted without a warrant; no clarity on the level of 
suspicion required to conduct tracking and/or access lo-
cation information; the Telecom Act offers no protection 
to location information generated by devices other than 
cell phones.
CTIA Best Practices and Guidelines for LBS; GIS Code 
of Ethics.
Telecom Act of 1996; Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure; CALEA; ECPA; Title 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, Sub-
chapter II, Part I, § 222; Title 18 U.S.C. Part II, Chapter 
205, § 3117(b); Title 47 C.F.R. Ch. I, § 20.18; Wireless 
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999; Report 
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
FCC 07-22; Title 47 C.F.R. § 64.2003(k); Katz v. Unit-
ed States (1967); United States v. Karo (1984); Oliver 
v. United States (1984); Kyllo v. United States (2001); 
United States v. Garcia (7th Circuit, 2007); State of Wis-
consin v. Michael A. Sveum (District of Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals, 2009); United States v. Jones (2012).




Limit the activation of the CCTV mi-
crophones to specific sounds using in-
corporated artificial intelligence.
The narrowed legal definition of per-
sonal data; the DPA does not cover 
general sound recorded in public; 
CCTV code of practice is ambiguous 
and not legally binding; legally little 
or no privacy out in public.
CCTV code of practice 2008.
Directive 95/46/EC; Data Protection 
Act 1998; Human Rights Act 1998; 
ECHR; Durant v. Financial Services 
Authority (2003); Private Security In-
dustry Act 2001.
Enables the audio recording of con-
versations out in public.
























Limitations on the use of CCTV loudspeak-
ers to pre-recorded messages; disciplinary 
action for abuse; an oversight committee.
CCTV code of practice fails to define the 
circumstances of the legitimate use of 
CCTV loudspeakers; RIPA is ambiguously 
worded and permits broad abuse.
CCTV code of practice 2008.
Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000; Anti-
Social Behaviour Act 2003.
Gives CCTV control room operators the 
ability to violate an individual’s right to be 
left alone.
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With a focus on the growing development and deployment of the latest technologies 
that threaten privacy, the PhD dissertation argues that the US and UK legal frame-
works, in their present form, are inadequate to defend privacy and other civil liberties 
against the intrusive capabilities of body scanners, CCTV microphones and loudspeak-
ers, human-implantable microchips, and other privacy-intrusive technologies. While 
there are benefits derived from the use of these technologies in terms of public security, 
for instance, these benefits do not necessarily need to come at the expense of privacy 
and liberty overall. The interests of privacy, liberty and security can be balanced and 
safeguarded concurrently. In order to accomplish this worthy objective, new laws must 
further regulate directly and proactively the design and manufacture of these privacy-
intrusive technologies in the first place, rather than only regulate their use or operation. 
Manufacturer-level rules/regulations should, therefore, require the incorporation of the 
fundamental privacy principles through what is known as “Privacy by Design”.

Samenvatting 
Privacy-Invading Technologies: Bescherming van de Privacy, Vrijheid en 
Veiligheid in de 21ste eeuw.
In het licht van de toenemende ontwikkeling en inzet van de nieuwste privacybedrei-
gende technologieën, concludeert dit proefschrift dat de wettelijke kaders in zowel de 
Verenigde Staten als het Verenigd Koninkrijk in hun huidige vorm niet toereikend zijn 
om de privacy en andere burgerlijke vrijheden te beschermen/verdedigen. Het betreft 
technologieën die kunnen binnendringen in de persoonlijke levenssfeer zoals body-
scanners, CCTV microfoons en luidsprekers, in mensen implanteerbare microchips en 
andere technologieën die inbreuk maken op de privacy. Hoewel het gebruik van deze 
technologieën voordelen oplevert in bijvoorbeeld het belang van de openbare veilig-
heid, worden dergelijke voordelen niet vanzelfsprekend ook behaald op het vlak van 
de privacy en algemene vrijheden. De belangen van de privacy en vrijheden aan de 
ene kant en de openbare veiligheid aan de andere kant kunnen evenwel in evenwicht 
worden gebracht en tegelijkertijd worden gewaarborgd. Voor het kunnen behalen van 
de ambitie van zo een evenwicht is nieuwe wetgeving nodig: wetgeving die direct en 
proactief het ontwerp en de ontwikkeling van inbreukmakende technologieën reguleert 
in plaats van zich enkel te richten op het reguleren van de operationele werking en het 
gebruik ervan. Regulering op het niveau van de productie zal daarom ook eisen moeten 
stellen die fundamentele privacyprincipes beschermen door middel van wat bekend 
staat als “Privacy by Design”.
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